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Hrabrin Bachev and Fusao Ito 
 
On March 11, 2011 the strongest ever recorded in Japan earthquake occurred which 
triggered a powerful tsunami and caused a nuclear accident in one of the world’s largest nuclear 
plant stations. The triple disaster has been having immense impacts on people’s life, health and 
property, social infrastructure, economy, policies, natural and institutional environment, etc. in the 
affected regions, Japan, and beyond.  
This book is a first attempt to present a comprehensive assessment of the multiple impacts of 
the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident on the 
Japanese agriculture and food sector. First, it identifies and assesses diverse impacts (radiation, 
displacement, health, physiological, production, economic, technological, organizational, 
environmental, institutional, political, direct, indirect, etc.) of the disasters including all stages 
(inputs supply, farming, storage, wholesaling, transportation, processing, distribution, retailing, 
consumption) and components (natural resources, labor, biological and material assets, intangibles, 
technology, production structure, finance, waste disposal, information, management) of agri-food 
chain, and all  temporal (immediate, short-term, long-term) and spacial (local, regional, national, 
trans-national) scales. Next, it summarizes responses of individuals, households, farms, businesses, 
communities, consumers, stakeholders, and authorities as well as assesses the progress and 
challenges in the post-disaster recovery and reconstruction. Finally, it withdraws lessons from the 
Japanese experiences and suggests recommendations for effective risk management in Japan and 
around the globe.  
The book is a result of long-term research cooperation between two leading experts in the 
area – Professor Fusao Ito, Tohoku University, Sendai and Professor Hrabrin Bachev, Institute of 
Agricultural Economics, Sofia. The study is based on a wide range of information from various 
organizations (governmental, academic, farmers, industry, international, media) as well as original 
experts assessments and in-deep interviews with leading experts, stakeholders, and affected agents. 
Findings are presented in a popular way in order to reach a larger audience of researchers, 
educators, students, experts, farmers, businessmen, administrators, policy makers, professionals, 
non-governmental and international organizations, consumers, victims, and public at large. 
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Preface 
 
On March 11, 2011 the strongest ever recorded in Japan earthquake 
occurred (known as the Great East Japan Earthquake) which triggered a 
powerful tsunami and caused a nuclear accident in one of the world’s largest 
nuclear plant stations (Fukushima Daichi). That was the “costliest” disaster in 
human history and the first one that included an earthquake, a tsunami, and a 
nuclear power plant accident.  
The triple disaster has been having immense impacts on people’s life, 
health and property, social infrastructure, economy, policies, natural and 
institutional environment, etc. in the affected regions, Japan, and beyond. 
Almost four years after the disasters the lives of many are still to be rebuilt, 
and socio-economic and environmental implications of the disasters fully 
understood.   
There has been a huge public, media and experts’ interest, and a 
growing number of publications on the (effects, responses to, challenges 
associated with) 2011 disasters, including badly affected agriculture and food 
sector. Most information and publications are in Japanese, which make it 
difficult for foreigners to get a full insight on the scale and diverse implications 
of the disasters. Besides, there are few comprehensive studies on the overall 
impacts of the disasters on agri-food chains.  
Our motivation to write this book was to fill that gap and assess multiple 
impacts of the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster on 
Japanese agriculture and food sector. We have included all type of impacts 
(radiation, displacement, health, physiological, production, economic, 
technological, organizational, environmental, institutional, political, direct, 
indirect), all stages (inputs supply, farming, storage, wholesaling,  
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transportation, processing, distribution, retailing, consumption) and 
components (natural resources, labor, biological assets, material assets, 
intangibles, technology, production structure, finance, waste disposal, 
information, management) of agri-food chain, and all temporal (immediate, 
short-term, long-term) and spacial (local, regional, national, trans-national) 
scales. 
We have used a huge amount of data from various organizations 
(governmental, academic, farmers, industry, non-governmental, international, 
media) and original experts’ assessments and in-deep interviews with leading 
experts, stakeholders, and affected agents. Our goal is to present a wide 
range of information, stakeholders’ positions, and experts’ assessments, and 
summarize responses of different agents, and assess the progress and 
challenges in post-disaster reconstruction, and withdraw lessons for effective 
risk management in Japan and around the globe. Our findings are presented in 
an easily understandable way in order to reach a large audience of 
researchers, educators, students, experts, farmers, businessmen, 
administrators, policy makers, professionals, non-governmental and 
international organizations, consumers, victims, and public at large. 
This book is a result of long-term research cooperation between us, 
which started in 2012. It presents the current findings of a “study in progress” 
giving international readers a “better” picture about the agri-food chain 
implications of the March 2011 disasters. We are aware that the final 
assessments are difficult and require multidisciplinary, large team and long-
term efforts due to the scales of the disasters, the numbers of affected agents, 
the effects’ multiplicities, spillovers, and a long time horizon, the nuclear crisis 
constant evolution, the post disaster reconstruction challenges, the lack of “full” 
information and models of analysis, etc.  
We would like to express our gratitude to the Japan Foundation for 
funding this project and cooperation, and Tohoku University for hosting this  
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research. We also want to thank all individuals and organizations providing 
valuable information and expertise as well as all participants in the expert 
assessments and interviews. We are enormously thankful to LAP LAMBERT 
Academic Publishing for giving us the extraordinary opportunity to present our 
work to the larger world audience. 
 
 
                                                         Hrabrin Bachev and Fusao Ito 
                                                         Sendai, January 15, 2015 
 
 
 
             Fusao Ito and Hrabrin Bachev, Fukushima, May 2013 
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Introduction 
 
On March 11, 2011 the strongest recorded in Japan earthquake off the 
Pacific coast of North-east of the country occurred (also known as the Great 
East Japan Earthquake, 2011 Tohoku earthquake, and the 3.11 Earthquake) 
which triggered a powerful tsunami and caused a nuclear accident in the 
Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Plant Station. It was the first disaster that included 
an earthquake, a tsunami, and a nuclear power plant accident.  
The triple 2011 disaster has had immense impacts on people life, health 
and property, social infrastructure and economy, natural and institutional 
environment, etc. in North-eastern Japan and beyond [Abe, 2014; Al-Badri 
and Berends, 2013; Biodiversity Center of Japan, 2013; Britannica, 2014; 
Buesseler, 2014; FNAIC, 2013; Fujita et al., 2012; IAEA, 2011; IBRD, 2012; 
Kontar et al., 2014; NIRA, 2013; Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014; Suppasri and 
Mas, 2013; TEPCO, 2012; UNEP, 2012; Vervaeck and Daniell, 2012; Umeda, 
2013; WHO, 2013; WWF, 2013].  
There have been numerous publications on diverse impacts of the 2011 
disasters including on badly affected Japanese agriculture and food sector 
[Bachev and Ito, 2013; JA-ZENCHU, 2011; Johnson, 2011; Hamada and 
Ogino, 2012; MAFF, 2012; Koyama, 2013; Sekizawa, 2013; Pushpalal et al., 
2013; Liou et al., 2012; Miyashita 2014; Murayama, 2012; MHLW, 2013; 
Nakanishi and Tanoi, 2013; Oka, 2012; Ujiie, 2012; Yasunaria et al., 2011; 
Watanabe A., 2011; Watanabe N., 2013].  
Most of the assessment focuses on the individual disaster (earthquake, 
tsunami, nuclear accident) and/or aspects of the impact (farming structures, 
material and economic damages, markets, health, displacement, 
environment, etc.) while there are few studies on the overall impacts of the 
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three disasters. What is more, due to the scale of the disasters and the 
number of affected agents, the effects’ multiplicities, spillovers, and long time 
horizon, the constant evolution of the nuclear crisis, the lack of “full” 
information and models of analysis, etc. the overall impacts of the 2011 
disasters on Japanese agri-food chains is far from being completely 
evaluated. Furthermore, most of the domestic information and publications 
have been in Japanese, which make it difficult for international public to get a 
full insight on the scales and diverse implications of disasters.  
The goal of this research is to study out the socio-economic impacts of 
the Great East Japan Earthquake and the Fukushima nuclear disaster on the 
Japanese agriculture and food sector. 
The individuals and households, farms and businesses, communities, 
material, biological and intellectual properties, institutional and natural 
environment, etc. all they have been affected by one, two or three disasters 
(earthquake, tsunami, nuclear accident) (Figure 1).  
First, we identify and assess diverse impacts from the March 2011 
disasters on the Japanese agriculture and food chains. The analysis 
embraces: 
- Individual stages of the agri-food chain - inputs supply, farming, 
storage, wholesaling, transportation, processing, distribution, retailing, and 
consumption; 
- Individual components of the agri-food chain - natural resources, 
labor, biological assets, material assets, technology, production structure, 
finance, waste disposal, information, and management; 
- Different spacial scales – local, regional, national, trans-national, and 
global. 
Multiple effects from the disasters are identified, described and 
“assessed” including: 
- Direct and indirect effects;  
- Immediate, short-term, and long-term effects; 
  
9 
Figure 1. Framework for analyzing impacts of March 2011 triple 
disasters on Japanese agriculture and food chains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
- Radiation, displacement, health, physiological, production, 
economic, technological, organizational, environmental, academic, 
institutional, and political effects; 
- Expected, real, likely, perceived, and modeled effects. 
Next, we summarize responses of individuals, households, farms, 
businesses, communities, consumers, stakeholders, and authorities as well 
as assess the progress and challenges in the post-disaster recovery and 
reconstruction. 
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Finally, we withdraw lessons from the Japanese experiences and 
suggest recommendations for improving public policies, and individual, 
business and collective actions for effective risk management in Japan and 
around the globe. 
The specification and assessment of individual effects has been 
associated with great difficulties because of their multiplicity, 
interdependency, synergy and multidirectional character, surround big 
uncertainty, shortage and controversy of data, large temporal and special 
scales, multiple agents with different perception, time horizon and interests 
involved, week methods of assessment and integration, etc. Therefore, we 
extended the uni-disciplinary and uni-sectoral analysis with multi and 
interdisciplinary approach and multisectoral study in order to better 
understand the overall impacts of the disaster on agri-food chain and its 
components. 
A wide range of official governmental, farmers, industry and 
international organizations, and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) 
data as well as information from publications in media, research and experts 
reports, etc. have been extensively used. In addition, we have carried out two 
expert assessments and numerous in-deep interviews with leading experts in 
the areas, and representatives of the prefectural governments, farmers, food 
industries and non-governmental organizations, and affected farmers, 
business and consumers.   
This book contains three parts and a conclusion. Initially, a short 
description of the three events is presented and the overall impacts on 
population, economy and environmental assessed; next the impacts on agri-
food organizations, products, markets and regulations are evaluated; after 
that the impacts on agri-food production, distribution and consumption are 
estimated; finally, a conclusion is made with major findings, lessons learned, 
and recommendations. 
  
11 
Unless otherwise stated, the official names of organizations, agencies, 
local and regional administrative divisions (Map 1), etc. are used throughout 
the book. 
Map 1. Regions and prefectures of Japan 
 
Source: Wikipedia Commons 
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Part 1. Overall impacts of March 2011 
triple disaster 
 
Chapter 1. Description of events 
 
The Great East Japan Earthquake 
 
On March 11, 2011 at 14:46 Japan Standard Time1 a mega thrust 
undersea earthquake occurred off the Pacific coast of Japan widely known as 
the Great East Japan Earthquake [Japan Meteorological Agency, 2014]. The 
earthquake hypocenter was at a depth of 24 km and epicenter 130 km (38° 
6.2′ N, 142° 51.6′ E) East of the Oshika Peninsula of Tōhoku region, Honshu 
island (Map 2).  
The earthquake was with a magnitude of 9.0 Megawatt (Mw) [Japan 
Meteorological Agency, 2011]. Its seismic intensity was 7 in the Northern part 
of Miyagi prefecture (Kurihara city), 6+ in the Southern and Central part of 
Miyagi prefecture, Nakadoti and Hamadori of Fukushima prefecture, the 
Northern and Southern part of Ibaraki prefecture, the Northern and Southern 
part of Tochigi prefecture, 6- in the Sothern part of coastal area, the Northern 
part of inland area and the Southern part of inland area of Iwate prefecture, 
Aizu region of Fukushima prefecture, the Southern part of Gunma prefecture, 
the Southern part of Saitama prefecture, and the North-west part of Chiba 
prefecture, and a lower intensity in other areas of the country (Map 2 and 
Map 3).  
 
 
                                                          
1
 05:46 Universal Time Coordinated 
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Map 2. Epicenter and seismic intensity  Map 3. Areas affected by March 11, 2011 
of March 11, 2011 earthquake   quake 
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency         Source: U.S. Geological Survey  
 
The Great East Japan Earthquake was the most powerful earthquake 
ever recorded in or around Japan, and the forth most powerful earthquake in 
the world since 1900 [Japan Meteorological Agency, 2013].  
The main earthquake, lasting approximately six minutes, was preceded 
by a number of large foreshocks first major of them being on 9 March (with 
7.2 Mw). Almost 1000 aftershocks of magnitude 5.0 Mw or greater occurred 
since the initial quake by the end of 2013 [Japan Meteorological Agency, 
2014]. 
According to some estimates The Great East Japan Earthquake moved 
Honshu island 2.4 m east, dropped vertically a 400 km stretch of the Pacific 
Ocean coastline by 0.6 m, and shifted the Earth axis between 10 cm and 25 
cm [Chang, 2011; Deutsche Welle, March 14, 2011]. The greatest confirmed 
land subsidence was in Oshika Peninsula, Miyagi (1.2 m), Rikuzentakata, 
Iwate (0.84 m), Ishinomaki, Miyagi (0.78 m), Kesennuma, Miyagi (0.74 m), 
Ōfunato, Iwate (0.73 m), Minamisanriku, Miyagi (0.69 m), Kamaishi, Iwate 
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(0.66 m) etc. [Geospatial Information Authority, 2011]. Experts say that the 
land subsidence is permanent which makes such areas more susceptible to 
flooding during high tides. 
 
Subsequent tsunami 
 
The Great East Japan Earthquake triggered powerful tsunamis that 
spread over the wide area from Hokkaido to Okinawa2 (Map 4). According to 
estimates an extensive coastal area surpassing 400 km was hit by tsunami 
higher than 10 m that submerged plane areas more than 5 km inland [Mori et 
al. 2011].  
 
Map 4. Great East Japan Earthquake observed tsunami heights in Japan       
   
Source: Japan Meteorological Agency  
 
The exact figures for heights of tsunami waves are not known. Official 
data for the maximum heights of tsunami are: more than 9.3 m in Souma, 
                                                          
2
 Simulations available on http://walrus.wr.usgs.gov/tsunami/sendai11/ 
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Fukushima prefecture (March 11, 15:51), more than 8.5 m in Miyako, Iwate 
prefecture (March 11, 15:26), more than 8 m in Oofunato, Iwate prefecture 
(March 11, 15:18), and more than 7.6 m in Ishinomaki, Miyagi prefecture 
(March 11, 15:25) [Japan Meteorological Agency, 2014]. Some reports 
indicate that tsunami waves reached heights of up to 40 meters at Omoe 
peninsula, Miyako city, Iwate prefecture, and travelled up to 10 km inland in 
Sendai area [NHK, August 13, 2011]. This height is also deemed the record 
in Japan historically [Yoshida, 2012]. The earthquake caused a vertical drop 
in the coastline 0.6 m, which allowed the tsunami to travel farther and faster 
onto the land. 
The tsunami raced outward from the earthquake epicenter at speeds 
that approached about 800 km per hour [Britannica, 2014]. Experts suggest 
that it would have taken 10 to 30 minutes to reach the areas first affected, 
and then areas further North and South based on the geography of the 
coastline [Deutsche Welle, March 11, 2011]. The timing of the earliest 
recorded tsunami maximum readings ranged from 15:12 to 15:21 or between 
26 and 35 minutes after the earthquake had struck [Japan Meteorological 
Agency, 2011]. Tsunami have traveled across the Pacific Ocean to Chile and 
highly likely returned to the Japanese coast about two days later with 30-60 
centimeters height [The Japan News, May 2, 2014].  
The most severe effects of the tsunami were felt along a 670-km long 
stretch of coastline from Erimo, Hokkaido, in the north to Ōarai, Ibaraki, in the 
South, with most of the destruction occurring in the hour following the 
earthquake [Biggs and Sheldrick, 2011]. The most severely affected areas 
were areas Kuji, Ōfunato, Rikuzentakata Kamaishi, Miyako, Ōtsuchi, and 
Yamada in Iwate prefecture, Namie, Sōma and Minamisōma in Fukushima 
prefecture, and Shichigahama, Higashimatsushima, Onagawa, Natori, 
Ishinomaki, and Kesennuma in Miyagi Prefecture3. 
                                                          
3
 detail maps of areas hit by the tsunami are available at: http://danso.env.nagoya-
u.ac.jp/20110311/map/index_e.html 
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The tsunami inundated a total area of approximately 561 km2 or 4.53% 
of the total territories of the six Northeastern prefectures of Honshu island 
(Geospatial Information Authority, 2011). The most affected was Miyagi 
prefecture where 16.3% of the territory was flooded by seawaters. The worst 
affected by flooding were Wakayabashi and Migagino words of Sendai 
(60.4% and 4.5% of the total areas inundated), Watari-cho (47.9%), Iwanuma 
(43.9%), Shishigahama town (38.5%), Yamomoto-cho (37.5%), 
Higashimatsushima (36.3%) and other areas (Map 5).  
 
Map 5. Tsunami flooded areas of Sendai    Photo 1. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant                 
 
Source: U.S. Geological Survey            Source: Tokyo Electric Power Company  
 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident 
 
The earthquake and the tsunami caused a nuclear accident in one of 
the world’s biggest nuclear power stations - the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant, Okuma and Futaba, Fukushima prefecture (Photo 1). The 
tsunami arrived at the plant station around 50 minutes after the initial 
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earthquake. The 14 meter high tsunami4 overwhelmed the plant's seawalls 
and damaged cooling systems and control rooms (Figure 2). Three out of the 
six reactors (units 1, 3 and 4) suffered large explosions from March 12 to 
March 15, 2011 [Tokyo Electric Power Company, 2011]. Level 7 meltdowns 
occurred5 leading to releases of huge radioactivity into the environment 
[Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, April 12, 2011]. 
 
Figure 2. Tsunami height at Fukushima nuclear plant 
 
A - plant building; B - peak tsunami height; C – site ground level; D - average sea level; E - 
sea wall  
Source: Wikipedia 
 
Diverse radioactive materials were released from the containment 
vessels of the power plant as a result of deliberate venting to reduce gas 
pressure, deliberate discharge of coolant water into the sea, and uncontrolled 
events. The official data for the radionuclides released into the atmosphere 
from Fukushima accident are presented in Table 1. 
 
                                                          
4
 Nuclear Regulation Authority has concluded that the tsunami triggered the meltdown 
[NHK World, July 18, 2014]. It rejected the conclusion of the Diet commission (July 2012) 
that the earthquake caused the reactor to lose power-damaging pipes leading to the 
meltdown before tsunami hit the plant. 
5
 International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) runs from 0 (indicating abnormal situation with 
no safety consequences) to 7 (indicating accident causing widespread contamination with 
serious health and environmental effects). Prior to Fukushima, the Chernobyl disaster was 
the only level 7 event. 
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Table 1. Radionuclides released from Fukushima nuclear power plant 
(Bq)6 
Nuclide Half life Amount Nuclide Half life Amount 
Xe-133 5.2 days 1.1×1019 Pu-238 87.7 years 1.9×1010 
Cs-134 2.1 years 1.8×1016 Pu-239 24065 years 3.2×1009 
Cs-137 30.0 years 1.5×1016 Pu-240 6537 years 3.2×1009 
Sr-89 50.5 days 2.0×1015 Pu-241 14.4 years 1.2×1012 
Sr-90 29.1 years 1.4×1014 Y-91 58.5 days 3.4×1012 
Ba-140 12.7 days 3.2×1015 Pr-143 13.6 days 4.1×1012 
Te-127m 109.0 days 1.1×1015 Nd-147 11.0 days 1.6×1012 
Te-129m 33.6 days 3.3×1015 Cm-242 162.8 days 1.0×1011 
Te-131m 30.0 hours 5.0×1015 I-131 8.0 days 1.6×1017 
Te-132 78.2 hours 8.8×1016 I-132 2.3 hours 1.3×1013 
Ru-103 39.3 days 7.5×1009 I-133 20.8 hours 4.2×1016 
Ru-106 368.2 days 2.1×1009 I-135 6.6 hours 2.3×1015 
Zr-95 64.0 days 1.7×1013 Sb-127 3.9 days 6.4×1015 
Ce-141 32.5 days 1.8×1013 Sb-129 4.3 hours 1.4×1014 
Ce-144 284.3 days 1.1×1013 Mo-99 66.0 hours 6.7×1009 
Np-239 2.4 days 7.6×1013    
Source: Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, 2011 
 
Radioactive elements were released by the nuclear plant into: the 
atmosphere in the form of radioactive gases or radioactive particles 
(aerosols) dispersed into the air, a portion of which fell on the ground soil and 
formed residual radioactive deposits; the marine environment, directly in the 
form of liquid releases into the sea and indirectly due to fallout on the sea's 
surface from radioactive aerosols dispersed over the ocean.  
There have been diverse estimates about the total amount of 
radioactive elements released into environment as a result of the nuclear 
                                                          
6
 Becquerel (Bq) is a unit for measuring substance's radioactivity equal to number of 
nuclear decays per second. Sievert (Sv) is a unit to quantify biological effects of radiation. 
Bq is converted into Sv through formula that factors in elements including the type of 
nucleus and type of radiation exposure. 
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accident. Table 2 and Table 3 summarize the assessments of Tokyo Electric 
Power Company7, related government agencies of Japan (Nuclear Safety 
Commission, Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency, and the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear 
Safety for the major radioactive materials released into the air and the sea 
during the period March-September, 2011 (Table 2 and Table 3). 
 
Table 2. Amounts of radioactive materials released into atmosphere for 
March 12-31, 2011 as result of Fukushima nuclear plant accident (PBq) 
Organizations and dates Rare Gas I-131 Cs-134 Cs-137 INES* 
Tokyo Electric Power Company 
(May 24, 2012) 
500 500 10 10 900 
Nuclear Safety Commission 
(August  22, 2011) 
- 130 - 11 570 
Nuclear and Industrial Safety 
Agency (February 16, 2012) 
- 150 - 8.2 480 
Institute for Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear Safety 
(February 28, 2012) 
 
2000 
 
200 
 
30 
 
- 
Reference: Chernobyl accident 6500 1800 - 85 5200 
* value obtained by converting amount of radioactivity into iodine equivalent  
Source: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Institute for Radiological Protection and 
Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Safety Commission, Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
 
According to the May 2012 nuclear power plant’s estimates the 
cumulative radiation releases amounts 538.1 petabecquerel (PBq) of iodine-
131, caesium-134 and caesium-137, out of which 520 PBq was released into 
the atmosphere between March 12–31, 2011 and 18.1 PBq into the ocean 
from March 26 to September 30, 2011 [Tokyo Electric Power Company, 
2012]. A total of 511 PBq of iodine-131 was released into both the 
                                                          
7
 the operator of the Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
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atmosphere and the ocean, 13.5 PBq of caesium-134 and 13.6 PBq of 
caesium-137. Releases of other radioactive nuclides into air, groundwater 
and ocean such as strontium, plutonium-238, 239, 240, and 2418, and 
neptunium-2399 were also reported. At least 900 PBq had been released into 
the atmosphere in March 2011 alone. By November-December 2011 the 
emissions dropped from around 220 billion Bq immediately after the accident 
to 17 thousand Bq or about one-13 millionth the initial level10. 
 
Table 3. Amounts of radioactive materials released into ocean between 
March 26-September 30, 2011 as result of Fukushima accident (PBq) 
Organization Period of assessment I-131 Cs-134 Cs-137 
Tokyo Electric Power 
Company 
March 26-September 
30, 2011 
1 3.5 3.6 
Japan Atomic Energy Agency March 21-April 30, 2011 1.4 - 3.6 
Institute for Radiological 
Protection and Nuclear Safety 
March 21-mid-July, 
2011 
- - 7 
Source: Tokyo Electric Power Company, Institute for Radiological Protection and 
Nuclear Safety, Japan Atomic Energy Agency 
 
One year after the accident the Institute for Radiological Protection and 
Nuclear Safety’s provisional estimates for the total radioactive releases into 
the air were:  
- radioactive noble gases: 6,550 PBq (the same order of magnitude as 
the Chernobyl accident), composed mainly of xenon-133;  
- radioactive iodine: 408 PBq (about ten times less than the Chernobyl  
accident), including 197 PBq of iodine-131 and 168 PBq of iodine-132;  
                                                          
8
 120 gigabecquerel (GBq) 
9
 7.6 terabecquerel (TBq) 
10
 due to human activities at the plant the emissions rose again up to 19 thousand Bq in 
January 2012. 
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- radioactive tellurium: 145 PBq including 108 PBq of tellurium-132 with 
its decay product iodine-132, and 12 PBq of tellurium-129 with its decay 
product tellurium-129; 
- radioactive cesium: 58 PBq (about three times less than the Chernobyl 
accident), including 21 PBq of caesium-137, 28 PBq of caesium-134 and 9.8 
PBq of caesium-136 [Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 
2012].  
The Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety also 
estimated that between March 21 and mid-July, 2011 around 2.7×1016 Bq of 
caesium-137 (about 8.4 kg) entered the ocean, about 82% having flowed into 
the sea before April 8, 2011. The later radioactivity represents the most 
important individual emission of artificial radioactivity into the sea ever 
observed.  
Given the prevailing winds at the time of accident only 20% of the 
atmospheric fallout is estimated to have fallen on land with the majority of the 
remainder deposited to the North Pacific [Morino et al., 2011]. Contaminated 
waters were transported far into the Pacific Ocean by currents causing a 
great dispersion of the radioactive elements11 [Buesseler, 2014]. 
Various publications show greater details about different radioactive 
materials released by the nuclear plant and their geographical dispersion 
[Busby, 2012; Buesseler, 2014; Chino et al., 2011; Morino et al., 2011; 
Tsumune et al. 2012; UNSCEAR 2013 Report].  
Different assessments of radioactivity from the Fukushima plant ranged 
from 10-40% of that of Chernobyl accident while significantly contaminated 
area is estimated to be 10-12% that of Chernobyl’s. For example, the largest 
source of Cs137 is global fallout from weapons testing amounting 950 PBq 
                                                          
11
  Recently it has been announced that for the first time trace amounts of radioactive 
cesium-134 emitted from Fukushima nuclear plant were detected off the northern 
California coast in water collected about 150 km off Eureka in August 2014 [The Japan 
News, November 17, 2014]. 
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(including 600 PBq in the ocean), Chernobyl accident contributed 100 PBq, 
while releases from Fukushima plant are estimated to be between 4-90 PBq 
(including 10-50 PBq atmospheric and 3.6-41 PBq direct ocean) [Buesseler, 
2014]. Cesium 137 leaks from Fukushima are compared with the amount 
released by 168 atomic blasts similar to that in Hiroshima in the end in of 
World War II [The Telegraph, August 25, 2011]. 
Since the accident there have been continued spills of contaminated 
water at the plant grounds and into the sea. On August 20, 2013 it was 
announced that 300 metric tons of heavily contaminated water had leaked 
from a storage tank [Tokyo Electric Power Company, 2013]. On February 27, 
2014 it was revealed that another leak of 110 tons of contaminated water 
occurred [The Japan News, February 27, 2014]. A new up to a ton water 
leaks was reported on April 14, 2014 [NHK World, April 14, 2014]. On June 6, 
2014 TEPCO announced that up to 3.4 tons of radioactive water may have 
leaked from barriers surrounding storage tanks [NHK World, June 6, 2014]. 
Moreover, about 11,000 tons of water used to cool melted-down fuel leaked 
out of reactor buildings into underground utility tunnels, from where it is 
believed to be flowing out to sea [NHK World, June 25, 2014]. 
Furthermore, the underground tunnels of the facilities have been filled 
with highly radioactive water, which is believed to be leaking into the nearby 
sea after mixing with groundwater [NHK World, November 25, 2014]. In June 
2014 TEPCO found that radioactive water can easily spread in a deep layer 
of groundwater12 and could be spilling into the ocean. On June 4 as much as 
4,700 becquerels of tritium per liter were detected in a well near the No. 1 
reactor building [NHK World, June 25, 2014]. Water pressure in the layer was 
lower than that of a shallower layer making it easier for contaminated water to 
spread in the deep layer.  
                                                          
12
 deep layer of water is about 25 meters below the surface.  
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After a strong typhoon in October 2014 it was found high levels of 
radioactive cesium in groundwater (up to 460,000 becquerels per liter)13 in 
the compound of the nuclear plant in wells around the reactors buildings 
[NHK World, October 25, 2014]. TEPCO began pumping up groundwater 
from the wells on a trial basis in August 2014 and full-scale operations in 
October14.  
Since May 2014 TEPCO has been releasing water in the ocean from 
“groundwater bypass operation”15 as more than 8,600 tons of groundwater 
has been discharged so far [The Japan News, June 28, 2014]. The first 
(about 560 tons) groundwater released in May contained 0.016 becquerel of 
cesium-134 per liter, 0.047 becquerel of cesium-137 and 220 becquerels of 
tritium [The Japan News, May 21, 2014]. 
Consequently, the significant pollution of sea water along the coast near 
the nuclear plant persist as a result of the continuing arrival of radioactive 
material transported towards the sea by surface and ground water running 
over contaminated soil as well as the leakages and releases from the power 
station16.  
Furthermore, in summer 2014 TEPCO announced that more than one 
trillion becquerels of radioactive substances were released as a result of 
debris removal work (280 billion becquerels per hour) at one of the plant's 
                                                          
13
 800 to 900 times the previous peak level of 500 becquerels per liter. 
14
 TEPCO plans to treat the tainted groundwater and discharge it into the ocean to deal 
with the buildup of contaminated water. Local people strongly oppose the plan and utility 
has yet to discharge water into the ocean. 
15
 intended to reduce the amount of radiation-tainted water at the plant. Groundwater is 
pumped up from 12 wells near the 1 to 4 reactors before it flows into the basement of the 
reactor buildings, temporarily stored in a tank and is released into the sea once radiation 
levels are confirmed to be lower than TEPCO standards. 
16
 In October 2014 the concentrations of Cs-134 and Cs-137 in the seawater around 
Fukushima nuclear plant in outer layer varied between 0.0013-0.4 Bq/L and 0.011-1.2 
Bq/L while in lower layer they were between 0.0013-0.099 Bq/L and 0.0046-0.034 Bq/L 
[Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2014]. 
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reactors [NHK World, July 23, 2014]. The plant is believed to be still releasing 
an average of 10 million becquerels per hour of radioactive material. 
Radioactive contamination from the nuclear plant has spread in the 
region and beyond though air, rains, dust, water circulations, wildlife, garbage 
disposals, transportation, and affected soils, waters, plants, animals, 
infrastructure, and population. High levels of radiation were detected in large 
areas surrounding the nuclear plant and beyond (Map 6). Besides, numerous 
anomalous “hot spots” have been discovered in areas far beyond the 
adjacent region – e.g. in the year after the accident there were about 150 
reports in Tokyo alone [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology, 2012].  
 
Map 6. Radioactive pollution caused by Fukushima accident (September 
18, 2011) 
       
        Source: Ministry of Environment, 2014 
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The highest radioactive contamination has been within 20-30 km from 
the Fukushima nuclear power plant where the authorities have been 
implementing a 20 km (800 sq. km) exclusion zone and other restricted areas 
since March 12, 2011. On March 20 the reported air radiation rate outside the 
evacuation zone ranged from 0.7 μSv/h (35-40 km to West from nuclear 
plant) to 110 μSv/h (30 km to Northwest from the plant) [Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2011]. Radiation 
monitoring in 47 prefectures of Japan showed a wide variation, but an upward 
trend in 10 of them on March 23, 2011 [Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2011].  
March-May 2011 soil monitoring in Fukushima prefecture showed the 
presence of radionuclides reaching up to 710,000 Bq/kg of I-131, 282,000 
Bq/kg of Cs-134, 290,000 Bq/kg of Cs-137, 270,000*6 Bq/kg of Te-129m, 
100,000 Bq/kg of Te-132, 23,000*6 Bq/kg of Cs-136 and 4,300*6 Bq/kg of La-
140 in samples from Namie town [Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2012]. 
More detailed surveys have found out that cesium 13717 had strongly 
contaminated the soils in large areas of eastern and northeastern Japan 
[Yasunaria et al.; Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2011-2014]. On November 
12, 2011, officials reported that long-lived radioactive cesium had 
contaminated 30,000 sq. km of the land surface of Japan while some 11,700 
sq. km was found to have radiation levels that exceeded Japan’s allowable 
exposure rate of 1 mSv per year18 [Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology, 2011]. Outside Fukushima prefecture reported soil 
radiation of cesium-134 and cesium-137 was between 30,000 and 100,000 
Bq/m2 in Ichinoseki and Oshu (Iwate prefecture), in Saku, Karuizawa and 
                                                          
17
 Two months after the accident, with disappearance of radionuclides with a short half-life 
(Te-123, I-132 and I-131), the majority of residual deposits were made up by Cs-134 and 
Cs-137 [Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 2012]. The later were 
contributing more than 80% of the activity of residual deposits after May 20, 2011. 
18
 On April 19, 2011 the official “safe” radiation exposure levels was drastically increased 
from 1 mSv to 20 mSv per year. Recommended by the International Commission on 
Radiological Protection limit for a member of the public is 1 mSv/y (for “Post-emergency 
situation” 20 mSv/y) and for the radiation worker 20 mSv/y. 
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Sakuho (Nagano prefecture), in Tabayama (Yamanashi prefecture) and 
elsewhere.   
Plutonium-238 and 239+240, Strontium-89 and 90, Tellurium-129m and 
Silver-110m fallouts have been also detected in the affected regions [Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 2011, 2012]. The 
highest levels of Pu-239 and Pu-240 combined were 15 becquerels per 
square meters19 in Fukushima prefecture and 9.4 Bq in Ibaraki prefecture. 
Nevertheless, measured plutonium, and radioactive strontium, tellurium and 
silver were very small compared with the accumulated effective doses for 50 
years of Cesium 134 and 137.  
In July-August 2011 detected concentrations of radioactive elements in 
river and well water samples in affected regions were: maximum values for 
river water of 1.9 Bq/kg for Cs-134 and 2.0 Bq/kg for Cs-137, for well water of 
0.85 Bq/kg for Cs-134 and 1.1 Bq/kg for Cs-137, and Strontium 89 and 90 in 
river waters of 5.5×10−2 Bq/kg and 1.8×10−2 Bq/kg accordingly [Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, October 2011].  
The extent of radioactive contamination of air, waters and soils in Japan 
has been monitored and updating constantly20. In Fukushima prefecture the 
environmental radioactivity varies according to location (and even within the 
same locality because of the numerous “hot spots”), it has been decreasing 
but it still higher than the levels before the disaster21 (Table 4 and Map 7).  
In other prefectures the environmental radioactivity levels have been 
stable or decreased but mostly they are still higher than the period before the 
accident (Table 5). 
 
 
                                                          
19
 compared to a global average of 0.4 to 3.7 Bq/kg from the atomic bomb tests. 
20
 Up to date environmental radioactivity levels can be found on 
http://radioactivity.nsr.go.jp/en/ 
21
 in April 2014 radioactivity levels inside 20 km zone of nuclear plant was still extremely 
high - from 0.2 μSv/h in Nahara and Tomioka towns up to 12.5 μSv/h, 16.8 μSv/h and 28.6 
μSv/h in Futaba, Namie and Okuma towns [Nuclear Radiation Authority, 2014].  
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Table 4. Evolution of radiation levels in Fukushima prefecture (μSv/h) 
 Ken-
poku, 
Fuku-
shima  
Ken-
chu, 
Koriya
ma  
Ken-
nan, 
Shira-
kawa  
Aizu, 
Aizu 
Waka-
matsu  
Minami 
Aizu, 
Minami 
Aizu  
Soso, 
Minami 
Soma  
Iwaki, 
Iwaki 
City 
Taira 
Direction and 
distance from 
nuclear power 
plant 
North 
west, 
about 
63km 
West, 
about 
58km 
South 
west, 
about 
81km 
West, 
about 
98km 
West 
south 
West,  
115km 
North, 
about 
24km 
South 
south-
west, 
43km 
Normal value* 0.04 0.04-
0.06 
0.04-
0.05 
0.04-
0.05 
0.02-
0.04 
0.05 0.05-
0.06 
April 2011 2.74   0.24   0.66 
March 2012 0.63   0.1   0.17 
June 11, 2013 0.35 0.18 0.13 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.09 
March 8, 2014 0.27 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.13 0.08 
*radioactivity levels surveyed in 2010 
Source: Fukushima prefectural government 
 
Map 7. Evolution of air radiation rates in 80 km zone from nuclear plant 
 
Source: Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2013 
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Table 5. Radioactivity at 1m height in prefectures of Japan (μSv/h) 
Prefecture 
(monitoring 
post) 
Before 
March 11, 
2011 
March 20, 
2011* 
March 20, 
2012* 
March 20, 
2013 
March 20, 
2014 
January 
7, 2015 
Hokkaido 
(Sapporo) 
0.02-0.105 0.027-0.028 0.028-
0.033 
0.034 0.037 0.039 
Aomori (Aomori) 0.017-0.102 0.021-0.023 0.018-
0.024 
0.021 0.026 0.021 
Iwate (Morioka) 0.014-0.084 0.025-0.040 0.021-
0.029 
0.038 0.039 0.033 
Miyagi (Sendai) 0.0176-
0.0513 
0.15** 0.051-
0.053 
0.055 0.054 0.048 
Akita (Akita) 0.022-0.086 0.034-0.041 0.034-
0.036 
0.054 0.052 0.051 
Yamagata 
(Yamagata) 
0.025-0.082 0.040-0.129 0.037-
0.039 
0.092**** 0.092 0.076 
Fukushima 
(Fukushima) 
0.037-0.046 2.1*** 0.89 0.82 0.27 0.22 
Ibaraki (Mito) 0.036-0.056 0.159-0.263 0.074-
0.075 
0.077 0.079 0.07 
Tochigi 
(Utshunomiya) 
0.030-0.067 0.136-0.164 0.050 0.079 0.084 0.074 
Gunma 
(Maebashi) 
0.016-0.049 0.069-0.103 0.025-
0.026 
0.071 0.076 0.068 
Saitama 
(Saitama) 
0.031-0.060 0.052-0.062 0.046-
0.047 
0.047 0.055 - 
Chiba (Ichihara) 0.022-0.044 0.031-0.033 0.037-
0.038 
0.058 0.069 0.049 
Tokyo 
(Shinjuku) 
0.028-0.079 0.044-0.049 0.049-
0.050 
0.057 0.071 0.06 
Kanagawa 
(Chigasaki) 
0.035-0.069 0.046-0.048 0.044-
0.045 
0.042 0.052 0.039 
Nigata (Nigata) 0.031-0.153 0.047-0.052 0.046-
0.052 
0.063 0.071 0.063 
Toyama (Imizu) 0.029-0.147 0.049-0.054 0.046-
0.048 
0.064 0.084 0.062 
Ishikawa 0.0291- 0.047-0.063 0.046- 0.052 0.063 0.051 
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(Kanazawa) 0.1275 0.051 
Fukui (Fukui) 0.032-0.097 0.046-0.053 0.044-
0.049 
0.061 0.073 0.059 
Yamanashi 
(Kohu) 
0.040-0.066 0.044 0.043-
0.044 
0.051 0.056 0.052 
Nagano 
(Nagano) 
0.0299-
0.0974 
0.06-0.067 0.038-
0.040 
0.067 0.070 0.062 
Gifu 
(Karamigahara) 
0.057-0.110 0.061-0.066 0.060-
0.061 
0.067 0.076 0.077 
Shizuika 
(Shizuoka) 
0.0281-
0.0765 
0.035-0.040 0.029 0.041 0.055 0.047 
Aichi (Nagoya) 0.035-0.074 0.039-0.042 0.039 0.068 0.071 0.079 
Mie (Yokkaichi) 0.0416-
0.0789 
0.046-0.051 0.045-
0.046 
0.070 0.081 0.076 
Shiga (Otsu) 0.031-0.061 0.034-0.037 0.031-
0.032 
0.065 0.081 0.079 
Kyoto (Kyoto) 0.033-0.087 0.039-0.045 0.037-
0.038 
0.048 0.063 0.059 
Osaka (Osaka) 0.042-0.061 0.042-0.046 0.042-
0.043 
0.080 0.083 0.091 
Hyogo (Kobe) 0.035-0.076 0.036-0.037 0.036-
0.037 
0.072 0.091 0.079 
Nara (Nara) 0.046-0.080 0.048-0.053 0.047-
0.048 
0.077 0.062 - 
Wakayama 
(Wakayama) 
0.031-0.056 0.031-0.033 0.031-
0.032 
0.081 0.083 0.095 
Tottori 
(Touhaku) 
0.036-0.110 0.063-0.075 0.062-
0.063 
0.071 0.073 0.086 
Shimane 
(Matsue) 
0.033-0.079 0.038-0.041 0.037-
0.039 
0.056 0.054 0.081 
Okayama 
(Okayama) 
0.043-0.104 0.049-0.053 0.048-
0.049 
0.067 0.082 0.084 
Hiroshima 
(Hiroshima) 
0.035-0.069 0.048-0.053 0.046-
0.049 
0.086 0.081 0.10 
Yamaguchi 
(Yamaguchi) 
0.084-0.128 0.094-0.096 0.091-
0.095 
0.080 0.075 0.091 
Tokushima 0.037-0.067 0.037-0.039 0.037- 0.069 0.070 0.065 
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(Tokushima) 0.038 
Kagawa 
(Takamatsu) 
0.051-0.077 0.053-0.054 0.054-
0.057 
0.063 0.067 0.065 
Ehime 
(Matsuyama) 
0.045-0.074 0.047-0.051 0.046-
0.048 
0.084 0.098 0.094 
Kochi (Kochi) 0.019-0.054 0.026-0.030 0.025-
0.026 
0.035 0.041 0.053 
Fukuoka 
(Dazaifu) 
0.034-0.079 0.036-0.040 0.036-
0.037 
0.066 0.060 0.060 
Saga (Saga) 0.037-0.086 0.040-0.049 0.040-
0.041 
0.064 0.048 - 
Nagasaki 
(Omura) 
0.027-0.069 0.028-0.033 0.030-
0.031 
0.074 0.053 0.053 
Kumamoto (Uto) 0.021-0.067 0.027-0.032 0.027-
0.028 
0.049 0.043 0.043 
Oita (Oita) 0.048-0.085 0.049-0.053 0.040-
0.050 
0.057 0.055 0.058 
Miyazaki 
(Miyazaki) 
0.0243-
0.0664 
0.026-0.028 0.026 0.060 0.034 0.038 
Kagoshima 
(Kagoshima) 
0.0306-
0.0943 
0.034-0.039 0.034 0.056 0.047 - 
Okinawa 
(Uruma) 
0.0133-
0.0575 
0.020-0.021 0.023-
0.031 
0.021 0.022 0.021 
* Minimum and maximum readings; ** Tohoku University data; ***MEXT data; ****March 
24 data 
Source: Nuclear Radiation Authority       
 
The National Diet of Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission22 concluded that the Fukushima nuclear accident 
“cannot be regarded as a natural disaster.  It was a profoundly manmade 
disaster - that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. And its 
effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human response” [The 
National Diet of Japan, 2012]. It was the result of collusion between the 
                                                          
22
 Formed to investigate the background and cause of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster 
on October 7, 2011 and chaired by Kiyoshi Kurokawa. 
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government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by these 
parties. They effectively “betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear 
accidents”.  
Recent disclosure of the records of interviews of the government panel 
investigating the nuclear crisis (so-called “Yoshida file”)23 also illustrates how 
badly the officials handled crisis management at Fukushima nuclear power 
plant and how serious the situation was [NHK World, September 11, 
November 12, December 26, 2014; The Japan News, September 13, 2014]. 
 
  
                                                          
23
 former manager of the power plant Masao Yoshida, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan 
and 17 others was relised in September 2014, more 56 in November 2014, and additional 
127 in December 2014. The government plans to disclose interviews with all 772 
government and TEPCO officials if interviewees give approval. 
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Chapter 2. Human damages and health effects 
 
The March 2011 earthquake and resulting tsunami killed almost 15,900 
people24, injured more than 6,100 and destroyed the lives of thousands more 
(Table 6). The majority of deaths were from tsunami and among elderly.25 
The biggest number of victims has been from Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima 
prefectures where whole communities were wiped out by the powerful 
tsunami.  Three and a half years after the disaster 2,601 people are still listed 
as missing and search for them has been continuing.  
 
Table 6. Number of confirmed deaths, missing and injured person 
associated with March 2011 earthquake (February 10, 2014) 
Prefectures Deaths Missing Injured Prefectures Deaths Missing Injured 
Hokkaido 1 - 3 Gunma 1 - 39 
Aomori 3 1 111 Saitama - - 45 
Iwate 4,673 1,142 213 Chiba 21 2 229 
Miyagi 9,537 1,283 4,145 Kanagawa 4 - 138 
Akita - - 4 Nigata - - 3 
Yamagata 2 - 29 Yamanashi - - 2 
Fukushima 1,607 207 182 Nagano - - 1 
Tokyo 7 - 117 Shizuoka - - 3 
Ibaraki 24 1 712 Mie - - 1 
Tochigi 4 - 133 Kochi - - 1 
    Total 15,884 2,636 6,147 
Source: National Police Agency 
 
                                                          
24
 Latest figure is 15,889 (September, 2014). 
25
 Around 94.2% of deaths are tsunami related. Around 600 are assumed to have died 
from earthquake-related stress and chronic disease, around 265 should be earthquake-
collapse related, and around 230 could be related to other causes such as fire, landslides 
etc. Around 56% of the dead were over 65 years old [Vervaeck and Daniell, 2012]. 
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What is more, official data for the “disaster related deaths”26 have been 
growing reaching 3,076 in 10 prefectures by the end of March 2014 [NHK 
World, May 6, 2014].  The majority of victims are from Fukushima prefecture 
(1,691), followed by Miyagi prefecture (889) and Iwate prefecture (441).  
June 25, 2014 data for Fukushima prefecture show that 1,729 people 
have died as a result of lingering effects of the accident exceeding the 1,603 
deaths caused directly by the disaster [Fukushima Minpo News, June 26, 
2014]. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly difficult to identify a 
relationship between deaths and the accident due to the long period of time 
that has lapsed27.  
Deaths associated with the disaster include people who died as a result 
of having to change their environment and lifestyle, and live as evacuees 
away from home, family, business and community for a long period time. 
Many of the Fukushima victims are from municipalities near the damaged 
Fukushima nuclear plant. For instance, in Minamisoma, Namie and Tomioka, 
which partly or fully have been off-limits due to high radiation, accordingly as 
many as 447, 317 and 225 deaths have been indirectly blamed on the 
disaster.  
What is more, at least 97 people affected by the disaster have died 
unattended28 in temporary housing units in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima 
prefectures, and experts say that the number of solitary death cases would 
likely increase in future [The Japan News, March 2014].  
Officials linked the number of suicide deaths to disaster of 2,916 as of 
September 2013 [LDP, 2014]. In 2013 disaster related suicides in 
                                                          
26
 They are recognized by a panel of experts (including medical doctors and lawyers) set 
up by each municipality, and a sum of 5 million yen is paid as consolation money to family 
for death of a main income earner (half sum for other family members). 
27
 government intends to provide municipal authorities with information on accident-related 
deaths in an “aggressive manner” to help standardize norms for identifying such fatalities. 
28
 There is no precise definition of the Japanese term “kodokushi” (meaning “solitary 
death”) and officials do not record statistics on such deaths. 
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Fukushima29, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures were associated with deteriorating 
health of 22 of them, money problems of nine more, and family issues of five.  
Many farmers from the affected areas and beyond who saw their 
businesses and livelihood destructed also suffered stress and anxiety 
[Murayama, 2012; Watanabe, 2011]. For instance, a 64-year-old farmer in 
Sukagawa was pushed over the edge since he lost “everything he had ever 
worked for during his life”30. One day after the government imposed a ban on 
the sale of cabbages he took his life [The New York Times, March 29, 2011]. 
Another dairy farmer in 50s killed himself on the land he struggled to maintain 
since tsunami and nuclear crisis began few months after the disaster [CNN, 
June 14, 2011]. 
There have been also many reports for affected survivors from disaster 
exposed to a high risk or suffering from various diseases after the accident – 
injuries, respiration problems due to dust an contamination, dehydration, 
exhaustion, shocks, etc. In a number of places rapidly spreading pneumonia 
epidemic (mostly among elderly) was registered due to overpopulated rooms, 
poor oral hygiene, destructed facilities, and lack of specialists and sufficient 
care [HNK World, July 28, 2014]. For instance, in the three months after the 
disaster in Kesenuma, Motoyashi and Otomo hospitals 225 were admitted 
suffering from pneumonia, 52 of whom consequently died. Similarly in 
Ishinomaki 122 were hospitalized in days after the disaster at rate 7 times 
higher than the normal one. 
What is more, as a result of long stay in temporary accommodations 
many experienced diverse health problems. For instance, in Ishinomaki, 
where there are 6000 people living in such accommodations, there has been 
                                                          
29
 Disaster related suicide rate has been on the rise in Fukushima [The Japan News, 
March 13, 2014]. 
30
 The farmer was reported to have lost his house in the earthquake but had a field of 
7,500 organically grown cabbages ready for harvest when the government prohibition was 
announced.  
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increasing number of complains and sicknesses due to molt and bacteria 
multiplied in temporary houses [NHK World, July 23, 2014]. 
Another factor for increased health risk has been caused by radiation 
exposure after the nuclear accident. The levels of radiation exposure of 
population varied according to the direction from the Fukushima plant and the 
time spent in contaminated zones31. Major pathways humans were exposed 
to radioactive materials after the accident were: external exposure from 
radionuclides deposited on the ground; external exposure from radionuclides 
in the radioactive cloud; internal exposure from inhalation of radionuclides in 
the radioactive cloud; and internal exposure from ingestion of radionuclides in 
food and water [World Health Organization, 2012]. However, the gap between 
our understanding of the biological effects of radiation in humans and the 
determination of regulatory values in too wide [Fukumoto, 2013]. 
Workers in the nuclear plant have suffered the highest exposures32. 
According to the data 167 workers received radiation dose more than 100 
mSv33, which is the level expert demonstrated measurably increases risks of 
cancer [United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic 
Radiation, 2014]. For additional 20,000 TEPCO workers34 and for roughly 
150,000 citizens from the fallout zone exposures were lower. For instance, in 
Namie town and Iitate village, nearby communities where the evacuation was 
delayed, residents received 10 to 50 mSv. There are still occasional reports 
                                                          
31
 Biological effect (danger) of radiation vary according to the quility, energy, dose (how 
much one absorb), and the dose rate (the time one is exposed to a dose) of radiation, and 
the organs exposed and dose rate [Fukumoto, 2013].  
32
 Reported maximum combined cumulative effective dose for TEPCO workers is 678.80 
mSv while the avarage for 31,383 workers and contractors from March 2011 to December 
2013 is 12.61 mSv [Tokyo Electric Power Company, 2014].  
33
 Cumulative exposure limit for workers responding to nuclear emergencies is 100 mSv. 
Three days after the accident, government raised the limit for workers at Fukushima plant 
to 250 mSv and kept it for 9 months [NHK World, July 10, July 30. 2014]. 
34
 Expert report asked the government to conduct a lifelong survey on 19,000 people who 
worked in immediate aftermath of the accident to see whether their exposure to radiation 
causes cancer or other illnesses. Such survey would provide important knowledge on 
radiation's impact on health and serve as a guideline for residents of Fukushima prefecture 
[NHK World, May 16, 2014]. 
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for radiation overexposure of workers at the plant [NHK World, May 8, 2014]. 
Furthermore, working in some areas35 and using some new methods (e.g. 
pouring cement into underground tunnels) are likely expose workers to more 
radiation than originally expected [NHK World, November 25, November 
28,2014].  
Experts estimates that for adults in Fukushima prefecture the average 
lifetime effective doses to be of the order of 11 mSv or less, and the first-year 
doses to be one third to one half of that [United Nations Scientific Committee 
on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2014; World Health Organization, 2012]. 
For children and other vulnerable groups (old people, sick persons) these 
doses have been much higher (Table 7). 
 
Table 7. Estimated average effective radiation doses in different regions 
of Japan (mSv) 
Age groups in 
2011 
Fukushima 
prefecture 
Miyagi, Gunma, Tochigi, 
Ibaraki, Chiba and Iwate 
  Rest of Japan 
1 YEAR EXPOSURE 
Adults 1.0 - 4.3 0.2 – 1.4 0.1 – 0.3 
Child 10 year old 1.2 - 5.9 0.2 – 2.0 0.1 – 0.4 
Infant 1 year old 2.0 - 7.5 0.3 – 2.5 0.2 – 0.5 
LIFETIME EXPOSURE 
Adults 1.1 - 11 0.2 – 4.0 0.1 0.6 
Child 10 year old 1.4 - 16 0.3 – 5.5 0.1 - 0.8 
Infant 1 year old 2.1 -18 0.4 – 6.4 0.2 – 0.9 
Source: United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2014 
 
Thanks to the timely undertaken measures by the authorities (warnings, 
protection, evacuation, monitoring, decontamination, treatment), the radiation 
                                                          
35
 E.g. operator expected to lower radiation level to 1 millisievert an hour in No.3 reactor 
upper part but it found out that even after cleaning up radiation could reach 60 millisieverts 
an hour in some areas and over 10 mSv in many others. 
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levels for the general population have been well below the norms required to 
damage human health36. Nevertheless, there have been debates and great 
concerns about the risks for people exposed to lower doses since risks are 
lower and hardly to detect [Akiyama et al., 2012; Fisher et al., 2013; 
Foodwatch, 2011; Hasegawa, 2013; Pacchioli, 2014; Rosen, 2013].  
According to an official report 180,592 people in the general population 
were screened for radiation exposure in March 2011 and no case was found 
which affects health [Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, 2011]. The World 
Health Organization anticipated that there would be no noticeable increases 
in cancer rates for the overall population, but somewhat elevated rates for 
particular sub-groups [World Health Organization, 2013]. For example, infants 
of Namie town and Iitate village were estimated to have a 6% increase in 
female breast cancer risk and a 7% increase in male leukemia risk.  
The latest UN report of more than 80 international experts also pointed 
out that no deaths or serious illnesses have so far been reported from the 
radiation exposure from the nuclear accident. It concluded that no discernible 
increased incidence of radiation-related health effects (e.g. rate of cancer) are 
expected among exposed members of the public or their descendants” [The 
Japan News, April 3, 2014; NHK World, May 28, 2014]. However, it warned 
that “an increased risk of thyroid cancer can be inferred for infants and 
children” stressing the need for continued research37. The maximum radiation 
dose for a year after the Fukushima crisis began was estimated at 9.3 mSv 
for adults in areas near the Fukushima plant and at 13 mSv for 1-year-old 
infants.  
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 Since April 2011 the maximum annual allowable radiation exposure to let evacuees 
return to the areas near nuclear plant is 20 mSv. For Fukushima schools a target of 
exposure dose 1 mSv/y was set up which should be used in decision making on limiting 
outdoor activity at schools. 
37
 November 2014 interim report of expert panel, based on a survey of some 370,000 
people aged 18 or younger in Fukushima prefecture, also suggests that that thyroid cancer 
cases are unlikely to be linked to exposure to radiation from the nuclear accident calling for 
more child thyroid checks [Fukushima Minpo News, November 15, 2014; NHK World, 
November 27, 2014].  
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Fukushima prefecture has been conducting thyroid checkups regularly 
on more than 380,000 residents who were younger than 18 at the time of the 
disaster. The first round of screening in 2011 found 108 confirmed or 
suspected cases of cancer. The results of the latest screening (started in April 
2014) indicate that 4 local young people38 may have thyroid cancer, even 
though they cleared a screening shortly after the nuclear accident in 2011 
[NHK World, December 25, 2014]. Officials say they have no enough data to 
prove whether nuclear fallout caused those cases since radiation levels in 
areas where people lived are not high enough to cause thyroid cancer. It is 
still much unknown about how children develop thyroid cancer and close 
monitoring of the situation have to continue. 
People living and working in different locations of the affected regions 
have been exposed to diverse levels of radiation39. What is more, even in the 
same locations the radiation level often differs due to the different precision of 
instruments or local hot spots. In addition, people are constantly exposed to 
small amount of no harmful natural background radiation – it is approximately 
2.1 mSv per person in Japan, including 0.3 mSv from space, 0.33 mSv from 
land, 0.48 mSv from Radon etc. and 0.99 mSv from food [National Institute of 
Radiological Science, 2014]. 
In addition, confusion has been also spreading among municipalities 
tasked with radiation cleanup under changing government decontamination 
policy40 [Fukushima Minpo News, July 22, 2014]. Under the new policy, the 
government will determine decontamination needs by using radiation 
exposure data collected from individual dosimeters (which tend to be lower 
than the current safe dose) leading to reduction areas of government-
mandated decontamination. 
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 They were 6 to 17 years old at the time of the Fukushima accident. 
39
 Government maintains that radiation exposure on residents in Fukushima prefecture are 
no different from those of in other prefectures [The Japan News, May 18, 2014]. 
40
  Government has been decontaminating areas whose aerial radiation reading is 0.23 
microsievert per hour or more, based on its policy of keeping annual radiation exposure for 
individuals at 1 millisievert or less. 
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Some municipalities welcome that new policies since it will allow to 
scale down decontamination efforts in areas where radiation levels are 
unlikely to go down significantly. However, others are worried that residents 
will be confused. For instance, according to Date officials, the city measured 
the radiation exposure of its 52,000 citizens wearing dosimeters (July 2012-
June 2013) and results showed that per-year exposure levels for nearly 70% 
of them (even in areas where aerial radiation levels exceeded 0.23 
microsievert per hour) was less than 1 millisievert in total [Fukushima Minpo 
News, July 22, 2014]. Moreover, Tamura officials declare that city will not 
change its decontamination plan, since if the cleanup projects are scaled 
back, it would cause anxiety among residents. Some experts41 also suggest 
that new approach is inappropriate since many residents have deliberately 
stayed indoors and if they start to go out like they used to, the individual 
radiation doses might go up. 
The official monitoring of agricultural and food products conducted after 
April 2012 indicates that the violation rates on new food safety standard (1 
mSv/year) have been much less than 1% [MHLW, inistry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare, 2014].  
What is more, surveys in most affected regions indicate that the annual 
radiation intakes from foods have been below 1 mSv/year (Figure 3). For 
instance, according to the September–October 2012 survey the estimated 
annual radiation doses from radioactive cesium in foods were in safety limit.  
It ranges from 0.0009 to 0.0057 mSv/year being highest in Miyagi prefecture 
and certain regions of Fukushima prefectures. At the same time, annual 
radiation doses from radioactive potassium (naturally occurring in foods) were 
between 0.14 and 0.22 mSv/year as no significant changes found comparing 
to before the accident. 
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 E.g. Keizo Ishii, director of the Research Center for Remediation Engineering of Living 
Environments Contaminated with Radioisotopes, Tohoku University. 
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Figure 3. Estimation on annual dietary intake of radionuclides for 
September-October 2012 in Japan (mSv/year) 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
Furthermore, radiation doses from radioactive cesium have been found 
to be decreasing over time - for 15 studied areas it was lower comparing to 
previous estimates for September-November 2011 (0.0024–0.019 mSv/year) 
and February-March 2012 (0.0009–0.0094 mSv/year). Likewise, in 
Fukushima prefecture (Nakadōri Area) the effective dose from radioactive 
cesium in foods has been decreasing constantly and it is less than 1% of the 
maximum allowed level42 [Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2012]. 
According to a large panel of experts the radiation uptake in such 
ranges is not harmful for the human health [Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare, 2012]. Furthermore, “health effects” from extra cumulative exposure 
above the official limit are difficult to be verified based on the current available 
knowledge43. Therefore, even if people are exposed to more than “around 
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 From 0,01 mSv/y in September-November 2011 it dropped to 0,038 mSv/y in 
September-October 2012. 
43
 there is a limitation to verify the effect arising from additional radiation exposure 
(including carcinogenesis and other influences since); difficulty to distinguish explicitly the 
effect of radiation and other effects; population of epidemiological studies were not large 
enough; and inaccuracy of estimated radiation exposure [Koizumi, 2011]. 
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100 mSv” of the extra cumulative exposure, it will not necessarily mean they 
will have adverse health effect [Koizumi, 2011].  
Some publications also demonstrate that the additional dose of 
Fukushima radionuclides received by consumers of Pacific Bluefin tuna can 
be estimated to result in two additional fatal cancer cases per 10,000,000 
exposed people [Fisher et al. (2013]. 
November 2013-February 201 survey of the Fukushima Consumer 
Cooperative found out that the levels of radioactive cesium in home-cooked 
meals in the prefecture were slightly above the limit for radioactive cesium44 
for 4% of participating households [Fukushima Minpo News, March 7, 2014]. 
Nevertheless, internal exposure to radioactive materials of all screened 
household members was below the 300Bq threshold for human exposure. 
Despite that in many places the radiation level and overall artificial 
exposure are less than the level in some onsens45 or certain medical check-
ups, many show a great concern on current figures46. That worries have been 
further enforced by the controversial opinions of experts in the filed, slow 
process of decontamination in some areas and ecosystems (e.g. forests, 
farmlands), unresolved issue with safe disposal of contaminated debris in 
certain areas, some deficiency of the food safety control systems, continuing 
radiation leakages in the nuclear plant, etc. 
It is known that when a large amount of radioactive cesium enters 
ecosystem and agri-food chain, it quickly becomes ubiquitous, contaminating 
water, soil, plants, animals, foods, etc. Radioactive cesium bioaccumulates, 
bioconcentrates, and biomagnifies as it moves up the food chain. Routine 
ingestion of foods contaminated with “low levels” of radioactive cesium has 
                                                          
44
 highest level detected in a household of 2.6 Bq/kg for Cs 137 and 1.1 Bq/kg for Cs 134. 
45
 hot springs regularly visited by many Japanese. 
46
 also true in other countries – e.g. US National Academy of Sciences report on lessons 
from Fukushima crisis notes that poor communication between central government and 
local governments, as well as a lack of clear standards about radiation levels that require 
decontamination led to public distrust in the government [NHK World, July 25, 2014]. 
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been shown to lead to its bioaccumulation in the heart, endocrine tissues, 
kidneys, small intestines, pancreas, spleen and liver. This process occurs 
much faster in children than in adults. Our interviews with local residents have 
found out that the cases of diverse complains and hospitalization in 
Fukushima has been increasing since the nuclear disaster.  
It is believed that the health effects of the radiation release are 
“primarily psychological rather than physical effects”. Many consumers and 
producers alike “lose peace of mind” having food with (lower than official 
safety limit but nevertheless) radiation contamination. As one Fukushima 
farmer was cited to say “his family is taking extreme care to protect their 
health by choosing only “safe” food, resulting in “a nerve-wracking lifestyle.” 
[Kakuchi, 2013]. 
Furthermore, long periods of evacuee life, lost property and 
employment have caused many people to grow isolated or develop physical 
or mental problems. For instance, evacuees from Namie reported that their 
health deteriorated after evacuating and they feel more irritable compared to 
before [Pushpalal et al., 2013]. Stress has been causing disputes among 
evacuees, lack of sleep, and increased smoking or drinking to alleviate 
psychological pain. Depression and family collapse have been also 
increasing. More than a half of evacuated live apart from the extended family, 
which is another reason for frustration.  
A 2014 survey indicates that 68% of evacuated households in 
Fukushima prefecture have one or more members with health problems such 
as lack of sleep or depression [NHK World, April 30, 2014]. Data from the 
Fukushima Center for Disaster Mental Health shows that consultations for 
emotional instability, such as irritation, depression and mood swings, 
increased 50% since 2012, forming 19% of total health consultations [The 
Japan Time, March 1, March 1, 2014]. Official survey has also found that 
almost 34% of children in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures who were 
aged 3 to 5 at the time of March 2011 earthquake now suffer from 
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post-traumatic stress disorder such as sleeping disorders, flashbacks etc. 
[The Japan News, March 2, 2014]. It was also reported that many elderly men 
cannot cook, so they became unable to maintain a balanced diet or develop a 
habit of turning to alcohol, and as a result they can easily fall ill [The Japan 
News, March 20, 2014). All these problems have been further aggravated by 
the lack of enough specialized doctors, health care centers and social 
workers in all affected areas. 
Data show that the suicide-prevention hotline in Fukushima prefecture 
received record 18,194 calls in 201347 and consultations related to the 2011 
disasters still stand out from the other issues [Fukushima Minpo News, June 
5, 2014]. The content of consultations has also changed over time - unlike the 
first days of the disasters, when new supply lines were in dire need, 
nowadays callers often discuss issues regarding mental distress. In 2011 
almost 12% of all calls were related to the quake and nuclear crisis. In 2012 
the later fell to just bellow 5% but counselors spent more hours talking to 
each person on average. Most recent topics range from arguments between 
spouses over whether to leave Fukushima, to the way fathers feel estranged 
from families after being forced to move out of the house to find work. Sense 
of loss and isolation, as well as pessimism about life in general, have recently 
stood out, while many used to mention “a sense of unity” and “preciousness 
of life” in the early stage of the disasters48. 
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 In 2011 the hotline handled fewer calls than 2010 (13,677 versus 16,649) because the 
telephone network had been damaged by the quake and Koriyama’s office remained out of 
service for about a month afterward [Fukushima Minpo News, June 5, 2014]. In 2012 the 
number of calls was up 30% (17,881). 
48
 According to experts the rise in calls is an alarming sign indicating that aftereffects have 
reached every corner of residents’ lives and reflecting the diversity of the mental problems 
rooted in March 11.  
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Free legal consultations service for the disaster victims49 has also been 
on a rise – e.g. in fiscal 2013 totaled 48,418 nationwide (up 12.6% from the 
previous year) as more than 80% (39,288 cases) were in Iwate, Miyagi and 
Fukushima prefectures [The Japan News, September 11, 2014]. Family legal 
troubles, including divorce and inheritance, topped the list at 39.2%, followed 
by financial troubles such as loans between friends at 25.4%, multiple debts, 
including double loan problems, accounted for 13.7%, and real estate issues 
such as land purchases by municipalities aimed at post- disaster 
reconstruction were 10.5%. 
Healthcare has also been a major issue for the more than 30,000 
people who have worked at the nuclear plant since the accident [NHK World, 
May 8, 2014]. There are reports that Fukushima disaster workers self 
medicating with alcohol to deal with stress, PTSD, depression, negative work 
environment, poor wages, wage- skimming, substandard living conditions and 
fear about future [McCurry, 2013].  
Surveys of the Fukushima Labor Bureau demonstrated that 68% of 
business operators involved in radioactive decontamination work have been 
violating the law [Fukushima Minpo News, March 13, 2014]. According to the 
officials 446 business operators were involved in 1,105 cases of legal 
violations, out of which 67% with labor conditions (such as failure to pay 
wages), and almost one third with health and safety (such as a lack of safety 
training, failure to conduct prior checks on the amounts of radiation at work 
sites, etc.). Only for April to August 2014 there were 130 complaints of unpaid 
wages and inadequate safety measures for workers employed to 
decommission the Fukushima plant [NHK World, September 22, 2014]. 
Some people are concerned about deteriorating work quality as number 
of staff unfamiliar with working at nuclear plant environment increases [The 
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 System provides free legal consultations to any quake victims who visit Japan Legal 
Support Center offices without any prerequisites (e.g. income). The government intends to 
extend the service period by three years after expiration date (end of March 2015). 
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Japan News, October 21, 2014]50. According to TEPCO 25 workers 
experienced some work-related difficulties, such as injury or heat stroke in 
2012, but that figure increased to 32 in 2013. What is more, in March 2014 a 
55--year-old man died after he was buried in soil while excavating it51.  
Consequently, the Nuclear Regulation Authority announced it will 
consider revisions to the law for protecting nuclear plant workers' health in 
emergencies responding to calls in negotiations that started 3 years ago with 
the Tokyo Occupational Safety and Health Center52 [NHK World, July 10. 
2014]. The later stresses that such revision is vital for ensuring that workers 
are better prepared for emergencies and must be informed of how radiation 
exposure could affect health and decide in advance whether to give consent. 
The number of workers taking part in the decommissioning and other 
work at the Fukushima nuclear plant has doubled to more than 5,700 in the 
past year [HNK World, September 29, 2014]. According to TEPCO 
contractors hire most of them53 and they are responsible for labor safety54 
[NHK World, July 17, September 29, 2014].  
NRA recently approved a proposal to study raising the emergency 
radiation exposure limit beyond current accumulative limit of 100 mSv [NHK 
World, July 30, 2014]. It will decide on the level by referring to overseas 
standards as well as on how to get prior consent from workers and train them.  
Therefore, the entire long-term health impact of the triple disaster is 
hardly to be assessed presently.  
                                                          
50 manpower shortages have occurred because veteran workers left Fukushima unsatisfied 
with short-term contracts and working environment. At the same time there are many 
employed from other regions with no experience in working at nuclear plant. 
50
 the first fatality since decommissioning work started. 
51
 the first fatality since decommissioning work started. 
52
 Nationwide information center on occupational safety and health issue. Until middle of 
2014 the nuclear regulator maintained that it is not in charge. 
53
 more than 10,000 workers are registered on TEPCO contractors' lists. 
54
 TEPCO recently started to take measures to improve working conditions – e.g. it is 
constructing a large rest building on the premises that can accommodate 1,200 people. 
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Chapter 3. Evacuation and migration 
 
The earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear accident have caused a large 
evacuation involving some 470,000 (the third day after the earthquake) and 
over 320,000 displaced persons on a longer-term basis [Reconstruction 
Agency, 2014].  
By March 15, 2011 the official number of evacuated people overpassed 
440,000 [World Health Organization, March 15, 2011]. The greatest number 
of evacuees and stranded persons were from Miyagi, Fukushima and Iwate 
prefectures where they accounted for a good portion of the entire population 
(Table 8). The number of refugees moved to other prefectures was also quite 
considerable – 52,000 in Fukushima prefecture, 7,500 in Miyagi prefecture, 
and 1,500 in Iwate prefecture [Pushpala et al., 2013]. 
 
Table 8. Number of evacuation centers and evacuees, March 17, 2011 
Prefectures Evacuation centers Evacuees Stranded % of population 
Aomori 32 367 - 0.03 
Iwate 386 48,439 ≈10,000 4.39 
Miyagi 1,063 191,467 >6,050 8.37 
Yamagata* 28 2,712 - 0.23 
Fukushima 556 131,665 98 6.3 
Ibaraki* 185 7,567 - 0.25 
Tochigi 148 1,028 - 0.05 
Nigata* 51 2,674 - 0.11 
Total >2,398 385,919 >16,150 2.56 
* including evacuees from Fukushima and/or Miyagi 
Source: World Health Organization, 2011                             
 
Immediately after the nuclear accident the government recommended 
evacuation of about 78,000 people living within a 20-km radius of the power 
plant and sheltering in own homes of about 62,000 others living between 20 
  
47 
and 30 km from the plant55. In April 2011, the evacuation of about 10,000 
more people form areas further to the Northwest of the plant was 
recommended (so called “Deliberate Evacuation Area”) because of the high 
levels of radioactive material on the ground56.  
On April 22, 2011, Fukushima prefecture was divided into following 
areas (Map 8):  
1) Restricted Area in 20 km radius around the nuclear plant where 
entry is prohibited (excluding those engaged in emergency response).  
2) Deliberate Evacuation Area other than Restricted Area, where 
annual cumulative radiation dose was expected to reach 20 mSv per year. 
Overnight stay is prohibited but it is permitted to pass through or commute to 
workplace (in case continued operation is approved by local authority).  
3) Evacuation prepared areas in case of emergency57 - 20-30 km 
radius from Fukushima nuclear plant where certain groups (pregnant women, 
with special needs) are not permitted.  
4) Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation - sites with a 
cumulative dose of 20 mSv/y and above. 
In the end of 2011 the government decided to rearrange the areas to 
which evacuation orders have been issued into following categories (Map 9):  
1) Areas to which evacuation orders are ready to be lifted - it is 
confirmed that the annual integral dose of radiation will definitely be below 
20mSv. People can pass through the areas along main roads, return home 
temporarily (staying overnight is prohibited), and enter the areas for the 
purpose of public benefit. They can also resume businesses such as 
                                                          
55
 Evacuation order was placed on March 15, 2011. A high percentage of residents of 
Minamisoma, Kawamata and Iitate received information from TV, radio or the internet [The 
National Diet of Japan, 2012]. The Mayor of Namie recounted that he made desision for 
evacuation on March 12 after learing from tv and there was not directives from government 
[Pushpalal et al., 2013]. 
56
 Population of 11 municipalities in six towns and villages (Tomioka, Okuma, Futaba, 
Namie, Katsurao and Iitate) of about 81,000 had to be evacuated from the no-entry zone 
after nuclear disaster. 
57
 Lifted on September 30, 2011. 
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manufacturing and conduct related maintenance, repair, or transport 
activities. Resuming farming depends on the degree of limitation on rice 
planting and the extent to which radiation has been removed from the ground. 
For hospitals, welfare facilities, or shops, work is limited to that for preparation 
for resuming businesses.  People are not required in principle to take or carry 
out protection measures, such as screening or measures to control the 
radiation dose when they enter the areas temporarily. 
 
Map 8. Restricted, Deliberate evacuation,     Map 9. Present status of evacuation 
Specific spots areas (September 30, 2011)    and restricted areas (March 30, 2014)58 
 
Source: Ministry Economy, Trade, Industry    Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014               
            
2) Areas in which residents are not permitted to live – the annual 
integral dose of radiation is expected to be 20 mSv or more. People can 
temporarily return home in the areas (but staying overnight is prohibited), 
                                                          
58
 On April 1, 2014 evacuation order for a portion of Miyakoji District, Tamura City was 
lifted, which was the first complete lifting in the initial “no go zone”. On October 2014 
evacuation advisory was lifted for bulk of Kawauchi village within 20 km of nuclear plant 
(status of western part of village also changed to a zone preparing for lifting of evacuation 
advisory). According to many these will be a test wether people would be ready to return 
back to areas surrounding nuclear plant [Fukushima Minpo News, October 1, 2014]. 
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pass through the areas along main roads, and enter the areas for the purpose 
of public benefit, such as for repairing the infrastructure or conducting 
disaster prevention-related work. Entry is not recommended but allowed 
during daytime. 
3) No entry areas - the annual integral dose of radiation is expected to 
be 20 mSv or more within five years and the current integral dose of radiation 
per year is 50 mSv or more. People are legally required to evacuate from the 
areas, for which physical barriers to entry such as barricades are placed at 
the boundaries of the area. People may temporarily return home to meet 
domestic needs and requirements as far as possible, while those who are in 
charge thoroughly screen people for radiation, control individual doses of 
radiation, and require the people entering the zone to wear protective gear. 
4) Restricted area – 20 km radius from the Fukushima plant (other than 
areas 1, 2, and 3). 
5) Specific spots recommended for evacuation.  
The evacuations greatly reduced (by up to a factor of 10) the levels of 
exposure that would otherwise have been received by those living in 
evacuated areas [United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 
Atomic Radiation, 2013]. 
The overall number of evacuees has decreased significantly and in 
February 2012 there were 342,509 evacuees living in 1,200 municipalities in 
47 prefectures around the country [National Policy Unit, 2012]. Most of them 
(94.1%) were in temporary and public housings59, hospitals etc., some 4.9 % 
lived with relative, friends etc., 97 stayed in hotels and similar facilities, and 
only 58460 remained in evacuation centers (community hall, school etc.) in 2 
prefectures.  
                                                          
59
 By July 2011 there were built 46,081 units of temporary housing (about 88% of planned 
number) and 73% of evacuees had moved into 73% of the temporary housing available 
[World Health Organization, July, 2011]. 
60
 Compared with 41,143 in June 2011 [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
  
50 
The reconstruction process has been progressing rapidly, as most 
evacuees were moved to temporary built houses by September 201161. Some 
evacuees have moved to permanent homes and return to a normal life. Vital 
infrastructure such as major road, railway, harbors, and telecommunications 
network have been quickly restored, and essential public services such as 
hospitals, schools, water and energy supply etc. quickly re-established. In 
recent months there has been considerable progress (decontamination, lifting 
evacuation orders, rebuilding, re-opening administration, hospitals, schools, 
train services, etc.) in some parts of the evacuation zone around the crippled 
nuclear plant as well [NHK World, April 1, April 24, June 2, 2014; The Asahi 
Shinbun, April 7, 2014; The Japan News, June 1, 2014].  
At the same time diverse national and local initiatives for building 
disaster resilient towns have been in progress, including the collective 
relocation of residential areas to safe places such as higher ground in 276 
districts in 26 municipalities62, and the readjustment and leveling of land for 
residential areas in 58 districts in 19 municipalities [Reconstruction Agency, 
2014]. Latest data indicates that while 81% of planed housing reconstruction 
started merely 11% have been completed63 [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
There are still more than 247,000 evacuated people living in temporary 
housing and other makeshift facilities nationwide (Figure 4). What is more, a 
significant number of them live outside home prefectures – e.g. in the end of 
August 2014 as many as 47,149 former Fukushima residents are living 
outside the prefecture, 6,974 people from Miyagi prefecture, and 1,513 from 
Iwate prefectures. Furthermore, many evacuees have been moved multiple 
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 At the same time only 99 evacuees were reported living is shelters in July 2013 and 
none since then [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
62
 It is estimated that 22,000 households need to be resettled to higher ground or further in 
land in the 3 disaster prefectures, including 6,900 in Ishinomaki, 3,000 in Higashi 
Matsushima, and 2,000 in Sendai [Yonekura, 2013]. The resettlement project budget for 5 
years is 350 billion yen (out of 19 trillion yen of the overall Reconstruction budget). 
63
 Construction of public houses in most affected 3 prefectures is expected to complete in 
2015 and private houses in 2017. 
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times before settling to a “permanent” place or returning home64 [NHK, 
August 4, 2014].  
 
Figure 4. Evolution of number of evacuees in post disaster years 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, National Police Unit 
 
In August 2014, a great portion of the evacuees still lives in “temporary 
housing, etc.” (93.38%) as most of them are in “private sector houses” 
(110,339 people in 46,221 houses), a significant portion “in temporary 
houses” (93,017 people in 42,590 houses), and the rest in “public houses, 
etc.”  (21,979 people in 8,201 houses) [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
In Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures more than 90,000 people 
live in makeshift housing [The Japan News, September 12, 2014]. In the end 
of July 2014 the occupancy rate of temporary housing stood at 79% in Iwate 
prefecture, 80% in Miyagi prefecture, and 78% in Fukushima prefecture, while 
only a faction of planned public housing were completed - 12.7% in Iwate, 
9.8% in Miyagi and 7.3% in Fukushima prefecture.  
Continued use of the makeshift facilities65 has been an issue as their 
conditions rapidly deteriorate (damages, bacteria, etc.). Recent deadly 
                                                          
64
 E.g. in the year after the accident around 70% of residents of Futaba, Okuma, Tomioka, 
Naraha and Namie had to evacuate four times or more [The National Diet of Japan, 2012]. 
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mudslides also caused fear about the safety of makeshift housing residents 
since some of these houses were built in sediment related “caution zones”66 
[The Japan News, November 2, 2014]. 
The construction of public housing has remained slow, with only about 
10% of planned 30,000 new low-rent units completed in most affected Miyagi, 
Iwate and Fukushima prefectures by the end of August, 2014 [NHK World, 
September 10, 2014]. According to the officials selecting locations and 
acquiring land plots take time as well limited availability of workers and 
building materials have been delaying factors. Recent data indicate that about 
330 of the completed units in 19 municipalities are unoccupied while in other 
locations applicants outnumber the available units67. 
The progress in projects to relocate tsunami stricken communities has 
also been slow and merely 10% of the areas planned for relocated 
communities had been developed by the end of January 2014 [NHK World, 
March 11, 2014]. A new town is coming to existence in Tamaura-Nishi district 
of Iwanuma (Miyagi Prefecture), where residential land has been developed 
for a collective relocation project [The Japan News, September 11, 2014]. 
About 60% of about 1,800 people who lived in the city’s six districts along the 
tsunami hit coast will move into the housing units. The new town will have 
336 residences, including 178 publicly operated housing units scheduled to 
be completed by the end of the fiscal 201468. Bus services started in October 
2014, but a large supermarket is set to be opened in summer 2015. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
65
 In principle, people are allowed to live in temporary housing for up to two years but the 
maximum period was extended to five years in Iwate and Miyagi under a special measure 
for areas hit by large-scale disasters, and until the end of March 2016 in Fukushima. 
66
 in August 2014 a wave of mudslides swept away houses in such caution zones in 
Hiroshima. In Miyagi and Iwate prefectures 52 still live in temporary housing and 
governments are considering to transfer residents in such areas to other locations. 
67
 vacancy is attributed to the changing needs of evacuees during delayed reconstruction – 
e.g. many people started rebuilding their lives by finding jobs and homes in communities 
where they had moved while some simply cannot afford to move again. 
68
 some people have already started to live in 27 newly built residences, 120 housing units 
are currently being constructed, while other residences have yet to be built. 
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The post disaster reconstruction has been much more delayed in 
Fukushima prefecture [The Japan News March 11, 2014]. A mid October 
public opinion poll indicated that for 86% of voters reconstruction work “has 
not progressed at all,” or “has not sufficiently progressed” [The Japan News, 
October 28, 2014]. 
More than three and held years after the accident about 127,000 
Fukushima prefecture residents are still displaced, of which 101,000 are from 
the “Evacuation Order Area”69 [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. The number of 
evacuees within Fukushima prefecture is 81,00070, and most of them 
(92,59%) are living in temporary houses (including private), 4,94% are in 
employees houses, etc., and the rests are staying in houses of relatives and 
friends. 
Furthermore, around 45,000 of Fukushima evacuees are still evacuated 
outside71 the prefecture [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. Most of them are in 
Tokyo (6,300), Yamagata (4,700), Nigata (4,100), Ibaraki (3,400) and Chiba 
(3,300) prefectures. Available data show that 81% of them live in the 
temporary housing complexes including apartments or civil servants 
housings, and the rest stay with relatives and friends [Fukushima Prefecture 
Government, 2014].  
About 40% of the first batch of public housing for people displaced by 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster will not be ready by the end of fiscal 201572, 
forcing those who evacuated to wait longer for permanent homes [Fukushima 
Minpo News, August 5, 2014]. According to the prefecture it takes longer than 
expected to conclude deals with landowners of construction sites for large 
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 Incl. 32,000 from Evacuation lifting preparation area, 23,000 from Residence restricted 
areas, and 25,000 from Returnnig back difficult areas [Reconstriction Agency, 2014]. 
70
 about 24,000 people of them evacuated to Iwaki and an increasing number have 
resettled in the city [The Japan News, October 28, 2014]. 
71
 only reported to government number. It is assumed that actual number should be higher. 
72
 In August 2014 prefectural government revealed that 1,600 housing units of first 3,700 
planned will likely face delays up to 9 months (residents scheduled to move in by March 
2016). More 1,190 expected to be built in same period are likely to be delayed by a year. 
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housing complexes while work to transform forests and rice paddies into 
residential land is also going slowly. 
The cleaning up and disposal of enormous amount of earthquake and 
tsunami debris has been largely completed in Miyagi and Iwate prefectures 
but still legging behind in Fukushima prefecture [Reconstruction Agency, 
2014]. Decontamination of lands, houses, roads etc. in the evacuation and 
other contaminated zones has been a complex and slow process with less 
than a half of houses decontaminated in the three most affected prefectures.  
About 70% of monitored 58 municipalities in 7 prefectures had 
completed or almost completed decontamination by the end of March 2014 
while remaining 16 failed to meet initial deadline as 12 cities and towns have 
sought extensions from 1 to 3 years of government funding for the clean up 
[NHK World, May 15, 2014]. 
The decontamination has not been proceeding as planned in 
evacuation zone as well [NHK World, June 10, 2014]. The Environment 
Ministry was planning to finish decontaminating 11 cities, towns and villages 
by the end of March 2014 but extended the decontamination period for 6 of 
them by 2 to 3 years.  
About 17,500 households were registered in the high-radiation 
evacuation zones as of April 2014 [NHK World, June 25, 2014]. All 24,500 
former residents in 7 municipalities in no-entry zone remain evacuees [NHK 
World, June 23, 2014]. In no entry areas there are 9,100 homes designated 
as unsuitable for living for a long period of time since radiation exposure 
exceeds 50 millisieverts per year. The government has yet to decide whether 
to conduct full-scale operations to remove the radioactive materials because 
it is unclear whether decontamination will be effective and feared that workers 
may be exposed to high levels of radiation. 
What is more, experimental decontamination results show that current 
decontamination technology has limits and considerable time would be 
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needed to clean up tainted areas73. Radiation levels in some areas near the 
damaged nuclear plant have been more than halved due to decontamination 
but still remain high [NHK World, June 10, 2014]. For instance, radiation 
levels in residential districts of Namie town averaged 3.26 to 8.47 
microsieverts per hour (about 40 to 50% of the pre-decontamination levels) 
and in Futaba town averaged 3.01 to 4.46 microsieverts per hour (about 20 to 
30% of the pre-decontamination levels). These figures are more than 10 
times higher than the government set level (0.23 microsieverts per hour) that 
requires decontamination. Consequently, the government will consider 
whether to carry out full-scale decontamination of such areas after asking 
former residents whether they hope to return to hometowns as well as 
receiving suggestions on reconstructing the no entry areas. 
This estimate suggests that decontamination work may reduce radiation 
levels at no entry zones below the government set maximum annual 
threshold of 20 millisieverts in 10 years [NHK World, June 23, 2014]. In 
places with an annual radiation reading of 100 millisieverts, decontamination 
would lower levels to a range of 9 to 19 millisieverts by 2021 while areas with 
50 millisieverts would see a drop to between 6 and 11 millisieverts74. 
Nevertheless, radiation levels in no-go zones are expected to remain far 
above the internationally recommended safe level even a decade after the 
nuclear disaster75. 
Besides, the progress in decontamination work does not necessarily 
mean residents’ return is smooth [The Japan News, October 28, 2014]. For 
example, evacuation instructions were lifted in eastern parts of the 
Miyakojimachi district in Tamur in April 2014 but only about one third of the 
                                                          
73
 carried at 6 locations in October 2013 - January 2014 in areas regarded as unsuitable 
for living (annual exposure to radiation exceed 50 millisieverts). 
74
 Based on a hypothetical model (person spends 8 hours/day outdoors and lives in 
wooden house). If decontamination does not take place, annual radiation reading of 100 
mSv would naturally drop to 37 mSv by 2021, and a reading of 50 mSv would drop to 19. 
75
 According to the International Commission on Radiological Protection the average 
person should not be exposed to more than one millisievert annually. 
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354 registered residents have returned until October (mostly elderly). This is 
largely because living circumstances in the district have not returned to 
previous state76.  
August 2014 survey in Namie and Tomioka indicated that 50% of 
former residents have made decision “never return to hometowns” [NHK 
World, October, 2014]. The later figure was much higher than in 2013 
indicating that some “undecided” have taken decision not to return for a good 
because of difficulties (e.g. lack of infrastructure, sufficient government 
support, etc.) and risks77. 
In December 2013 the government compiled new guidelines for helping 
people affected by the nuclear accident including financial assistance for 
residents who plan to return home because their evacuation orders have 
been lifted and those who need to move elsewhere. For residents of areas 
where evacuation orders are still in place, the government will cover the cost 
of purchasing homes if people want to start new lives elsewhere, and provide 
a lump sum compensation for mental distress they could suffer after 2017. 
Many evacuees have been refusing to return back even after 
decontamination is completed because of the persisting high radiation in 
forests around houses, and some hot spots in neighboring areas. That is 
especially true for the younger generation who chose to stay away because 
of the health risk, and destructed business and community infrastructure 
(schools, medical facilities), etc.  
In some cases (e.g. Kawauchi village) there has been a drop in the 
radiation levels78 and improvements in infrastructure but the government 
                                                          
76
 Before the disaster residents were able to reach hospitals and large commercial facilities 
in Okuma in about 30 minutes by car, which is still in evacuation zone. 
77
 In 2013 one third of evacuees from Namie responded that they will never return because 
“there is no hope of radiation levels decreasing”, “the nuclear accident will not be brought 
under control”, and “”it will be difficult to rebuild social infrastructure” [Pushpalal et. al., 
2013]. 70% of who want to return, certain conditions have to be met such as decrease in 
radiation levels, rebuilding infrastructure, and having certain portion of residents returning. 
78
 by average of 63% from prior to decontamination work and bellow safety standards. 
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postpone removal of the evacuation advisory after consultations with and 
opposition by residents [The Japan News, July 14, 2014]. Residents in the 
area where the evacuation advisory was lifted on October 1, 2014 numbered 
275 of 139 families, out of total, 48 people of 22 families have applied for 
long-term stays at their homes79 [Fukushima Minpo News, October 1, 2014]. 
For some places there is no clear timetable for the end of 
decontamination and rebuilding process. Consequently, evacuees have been 
rebuilding their new life and business in other places. For instance, 67% of 
the Okuma evacuees who answered a government questionnaire in October 
2013 said they did not wish to return home under current conditions [NHK 
World, July 3, 2014]. They have been asking for more public support to 
acquire new houses outside hometown not seeing any prospect of restoring 
infrastructure, as radiation levels remain high, and their houses and farmland 
ruined. Evacuees are also having concerns about the safety of an 
intermediate storage facility for nuclear waste, which will be built in the town.  
According to the evacuees the compensation from TEPCO and other 
financial aid they have been receiving is not enough to rebuild their lives 
[NHK World, July 3, 2014]. They asked the Okuma government to request 
more state compensation for evacuees who have given up returning home 
rather than for decontamination. They also called on the municipal 
government to present support measures for them as the head of the district 
suggesting “the town government should work not only for evacuees hoping 
to return home but also for those giving up the idea”.  
In many places diverse organizations have been set up to support 
residents who will return. For instance, a community-based organization has 
been set up to support residents who will return to Naraha town after the 
evacuation order is lifted80 [NHK World, June 30, 2014]. The support 
organization (including three officials and volunteers) will provide services 
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 53.5% of population (2,758) live inside the village on a temporary or permanent basis. 
80
 early 2015 after decontamination work is over. 
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such as keeping the houses in order, weeding residents' gardens, building 
ties among residents, and consultations on radiation exposure. 
Data suggests that more and more evacuees have been settling down 
permanently away from hometowns [NHK World, June 25, 2014]. Residents 
of evacuation zones are entitled to tax reductions if they acquire a new house 
or land while they have to live elsewhere and such was given to nearly 1,400 
applicants during the fiscal year that ended in March, 201481. 
Major reasons for the slow progress of reconstruction and returning 
back of the evacuees have been: a slow pace of decontamination of lands, 
existing hotspots and restricted mobility in evacuated areas, difficulties of land 
acquisition for building cites, series difficulties in safe disposal of 
contaminated soil and debris, population fears regarding radiation hazards, 
lack of job opportunities, unrestored critical services and infrastructure, 
problems for attracting bids from contractors, spikes in construction material 
prices and manpower shortages, absence of communities consensus for 
certain projects, uncertainty for future developments, etc. [The Japan News, 
March 4, March 11, April 3, April 4 and April 11, 2014; Hasegawa, 2013; 
Matanle, 2012; NHK World, March 11, May 8, May 29, 2014].  
According to the mayors in most affected prefectures many among 
them do not expect reconstruction work to be completed by the end of fiscal 
2015 [The Japan News, March 4, 2014]. Many residents of evacuated towns 
and villages require “more decontamination” before allowed returning home 
[The Japan News, April 3, 2014; NHK World, May 8, 2014)]. Some part of the 
population also think that more efforts have to be concentrated on areas that 
were damaged by the earthquake (rather than the tsunami and radiation) that 
need to be rebuilt [The Japan Times, March 19, 2014]. 
All these issues have caused further pressure to accelerate 
reconstruction process and pledge by the government people to feel not only 
“the hard side of reconstruction, but also reconstruction of their hearts” [Abe, 
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 more than twice the number of cases in the previous year. 
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2014]. It has also lead to a shift from the previous policy (December, 2013) of 
“eventually having all those who were forced to live as evacuees return 
home” and include support measures for evacuees who have decided to live 
elsewhere than their hometown”. 
In June 2014 the Reconstruction Agency announced that the 
government is granting about 80 million dollars to Fukushima prefecture and 
its 16 municipalities to assist local rebuilding projects (such as designing 
public rental housing for returning residents who had to evacuate), for 
resumption of farming and industrial activities, etc. [NHK World, June 17, 
2014]. That money is part of about 1.6 billion dollars earmarked by the 
government to help local governments jump start projects in areas where 
evacuation orders have been being lifted hoping that will speed up rebuilding 
efforts in areas that experienced delays because of evacuation orders. 
Fukushima prefectural government estimates that ¥3.9 trillion will be needed 
for reconstruction work over a 10-year period from fiscal 2016 [The Japan 
News, October 28, 2014]. 
The process of evacuation and reconstructions has been associated 
with a number of challenges such as: failure for timely evacuation from 
certain highly contaminated areas, slow response of authorities, lack of 
sufficient public information in the first stages of the disasters, mistrust to 
public and private institutions, multiple displacements of many evacuees, 
divided communities and families, bad communication between different 
organizations, lack of financial resources, insufficient manpower and building 
materials, ineffective use of public funds, discrimination toward some 
evacuees, emotional conflicts between evacuees (about “self-evacuation”, 
compensations, rebuilding modes), insufficient and unequal compensation, 
substandard labor conditions for decontamination workers, increased number 
of individual and organized criminal cases, numerous lawsuits against 
TEPCO and authorities, revisions in national energy, disaster prevention etc. 
policies, etc. [Akiyama et al. 2012; Fukushima Minpo News, February 17, 
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March 13, 2014; Hasegawa, 2013; The Japan News, March 4, March 6, 
March 11, March 12, March 27, April 4, 2014; The Japan Times, March 13, 
2014; NHK World, March 13, June 12, 2014; Manoliu, 2014]. 
The 2011 disasters occurred at areas that had been facing problems of 
depopulation and aging [Nemoto, 2014]. Populations of prefectures hardest 
hit by the disasters have continued to decline during the last 3 years [NHK-
World, March 11, 2014]. In Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures total 
population dropped by more than 132,000 between March 1, 2011 and 
February 1, 2014. In the first year the population declined by about 85,000 as 
many people died or were evacuated, in the second year, the number fell by 
29,000, and the third year by 17,00082.  
Fukushima prefecture has seen the largest population decline in post 
disaster years - 86,077 people since March 1, 2011 (Figure 5). What is more 
there has been significant decline in age groups up to 65, and increase in 
older population83. 
 
Figure 5. Population dynamics in Fukushima prefecture  
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
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 Populations began rising recently in some stricken areas (Iwanuma, Miyagi) due to 
progress in community relocation projects and in some urban areas (Sendai and Morioka). 
83
 Currently, 27.3% of the total population is older than 65, of which 53.6% older than 75. 
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Most people especially younger one have been reluctant to return to 
home places due to the health risk, lack of basic infrastructure and services, 
reduced employment opportunities etc. What is more, the overall population 
has been decreasing due to out-migration since the nuclear accident (Figure 
6). 
 
Figure 6. Number of intra-prefectural migrants, in-migrants, out-
migrants and net losses in population in Fukushima prefecture 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
 
The most recent data show that Fukushima prefecture saw its 
population fall at a slower pace of 0.72% in 201384, which is seen by officials 
as an indicator that the impact of the nuclear accident has softened [The 
Japan News, June 25, 2014]. On the other hand, Miyagi prefecture registered 
a 0.06% increase apparently due to a rise in the number of people moving to 
take part in reconstruction work. 
In 2011 Fukushima's fertility rate fell 0.04 point from the previous year 
to 1.48 and another 0.07 point to 1.41 in 2012 [Fukushima Minpo News, June 
5, 2014]. In 2013 the number of newborn babies in the prefecture was 14,546 
last year or up 776 from 2012. The total fertility rate stood at 1.53 which was 
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the levels prevailing in the years immediately before the disasters. The later 
increase was the largest among all Japanese prefectures and boosted 
prefectural rate to the 15th highest level across the nation (from 33rd in 
2012). 
All that has been a consequence of policy measures of the prefectural 
government to cope with a population decline including improved childbearing 
and rearing environment offering free medical care for young people aged 18 
or less, increasing indoor play areas and expanding a scheme for detecting 
radioactive materials in school lunch meals, among other things.  
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Chapter 4. Economic damages and impacts 
 
The earthquake, tsunami and the nuclear accident have caused 
immense damages in North-eastern Japan and beyond. They affected 
directly 62 municipalities in six prefectures, among them 28 in the three worst 
affected prefectures85 [International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2012].  
The latest figure shows that 1,220,360 buildings in 20 prefectures have 
been damaged from the earthquake and tsunami, out of which 10.43% totally 
collapsed, 22.35% half destroyed, and the rest partially damaged, flooded or 
burned down (Table 9). The biggest property damages have been registered 
in Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and Iwate prefectures.  
Most of the totally and half destroyed buildings were from coastal 
municipalities - 94% and 75% accordingly86. According to experts 42% of 
damages to buildings come from the earthquake, 39% from the tsunami, and 
19% from the nuclear disaster [Daniell et al., 2011]. 
In addition, there have been reports for numerous damaged roads, 
bridges, dikes, railways and landslides in 14 prefectures (Table 10).  
In the three most affected prefectures the March 2011 disaster left 
approximately 2,580,000 households without electricity supply, around 
420,000 households without gas supply, about 1,660,000 households without 
Liquefied Petroleum gas supply, and approximately 2,300,000 with 
interrupted water supply [Government of Japan, 2012]. 
The triple disaster has cased destruction of many businesses, which 
incurred big direct and indirect losses in certain sectors (manufacturing, 
energy, transport, agri-food, etc.) and supply chains in Japan and worldwide 
[Fujita et al. 2012; Government of Japan, 2012; OECD, 2013; UFJ, 2011].  
                                                          
85
 computer servers in some municipalities were damaged or destroyed, resulting in a loss 
of data. 221 public officials died or remain missing from 17 municipalities in 3 prefectures. 
86
 coastal municipalities generally go much inland and therefore not impacted by the 
tsunami. 
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Table 9. Number of property damages associated with March 2011 
earthquake (February 10, 2014) 
Prefec-
tures 
Totally 
coll-
apsed 
Half 
coll-
apsed 
Total 
burn 
down 
Part-
ial 
burn 
down 
Floo-
ded  
above 
floor 
Floo-
ded 
bellow 
floor 
Partially 
dam-
aged 
Non 
dwe-
lling 
house 
Hokkaido - 4 - - 329 545 7 469 
Aomori 308 701 - - - - 1006 1402 
Iwate 19107 6598 33 - 6 18554 4368 
Miyagi 82911 155086 135 - 7796 222893 28893 
Akita - - - - - - 3 3 
Yamagata - - - - - - 2 96 
Fukushima 21235 73388 77 3 1061 338 167211 1117 
Tokyo 15 198 1 - - - 4847 1101 
Ibaraki 2628 24327 31 1799 779 185795 19949 
Tochigi 261 2118 - - - - 73246 295 
Gunma - 7 - - - - 17246 - 
Saitama 24 199 1 1 - 1 1800 33 
Chiba 801 10121 15 157 731 54931 660 
Kanagawa - 41 - - - - 459 13 
Nigata - - - - - - 17 9 
Yamanashi - - - - - - - 4 
Shizuoka - - - - - 5 13 9 
Mie - - - - 2 - - 9 
Tokushima - - - - 2 9 - - 
Kochi - - - - 2 8 - - 
Total 127290 272788 297 3352 10218 747989 58426 
Source: National Police Agency 
 
There have been considerable damages in agriculture, fishery and 
forestry sectors. Around 23,600 hectares of farmland were washed away or 
flooded by the tsunami as well as considerably salinized by the seawaters 
[Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. In Aomori, Iwate and 
Miyagi prefectures approximately 4,550,000 poultry, 5,850 hogs, and 750 
beef cattle were drowned, crushed or starved [Tohoku Regional Agricultural 
  
65 
Administration, 2011]. In addition, large areas of farmland have been 
contaminated, and many livestock, crops and other products destroyed or 
devaluated due to the Fukushima nuclear disaster [Bachev and Ito, 2013; 
Koyama, 2013; Watanabe, 2013].  
 
Table 10. Places with infrastructure damages associated with March 
2011 earthquake (February 10, 2014) 
Prefectures Damaged 
roads 
Damaged 
bridges 
Landslides Break of 
dikes 
Damaged 
railways 
Aomori 2 - - - - 
Iwate 30 4 6 - - 
Miyagi 390 12 51 45 26 
Akita 9 - - - - 
Yamagata 21 - 29 - - 
Fukushima 187 3 9 - - 
Tokyo 295 55 6 - - 
Ibaraki 307 41 - - - 
Tochigi 257 - 40 - 2 
Gunma 36 - 9 - - 
Saitama 160 - - - - 
Chiba 2343 - 55 - 1 
Kanagawa 160 1 2 - - 
Gifu 1 - - - - 
Total 4198 116 207 45 29 
Source: National Police Agency 
 
In total 28,612 fish vessels, 1,725 common use facilities and 319 
harbors were damaged by the disaster [Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and 
Fisheries, 2014]. In Miyagi, Iwate, and Fukushima prefectures an estimated 
90% of the fishing boats were rendered unusable by the tsunami [The Japan 
Times, April 28, 2011] and almost all fishing-ports destructed [Ministry of 
Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. Similarly, there were desolation of 
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forest lands in 458 points, damaged facilities for forest maintaining and 
conservation in 275 points, damaged forest roads in 2,632 points, damaged 
forests amounting 1,065 ha, damaged cultivating facilities for forest products 
in 476 points, and damaged of processing and marketing facilities, etc. in 115 
points [Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. 
Furthermore, enormous amount of rubble and debris have been created 
by the earthquake and tsunami. In affected 239 municipalities of 13 
prefectures the total amount of disaster debris is estimated to be about 20 
million tons and tsunami deposits around 10 million tons [Reconstruction 
Agency, 2014]. The debris (some of them radioactive) has been an enormous 
obstacle to rescue and impeded reconstruction.  
In the most affected Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures the 
amount of debris and tsunami deposits reached 22.63 million tons 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. In Miyagi prefecture the amount of tsunami-
related debris was 19 times greater than a normal year’s waste while in Iwate 
prefecture it was 11 times greater [International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2012].  
The amount of debris washed out by the tsunami in the three 
prefectures is estimated to be about 5 million tons, 70 % of which deposited 
on seabed along Japan coasts and the remaining 30% becoming floating 
debris87 [Ministry of Environment, 2012]. The debris and tsunami deposits in 
these prefectures have been stored in almost 1,700 temporary cites, debris 
account for more than 60% of the total amount, and around two-third of all 
debris and tsunami deposits are in Miyagi prefecture (Table 11). 
What is more, the nuclear accident has contaminated huge areas of 
lands, property infrastructure, and debris in Fukushima and neighboring 
prefectures (Map 10). Heavily contaminated areas are located in 101 
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 Some debris have been collected or sunk. Therefore, floating debris still drifting are less 
than 1.5 million tons.  
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municipalities of 8 prefectures, and divided into: “Special Decontamination 
Area” (overlapping with Evacuation Order Area), where decontamination and 
waste management is done by the Government, and “Intensive 
Contamination Survey Area”, overseen by the local municipalities. 
 
Table 11. Amount of total and treated debris and tsunami deposits in 
Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima* prefectures (January 31, 2014) 
Prefectures Total amount 
(10000s tons) 
Debris Tsunami deposits 
Amount Treated (%) Amount Treated (%) 
Iwate 556 400 97 145 93 
Miyagi 1,874 1,121 98.7 739 98 
Fukushima 349 174 68.4 78 44 
Total 2,778 1,694 95.2 961 89 
* exclude evacuation area 
Source: Ministry of Environment, 2014 
 
In October 2011, the government announced that it will spend at least 1 
trillion yen ($13 billion) to clean up the vast areas contaminated by radiation 
from the Fukushima nuclear disaster as country faces the prospect of 
removing and disposing 29 million cubic meters of soil from a sprawling area 
in Fukushima and four nearby prefectures [Reuters, October 20, 2011]. 
Furthermore, evacuated zones have become home to an increasing 
number of wild animals like rats, boars and their offspring with domestic pigs, 
which have been causing huge (unaccounted) damages to empty houses and 
farms [NHK World, July 11, 2013, May 6, 2014]. 
The initial official estimate for the direct economic losses from the 
March 2011 disaster was about 16.9 trillion yen ($210 billion USD) or 4% of 
the Gross Domestic Product of Japan88 (Figure 7). The greatest share of 
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 More than twice than the 1995 Great Hanshin Eartquake which caused damage of 
arround ten trillion yen ($102.5) billion or 2.5% of Japan’s GDP at the time [Wikipedia]. 
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damages (61.5%) was for “Buildings, etc. (Housing, offices, plants, 
machinery, etc.)”, followed by “Others (including agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries)” (17.7%), “Social infrastructure (river, road, harbors, drainage, and 
airport, etc.)” (13%) and “Lifeline utilities (water service, gas, electricity, and 
communication and broadcasting facilities” (7.7%). Anticipated damage in the 
sector “Agriculture” accounted for 11.24% of the total amount. 
 
Map 10. Special decontamination (red) &   Figure 7. Estimated economic damages 
Intensive contamination (yellow) areas         of March 2011 earthquake (trillion yens) 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment, 2014             Source: Cabinet Office, June 24, 2011 
 
Most damages have been concentrated in Fukushima, Iwate, and 
Miyagi prefectures where there was a significant destruction of the basic 
infrastructure and the economic activity.  In March 2011 the Index of Industrial 
Production in the country and the most affected areas dropped considerably – 
with 15% and 35% accordingly [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. In March 
2011 the Index expressing Status of Activity declined 30% in Iwate 
prefecture, 40% in Fukushima prefecture and 80% in Miyagi prefecture 
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comparing to the previous month [National Institute for Research 
Advancement, 2013] 
The insured losses from the Great ast Japan Earthquake were 
estimated at ¥2,750 billion, or 16% of total direct economic losses89 [Raghieri 
and Ishiwatari, 2014]. The insurance payouts stemming from the quake had 
reached ¥1,234.6 billion as of May 201290 [Takabe and Inui, 2013]. In 
addition, ¥360.3 billion (as of December 2012) monetary donations were 
distributed to the affected by the disaster via the Japanese Red Cross, the 
Central Community Chest of Japan and local authorities in affected areas. 
There are approximately 80,000 businesses in the tsunami-affected 
areas, 740,000 in the earthquake-affected areas, and 8,000 in the evacuation 
zones of the Fukushima nuclear plant [Tokyo Electric Power Company, 
2012]. The most of them have seen their businesses severely destructed 
after March 2011 [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
The basic economic indicators demonstrate that considerable part of 
the local economy in disaster areas have recovered to approximately pre-
disaster levels. Nevertheless, many challenges still remain especially for 
small and middle size enterprises and certain sectors such as agriculture, 
fishery, food processing etc.  
Up-to-date merely 36.6% of the recipients of Group subsidies for 
recovery and development of facilities (549 groups of approximately 10,000 
business operators) report they have recovered sales above the level before 
the disaster [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. Similarly, only 63% of damaged 
by tsunami agricultural lands have been restored for farming and 78% of 
destructed fishery processing facilities resumed operations.  
                                                          
89
 Residential assets represented 78% of insured losses. Rice is greatly insured but 
insurance did not cover production losses (disaster happened before rice-growing 
season). In Miyagi agricultural insurance scheme covered damages to green-houses of ¥1 
billion. 
90
 General Insurance Association designated specific total loss zones, based on satellite 
imagery and any total loss claims filed from the area did not require additional 
confirmation. Out of ¥1,200 billion generated by 741,000 claim payments made, 60% was 
paid within two months and 90% within five months [Raghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014]. 
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The overall value of agricultural, forestry and fisheries products in 
Fukushima prefecture has declined considerably, and there has been no or 
only a slight recovery in these sectors of the economy (Figure 8). The high 
level of radiation has caused some Fukushima forests to be abandoned and 
there is concern about the long-term management of forestry resources [NHK 
World, May 6, 2014]. 
 
Figure 8. Dynamics of values of agricultural, forestry* and fishery* 
products in Fukushima prefecture 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries           * multiplied by 10 
 
Summer festivals are significant event in Japan in terms of keeping 
tradition and as attracting tourists and overall economic benefits. Data show 
that visitor figures for 14 major summer festivals in Tohoku six prefectures fell 
by 1.01 million or 6.5% from the previous year [The Japan News, July 24, 
2014]. Despite that numbers have been rising with 14.96 million visitors in 
201391, this is still 4.2% fewer than in 2010. In 2013 visitors to the Sendai 
Tanabata, Morioka Sansa Odori and Soma Nomaoi festivals declined, 
                                                          
91
 In addition, 6 prefectural capitals of the region have been hosting the Tohoku 
Rokkon-sai (Festival of the six souls in Tohoku) in rotation since 2011 to support disaster 
reconstruction efforts which draw 200,000 visitors a year [The Japan News, July 24, 2014]. 
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respectively to 2.06 million (down 12.5%), to 1.3 million (down 3.6%) and 
167,000 (down 22.4%) comparing to the pre-disaster period. 
Tourism was an important part of the Fukushima economy and the 
number of overnight stays in hotels and other accommodations dropped more 
than 65% in March 2011 comparing to the same period of 201092 [Tourist 
Agency, 2014]. There has been some recovery in certain parts of the 
prefecture (Figure 9) but the overall level is far bellow the pre-disaster period 
– in December 2013 it was still 26% bellow (comparing to 0.3% up 
nationwide).  
 
Figure 9. Number of overnight stays in hotels and other accommodation 
in Naukomi, Fukushima prefecture 
 
Source: Tourist Agency, 2014 
 
By March 2012 as many as 644 companies in 40 prefectures had been 
forced into bankruptcy by the disaster, including 157 service companies, 150 
manufacturers, and 113 wholesalers [The Japan Times, March 11, 2012]. 
They left behind liabilities of ¥925.4 billion and had employed 11,412 people. 
April-September 2014 data show that the number of corporate bankruptcies 
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 At the same time the national figure declined around 35%. 
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in Japan fell but rose in Tohoku (and Shikoku) for the first time in six years 
[The Japan News, October 10, 2014]. 
In order to support firms in Fukushima prefecture, which are under the 
weight of so-called “double loans”, the Corporation for Revitalizing 
Earthquake Affected Business (a unit of the Deposit Insurance Corporation of 
Japan) set up a special team (May 2014) to extend support  [The Japan 
News, June 6, 2014]. Firms93 need enhanced assistance since they have 
difficulty developing long-term plans for business restoration due to the 
ongoing nuclear crisis. 
Furthermore, land prices94 in disaster hit prefectures grew or slowed the 
pace of reduction in the last year95 as an increasing number of residents 
moved to higher ground from coastal areas [The Japan News, July 2, 2014]. 
In Miyagi prefecture the average land price grew 2.4%, marking the steepest 
growth in the country’s 47 prefectures. In Fukushima land prices rose 0.8% 
rising for the first time in 22 years96.  
Some $30 billion has been paid to 84,000 nuclear accident refugees 
and around $20 billion to 300,000 tsunami survivors in the Tohoku region 
[World Nuclear Association, 2014]. The evacuees received JPY 100,000 
($1,030) per month in psychological suffering compensation, which is tax-
exempt and paid unconditionally. In October 2013, about 84,000 evacuees 
received the payments as an average family of four got about JPY 90 million 
($900,000) in compensation from TEPCO. The average compensation for 
real estate was JPY 49.1 million ($490,000), JPY 10.9 million ($110,000) for 
lost wages, and JPY 30 million ($300,000) as “consolation money” for pain 
and suffering [Asahi Shinbun, October 26, 2013].  
                                                          
93
 Principal repayments began in summer 2014 for some afflicted companies that received 
loans from the government financial institutions. 
94
  “Rosenka” (price of land facing major streets) used to calculate inheritance & gift taxes. 
95
 although average price for country fell for the 6 straight year (dropped by 0.7% in 2013) 
with exception of the 3 major metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya). 
96
 Land prices in evacuation zones have been appraised at zero due to difficulty in 
conducting on-site surveys. 
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In mid April 2011 a Panel to address compensation for nuclear related 
damage acting as intermediary97 established “Guidelines for determining the 
scope of compensation for damage caused by the accident”98. The 
government and nuclear plant operators also established the Nuclear 
Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation99. Some JPY 900 billion 
($11.5 billion) were released to the company through bonds issued to the 
Nuclear Damage Facilitation Fund to cover compensation payments100. In 
February 2012 the government approved a further JPY 690 billion ($8.9 
billion) in compensation support from the Nuclear Damage Liability 
Facilitation Fund giving the government voting rights101. In the end of July 
2012 TEPCO sold the government 50.11% of the voting and 25.73% no 
voting rights shares, and became government-controlled company. 
In June 2013 TEPCO requested a further JPY 666 billion ($6.7 billion) 
in government support through the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation 
Fund, bringing the total amount to JPY 3.79 trillion ($38 billion). More than 
half of the request (some JPY 370 billion, $3.7 billion) resulted from the 
re-evaluation of the evacuation zone around the damaged plant and a 
re-examination of the estimated amount regarding compensation for mental 
damages, loss or depreciation of valuables such as housing lands and 
buildings. About JPY 43 billion ($431 million) was due to a higher estimate of 
                                                          
97
 established within the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, 
led by Law Professor Yoshihisa Nomi of Gakushuin University, Tokyo. 
98
 According to Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage and Law on Contract for 
Liability Insurance for Nuclear Damage TEPCO liability is exclusive & absolute regardless 
of fault [World Nuclear Association, 2014]. Government may relieve operator of liability if 
damage results from “grave natural disaster of exceptional character” (it did not do here). 
99
 It received JPY 7 billion ($91 million) in public funds and JPY 7 billion from 12 nuclear 
plant operators, including TEPCO’s of JPY 2379 million ($30 million).  
100
 a more comprehensive business plan was introduced in March 2012, involving 
compensation payments of JPY 910 billion ($11.6 billion) annually. 
101
 for JPY 1 trillion ($12.5 billion) paid through Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund. 
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compensation coming from damages by “harmful rumors” to the agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, food processing and distribution industries102.  
By mid May 2014 TEPCO had paid JPY 3808 billion ($38 billion) in 
compensation, fairly evenly split between businesses and individuals, based 
on decisions of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation, 
and covered by loans from the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund 
[World Nuclear Association, 2014]. Some $16 billion was distributed evenly 
among 85,000 evacuees ($188,200 each person including children). In 
December 2013 the government raised the upper limit of financial assistance 
from JPY 5 trillion to JPY 9 trillion ($86 billion).  
By the end of November 2013 TEPCO received 2,035,000 applications 
for compensations related to the Fukushima nuclear accidents, and paid a 
total amount of 3,168.7 billion yen [Nomura and Hokugo, 2013]. Until the end 
of January 2013 the biggest amount of compensation was paid to “Natural 
Persons” (48.5%)103, followed by “Legal Persons and Sole Proprietors” 
(30.9%), and “Groups Representing Members” (20.6%) such as Agricultural 
Cooperatives, Fishery Cooperatives, Fukushima Prefecture Residents Health 
Care Fund104, and Others [Nomura and Hokugo, 2013].  
The greatest compensation payments were for demands from 
Fukushima prefecture (75%), followed by Kanto region (17.1%), Hokkaido 
and Tohoku region (4.6%), and Other regions (3.2%).  “Mental anguish” and 
“Damage from incapacity of work” took the largest portion of compensation 
payments to Natural persons (Figure 10). Most compensation payments to 
                                                          
102
 As restrictions on shipment of foodstuffs from affected area continue an additional JPY 
240 billion ($2.4 billion) was included to cover for the further compensation claims. 
103
 TEPCO has been paying 100,000 yen (USD990) a month to each residents who was 
forced to evacuate – figure calculated by referring to approximate 120,000 yen monthly 
benefit that is paid through automobile liability insurance to hospitalized as a result of 
traffic accident [Pushpalal et al. 2013]. Local government argue that figure is low and ask 
for monthly compensation for psychological duress be increased to 350,000 yen. 
104
 Fund received by Fukushima prefectural government for financing long-term healthcare 
of residents. 
  
75 
Legal Persons and Sole Proprietors105 were for “Lost earning” (94.5%), and 
for applicants from Evacuation Areas (other than agriculture), Tourisms and 
Service industries (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 10. Share of TEPCO payments to Natural Persons by damage 
categories (%) 
 
Source: Nomura and Hokugo, 2013 
 
The nuclear disaster and the suspension of nuclear reactors has been 
also a severe blow for the nuclear industry in the country. For instance, 
TEPCO logged a net loss of ¥173.26 billion, against the year before profit of 
¥437.93 billion, due to a special loss of ¥218.8 billion for compensation for the 
crisis at Fukushima nuclear power plant [The Japan News, August 1, 2014]. It 
logged a group recurring profit of ¥52.51 billion in April-June 2014 against a 
loss of ¥29.49 billion a year before, marking the first profit for the period in 4 
years106. Meanwhile, four other regional power suppliers107 suffered group 
                                                          
105
 not including  payments to farmers, fishermen and others who apply through “Group 
Representing Victims”. 
106
 It reflects electricity rate increase under system allowing power firms to pass higher fuel 
costs for thermal power generation on to customers. Group sales in first quarter of FY2014 
rose 9.1%, labor costs grow 18.5%, while fuel costs fell 1.8% (thermal power efficiency). 
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recurring losses of ¥74.7 billion, due largely to hefty costs for fuel for thermal 
power generation with total recurring losses108.  
 
Figure 11. Share of TEPCO payments to Legal Persons and Sole 
Proprietors by damage categories (%) 
 
Source: Nomura and Hokugo, 2013 
 
The macroeconomic impact of the March 2011 disaster has been also 
significant (Figure 12). Country’s real Gross Domestic Product contracted 
almost 4% during January-March 2011 (comparing to 2010), and Japan has 
been experiencing a trade deficit as a result of the increased import.  
Nevertheless, the share of Tohoku region and the three most affected 
prefectures in Japan’s GDP and population is small - 8% and 4% accordingly 
[Statistics Bureau, 2012]. Besides, the disaster created a big demand for 
jobs, incentives for investments, and potential for economic growth 
associated with the recovery and reconstruction businesses (relief, rebuilding, 
decontamination, innovation etc.). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
107
 Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Kansai Electric Power Co., Kyushu Electric Power Co. 
and Okinawa Electric Power Co. 
108
 smaller than combined year before recurring losses of ¥233 billion at 9 of 10 utilities. 
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Figure 12. Evolution of GDP, export and import of Japan 
 
Source: Statistics Bureau, MIAC, 2014 
 
What is more, there has been a huge government budget for recovery, 
reconstructions, compensations and development. Following the disaster, the 
Government approved two supplementary budgets of 6.14 trillion yens for 
relief and recovery (May and July 2011), and launched a ten-year 
reconstruction program (focusing on Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate 
prefectures) with expended budget of 25 trillion yens for the period 2011-2015 
[Government of Japan, 2012; Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
For instance, the government has promoted the “Japan As One’ Work 
Project” as countermeasures against employment during the restoration 
stage, which resulted in the job placement of over 64,000 people in the 
disaster-hit 3 prefectures by October 2011 [Ministry of Health Labor and 
Welfare, 2011]. With the compilation of the Project 580,000 jobs are expected 
to be generated. 
Subsequently, there has been a rapid recovery of infrastructure and 
economic activities in the country, including the most affected regions. By 
March 2013 the Index expressing status of recovery of basic infrastructure in 
Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima prefecture reached 91%, 88% and 81.1% 
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accordingly (National Institute for Research Advancement, 2013). At the 
same time the national Activity Status Index augmented by 14.8% comparing 
to the pre-disaster period, with appositive dynamic in Iwate prefecture (1.6%) 
and staying still bellow the pre-disaster level in Miyagi (93.6%) and 
Fukushima (82.2%) prefectures. 
There has been a sizeable or complete recovery of damaged lifeline 
infrastructure in the months after the disaster – e.g. 96% of Electricity, 86% of 
Gas, 95% of LP Gas, 99% of Fixed line and Wireless phones, 100% of Mail 
delivery and Gas stations (as of October 2012), 98% of Water and 90% of 
healthcare facilities (as of March 2012) and 92% of public school facilities (as 
of March 2013) [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
Similarly, there has been substantial progress in recovery and 
reconstruction of long-term infrastructures such as land, transportation 
networks, utilities, fish processing facilities, etc. (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. State of full-scale recovery and reconstruction of public 
infrastructure after Great East Japan Earthquake (July, 2014)* 
 
*farmland, and healthcare, school, and fish processing facilities (March, 2014), 
Aquaculture facilities (December 2012) 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014      
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The progress of reconstruction of different type of public infrastructure 
has not been similar in different affected areas. For instance, in Fukushima 
prefecture reconstruction started in 85% of planed cites, and in 65% have 
already completed (Figure 14). In Aizu and Nakadori regions progress has 
been substantial – in 100% and 99% of planed cites (26 and 536 accordingly) 
construction has been completed. On the other hand, in coastal Hamadori 
region in a fifth of planed (1,537) cites reconstruction has not started yet 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
 
Figure 14. Progress in reconstruction of public infrastructure in 
Fukushima prefecture, July 1, 2014 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014 
 
There has been also a constant recovery of sales of all industries in 
most affected prefectures (Figure 15). However, the rate of post-disaster 
recovery has not bee similar in all sectors of affected industry. There is a fast 
and above pre-disaster recovery of construction industry. On the other hand, 
the recovery in wholesale, service, and food processing industries has been 
slower. For instance, comparing with the same period of 2010 for January-
March 2014 the number of guests in hotel rooms in affected 6 prefectures 
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was 14.3% lower, and in most affected 3 prefectures 10.6% lower while there 
was a growth of 1.4% nationwide [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
 
Figure 15. Percent of sales recovery comparing to pre-disaster state in 
“Group subsidy recipients”, July 2013 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014 
 
Economy of the three main affected prefectures has been showing a 
positive employment trend, with the ratio of job offers to jobseekers 
consistently higher than the national average since early 2012 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. For instance, in Fukushima prefecture the 
later ration jumped from 0.42 in 2010 to 1.24 in 2013. This trend in affected 
regions is particularly true when it comes to jobs in public welfare, 
construction, transportation industries, the service sector, as well as certain 
specialist skills jobs.  
Furthermore, there has been a boom in technological innovations and 
the new sectors such as energy saving, renewable (solar, wind, biofuel) 
energy, nuclear safety, debris cleaning, processing and disposal, research 
and development, robotics, ITC, no-soil and solar sharing farming etc. with 
huge investments of leading players, numerous new comers, joint ventures, 
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etc. [Asiaone News, June 26, 2013; Fukushima Minpo News, November 7, 
2014; JETRO, 2013; NHK World, June 12, 2012, June 30, July 8, July 25, 
2014; The Japan Times, March 23, 2014].  
For instance, academic and corporate experts developed a technology 
to eliminate 90%-95% of radioactive cesium from fly ash resulting from the 
burning of combustible garbage109 in Fukushima prefecture as a 
demonstration plant for cesium elimination opened in Hirono town 
[Fukushima Minpo News, November 7, 2014]. 
Leading telecommunication and internet corporation SoftBank intends 
to invest in solar and wind power generation in Northeast Japan [NHK World, 
June 20, 2014]. Similarly, the Tokyo metropolitan government is going to 
invest 100 million yen in a project to build a mega solar power plant in the 
Matsukawa district of Fukushima city [Fukushima Minpo News July 1, 2014].  
The government has decided to create a research center110 in 
Fukushima prefecture operated jointly by members of industry, government 
and academia, to bring experts together from all over the world to develop 
improved technologies for decommissioning the crippled reactors at 
Fukushima nuclear plant [The Japan News, June 20, 2014]. The plan pledges 
to bring together 200 domestic and overseas experts with knowledge of 
reactor decommissioning at the joint research center from five countries111  
Nevertheless, there have been differences in the progress of recovery 
between Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures. In Fukushima prefecture 
the overall progress has been lagging behind with regard to the recovery of 
economic activity, including production, consumption, and distribution 
[National Institute for Research Advancement, 2013]. In the three prefectures 
there has been also unlike speed in the infrastructure recovery by individual 
cities, towns and villages. The later have been mostly associated with 
                                                          
109
 In experiment, plant reduced radioactive Cs content of fly ash from 5,100 to 309 Bq/kg.  
110
 International Joint Research Center for Safe Decommissioning will start in FY2016. 
111
 including United States and Russia who were involved in efforts following the 1986 
Chernobyl disaster and the 1979 Three Mile Island crisis. 
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differences in the recovery of rail systems, treatment of debris, education and 
medical care.  
For instance, in Fukushima prefecture merely 68% of debris and 44% of 
tsunami deposits outside the evacuation areas has been treated 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. In the Special Decontamination Area112 the 
progress of implementation of planned decontamination work also differ 
substantially (Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16. Progress in implementation of decontamination work in 
Special Decontamination Area by September 30, 2014 (per cent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment 
 
Similarly, there is a considerable difference in the progress of 
decontamination in Municipality Decontamination Areas113 in Fukushima and 
other prefectures (Figure 17). Furthermore, while the decontamination of 
public facilities (administration facilities, schools, parks and sport facilities, 
                                                          
112
 responsibility of the central government. 
113
 responsibility of local governments in 94 municipalities, including 36 in Fukushima 
prefecture, 19 in Ibaraki, by 9 in Chiba and Gunma, by 8 in Miyagi and Tochigi, 3 in Iwate, 
and 2 in Saitama prefecture [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
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etc.) has been entirely or largely completed114 reaching the end of full 
decontamination will likely take few more years [Reconstruction Agency, 
2014]. 
 
Figure 17. Progress of decontamination of Municipality Decontaminated 
Areas, as of March 2014 (percent) 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency, 2014 
 
Besides, recent media reports indicate that some of the land along the 
coastal area flooded by the tsunami remains unused [NHK World, September 
11, 2014]. Municipal governments hit by the disaster have purchased land in 
the inundated areas hoping the financial assistance will help former residents 
move to higher ground away from the sea. However, according to 25 
municipalities in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures they have so far 
purchased a total of 2,600 ha115 but 37% remains untouched because 
municipalities have no idea how to utilize the land, pieces of land are 
scattered making it difficult to put them to use, and businesses hesitate to 
move into the areas that were once flooded by tsunami.  
There have been also some new challenges associated with the 
reconstruction and decontamination. The government’s employment 
                                                          
114
 E.g. for public facilities, shools, etc. 90% in Fukushima prefectures and 100% outside 
Fukushima prefectures [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. 
115
 for about 2.1 billion dollars. 
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measures seem have resolved unemployment problem but they have been 
turning job seekers away from the traditional local industries like fisheries, 
agriculture, etc. According to the Kesennuma Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry “local companies are beginning to be restored but the government’s 
emergency employment measures have begun to choke off the local key 
industries” [The Japan News, March 01, 2014]. In Kesennuma construction 
workers are now paid about ¥10,000 a day, and those getting jobs via the 
government’s emergency employment program (e.g. patrolling temporary 
housing units) receive about ¥8,000 a day, while the fishery processing firm 
pays only about ¥6,000. 
What is more, there has been a huge proportion of the unused budget 
for the reconstruction – it was announced that 35.3% of the ¥7.51 trillion 
budget set aside in fiscal 2013 to rebuild disaster areas was left unused116 
[The Japan News, July 31, 2014]. The proportion of the unspent funding was 
almost unchanged from fiscal 2012 (35.2%), indicating that the country has 
made little progress in overcoming delays in implementing reconstruction 
projects.  
According to the Reconstruction Agency funds were unutilized because 
it took time to obtain local consent for reviews of reconstruction plans and to 
acquire land as well as because bidding for many reconstruction projects 
ended in failure due in part to price hikes for construction materials 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. The budget implementation rate stood at 
62.8% for projects to assist disaster victims and at 77.5% for projects to 
revitalize industries. But the rate was low, at 47% for reconstruction projects 
related to the nuclear crisis at Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
OECD ranked the March 2011 earthquake as the costliest disaster in 
Japan’s post-war history with 3.5% of GDP in property damage not including 
                                                          
116
 FY2013 consisted of special budget for reconstruction and funds carried over from 
FY2011-2012. Of the total, ¥4.86 trillion executed. Of unused funds, ¥1.96 trillion will be 
carried over to FY2014 and ¥691.7 billion used for projects other than originally planned. 
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the costs of nuclear accident (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2013). There has been a considerable contraction of the real 
GDP growth in 2011 and 2012 comparing to the pre-disaster projections of 
the national and international organizations (Table 12). 
 
Table 12. Macroeconomic impact of Great East Japan Earthquake 
Growth of Gross Domestic Product FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 
Bank of Japan - January 2011 (%) 3.3 1.6 2 
OECD – December 2010 (%) 3.7 1.7 1.3 
Real dynamics (%) 1.3 -0.4 -0.3 
Change real – projected (percentage points) - (2 - 2.4) - (2 - 2.1) - (1.6 – 2.4) 
Source: Bank of Japan, OECD 
 
Recent experts estimates also indicate that the overall macroeconomic 
impact of the disaster (on stock prices, housing prices, and so on) has not 
been so huge117 when compared with the effects of previous crisis such as 
real estate bubble in 1990 and fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008 [Kawaguchi, 
2014]. Most contemporary problems of the Japanese economy have been 
attributed to other factors (structural problems, inefficient policies, weak yen) 
rather than the 2011 disaster [The Japan News, April 23, 2014; OECD, 2013]. 
According to the initial prediction, the March 2011 earthquake is likely to 
be the costliest natural disaster118 in the world history [Kim, 2011]. One year 
after the disaster the direct economic loss from the earthquake and tsunami 
was estimated to be between 237 and 303 billion USD, and from the nuclear 
power plant incident around $65 billion [Vervaeck and Daniell, 2012]. Indirect 
losses were assessed between 185 to 345 billion USD across the 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear plant. 
                                                          
117
 calculated losses in Net Present Income accounts for 3.5 trillion yen for 2011-2012 or 
about 1% of GDP [Waldenberger and Eilker, 2014]. 
118
 Later found that nuclear disaster was a “man made” which could have been prevented. 
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According to the initial estimates of property damages and income 
losses are contrasted with the amounts shouldered by the insurance industry, 
TEPCO, donors and the government, those directly affected will on average 
have to come up for about 23% of the overall losses (Table 13). That 
catastrophe might turn out as the most expensive but the burden for the 
insurance industry will likely be lower119 since the low proportion of individuals 
with earthquake insurance in Japan120.  
 
Table 13. Distribution of costs related to Great East Japan Earthquake 
 Organizations and type of costs Amount (billion yen) Share of B Share of C 
Property and Life Insurances  2,295 9.3 10.2 
TEPCO 151 0.6 0.7 
Government 16,133 65.7 72 
Donations 298 1.2 1.3 
Total (A) 18,877 76.8 84.2 
Damage through property losses -16,900   
Costs for cleanup operations -845   
Income losses 2011 -6,822   
Total losses (B) -25,412   
Income losses for 2011 and 2012 -4,670   
Medium-term losses (C) -23,260   
Short-term difference (B – A) -6,535 23.2  
Medium-term difference (C – A) -4,383  15.8 
   Source: Waldenberger and Eilker 
 
Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty about the full costs related to the 
nuclear accident. The process of compensation of victims, decommissioning 
of the nuclear plant, and decontamination, rebuilding businesses and social 
life in affected areas will last many years and incur enormous costs.  
                                                          
119
 E.g. in the case of the hurricane Katrina (2005). 
120
 End of March 2010 only 23% of all private households were insured, including in Miyagi 
33%, in Fukushima 14%, and Iwate 12% [Waldenberger and Eilker, 2014]. 
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For instance, the total number of applications and lawsuits for damages, 
and the type and requested amount of compensations from TEPCO are not 
publicly known121. According to the recent information TEPCO has paid about 
¥3.53 trillion in compensation using government bonds while the total amount 
of compensation is estimated to be about ¥4.91 trillion [The Japan News, 
March 12, 2014]. According to the company available funds are not sufficient 
for compensation of the amount of payouts required [Tokyo Electric Power 
Company, February 24, 2014]. Nevertheless, the government will eventually 
pay all TEPCO’s debt since it was placed under effective state control since 
June 2012 [The Japan News, March 27, 2014].  
What is more, the estimated amount of compensation has been growing 
up each time the governmental panel has issued new guidelines. Besides, 
there have been reported thousands applicants and claimants seeking 
compensation or resolution of disputes on compensation from TEPCO or 
authorities through court or other ways [The Japan News, March 12, 2014; 
The Japan Times, March 13; 2014; NHK World, March, 17, May 8, May 26, 
May 27, December 19, 2014].  
For example, in December 2014 as many as 340 residents of the 
Odaka district122 filed suit against TEPCO [NHK World, December 19, 2014]. 
The damages the evacuees are demanding include a doubling of the monthly 
evacuation compensation per capita of around 1,700 dollars and about 
84,000 dollars per head for destruction of the basis for living conditions (e.g. 
deprivation of ancestral land and history, and severing residents' bonds). 
Similarly, in 2014 the Center for Settlement of Fukushima Nuclear 
Damage Claims123 made proposals to settle claims filed by groups of 
residents of Namie Town and Iitate Village [NHK World, October 22, 2014]. 
                                                          
121
 Despite our requests to TEPCO we have not been provide with such information. 
122
 entire district is designated as a no-entry zone and residents still must live elsewhere.  
123
 By end August 2014 above 8,000 cases settled by it [NHK World, September 2, 2014]. 
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However, TEPCO has rejected it saying blanket compensation without 
consideration for individual circumstances would not ensure equality. 
Increased number of false claims and swindling compensation funds for 
millions of yens has been also reported124 [NHK World, June 2, 2014; The 
Japan News, August 3, 2014]. 
In addition, there are lawsuits against the central and local governments 
related to earthquake and tsunami damages. For instance, families of 23 
schoolchildren from Okawa Elementary School, Ishinomaki city suits 
prefectural and local governments for the deaths of their children’s claiming 
that the arrival of tsunami was foreseeable because of issued warning but 
school did not evacuate children to higher ground [The Japan News, May 19, 
2014]. Similarly, a man claims his wife died because the Meteorological 
Agency initially predicted the ensuing tsunami would be much lower than it 
actually was (3 minutes after the earthquake) and updated warning did not 
reach his wife due to the poor condition of the city's address system [NHK 
World, March 13, 2014]. 
Recently a district court in Sendai has ruled that the death of a woman 
five months after the earthquake was related to the disaster125 [NHK World, 
December 9, 2014]. The family considered the death to be disaster-related 
and applied for compensation but the municipal government rejected it. For 
the first time the court ruled against a local government's decision of this kind 
stating that the extremely poor living conditions caused by the disaster were a 
burden to the woman's mind and body and led to her death. 
                                                          
124
 Tokyo police arrested 2 who under name of a dummy company defrauded TEPCO of 
40,000 dollars making a false claim that staffing agency suffered a sales drop because it 
received fewer job orders from hotels in Fukushima prefecture. Other people were 
involved as well who submitted fake applications to steal more than 200,000 dollars in total 
[NHK World, June 2, 2014]. Police also arrested 4 on suspicion of defrauding TEPCO of 
¥12 million in compensation [The Japan News, August 3, 2014]. They included official of 
NGO that does paperwork on behalf of clients for claiming damages from harmful rumors - 
not operating event company in Koriyama faced cancellations from customers.  
125
 A 85-year old remained in damaged house for about month and died from pneumonia. 
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Similarly, a group of residents from a Iitate village is seeking state 
arbitration for a rise in compensation so all villagers can be entitled to equal 
damages126 regardless of radiation levels of areas [NHK World July 22, 
November 14, 2014]. According to the residents from the two zones with 
lower contamination the difference is dividing them. They ask the Center for 
Settlement of Fukushima Nuclear Damage Claims to urge TEPCO to pay 
equal damages. The residents also seek the payment of consolation money 
(about 30-thousand dollars per person) since they were exposed to more 
radiation because the evacuation order was not issued until more than one 
month after the meltdown. Evacuees also call for around 172,000 dollars per 
person in compensation for ruining their village lives. About a half of all Iitate 
residents (2,837) joint the group.  
Finally, there are unknown amount of private costs related to dispute 
and compensation associated with the triple disaster. For instance, about 30 
residents of Urayasu City (northeast of Tokyo) whose homes were damaged 
by massive liquefaction in the March 2011 earthquake127 filed a lawsuit 
against the real estate company (Mitsui Fudosan) due to failure to reinforce 
ground when it developed the area more than 30 years ago128 [NHK World, 
October 8, 2014]. 
Central government offered Fukushima prefecture, and the two 
candidate towns for interim storage facilities of highly radioactive waste 
(Okuma and Futaba) a total of ¥374 billion (2.2 billion dollars) over 30 years 
as financial assistance for regional development and restoration of local 
residents’ lives [The Japan News, July 31, 2014; NHK World, July 30, 2014]. 
First year’s payment includes ¥90 billion for the local governments for 
                                                          
126
 Entire village is designated for evacuation, but categorized into 3 different zones, each 
with different radiation level and amounts of compensation. Evacuees want monthly 
compensation per capita more than tripled to 350,000 yen (3,000 dollars) per month.  
127
 Liquefaction caused by quake damaged 27,000 houses [NHK World, October 8, 2014]. 
128
 Plaintiffs demanded that company pay compensation totaling about 7.8 million dollars 
but the court has turned down residents' claim. Similar lawsuits have been filed elsewhere. 
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rebuilding lives of local residents and for regional development (measures to 
repair damage to public image) while remaining ¥50 billion is for 
reconstruction of infrastructure in Okuma and Futaba (water supplies, 
sewerage systems and roads)129. In addition, the government will continue to 
pay for 30 years allowances to areas hosting power plants planning to add 
¥1.1 billion to the current ¥6.7 billion a year as subsidy130 which is normally 
paid to municipalities hosting nuclear plants and typically used to develop 
local communities and improve residents’ health131.  
(Some) Experts underline the uncertainty related to the total costs of the 
nuclear disaster since their level has been expanding constantly [Okuyama, 
2014]. Early in 2014 the government estimated it would take JPY11.16 trillion 
and 40 years to clean up the Fukushima site [World Nuclear Association, 
2014]. It is largely made up of more than 2.5 trillion yen for decontamination, 
1.1 trillion yen for interim storage facilities, 2 trillion yen for reactor 
decommissioning and contaminated water treatment, and over 5 trillion yen 
for compensation from TEPCO132.  
Up to date huge challenges in decommissioning the nuclear rectors 
have been associated with changes in timetables and costs tags. The current 
timetable calls for the process of removing spent fuel assemblies from the 
storage pool to begin in fiscal 2017, and removing melted fuel to begin 3 
years later. However, the Government and TEPCO officials recently 
announced that they are planning to delay the start of removing spent fuel 
units until fiscal 2019 (by 2 years) and the start of removing melted fuel till 
2025 (by 5 years) [NHK World, October 30, 2014]. 
                                                          
129
 Government plans to pay initial ¥140 billion as lump sum when facilities are constructed 
and local governments use money flexibly by setting up funds or through other measures. 
130
 total ¥7.8 billion a year or ¥234 billion over 30 years. 
131
 Local authorities are not satisfied with amount of money and asked increased sum. 
Government indicated that it would stop paying subsidies for offline Fukushima Daichi 
nuclear plant (10 km south of damaged one), which local calling to be decommissioned. 
132
 In December 2011 damage costs were forecasted to be “merely” 5.8 trillion yen for 
things such as compensation for residents, decontamination, and nuclear reactor cooling. 
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The latest experts estimate to clean up areas designated as 
uninhabitable133 is for 6.6 billion US dollars including fees for transportation 
and storing contaminated soil [NHK World, June 10, 2014]. The 2013 
estimated cost of decontaminating other areas were 19.2 billion dollars 
including spending for setting up the initial storage sites and follow-up 
checking of radiation levels. The government calculated that building 
intermediate storage facilities to keep contaminated soil for up to 30 years 
would cost about 10.4 billion dollars including the funds needed to buy land 
for such facilities. Finally, the decommissioning of nuclear reactors has just 
begun and it would take 30-40 years costing 20 billion dollars [NHK World, 
August 2, 2014]. 
Experts find the latest Cost Verification Committee’s estimate “over-
optimistic” and predict that nuclear disaster costs are bound to increase 
further134 [Okuyama, 2014]. It is assessed that more and more public funding 
has been injected but the support for victims is being stopped or reduced. If 
compensation is conducted in good faith, damage costs could become as 
high as the annual tax revenue of nation, or 43 trillion yen [Okuyama, 2014].  
Furthermore, some of the economic costs and impacts from the March 
2011 disaster could hardly be measured in quantitative (e.g. monetary) terms 
such as: lost lives and piece of mind, destroyed livelihood and accumulated 
with many generations capital (community relations, permanent crops, 
livestock herds, established brands, networks), degradated natural resources 
(lands, waters, biodiversity, landscape, eco-systems), labor health 
implications (reduced productivity, increased healthcare costs) etc. [Bachev 
and Ito, 2013]. Particularly, in the first five months of 2014 police have 
                                                          
133
 Government has not decided yet whether to conduct cleanup operations in such areas. 
134
 E.g. unpecedented construction of ice walls as a temporary method of halting 
groundwater flow into reactor buildings is under way which will cost ¥31.9 billion [The 
Japan News, June 6, 2014]. Consumption of 45.5 million kilowatt-hours (equivalent to 
electricity of 13,000 households) and ¥1 billion annually will be needed to keep 
underground walls frozen. Implementation has many dificulties while efficiency uncertain. 
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recorded 90 cases of burglary in 8 municipalities surrounding crippled nuclear 
plant, which totaled about 1,200 since 2011 [NHK World, June 12, 2014]. 
Excessive use of aging nuclear power plants is problematic both in 
terms of safety and cost [The Japan News, October 20, 2014]. In the wake of 
the March 2011 crisis, a new rule has been adopted that puts a reactor’s 
operating life at no longer than 40 years in principle135. Major utilities have set 
aside cash reserves to fund decommissioning costs but if a plant closes 
ahead of schedule and the reserve fund fails to cover decommissioning costs, 
a utility could face a huge financial burden. What is more, if reactors are 
decommissioned, host municipalities will be unable to receive subsidies from 
the central government and there will be negative impacts on local economy.  
Finally, the 2011 disasters has led to increased public concerns about 
disaster preparedness and management efficiency, and fundamental 
revisions of country’s disaster management, nuclear safety and energy 
policies. The later has been result of the 2011 experience and the post 
disaster reconstruction and development as well as some recent natural 
disasters like huge mudslides in Hiroshima (August 2014), unexpected 
volcanic eruption at Mount Ontake (September, 2014), strong Typhoon 
Vongfong (October 2014), and a 6.7 earthquake in Nagano prefecture 
(November 2014).   
Recent surveys indicated that 35% of industry sites see liquefaction risk 
[The Japan News, June 24, 2014], 76% of the public is concerned about 
aging infrastructure [The Japan News, July 2, 2014], over 70% of schools see 
risk of tsunami [The Japan News, April 7, 2014], around half of the 
municipalities within 30 km from nuclear power plants have yet to draw up 
plans for evacuation in the event of a nuclear accident [NHK World April 19, 
2014], some prefectures failed to supply the iodine tablets required for people 
living within 30 km of nuclear power plants [NHK World, May 9, 2014], less 
                                                          
135
 Depending on approval by Nuclear Regulation Authority, operation of nuclear facility 
could get a one-time extension of 20 years. Out of 48 reactors, 7 are about 40 years old. 
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than a half of companies in Tokyo store food and provisions for emergencies 
in spite of a legal requirement for businesses to prepare for possible large-
scale disasters136 [The Japan News, May 26, 2014], nearly 30% (more than 
17,000 districts) in mountainous regions as well more than 30% (about 6,300) 
of fishing villages in the country could become inaccessible in the event of a 
major earthquake or other natural disasters [NHK World, October 22, 2014], 
volcano experts are calling for a review of the Nuclear Regulation Authority’s 
safety requirements and taking into consideration the limitations of volcanic 
eruption prediction [NHK World, November 3, 2014], etc. 
A panel of nuclear experts137 monitoring reforms at the TEPCO 
maintains that the utility's nuclear safety culture “has not yet reached desired 
level in terms of preparing for the unexpected” [NHK World, May, 1, 2014]. 
TEPCO management problems led to troubles with systems used to purify 
contaminated water, repeated water leaks, and preparations for cleanup 
work. The experts recommend that the utility make sure workers are fully 
aware that they are dealing with a special plant, which caused an accident, 
and to learn from measures taken at overseas nuclear facilities. 
All these have been associated with new public and private measures 
to modernize infrastructure, enhance safety and disaster preparation, shift to 
renewable and energy saving technologies, etc. 
For instance, the Government set concrete numerical targets to 
promote the nation’s countermeasures to prepare for disasters and reduce 
damage on a long-term basis [The Japan News, May 16, 2014]. The two 
plans are compiled based on the basic law (December 2013) to make Japan 
more resilient against disasters138 and include measures such as: enhancing 
information and telecommunications networks, building road networks to 
                                                          
136
 E.g. metropolitan ordinance (April 2013) obliges all companies to store drinking water 
and food for 3 days as a measure to help those who unable to go home after disater. 
137
 independent advisory panel set up after the 2011 accident and chaired by the former 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Dale Klein. 
138
 a basic plan on making Japan disaster ready and disaster resistant, and a 2014 action 
plan concerning numerical targets of respective measures. 
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enable drivers to take detours in the wake of major disasters and boosting the 
oil supply system, raise the completion rate of sea embankments from the 
current 31% (2012) to 66% by fiscal 2016, etc. 
Similarly, government obliges local governments to compile evacuation 
rules that limit the time for operating floodgates and tide gates in coastal 
areas139 in the event of tsunami [The Japan News, November 2, 2014]. In 
addition, multiple nuclear disaster drill has been held in vulnerable regions of 
the country (including Kawauchi, Fukushima prefecture) under the new 
disaster preparedness guidelines140, which highlighted existing problems 
[NHK World, November 3, 2014; The Japan News, November 22, 2014]. 
The new policy is that in the process of disaster preparation and 
responses needs and desires of local people are to be addressed – e.g. in 
the process of reconstruction, land relocation planning, seawalls building, etc. 
For instance, 2011 disaster seriously damaged or destroyed 60% of 
seawalls with length of about 300 km in Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima 
prefectures. The central and prefectural governments are currently pushing a 
project to build 390 km of new seawalls with ¥800 billion from state coffers 
[The Japan News, June 23, 2014]. However, many communities are 
opposed141 to the project as local residents consider the proposed walls “too 
high” leaving less land available along the coasts, adversely affecting 
fisheries, and block ocean views, and affect negatively fishery and tourism 
industries on which local residents depend. What is more, cost-effectiveness 
                                                          
139
 There are about 27,000 floodgates and tide gates nationwide and 75% of them need to 
be manually closed if quake tremors are detected. In March 2011 eartquake 198 
firefighters died or went missing and 30% were working to close such gates. 
140
 revised after Fukushima accident. Such drills have been organized every year since the 
1999 accident at a nuclear-processing plant in Ibaraki Prefecture. 
141
 E.g. in Miyagi approval for project is to be received from 40 of 276 communities where 
construction of new seawalls is planned. Under its plan, prefecture will raise height of 
seawalls from pre-disaster average of 4m to 7.5m. However, that height will be insufficient 
to block gigantic tsunami such as in March 2011, which occurred once in a millennium. 
  
95 
of the seawalls is to be more carefully estimated142. Some communities have 
already lowered the planned height of seawalls, while taking such measures 
as transferring houses to higher ground and building seawalls in locations 
further inland.  
Some experts suggest that it is important to recover, preserve and 
expend coastal ecosystems such as coastal forests and igune not only as 
important ecological and cultural assets but as an effective measure for 
reducing damage from natural disasters143 [Ogata and Pushpalala, 2013].  
The Cabinet Office has set up a new section dedicated to helping local 
municipalities prepare for accidents at nuclear power plants consisting of 50 
workers from the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority and other 
relevant government ministries and agencies [NHK World, October 14, 2014]. 
In November 2014 the Diet approved a bill to join an international treaty 
on sharing the costs of compensation in a nuclear disaster144 [NHK World, 
October 24, November 19, 2014]. The government expects the treaty to 
encourage foreign companies to join the cleanup and decommissioning of 
reactors at the Fukushima nuclear power plant. 
There has been a response in private sector as well. For instance in 
October 2014 the Nuclear Risk Research Center was established as a part of 
the Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (run jointly by 
Japanese power companies) [NHK World, October 1, 2014]. The center's aim 
is to pinpoint associated risks, including those at plants that have met 
government requirements to restart, and help power companies fix the 
                                                          
142
 Higher seawall more effective it is as safeguard. Higher seawalls are more expensive to 
construct, ruin scenic views, take toll on environment, entail higher maintenance costs. Life 
of concrete seawalls is 50 years making rebuilding inevitable at some point in the future. 
143
 In 2011 disasters they prove particularly effective in reducing impact of tsunami, 
preserving houses from damages and debris.  
144
 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage obliging signatories 
to set aside 47 billion yen (400 million dollars) for compensation for nuclear accident. If 
damage surpasses this amount, other countries will provide funds to supplement it. Pact 
stipulates that lawsuit for compensation can only be filed in country where nuclear accident 
occurred, and liability for damages is concentrated against nuclear power plant operator. 
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problems. According to the Center chief145 “Japan has been slow to introduce 
risk analysis because most people think everything that meets government 
requirements is safe, and such attitudes must change to ensure safety”. 
The insurance industry is set to raise earthquake insurance premiums 
by an average 15.5% which is the first hike in 18 years [The Japan News, 
June 29, 2014]. Meanwhile, proportion of newly concluded fire insurance 
contracts in FY2013 (including earthquake damage coverage146) rose 1.6 
percentage points from the previous year to a record high of 58.1%147 [The 
Japan News, August 26, 2014]. Miyagi prefecture saw the highest proportion 
(85.2%), as the pace of growth was steepest in Hyogo (3.2 points), and third 
in Iwate, Tochigi, Kyoto, Tottori, Kagawa and Ehime prefectures (2.6 points). 
Fukushima accident has triggered many anti-nuclear protests in Japan 
since 2011 [BBC News, 2011; Slodkowski, 2011]. The previous Government 
of Yoshihiko Noda ordered all nuclear reactors to be stopped for safety 
checks, considered to freeze plans to build new reactors, questioned whether 
private companies should be running nuclear plants, and focus on reducing 
dependence from nuclear and promotion of renewable energy148. 
After the 2011 accident all nuclear reactors were shut down for 
maintenance or refueling, and for the stress tests demanded by the 
government. Only two were restarted (in the Ohi facility) but shut down on 
September 14, 2013 leaving all 48 commercial nuclear reactors off-line. Since 
then the Nuclear Regulatory Authority has received safety-screening 
applications for 21 reactors at 14 nuclear plants [NHK World, January 5, 
2014].  
                                                          
145
 George Apostolakis, specialized in analyzing risks at nuclear plants, served on the US 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission until June 2014. 
146
 Earthquake insurance, offered as an option to fire insurance, covers damage to 
housing and household goods from temblors, tsunami and volcanic eruptions. 
147
 As of the end of March, the number of earthquake insurance contracts in force stood at 
15,838,144, up 5.2% from a year before. That is all-time high for the 11th straight year. 
148
 Energy White Paper (October 2011) calls for a reduction in nation’s reliance on nuclear 
power omitting a section on nuclear power expansion in the previous year’s policy review.  
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  Nuclear power accounted for 30% of the nation’s electricity generation 
before the nuclear crisis while now nearly 90% of the power generated by 
nuclear plants is being compensated for by thermal power [The Japan News, 
April 12, 2014]. The shortage of energy, the high energy149 and fuel import150 
costs, and security risk from relying on imported energy have been pressing 
current government to speed up safety inspections and resuming operations 
of nuclear plants [The Japan News, July 18, November 7, 2014; NHK World, 
May 13, 2014]. In addition, the Government has been calling for power 
conservation without setting numerical power-saving targets anymore151 [The 
Japan News, May 16, November 3, 2014; NHK World, July 1, 2014].  
Power suppliers have been worried about the possibility of electricity 
shortages and being hit by glitches152 [The Japan News, May 18, June 30, 
2014], while most companies have been expending energy conservation 
technologies and products [The Japan News, May 18, 2014]. Nevertheless, 
eight of the 10 regional power utilities, including TEPCO, continue to secure 
recurring profits153 due to postponement of equipment renovation and higher 
efficiency in thermal power operations [The Japan News, November 1, 2014]. 
The schedule for safety inspections is uncertain and no nuclear reactors 
restarted by the end of 2014 due to lack of readiness154, uncompleted formal 
                                                          
149
 Electricity rates TEPCO charges households have risen by 40% from before the crisis, 
while Kansai Electricity Power Co. have increased by nearly 30% [The Japan News, April 
12, 2014]. Bills for households jumped arround 20% and businesses arroud 30% [The 
Japan News, May 30, 2014]. According to experts the additional rate hikes are inevitable. 
150
 In 2013, imports of fossil fuels including liquefied natural gas as a percentage of GDP 
stood at 5.7% - higher than in 2008 (5.5%) when the prices of resources soared, and in 
1974 (5.4%) during the first oil crisis [The Japan News, June 18, 2014]. 
151
 since summer 2014. Government worries that it will restrict corporate activities and 
hinder economic recovery.  
152
 In FY2013, a total of 169 thermal power plant shutdowns, mainly due to glitches, were 
reported by 9 of 10 regional power suppliers – that is up 70% from 2010 level. 
153
 in April-Setember 2014 TEPCO reported profit of ¥242.8 billion, second straight profit 
and topping ¥201.3-billion before the accident. Only Hokkaido Electric Power and Kyushu 
Electric Power suffered recurring losses since they relied heavily on nuclear energy. 
154
 Nuclear Regulation Authority criticized plant operators being not serious enough about 
improving safety and aiming simply satisfy screening criteria [NHK World, June 25, 2014].  
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procedures155 or strong opposition by local governments and communities, 
including a court ban156. Recent court order against resuming operations at 
the Ohi nuclear plant could affect other similar lawsuits across the country157 
[NHK World, May 21, 2014].  
There have been numerous protests and a lawsuit against reopening 
Sendai nuclear station in Kagoshima prefecture scheduled to be the first 
resuming operations [NHK World, May 30, June 1, June 13, 2014]. Recently 
the hosting city assembly and prefectural government approved the Sendai 
plant restart, and operations will likely resume early next year after all safety 
inspections are complete [NHK World, October 20, November 7, 2014]. 
According to the March 2014 survey, 59% of the respondents opposed 
to the restart of nuclear plants, outnumbering the 28% supporting the move 
[The Asahi Shinbun, March 18, 2014]. In all previous surveys (July and 
September, 2013, January, 2014) the majority of respondents (56%) opposed 
the restart of reactors.  
Furthermore, regarding a nuclear phase-out plan, 77% supported it 
while only 14% opposed it. Asked about how anxious they feel about the 
possibility of a serious accident at a nuclear power plant other than the 
Fukushima plant, 36% said they were “greatly” anxious, and 50% were 
anxious “to some degree”.  
August 2014 survey also indicated that more than 60% of local 
governments that host or surround a nuclear power plant158 are cautious 
about restarting idled reactors even if they meet new safety guidelines [NHK 
World, September 8, 2014]. About 67% report they were undecided whether 
                                                          
155
 E.g. formal approval by the local authorities. 
156
 Most lawsuits since late 1960s by residents seeking to halt nuclear facilities have been 
dismissed [NHK World, May 21, 2014]. On May 20, 2014 Fukui District Court ordered 
Kansai Electric Power not to restart 3 and 4 reactors at Oi nuclear plant in Fukui prefecture 
becouse safety of idled reactors is not ensured. It was first court order to ban nuclear plant 
operations since 2011 accident. Lawsuit was filed by 189 local residents, November 2012.  
157
 there are now about 30 lawsuits pending against 16 nuclear plants and other nuclear 
facilities in Japan, including those under construction or in the planning stage.  
158
 Included 146 prefectures and municipalities within a 30km radius of a nuclear plant. 
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to approve the restart of reactors, about 12% said they will approve or hope 
to approve in the future, while 8% indicated they will not approve or will never 
approve159. The major reason for opposition or cautious for 30% is because 
inspections by the nuclear regulating body have not yet finished, for 25% that 
the central government has not yet dealt with the issue, and for 23% because 
residents are worried. 
The basic energy plan160 of the new Abe administration defined nuclear 
energy as “an important base load electricity source” and clearly stated that 
nuclear power plants will resume operations after safety is confirmed [The 
Japan News, April 12, 2014]. The nuclear reactors will be restarted since the 
new safety guidelines (introduced in July 2013) are the strictest in the world 
and the safety inspections will confirm compliance.  
Energy industry reaction has been to maintain nuclear – e.g. in 2014 
shareholders meetings of TEPCO, Kansai Electric Power Company and 
Kyushu Electric Power Company the anti-nuclear proposals of not restarting 
and scrapping nuclear reactors have been rejected [HNK World, June 26, 
2014; The Japan News, June 26, 2014].  
Nevertheless, there is strong opposition to restart nuclear power plants 
by various groups, including some prominent politicians (like Ex-PMs 
Junichiro Koizumi and Morihiro Hosokawa)161 suggesting that nuclear power 
is not safe, it is the most expensive, disposal cites for nuclear waste are not 
secured, the evacuation routes not secured, and anti-terrorism measures 
insufficient [NHK World, July 7, September 24, November 2, 2014]. The lack 
of a single power outage since the nuclear reactors have been offline is 
evidence that people can live without nuclear energy and calls for more 
renewables.  
                                                          
159
 There is no legal framework for government to obtain approval from local municipalities.  
160
 which serves as a guideline for the government’s energy policy. 
161
 launched organization to ending reliance on nuclear power [NHK World, May 7, 2014]. 
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Anti-nuclear power groups also criticize the Nuclear Regulation 
Authority for the conflict of interests of the appointed new Commissioner 
(Satoru Tanaka) with close ties with the industry compromising the 
watchdog's neutrality [NHK World, July 8, July 16, 2014].  
Experts suggest that further delays in restarting reactors at the nation’s 
nuclear power plants will slow the recovery of the domestic economy, while 
the resumption of reactor operations could halve Japan’s trade deficit [The 
Japan News, July 26, 2014]. According to estimate, if all 19 reactors162 
resume operations in fiscal 2015 the total nuclear power generation would be 
less than a half of the output of fiscal 2010. That will reduce the nation’s trade 
deficit163 to ¥7.2 trillion, providing certain conditions (such as overseas 
economic growth) are met.  
If 19 reactors resume operations, imports of fossil fuels are estimated to 
total ¥25.8 trillion in fiscal 2015. This is ¥900 billion lower than the ¥26.7 
trillion in fossil fuel imports estimated under the scenario of having just 9 
reactors in operation, and ¥1.5 trillion lower than when no reactors operate in 
the nation. In the latter case, imports were predicted to reach ¥27.3 trillion. 
Under such circumstances, the cost of power generation is likely to rise to 
¥11.2 per kilowatt-hour from ¥8.2 in fiscal 2010, putting additional upward 
pressure on electricity prices164. Moreover, if the price of crude oil rises by 
$10 per barrel, imports of fossil fuels will increase ¥1.9 trillion, which is likely 
to lower the nation’s gross domestic product by 0.2%.  
Thanks to the recent decline in crude oil prices the procurement costs 
(liquefied natural gas and other fossil fuels) for national utilities are expected 
to decline. However, that would not improve financial balance of some of 
                                                          
162
 NRA is inspecting safety of 19 reactors at 12 nuclear plants. If all 19 reactors resume 
operations, nuclear power generation capacity would be 124.3 billion kilowatt-hours. 
163
 which hit record high of ¥13.8 trillion in FY2013. In January­June 2014 Japan’s trade 
deficit hit ¥7.6 trillion, worst since such records began in FY1979. Surge is mainly 
accounted for by growing imports of such fossil fuels as oil and liquefied natural gas. 
164
 If no reactors resume operation, the power generation cost will surge to ¥13 – 60% 
higher than the price in fiscal 2010 - making it difficult to avoid further electricity rate hikes. 
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them (like Kansai Electric) under the government enforced fuel cost 
adjustment system165 and an additional rate hikes would be inevitable [The 
Japan News, December 26, 2014]. Therefore, the progress of safety 
inspections at the nuclear reactors will have a significant impact on the 
Japanese economy166. 
Due to the suspension of nuclear reactors the thermal power generation 
accounted for 88% of Japan’s electricity supply in fiscal 2013, increased by 
26 percentage points from 2010 [The Japan News, June 18, 2014]. The 
nation’s greenhouse gas emissions in fiscal 2012 soared about 8% from 
those in 2010 as utilities discharged about 30% more gases contributing to 
global warming [The Japan News, May 30, 2014]. 
The government intends to diversify energy sources aiming to raise the 
share of renewable (solar, wind, hydro and geothermal) energy in the 
electricity supply to more than 13.5% of the nation's electricity in 2020, and 
more than 20% by end of 2030, from about 10% in 2012 [The Japan News, 
April 4, 2014]. It also started reexamining the renewable energy purchase 
system making it mandatory for electric power companies to purchase 
electricity generated by renewable energy sources (solar and wind power) at 
fixed prices167 for up to 20 years [The Japan News, July 8, 2014]. Large 
numbers of applications have been filed for solar power generation, which 
entails relatively high purchase prices. Since the utilities pass the costs to the 
consumers the amount in a typical family’s utility bill soared from ¥87 to ¥225 
a month in 2014168.  
It is estimated that higher power costs have been also hampering pay 
rise of manufacture industry workers in average lost salary per year ¥52,000 
                                                          
165
 making it mandatory to reflect fuel cost changes in utility rates. 
166
 NRA has given priority to safety inspections on reactors at Kyushu Electric Power Co.’s 
Sendai nuclear plant, expected to resume operations spring 2015. Dates for restarting 
other reactors are unknown and restarting all 19 in fiscal 2015 is considered difficult. 
167
 purchase prices have been set at levels more than double those in Europe.  
168
 households and businesses will have to pay ¥38 trillion in the next two decades 
because of surcharges on utility bills [The Japan News, July 8, 2014]. 
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[The Japan News, September 4, 2014]. In order to make up for a maximum 
40% increase in electricity costs in comparison to pre-disaster levels, workers 
could see their annual pay cut by as much as ¥100,000 while if 
manufacturers deal with the situation by reducing employment as many as 
180,000 jobs could be lost. 
Another problem is that operations have started at only 10% of the 
approved mega solar power plants169. Seven of the nation’s 10 major utilities 
(including Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Tohoku Electric Power Co. and 
Kyushu Electric Power Co.) are freezing new applications by producers keen 
to access their grids with electricity generated through solar, wind and other 
renewable sources since they exceeded the capacity their grids can accept170 
[The Japan News, October 9, 2014]. A major weak point of solar and many 
other renewable energy sources is that output can fluctuate sharply 
depending on weather conditions and the time of day. Failure to maintain a 
steady balance with demand presents the risk of disrupting the frequency and 
voltage of electricity supplies, which could in turn cause power outages and 
damage equipment and facilities171. 
Calculations of independent experts also shows that the electricity from 
nuclear power is the second cheapest energy to produce at ¥8 per kilowatt-
                                                          
169
 attempt to increase profits by building facilities at time when solar panel prices 
decrease after obtaining approval for projects when purchase prices are high. Survey on 
4,700 large solar power projects that have yet to begin generating electricity resulted in 
canceling certification on 144 considered as inappropriate [The Japan News, July 8, 2014]. 
170
 If renewable energy providers approved were all operating, they would have supply 
capacity of 70 million kilowatts (90% of target - 20%). Survey indicates that combined 
acceptance capacity of utilities is 47% of authorized 30 million kilowatts - e.g. Kyushu 
Electric and Tohoku Electric will only be able to accommodate 8 million kilowatts and 5-6 
million kilowatts compared to 18 and 12 million kilowatts to be generated by authorized 
renewable energy suppliers in their service areas [The Japan News, December 7, 2014]. 
171
 Greater use of renewable energy, more adjustments must be made to supply of 
electricity generated through such sources as thermal power generation. It could be 
accepted through installing huge storage batteries and building more transmission lines to 
share surplus. Implementing later steps on a large scale will come with a price (trillions of 
yen) but there are not even rules in place for covering such expenses. 
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hour172 even after such expenses as costs related to accident compensation 
were factored the production cost rose to ¥8.4 [The Japan News, October 26, 
2014]. Production cost of electricity from renewable energy sources is 
comparatively high – e.g. large mega solar power facilities generate electricity 
at ¥30.6 per kilowatt-hour, electricity from wind power cost ¥21.2 per kilowatt-
hour, etc. Beside, some renewable energy producers have been gleaning 
excessive profits while users have borne the financial burden. 
The government has limited the role of the Atomic Energy Commission 
an advisory panel that has served to promote nuclear energy for over half a 
century173 [NHK World, April 18, 2014]. The commission no longer will draw 
up the policy and focus to solving problems related to nuclear power, such as 
how to deal with radioactive waste and what do to with damaged Fukushima 
power plant. The number of commissioners has been also reduced (from 5 to 
3) and a new code of conduct introduced to ensure neutrality and 
transparency. 
A bill has been enacted for the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation 
Fund’s reorganization to allow the state-backed body to provide financial 
assistance for decommissioning the reactors at Fukushima nuclear plant [The 
Japan News, May 14, 2014]. The government will take the lead in work to 
decommission the reactors and contain the radioactive water at the nuclear 
plant. The body will provide TEPCO with technical instructions on how to 
proceed with the decommissioning work, monitor whether the utility maintains 
adequate budget and manpower for decommission, and promote 
development of related technologies. The government is also planning to 
review the law on compensation for accidents at nuclear power plants 
according to which the power companies in principle bear unlimited 
                                                          
172
 After coal (¥7.8). All expenses including building and maintenance of plants were 
factored into energy costs, including processing of spent fuel rods of nuclear power. 
173
 Commission’s role came under review following disclosures 2 years ago that it held 
secret meetings only with pro-nuclear power utilities and bureaucrats compiling policy. 
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responsibility for damage payments in the event of an accident [NHK World, 
June 3, 2014]. 
The Government has been taking action to increase transparency 
following the failure to do so in the first days after the nuclear accident. It 
started to publicize interviews with TEPCO and government officials about the 
accident after receiving their consent. TEPCO shareholders are also asking 
the government to release interviews since they are important for examining 
responsibility for the accident, and plan to take legal action if it is turned down 
[HNK World, June 5, 2014].  
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Chapter 5. Environmental impact 
 
The March 2011 disasters have had enormous environmental impacts 
[Kontar at al., 2014; ME; NASA; Urabe et al., 2013; UNSCEAR, 2014; WWF]. 
There have been numerous surface ruptures, ground cracks, mass 
movements (rock falls and landslides), land uplifts and subsidence, alterated 
landscape and seacoast in affected by earthquake and tsunami areas. 
Furthermore, a huge amount of rubble and debris have been created after the 
disaster. Most of these damages and waste have been “trivial” and once the 
infrastructure is repaired, none of them will matter at all [McNeill, 2011].  
What is more, the large-scale reconstruction plans for the affected 
areas have included appropriate measures for rebuilding and better disaster 
protection of communities, cleaning and recycling of debris, and recovery and 
conservation of natural environment [Iwate Prefecture, 2011; Sendai City, 
2011; Fukushima Prefectural Government, 2012; Government of Japan]. 
The earthquake and tsunami have caused huge destructions of soils, 
landscape, natural flora and fauna, and entire coastal ecosystems. Unknown 
number of wildlife have been killed, injured or displaced. Large land areas 
have been damaged by the seawaters, salinity and other pollutants, and 
become unsuitable for farming and natural habitats.  
Tsunami badly affected about 1,718 ha of coastal disaster-prevention 
forests in 253 sites situated over an extensive area from Aomori to Chiba 
[Ministry of Environment, 2012]. In Rikuzentakata, Iwate the destruction left 
nothing but a single tree out of a coastal protection pine forest with more than 
60,000 trees planted two century ago [National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 2011]. In addition, many traditional Igune were destructed by 
tsunami and consequently cut because they were composed by badly 
damaged by salt water Japanese cedar [Ogata and Pushpalala, 2013]. 
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One year after the tsunami, the landscape near the mouth of the 
Kitakami River174 remains irrevocably altered, farmland north and east of 
nearby Nagatsura become river bottom, the river mouth widened, and water 
from Oppa Bay crept inland, leaving only a narrow strip of land and new 
islands near the river mouth [National Aeronautics and Space Administration]. 
Similarly, tsunami tide swept away all fishing weirs and hatcheries in 
Kido River which boast large numbers of returning salmon on Honshu 
island175 [Fukushima Minpo News, April 16, 2014]. A trial study in 2013 has 
found out that both fish born before the and after disaster are returning176 to 
rivers significantly altered by the tsunami [NHK World, November 20, 2014]. 
Only a third of salmon born before the disaster made their way upstream 
while 38.88% never entered rivers since environs changes (riverbeds and 
embankments) may make it difficult to find a way back.  
A study has found out that soil liquefaction in the March 2011 
earthquake was more widespread than previously thought [The Japan Times, 
Match 6, 2014]. Nearly 9,700 zones in 189 municipalities across 13 eastern 
and northeastern prefectures experienced soil liquefaction due to earthquake, 
and while reclaimed land along coastlines was especially susceptible, it also 
occurred inland along rivers and land developed for housing. 
Monitoring of the changes in vegetation in areas submerged by the 
tsunami along the Pacific coastline shows that “Changed to barren land” 
areas (where weeds grow abundantly in damaged areas) occupies the 
greatest share - around 30% of the total area (Figure 18). This is followed by 
“Changed for artificial use” such as developed lands and debris storage areas 
                                                          
174
 in March 2011 wide swaths of floodwater covered the north and south banks of the river 
channel, and sediment fills the river's mouth. Research suggests that waves from the 
tsunami traveled nearly 50 km upstream from the mouth of Kitakami River [NASA, 2012]. 
175
 In April 2014 Naraha fisheries cooperative released young salmon for first time since 
disaster, considering rebuilding hatcheries, resuming egg collection/hauling, and restart 
release self-hatched salmon in spring 2016 [Fukushima Minpo News, April 16, 2014]. 
176
 Salmon usually returns to its river 3 to 5 years after birth.  
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etc. (10% of the overall area). After the disaster “Changed to barren land” 
occupies a significant portions in Iwate (40%), Fukushima (40%), and Miyagi 
(30%) prefectures while “Flowed out/Sink areas” are seen in about 5% of the 
land in these prefectures.  
 
Figure 18.  Vegetation changes in areas submerged by March 2011 
tsunami  (percent) 
 
Source: Biodiversity Center of Japan, Ministry of Environment, 2013 
 
In other prefectures “No change” areas are prevailing. However, in 
some places like Sosa City and Yokoshiba-Hikari Town of Chiba prefecture 
“Remained Forest” and “Lodging/Die back” areas occupied the greater share. 
Monitoring on changes in the sandy and muddy beaches due to the 
tsunami also indicates that “Sand dune vegetation” and “Coastal forest” were 
vastly reduced and mostly were transformed through man-made 
developments or changed into “Barren lands” included under “Others” 
[Biodiversity Center of Japan, 2013]. “Sand dune vegetation” in Aomori 
prefecture, “Sand dune vegetation” and “Coastal forest” in Miyagi prefecture, 
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and “Coastal forest” in Chiba prefecture were changed to “Others” by almost 
the same extent in terms of the area. 
Natural environment survey in Matsukawaura Lagoon has found out a 
trend toward recovery of species numbers and population densities of benthic 
animals, forest bird species declined due to the elimination of coastal forests, 
while some water bird species showed an increase in numbers [World Wide 
Fund, 2013]. Besides, a large amount of water springs is observed due to 
ground subsidence, suggesting the possibility that a sandy environment will 
be sustained.  
In Shizugawa Bay rocky-shore denudation was still observed despite 
the decrease in algae-eating animals such as sea urchins [World Wide Fund, 
2013]. In surveyed two bays there are new kinds of places functioning as 
habitats for living creatures including remaining driftwood and concrete 
rubble, swamp environments that appeared on land due to ground 
subsidence, and unused rice fields. 
Monitoring of the marine environment has found out a great disturbance 
of Zostera forest caused by the tsunami [Biodiversity Center of Japan, 2013]. 
For instance, in Mangokuura lagoon, Ishinomaki City, the ground was seen to 
have subsided by about 0.9-1.5 meters, becoming muddy as sludge 
accumulated, distribution area of the Zostera was drastically reduced, and 
their population growing from the coast up to about 100 meters out at sea 
was exterminated.  
The study of Sendai Bay and the Sanriku Ria coast showed that 30–
80% of taxa indigenously inhabiting intertidal flats disappeared after the 
tsunami [Urabe et al., 2013]. Among animal types, endobenthic and sessile 
epibenthic animals were more vulnerable to the tsunami than mobile 
epibenthic animals like shore crabs and snails.  
At the same time, some species reallocated or increased their 
population after tsunami. For examples, Scopimera globosa and 
Grandidierella japonica not seen before the disaster in Gamo lagoon, Sendai 
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city have been observed and their population increased [Biodiversity Center 
of Japan, 2013]. Other study have also confirmed that tsunami not only took 
away many benthic taxa from the intertidal flats but also brought in some taxa 
from elsewhere [Urabe et al., 2013].  
Enhanced habitats in the seawater have been also reported due to 
reduced fishing after disasters [Biodiversity Center of Japan, 2013]. For 
instance, estimated number of chub mackerel in waters near Kinkasan is now 
2.6 times higher and there are 80% more adult fish than in the summer of 
2010 [The Japan News, March 29, 2014]. 
The study on marine pollution has found out that PCBs (polychlorinated 
biphenyls), HBCDs (brominated flame retardants) and PBDEs 
(polybrominated diphenyl ethers, brominated flame retardants) were detected 
in all analyzed marine life [World Wide Fund, 2013]. High concentrations of 
HBCDs were detected in some specimens and PCB concentrations in Pacific 
cod were found to be about four times higher than before the earthquake and 
tsunami disaster.  A positive correlation was seen between trophic level (level 
in the food chain) and concentration of PCBs, HBCD and PBDEs, suggesting 
bioconcentration throughout the food chain.  
The radiation contamination after Fukushima accident has also affected 
the natural environment. Experts suggested similar to the Chernobyl accident 
biological anomalies in plants and animals such as population decease, 
mutations, etc. [Akimoto, 2014; ISHES, 2011; Nakanishi and, Tanoi, 2013]. 
For instance, a study on the effects of radioactive contamination following 
Fukushima disaster demonstrated that the abundance of birds was negatively 
correlated with radioactive contamination, and that among 14 species in 
common between the Fukushima and the Chernobyl regions, the decline in 
abundance was steeper in Fukushima [Møller et al., 2012]. A year after the 
nuclear disaster scientists found (“unexpected”) mutated butterflies 
suggesting that mutations have been passed down from the older 
generations. 
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Other studies have also reported a link between elevated radiation 
levels after nuclear disaster and abnormalities in insects such as pale grass 
blue butterfly [Hiyama et al., 2012]. Radioactive isotopes originating from the 
Fukushima nuclear reactor were found in resident marine animals and in 
migratory Pacific Bluefin tuna, which caused a worldwide public anxiety and 
concern [Fisher et al., 2013]. Diverse studies on sea and fresh water fish in 
vast areas suggest that concentration of Cs has not decreased suggesting 
additional uptake [Buesseler, 2014; Mizuno and Kubo, 2013].   
The United Nations assessment on the effects of nuclear accident on 
non-human biota inhabiting terrestrial, fresh-water and marine ecosystems 
concluded that radiation exposure have been high in the most contaminated 
areas, and there are risks for individuals of certain species, but it is 
geographically constrained with no long-term effects on populations  [United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 2014]. 
Nevertheless, experts warned for follow up assessments of exposure and 
trends in marine environment. 
More recent scientific models suggest that radiation exposures to 
wildlife within 100 km of the power plant were not high enough to cause a 
long-term harm such as prevent populations of plants and animals from 
reproducing and surviving [Strand et al., 2014].  
Nevertheless, there have been some impacts on wildlife in 
contaminated areas. For example, evacuation zones have become home to 
an increasing number of wild animals like rats, boars and their offspring with 
abandoned domestic pigs, etc. [NHK World, July 11, 2o13, May 6, 2014]. 
There have been reported changes in population, areas of habitation, 
behavior and eating habits of these wildlife. For instance, the wild monkey 
(Japanese macaques) population is rapidly increasing in Odaka Ward of 
Minami-Soma, which is under an evacuation advisory, and said to have 
reached about 390 or three times its pre-crisis level [The Japan News, August 
22, 2014]. The monkeys and other animals found in evacuation advisory 
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areas (such as wild boars and raccoons) believed to be expanding habitats 
taking over areas formerly inhabited by people. 
During the year ending in March 2014 the average radiation level in 
Fukushima forests fell to 0.44 microsieverts or more than a half compared to 
two years ago [NHK World, May 6, 2014]. The amount of radioactive 
materials in new leaves is about one fifth of those contained in leaves that 
started growing before the disaster. According to forecasts the forest radiation 
will drop to around 30% from the current level over the next 20 years. Officials 
say workers' fear of radiation has led to abandonment of some forests and 
that is causing concern about long-term management of forestry resources. 
Recently it has been found out that most of the radioactive cesium that 
leaked from the Fukushima nuclear plant settled in a common mineral that 
comes from granite [NHK World, November 11, 2014]. According to scientists 
it is important to identify how the element exists in the soil predicting that 
most of the radioactive cesium in Fukushima soils is likely to be found in 
black mica. That finding is expected to encourage others to develop ways to 
remove it from contaminated lands177.  
The first assessments of “health effect” on farm and domestic animals 
and plants in the most affected areas have been also completed. Many of the 
farm livestock in the contaminated area has been slathered or died. However, 
a farmer M.Yoshizawa kept 360 cows178 alive at his 80-acre spread inside the 
nuclear evacuation zone in defiance of a government kill order [Uncanny 
Terrain; Fackler 2014]. The farmer could monitors effects of prolonged 
radiation and there are reports that white spots on the fur and skin are 
appearing on some of his Japanese black cattle [CAN, 2013; Fackler 2014]. 
                                                          
177
 Scientists still don't know how the radioactive cesium chemically combined with 
minerals in soil around the plant. 
178
 more than half are ones that others left behind. 
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The first study of cattle abandoned in the evacuation area179 and 
euthanized indicates that in all examined specimens deposition of Cs 134 and 
Cs 137 was observed [Fukumoto, 2013]. Organ-specific deposition of 
radionuclides with relatively short half-life was also detected such as Silver-
110m in the liver and Te 129m in the kidney. A linear correlation was found 
between radiosesium concentration in peripheral blood180 and in each organ 
as the resulting slopes were organ dependent with the maximum value 
obtained for skeleton muscles. The levels of rediosesium in the organs of 
fetuses and infants were 1.19 fold and 1.51fold higher than in corresponding 
maternal organs. Radiosesium concentration in organs was found to be 
dependent on the feeding conditions and the geographical locations location 
where cattle were caught.  
Radioactive Ag110m was detected in all the liver samples and no 
relation was found between the activity concentration in blood and liver. The 
data indicate that the liver is the primary target organ that accumulates silver. 
As far as Te129m is concerned it was detected in 62% of cattle 
examined. Its deposition in kidneys suggests that Te132181 also accumulated 
in kidney shortly after the nuclear accident. These results suggest that 
monitoring of Te132 and I131 warrants more attention in terms of assessing 
health risk to the thyroid. 
The study have expended to measurement of radioactivity in animals 
other than cattle. It was found that the radioactivity in each organ was higher 
in swine than in cattle but its transfer to organs from the blood was higher in 
cattle than in pigs. Therefore, bio distribution of radioactivity substances is 
species-specific and that further study is necessary to assess the effect of 
radionuclides in humans. The study has also revealed that the problem is not 
only radioactive cesium but also other radionuclides. 
                                                          
179
 79 cattle, including 3 fetuses from pregnant cattle and 3 mother-infant pairs, all 
obtained between August 29 -November 15, 2011. 
180
 Thus the activity concentration d Cs in organ can ne estimated from that of blood. 
181
 with half-life 3.2 days and decay product I132. 
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Analyses of this type182 are extremely valuable for the assessment of 
environmental pollution, bio distribution, metabolism of radionuclides, dose 
evaluation and the influence of internal exposure as well as likely 
consequences for humans from long-term exposure183. 
It is estimated that the Great Japan Earthquake generated more than 
20 million tons of debris184 in the three most affected prefectures, of which 
about 5 million tons is estimated to have been washed out by the tsunami 
[Prime Minister of Japan and cabinet, 2014]. A major portion of the later (3.5 
million tons) is considered to have deposited on seabed along Japan’s coast, 
and remaining 30% become floating debris. Since 2011 some 1.5 million tons 
of debris has been collected or sunk, and the amount of floating debris still 
drifting is considered to be less than 1.5 million tons. 
By March 2014 processing of all disaster debris and tsunami deposits 
were completed with exception of some (Evacuation) areas of Fukushima 
Prefecture [Reconstruction Agency 2014]. The official data indicate that 
almost all disaster debris were removed (99%) as treatment and disposal of 
97% of them completed (over 80% recycled) (Figure 19). Similarly, around 
96% of the tsunami deposit were removed and processing of 92% finished 
(almost all recycled). Approximately 85% of debris and nearly all of the 
tsunami deposits can be recycled, and materials used in public works projects 
in disaster-affected area [Ministry of Environment, 2014]. 
The major issues associated with the cleaning have been the 
availability and selection of storage sites, methods of incineration, decisions 
about recycling, and waste treatment and disposal [International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 2012]. 
                                                          
182
 The team collected tissue samples from different animals (cattle, swine, Japanese 
macaque, wild pigs, horses) which are currently being examined. 
183
 The amount of radioactivity concentration does not reflect biological effects but it is the 
first clue for understanding the biological effect of radiation. 
184
 tsunami washed out collapsed houses, cars, woods, ships, aquaculture facilities, fixed 
fishing nets, cargo containers, etc. More than 90% of floating debris is parts of collapsed 
houses and driftwoods, which are difficult to sink. 
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Debris swept away by tsunami are still drifting in the Pacific Ocean with 
much of it washing ashore in North America [The Japan News, March 22, 
2014]. According to the officials western U.S. coastline will continue to see 
debris for years to come contaminating seawater and beaches. It is estimated 
that about 400-thousand tons of the 1.5-million tons of debris adrift in the 
Pacific Ocean could reach the US and Canada by October 2014 [NHK World, 
May 5, 2014]. 
 
Figure 19. Processing rate of disaster waste in coastal municipalities 
(percent) 
 
Source: Reconstruction Agency 
 
There have been found shellfish and algae native to Japan on debris 
that has already washed ashore causing concern about the creatures' 
possible impact on ecosystems [NHK World, May 5, 2014]. Japan's 
Environment Ministry has launch a 3 years study (starting July 2014) to find 
out whether the 2011 tsunami debris carries living organisms from Japan and 
what is their possible impact on ecosystems on North America's west coast. 
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Recently the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) sent marine 
experts185 to Japan to report their analysis of the seawater off the coast of 
Fukushima nuclear plant, and compare results from Japanese and IAEA 
laboratories to assess accuracy of Japanese data [NHK World, November 1, 
2014]. The IAEA has been advising Japan to disclose comparative analysis of 
the results of more than one institution to enhance transparency and ease 
concerns of neighboring countries. 
A large-scale decontamination of soils, waters, infrastructure, property 
etc. has been going on involving central and local authorities, private and 
collective organizations, individual and communities efforts, etc. 
Consequently, a good progress has been achieved in cleaning up residential 
and natural environment in many places.  
A pilot work for forest decontamination in 4 Fukushima localities186 
started in September 2014 (for completion March 2015), covering a forest 
area tens of hectares wide in each selected municipality [Fukushima Minpo 
News, July 31, 2014]. The demonstration work seek to lay the groundwork for 
resuming forestry business and reducing anxiety among evacuees hoping to 
return to hometowns as well identify effective methods of decontamination 
and ways to minimize workers' exposure to radiation.  
According to some experts the undertaken large-scale decontamination 
by the authorities and at grass-room level187 would create new environmental 
problems such as: huge amounts of radioactive waste, removal of top soil, 
damage to wildlife habitat188 and soil fertility, increased erosion on scraped 
                                                          
185
 From Environment Laboratories in Monaco who collected samples in September to 
examine the effects of radioactive materials on the ocean's ecosystem. 
186
 30ha in Tamura city's Miyakoji district (evacuation order lifted in April, 2014); 10ha each 
in Minamisoma city's Odaka district and Iitate village's Nimaibashi district; and 30ha in 
Kawauchi village's Modo district (last 3 areas preparing for lifting of evacuation orders). 
Locations are privately owned where central government is to undertake decontamination. 
187
 E.g. in Iitate-mura villagers have been carrying decontamination actions and trials with 
support of a recovery group “Resurrection of Fukushima” [NHK World, December 9, 2013]. 
188
 Including negative impact on species on Fukushia prefecture’s Red List of endangered 
or threatened species (“vulnerable” grassland butterfly and Japanese peregrine falcon). 
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bare hillsides and forests, and intrusion by people and machinery into every 
ecosystem scheduled for remediation etc. [Bird, 2012].   
September 2014 data indicate that in temporary storage sites (in 
Kotakizawa, Jikenjo, Shin-Baba, Baba, Goshi and Ogita districts) where 
removed soil has been collected and stored, the air dose rate at the entrance 
of the sites shows no difference after removed soil is stored, and radioactive 
materials has never been detected from leachate or groundwater under the 
sites [Ministry of Environment, 2014]. 
In July 2014 TEPCO reported that it recovered about 80% of a 
radioactive substance that leaked with contaminated wastewater in 2013189. 
The substance with the highest concentration in the water was radioactive 
strontium with an estimated 45 trillion becquerels of radioactivity [HNK World, 
July 2014]. Most strontium has been recovered by collecting soil soaked with 
the contaminated water while remaining 20% likely seeped into soil below 
tanks and other facilities. According to TEPCO the substance remains in soils 
and it is highly unlikely that it was carried into the sea by underground water. 
TEPCO recently revised its storage plan190 with planning to build 
additional tanks to store 100,000 tons of radioactive water at the nuclear 
plant. Tanks at the cite can store about 480,000 tons of radioactive water, but 
90% of the 1000 storage tanks are already full [NHK World, April 4, 2014]. 
Company expects the amount of contaminated water to be less than 800,000 
tons by March 2016. More tanks are added in case the planned one are not 
enough or preventative measures (including frozen underground walls) do not 
work as well as planned [NHK World, July 14, 2014].  
In April-November 2014 TEPCO tried to freeze radiation-contaminated 
water in underground tunnels in order to prevent water used to cool melted-
down fuel to leak out of reactor buildings into tunnels where it mix with ground 
                                                          
189
 In August 2013 about 300 tons of wastewater contaminated with radioactive 
substances leaked from a storage tank at the plant. 
190
 Previous plan was to build tanks to store 830,000 tons of water by the end March 2015. 
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water, seep into the ground and end up in the sea191. In November the 
company gave up that plan (water did not freeze) and announced that 
underground tunnels containing radioactive water will be blocked off by newly 
developed cement192 [NHK World, November 21, 2014]. Nevertheless, initial 
results indicated that new method has also not been entirely successful [NHK 
World, December 26, 2014]. 
A separate and larger project has been underway to freeze soil and 
create a wall of ice 1.5 km stretch around the four reactor buildings. TEPCO 
plans to lay 1,500 meters of pipes around the four reactor buildings hoping to 
complete the construction work by the end of March 2015 and start circulating 
refrigerant of minus 30 C193. The ice walls are intended to prevent 
groundwater from coming into the reactor building basements, which are filled 
with highly contaminated water from operations to cool the overheating 
reactors. The work has been delayed due to a suspension in freezing the 
water in the tunnels as part of the work areas overlap.  
There has been also many technical problems such as failures in 
cooling systems, multiple leakages, high radiation at the plant cite, delays 
and/or changes in plans, etc. [NHK World, April 4, April 13, May, 31, June 4, 
June 9, June 10, June 19, June 22, July 8, October 22, October 30, 
December 26, 2014]. All that has been coupled by high uncertainties on state 
of affairs and risks, and likely effects of undertaken actions.  
For instance, the effects of the groundwater bypass operation194 
intended to reduce the amount of radiation-tainted water at the plant has 
                                                          
191
 Utility tunnels between the 2 and 3 reactors and the sea are estimated to hold a total of 
11,000 tons of radiation-contaminated wastewater. TEPCO hopes to remove wastewater 
from tunnels around all reactors in fiscal 2014 [NHK World, June 16, 2014]. 
192
 plan will not affect larger project to freeze soil and create a wall of ice around reactors. 
193
 so that two-meter thick frozen soil walls will be created within a few months. 
194
 groundwater is pumped up from wells near plant’s 1 to 4 reactors before it flows into 
basements of reactor buildings mixing with high-level radioactive water. It is temporarily 
stored at tanks and released into the sea after radiation checks. Company began to pump 
up groundwater in early April, and release pumped-up water started in late May as more 
than 8,600 tons of groundwater have been released into the Pacific [The Japan News, 
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been apparently having limited effects [The Japan News, June 28; NHK 
World, July 25, 2014]. In the first 2 months water levels at observation wells 
near the reactor buildings195 dropped by only around 10 cm at most. Water 
levels tend to rise after rains and it is vital to reduce the amount of rainwater 
infiltrating the soil but little progress has been made due to a delay in land 
leveling196. It has been also found that Cesium in groundwater rises at plant 
after storm as well water near the embankment was more than 3 times higher 
(251,000 becquerels of cesium per liter) the level before heavy rainfall from 
Typhoon Phanfone [NHK World October 15, 2014]. 
Similarly, some experts warn that there is no reason to place overly 
high expectations on the ice walls [The Japan News, June 6, 2014]. There 
are fears associated that if soil is not frozen evenly it could cause subsidence, 
or if the ice walls melt due to problems with cooling functions, there could be 
a widespread danger of radioactive water flowing outside the buildings. It is 
essential to carry out several measures in parallel. Amount of contaminated 
water has increased by 300-400 tons a day and sooner or later there will be 
no more sites available for the construction of storage tanks at the plant.  
Experts have also pointed out the need to purify contaminated water 
before discharging it into the ocean [The Japan News, June 6, 2014]. 
Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) introduced for that purpose has 
continued to malfunction197. Recently TEPCO has unveiled an improved 
system (sophisticated ALPS) for decontaminating radioactive water198 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
June 28, 2014]. Fishermen's federation (differences in opinions) accepted the plan [NHK 
World, March 31]. Water bypass operation, once fully implemented, will reduce the daily 
buildup up of highly radioactive water at the plant to 100 tons down from roughly 400.  
195
 3 wells located 70 to 150m from the reactor buildings. 
196
 Current plan is to cover soil near the wells with asphalt by the end of March 2015 to 
keep rain from seeping into the ground [NHK World, July 25, 2014]. 
197
 Current system is supposed to be capable of treating up to 750 tons of water daily with 
its 3 processing lines but its operation has been plagued by trouble. A second version of 
system started trial operations in September 2014. 
198
 The new system can process more than 500 tons of water a day with only one line and 
it is expected to leave less radioactive waste and be less prone to glitches. 
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planning to put 3 systems into full operation in December 2014 treating 2,000 
tons of water daily [NHK World, October 16, 2014].   
TEPCO has showed a system to remove radioactive substances from 
tainted underground water before releasing it into the sea. The utility plans to 
discharge well water from around reactor buildings at the facility to stem the 
buildup of contaminated water199. The officials say the system removed most 
radioactive materials to undetectable levels in trial runs but its plan has met 
opposition from local fishermen [NHK World, October 16, 2014]. 
One of the TEPCO’s engineers properly described the progress as “trial 
and error continues” since dealing with new technology and equipment, 
making mistakes, and are unknown results [NHK World, July 4, 2014]. 
Furthermore, the process of decommissioning the nuclear reactors is at 
the beginning stare and is expected to last 30-40 years200 and associated 
with many challenges such as lack of experiences, available technologies, 
uncertainties and risks, public concerns, lack of disposal cite, etc. [NHK 
World, August 2, 2014]. For instance, there is a lots of uncertainty related to 
the state and schedules of operations – e.g. it is extremely difficult to remove 
melted fuel from the No.1 to No.3 reactors. Operation schedule is to start 
work at the No.1 and 2 reactors in fiscal 2020, and at the No.3 in fiscal 2021, 
but workers still do not know where or in what state the fuel lies as a result of 
the meltdowns at the 3 reactors [NHK World, October 22, 2014]. 
In October 2014 it was announced that the decommissioning of 
Fukushima reactors may be further delayed [NHK World, October 16, 
October 22, 2014]. The work was to begin in July 2014, but have been 
delayed after radioactive dust from the plant was blamed for contaminating 
                                                          
199
 About 300 tons of underground water is flowing into the buildings daily. Tainted water is 
believed to be leaking into the sea with underground water. 
200
 With first stage (removal of 270 tons of fuel from 3 melted reactors) around 20 years 
and disposal and dismantling another 15 years. Decommissioning work has progressed 
fastest at No.4 (all fuel rods removed by end 2014). Removal of fuel from No.3 reactor 
building is to begin in FY2015, and No.1 and 2 buildings in FY2017. Radiation is extremely 
high in No.2 building and no schedule for removal there [NHK World, October 22, 2014]. 
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rice paddies when the operator removed debris from the plant's No.3 reactor 
in August 2013201.  
The No.1 reactor building has a cover to prevent massive amount of 
radioactive material from spreading. TEPCO began drilling holes in the ceiling 
and spraying chemicals inside to stop dust from spreading, planning partially 
to remove the cover in late October. The operator hopes to begin full-scale 
dismantling of the cover in March 2015 and complete the task in about a 
year202. The government and TEPCO set a timetable for removing fuel out of 
the storage pool at the No. 1 reactor from the reactor building after April 2017, 
but delays are also likely.  
Last but not least important, up to date, it has been difficult to secure 
cites for long-term and permanent disposal of radioactive waste [NHK World, 
April 7, June 15, 2014; The Japan News, March 8, 2014]. Until now 
contaminated soil, leaves, and mud removed during decontamination work, 
and other radioactive waste have been stored at around 1,000 initial 
“temporary” storage sites and more than 75,000 private properties across 
Fukushima prefecture [The Japan News, December 9, 2014; NHK World, 
January 15, 2015]. 
According to expert there are 3 million tons of tainted biomass in 
Fukushima and its disposal is a big challenge [The Japan Times March 23, 
2014]. In addition, there have been collected a huge amount of contaminated 
soils, debris, incinerated ash, mud from sewage, straw, etc. located in Tokyo 
and 11 other prefectures. In the end of March 2014 there are a total of 
143,689 tons of materials defined by the Government as “designated 
                                                          
201
 Recently NRA announced that it is highly unlikely that radioactive particles from 
Fukushima plant contaminated rice fields [NHK World, October 31, 2014]. Removal work 
released dust particles with 110 billion Bq with relatively large diameters of several 
micrometers. They had eco-impact only in plant compound and rice paddy contamination 
may have come from river and ground water [NHK World, October 31, 2014]. 
202
 debris removal is planed to begin before October 2016. 
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waste”203 [The Japan News, July 9, 2014]. The later contain radioactive 
substances measuring more than 8,000 Bq/kg, and according to law204 
should be handled in the prefecture where it originated under the 
responsibility of the central government. 
A site for the final disposal of radioactive waste has not been chosen 
yet. There is a government plan to build interim storage facilities in Okuma 
and Futaba to store contaminated soil, waste and ash from burned 
contaminated materials205. These sites are to operate for up to 30 years but 
residents of candidate places continue to suspect that they will eventually be 
used for final disposal facilities and insist for safeguards [NHK World, May 27, 
June 8, 2014]. Some residents are also against since the storage facilities 
would harm the towns' image and make it difficult to restart farming due to 
consumers concerns about safety of agricultural products [NHK World, June 
2, 2014]. Besides, some residents complained about the offered price, saying 
it's not enough to rebuild their lives206 elsewhere but government has no 
revised the planned purchase prices [NHK World, October 14, 2014]. 
Meanwhile, Government is proceeding with the plan seeking residents' 
understanding while briefing residents about safety measures related to 
transportation and storage of radioactive wastes [NHK World, May 28, June 
7, June 15, September 30, 2014]. Late August 2014 the prefectural 
government formally accepted the construction of storage facilities on its 
territory followed by approval of tow host towns [NHK World, January 2015]. 
                                                          
203
 containing radioactive substances measuring more than 8,000 Bq/kg. 
204
 on special measures concerning the handling of pollution from radioactive materials. 
205
 They will accommodate waste to fill Tokyo Dome more than 20 times and dispose 
waste containing up to 100,000 Bq/kg. Government plans to purchase 16 square km of 
land in the area and initially planed to start transporting radioactive soil to the facilities in 
January 2015 (it is delayed due to the prolonged procedures). 
206
 Government plan to purchase land at around half of its value before the accident as 
compensation for housing would depend on age of buildings [NHK World, September 30, 
2014]. Landowners who decline to sell but allow usage would be paid 70% of purchase 
price. Prefecture would cover difference between pre-disaster value and compensation. 
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In November 2014 both Houses of the Diet approved Fukushima waste 
bill for the construction of temporary storage facilities207 for radioactive waste 
near the crippled nuclear plant [NHK World, November 4, 19, 2014]. The bill 
obliges the government to ensure to ensure the waste is safely stored in the 
facilities and complete within 30 years the final disposal of radioactive waste 
(including contaminated soil) after moving it outside Fukushima prefecture.  
Furthermore, the government announced it will set superficies (surface) 
rights for land allowing landowners to keep property rights for the land208 to 
be used for building temporary storage facilities [NHK World, July 28, 2014; 
The Japan News, July 29, 2014]. In addition, 820-million dollars of grants will 
be handed over directly to the 2 towns as a part of the 3 billion dollars in 
subsidies that will be given to the prefecture and municipalities to help rebuild 
communities and peoples' lives [NHK World, August 26, 2014]. 
A little progress has been also made in deciding on final disposal 
facilities locations for handling more than 146,000 tons radioactive waste from 
the Fukushima nuclear crisis in Tokyo and 11 other prefectures (Figure 20). 
For instance, up to date one of the warehouses storing rice straw (supposed 
to be used as livestock feed) covered in sheets of silver foil to protect against 
the sun’s rays, stands in area of farming paddy in Tome, Miyagi Prefecture209 
[The Japan News, September 12, 2014]. 
The central government210 plans to construct a safe concrete double-
walled structure underground to contain buried designated waste. Waste will 
be put into containers and bags, which will then be stored inside a concrete 
double walled structure to be buried underground, and after being buried that 
                                                          
207
 Government acquires all shares in a state company (Japan Environmental Safety 
Corporation) that will run the business of storing nuclear waste  
208
 Initially, government planned to buy land for temporary facilities to ensure stable 
management but some landowners refuse to sell. Locals are attached to ancestral land 
and fear that temporary facilities would become final disposal sites if land is nationalized. 
209
 city government initially explained that the warehouses would be kept in the farmer’s 
vicinity for only two years (until January 2014). 
210
 central government is responsible for disposal of “designated waste” in each prefecture. 
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the structure will be covered with a second layer of concrete and soil211 [The 
Japan News, July 9, 2014].  
The government has been considering locations to newly build final 
disposal in five prefectures (Miyagi, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Gunma and Chiba) 
because there are large amounts of “designated waste”212 [The Japan News, 
July 9, 2014]. Local residents have been strongly opposing to the 
construction of facilities due to fears about radiation, environmental threat, 
and risk that agricultural products will become unsellable. In 2014 the 
Environment Ministry officials held meetings with officials from Miyagi 
prefecture and the three “candidate” municipalities (Kurihara, Taiwan and 
Kami) on one of which territory it aims to construct the final disposal facilities 
but all municipalities opposed.  
 
Figure 20. Amount of Designated waste in Japan, June 30, 2014 (tons) 
 
Source: Ministry of Environment 
                                                          
211
 additional radioactivity along premises borders is expected to be less than 0.01 mSv a 
year and “health risk negligible” (average radiation dosage in nature is 2.1 mSv per year).  
212
 material from the Fukushima nuclear accident that has radiation levels exceeding 8,000 
Bq/kg. For prefectures with small amounts of designated waste plans are to bury the waste 
underground in existing disposal facilities [The Japan News, September 12, 2014]. 
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There are nine temporary storage facilities for designated waste on the 
premises of the Teganuma sewage treatment facility in Chiba prefecture. 
Each of them stores 526 tons of designated waste generated in Matsudo, 
Kashiwa and Nagareyama in the northwestern part of the prefecture. Since 
the later do not have adequate storage facilities, the prefecture accepted their 
waste at the sewage facility on a “temporary basis”, with a time limit set for 
the end of March 2015 [The Japan News, July 9, 2014].  
In Tome, storing Miyagi prefecture’s largest amount of designated 
waste (like straw), the difficulty of securing storage sites has led to some 
waste being stored by individuals. Much of the radioactive waste in Nasu-
Shiobara, Tochigi prefecture is also temporarily stored on private property. 
Local officials and people in these places fear that if situation is prolonged for 
a long period of time waterproof sheets used to store designated waste will 
deteriorate. Residents near the sewage facility in Chiba prefecture filed a 
lawsuit demanding the elimination of the storage facilities.  
The government needs to create the disposal facilities213 because 
storage is reaching capacity in 5 prefectures [NHK World, July 30, 2014]. In 
response to the failure of previous administration to select cites “without 
consulting local residents”, the current government revised the process as 
municipal councils were set up in every prefecture to decide on selection 
methods while taking into consideration local residents preferences [The 
Japan News, July 9, 2014].  
Up to now only three prefectures (Chiba, Tochigi and Miyagi) decided 
on their selection process of candidates. The government was able to 
propose the candidate sites in Miyagi Prefecture (Kami, Kurihara and Taiwan) 
but local opposition is strong, and final decision is not made and planned field 
surveys blocked by residents [NHK World, October 24, 2014].  
                                                          
213
 They are for sewage sludge, incinerated ash, and other waste contaminated with more 
than 8,000 Bq/kg of radioactive materials. 
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The government has also chosen a state-owned property in Shioya 
town, Tochigi prefecture as a possible final disposal site for radioactive waste 
[NHK World, July 30, August 18, 2014]. The local government and citizens 
have been opposing saying it will have a negative effect on natural water 
resources and local agricultural and food products214. The mayor suggested a 
counterproposal on radioactive waste215 calling for all radioactive waste to be 
stored at an intermediate facility in a no-entry evacuation zone on the Daiichi 
plant compound [NHK World, November 7, 2014]. 
Recently government allocated ¥5 billion in 2014 fiscal year’s budget to 
five prefectures (Miyagi, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Gunma and Chiba) to carry out 
regional developments and take measures to counter harmful rumors hoping 
it will help win understanding of local residence. 
The Atomic Energy Agency is reported to be looking at the direct 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel instead of reprocessing it216 [NHK World, July 
29, 2014]. The government has long maintained the policy of reprocessing all 
spent nuclear fuel217 and conducted few studies about disposing it as waste. 
A basic energy plan adopted in April 2014 upholds the nuclear fuel recycling 
policy but for the first time it called for studies on ways to directly dispose of 
spent fuel without reprocessing it [NHK World, July 25, 2014].  
A series of challenges led to the later move: a reprocessing plant in 
Rokkasho Village, Aomori prefecture has suffered numerous troubles being 
unable to start full operation more than 20 years since construction began; 
nuclear power plants have accumulated 17,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel; 
                                                          
214
 In September 2012, Ministry chose a state-held forest in Yaita city as prefecture's 
candidate site but plan faced criticism and it had to start selection again. In October Mayor 
of Shioya and leader residents group handed petition - population is 12,000 but the petition 
was signed by about 173,000 from across Japan [NHK World, October 29, 2014]. 
215
 state should pay sufficient compensation to Fukushima and dispose radioactive waste 
in one place. 
216
 Agency's draft report says it is technically possible to directly dispose spent nuclear fuel 
at a low radiation level. If spent nuclear fuel is buried 1,000m underground for 1 million 
years, radiation level at earth's surface will peak in 3,000 years at 0.3 mSv per year.  
217
 extract plutonium and reuse it as fuel at nuclear power plants. 
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fast breeder reactor Monju, Fukui prefecture is designed to use recycled 
plutonium but facility has been plagued by troubles218 and its future is 
uncertain. 
The agency's analysis is expected to lead to greater discussions on 
how to deal with the stockpile of spent nuclear fuel and wastes. Spent nuclear 
fuel is known to have higher radiation levels than high-level radioactive waste, 
and compared to reprocessing, direct disposal would mean more than a 
4-fold increase in nuclear waste volume. Besides, the government lacks any 
prospect of finding a place that would accept a nuclear dumpsite. 
Top officials at the Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan 
charged with the selection and construction of the final disposal facilities, 
were replaced recently in view of the planned restart of nuclear power plant 
operations. Since 2002 the Organization charged with the selection and 
construction of the final disposal facilities has been asking municipal 
governments to indicate willingness to accommodate the final disposal 
facilities [The Japan News, July 23, 2014].  
Until now only one local government (Toyo, Kochi prefecture) has 
announced its candidacy (2007) but its efforts have been buckled under 
opposition from local residents. In December 2013 the central government 
switched to a policy in which it would play a leading role in narrowing down 
prospective candidate sites beforehand and then requesting two or more 
municipal governments to accommodate the facilities.  
The central government plans for radioactive waste to be mixed with 
glass, and the vitrified waste to be stored in metal containers buried at least 
300 m deep underground219. Some in the government voiced a cautious view 
that presenting candidate sites before the local elections next spring will 
                                                          
218
 including a fire and failed inspections. 
219
 Final disposal facilities are to be 6 sq. km to accommodate 40,000 metal containers. 
Existing spent nuclear fuel is equivalent to 25,000 such metal containers (stored at nuclear 
plants and other sites). Many plants have no more room to store spent nuclear fuel.  
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cause disarray, and the candidate sites will most likely be presented after that 
[The Japan News, July 23, 2014]. 
All these difficulties and uncertainties make it difficult to access the full 
environmental impact of the March 2011 disasters, and require a long-term 
monitoring of effects on the individual components and entire ecosystems 
[ISHES, 2011; ME, 2012a; UNSCEAR, 2014; WWF, 2013].  
A 2014 government report points out that the release of radioactive 
materials following the Fukushima nuclear accident remains Japan's biggest 
environmental problem [NHK World, June 6, 2014]. What is more, Japan 
emitted the largest amounts of greenhouse gases on record220 in FY2013 (a 
1.6% climb since 2012) blamed on the increased use of fossil fuels (including 
coal) since the 2011 nuclear disaster [NHK World, December 5, 2014].  
At the same time, people’s enthusiasm for power saving fades down 
from increased willingness to save power after rolling blackouts following 
Fukushima crisis. Recent survey shows that 60.7% of respondents wanted to 
save power, set air conditioning temperatures at appropriate levels or take 
other measures to curb global warming (down from 71.9% in June 2012 
survey) while purchasing environmentally friendly products was cited by 
36.9% (down from 47.4%) [The Japan News, September 25, 2014].  
 
  
 
  
                                                          
220
 1.395 billion tons - most since comparable data are available (1990) and 1.3% up from 
the 2005 levels. By 2020 the target is to cut emissions by 3.8% from the 2005 levels.  
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Part 2. Impacts on agri-food 
organizations, products, markets and 
regulations 
 
Chapter 6. Affected farms and agricultural resources 
 
There have been a huge number of destructed agricultural 
communities, farms, and agricultural lands and properties from the March 
2011 disasters.  
The total number of damaged Agricultural Management Entities221 of 
different type (private farms, corporate entities, cooperatives, local public 
bodies, etc.) reached 37,700 or around 16% of all Agricultural Management 
Entities in the affected eight prefectures (Table 14). 
The greatest part of damaged farms (45.6%) was in Fukushima 
prefectures where more than a third of farms were hurt by the earthquake, 
tsunami, or nuclear accident. The affected Agricultural Management Entities 
in Nagano, Nigata, Iwate and Miyagi prefectures also comprised a good 
portion of all entities in these prefectures. 
The tsunami affected adversely almost 5% of all farms of the six coastal 
prefectures. Tsunami damaged Agricultural Management Entities account for 
about 27% of all damaged by the disasters entities. The majority of the 
                                                          
221
 defined as entities engaged in or entrusted to conduct agriculture production activities 
where area and number of feed livestock of production or operation are above a certain 
size - 30 ares of managed cultivated land; 15 ares of planted land for fields vegetables; 
350 square meters of  planted land for vegetables in facilities; 10 ares of planted land for 
fruits trees; 10 ares of planted land for fields flowers and ornamental plants; 250 square 
meters of lanted land for flowers and ornamental plants in facility; 1 milking cow; 1 
fattening cattle; 15 pigs; 150 layers; 1000 broiler chickens shipped in a year; total sales of 
500,000 yen of agricultural products [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries]. 
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tsunami-damaged farms are located in Miyagi (59.4%) and Fukushima 
(26.9%) prefectures. 
 
Table 14. Number of damaged Agricultural Management Entities by 2011 
earthquake (March 11, 2012) 
Prefectures Total number of 
Agricultural 
management entities* 
Damaged agricultural 
entities 
Entities damaged by 
tsunami 
Number Share, % Number Share, % 
Aomori 3,733 180 4.8 170 4.6 
Iwate 35,321 7,700 21.8 480 1.4 
Miyagi 47,574 7,290 15.3 6,060 12.7 
Fukushima 50,945 17,200 33.8 2,850 5.6 
Ibaraki 56,537 1,430 2.5 180 0.3 
Tochigi 25,010 1,330 5.3 - - 
Chiba 17,224 1,220 7.1 430 2.5 
Nigata 5,311 1,190 22.4 - - 
Nagano 312 210 67.3 - - 
Total 241,967 37,700 15.6 10,200 4.2 
 Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries         *subject to status confirmation 
 
Reported area of agricultural land damaged by the 2011 disasters in the 
six coastal and six inland prefectures is around 24,500 ha (Table 15). More 
than 98% of the damaged agricultural lands were in the coastal regions. The 
mostly hit farmlands were in Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, which 
represent accordingly 60.6% and 24.7% of the damaged agricultural lands in 
the coastal areas. Affected by the disasters farmlands in Miyagi and 
Fukushima prefectures amount almost to 11% and 4% of the total agricultural 
land in these prefectures. 
The tsunami damaged agricultural land accounts for more than 89% of 
the damaged farmland in coastal regions and the greatest portion of the 
damaged land in all but Ibaraki prefectures. Badly hit were 48 municipalities 
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of the six Northeastern prefectures of the country. Particularly huge areas of 
farmland were washed or flooded by tsunami in Minami-Soma city (2,722 ha), 
Watari town (2,711 ha), Yamamoto town (1,595 ha), and Soma city (1,311 
ha) of Fukushima prefecture, Sendai city (2,681 ha), Ishinomaki city (2,107 
ha), Natori city (1,561 ha), Higashi-Matsushima city (1,495 ha), and Imanuma 
city (1,206 ha) of Miyagi prefecture, and Kasennuma city (1,032 ha) of Iwate 
prefecture [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014].  
More than 85% of the washed away or flooded by the tsunami 
farmlands were paddy fields (Figure 21). In most affected Miyagi and 
Fukushima prefectures the destroyed by the tsunami paddy fields accounted 
for 11.5% and 5.3% of all paddy fields in these prefectures. 
The average farms size in the affected by the 2011 disasters regions is 
2.51 ha222. The average damaged-land per affected Agricultural Management 
Entities comprises a considerable portion of the average agricultural land 
under farm management in Miyagi, Chiba and Ibaraki prefectures (Figure 22). 
What is more, the average tsunami-damaged land per affected Agricultural 
Management Entities represents a significant part of the average farm size in 
all costal prefectures ranging from 12% (Aomori) up to 92% (Fukushima). 
Therefore, the 2011 disaster has enormously damaged the farmland, 
production capability and the entire economy of the (most) affected farms. 
The later is also confirmed by the detailed classification of the 
agricultural holdings in different parts of the most tsunami-damaged Miyagi 
prefecture where a significant portion are up to 1 ha and the majority bellow 3 
ha (Figure 49). 
In the three most strongly hit prefectures two-third of municipalities (85) 
has been damaged by the 2011 disaster, including 41.9% of them tsunami 
damaged [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. The biggest 
number of damaged municipalities has been in Fukushima prefecture (34, 
including 10 tsunami-damaged), followed by Miyagi prefecture (31, including 
                                                          
222
 including both unaffected and damaged Agricultural Management Entities. 
  
131 
15 tsunami-damaged), and Iwate prefecture (20, including 11 tsunami-
damaged). 
 
Table 15. Area of damaged agricultural land by 2011 earthquake (March 
11, 2012) 
Prefectures Damaged 
agricultural land* 
Tsunami damaged 
agricultural land 
Share of 
completely 
restored 
agricultural 
land (%) 
Share of 
restored 
tsunami 
damaged 
land (%) 
Area 
(ha) 
% in total 
cultivated 
land 
Area 
(ha) 
% in 
damaged 
land 
Aomori 107 0.1 77 72 94.4 92.2 
Iwate 1,209 0.8 725 60 22.2 3.9 
Miyagi 14,558 10.7 14,341 98.5 33.3 32.5 
Fukushima 5,927 3.9 5,462 92.1 9.3 4.1 
Ibaraki 1,063 0.6 208 19.6 90.1 97.1 
Chiba 1,162 0.9 663 57.1 100.0 100 
Total coastal 24,026 2.7 21,476 89.4 32.9 27.3 
Yamagata 1 0.0 - 0 100.0 - 
Tochigi 198 0.1 - 0 98.0 - 
Gunma 1 0.0 - 0 100.0 - 
Saitama 39 0.0 - 0 100.0 - 
Niigata 117 0.1 - 0 73.5 - 
Nagano 95 0.1 - 0 69.5 - 
Total inland  451 0.1 - 0 85.8 - 
Total 24,477 1.6 21,476 87.7 33.8 27.3 
*includes tsunami-damaged land (to be restored) in Reconstruction Master Plan for 
Agriculture and Farming Villages), and other damaged land due to cracks, liquefaction, 
burial, sediment inflow, etc. as well as minimal tsunami-damaged land not included in 
Master Plan 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries       
 
According to the latest data almost 56% of the traditional agricultural 
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hamlets223 in Miyagi prefecture have been damaged by the disasters, 
including 20.1% tsunami-damaged [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, 2014]. Particularly severely have been hit Tagajo, 
Higashimatsushima, Kawasaki-cho, Yamamoto-cho, Matsushima-machi, 
Shichigahama town, Rifu-cho, Yamato-cho, Osato-cho, Tomiya Town, Ohira 
village and Onagawa, where every one of the agricultural communities has 
been damaged by the disasters. 
 
Figure 21. Areas of farmlands washed away or flooded by tsunami (ha) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries            
 
In other two most affected prefectures Iwate and Fukushima the share 
of damaged traditional agricultural hamlets is 35.8% and 27,7%, including 
7.4% and 4.1% tsunami-damaged. Harshly affected by the disasters have 
been Fukushima’s Kagamiishi Town, Izumizaki village, Nakajima Village, 
Yabuki-machi, Naraha Town, Tomioka, Kawauchi Village, Okuma-machi, 
Futaba-cho, Namie-machi, Katsurao Village and Iitate, where each 
agricultural community has been damaged. 
There have been registered damages in 36,092 places including: 
                                                          
223
 Shuraku – ancient agricultural community organization still vital in Japan. In 3 most 
affected prefectures there are 10,737 agricultural hamlets, including 3,652 in Iwate, 2,797 
in Miyagi and 4,288 in Fukushima [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. 
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damaged agricultural land in 18,186 areas, damaged agricultural facilities 
(mainly storage reservoirs, drains, pumps, shore protection facilities for 
agricultural land) in 17,317 points, damaged coastal protection facilities for 
agricultural land in 139 points, and damaged facilities for daily life in farming 
villages (mainly community sewerage) in 450 points [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. 
 
Figure 22. Size of farms, damaged land &      Figure 23. Size of agricultural holdings 
tsunami damaged land per affected AME       in tsunami-damaged areas in Miyagi  
  
Source: MAFF                                                     Source: Fuyuki 2013 
 
The biggest number of places with damaged lands was registered in 
Iwate (73.9%), Fukushima 10%) and Miyagi (8.3%) prefectures [Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. The number of points with 
damaged agricultural facilities etc. was biggest in Miyagi (27.7% of total), 
Fukushima (22%), Iwate (21.4%), Chiba (13%) and Ibaraki (10.6%) 
prefectures; with damaged coastal farmland protection facilities in Miyagi 
(74.1%), Fukushima (14.4%) and Iwate (10.8%) prefectures; and with 
damaged rural community facilities in Fukushima (31.8%), Miyagi (24.1%), 
Ibaraki (21.7%) and Iwate (9.3%) prefectures. 
Furthermore, there has been radioactive contamination of farmlands 
from the nuclear accident’s fallout (Map 11). A survey in the most affected 
regions shows that contamination with cesium of paddy fields ranges from 67 
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up to 41,400 Bq/kg and other lands (arable, meadows, permanent crops) 
from 16 to 56,600 Bq/kg (Table 16). Most heavily contaminated farmlands are 
in Fukushima prefecture where 3.6% of all samples (including 4% of the 
paddy fields and 2.9% of other lands) are above 5000 Bq/kg. 
 
Map 11. Farmland soil radiation (March 23, 2012) 
 
                   Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries            
 
There has been enormous destruction of livestock, fruit trees and crops 
in affected by the disasters regions. The total crop and livestock damages 
from the 2011 earthquake are estimated to worth 14.2 billion yen [Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012]. In Aomori, Iwate and Miyagi 
prefectures registered livestock damages include 187 dairy heads (171 
drowned and 16 crushed or starved), 458 beef cattle (466 drowned and 12 
crushed or starved), 5,850 hogs (4,037 drowned and 1,813 crushed or 
starved), and 4,549,620 poultry (174,800 drowned and 4,374820 crushed or 
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starved) [Tohoku Agricultural Administration Office, 2011].  
 
Table 16. Share of contaminated with Cs farmlands, as of December 28, 
2012 (percent) 
Prefec-
tures 
Paddy fields Other farmlands 
range 
(Bq/kg) 
0-
500 
500-
1000 
1000
-
5000 
> 
50
00 
range 
(Bq/kg) 
0-500 500-
1000 
1000-
5000 
> 
50
00 
Miyagi 72-1,310 61.9 28.6 9.5 0 110-860 50 50 0 0 
Fukushima 50-41,400 39 16.1 40.8 4 40-56,600 34.3 21.2 41.6 2.9 
Ibaraki  0 0 0 0 230-560 50 50 0 0 
Tochigi 110-1,040 50 41.7 8.3 0 62-2,630 66.7 11.1 22.22 0 
Gunma 85-170 100 0 0 0 49-560 95 5 0 0 
Chiba 67-120 100 0 0 0 < 16-190 100 0 0 0 
Total 67-41,400 43.2 17.8 35.6 3.4 16-56,600 46.2 19.2 32.4 2.2 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries               
 
Damages on farms have been particularly big in areas around the 
Fukushima nuclear plant, where most agricultural land, livestock and crops 
were heavily contaminated and destructed [Koyama, 2012, 2013; Watanabe, 
2013]. In the most affected evacuation areas farming activity has been 
suspended or significantly reduced, and majority of livestock and crops 
destroyed. For instance, in JA Soma the damaged area from the nuclear 
accident reaches 5,439 ha and the damaged farmlands is 4,155 ha 
[Nagashima, 2013]. Consequently, in the evacuation area the number of 
farms decreased from 364 to 101, and the livestock heads from 4864 to 2261. 
The official number of farm households in the evacuation zones is 5400 
and the farming area 11,000 ha, including 73.3% of paddy fields, 25.6% of 
uplands, and 1.1% permanent crops [Fukushima Prefectural Government, 
2012]. That comprises 8% of the total number of farmers and 9% of the 
farming area in Fukushima prefecture in 2010. The numbers of beef cattle in 
the evacuation areas was 10,836, of milk cows 1,980 and of pigs 40,740, 
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accounting respectively for 15%, 12% and 22% of the overall numbers of 
livestock in 2011. The figure for chickens was 1,589 or 30% of the total 
number in the prefecture in 2009. 
The official estimate for the inflicted damage on agriculture by the 2011 
earthquake is 904.9 billion yen224 (Figure 24). The biggest share of the 
damages is for agricultural land (44.3%) and agricultural facilities (30.4%), 
followed by the coastal farmland protection facilities (11.3%), community 
facilities (7%), agricultural livestock etc. (mainly country elevators, agricultural 
warehouses, PVC greenhouses, livestock bams, compost depos) (5.4%), and 
agricultural crop and livestock etc. (1.6%). 
 
Figure 24. Damages to agriculture from 2011 earthquake as of July 5, 
2012 (100 million yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries        
 
The biggest portion of the damage value (worth) on agricultural land 
was in Miyagi (69%), Fukushima (23.6%) and Iwate (5.8%) prefectures; on 
agricultural facilities, etc. in Miyagi (44.4%), Fukushima (34%), Ibaraki (9.9%) 
and Chiba (6.3%) prefectures; on coastal farmland protection facilities in 
                                                          
224
 Damage to Sector Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (2,426.8 billion yen) is 18 times 
as large as for 2004 Nigata Chuetsu Easrtquake and about 27 times bigger than for 1995 
Great Hanshin Easrtquake [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. 
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Miyagi (42.5%), Iwate (32.4%) and Fukushima (24.8%) prefectures; on rural 
community facilities in Miyagi (43.1%), Fukushima (38.7%) and Ibaraki (12%) 
prefectures. The bulk of damage on crop and livestock, etc. was in Miyagi 
(57.8%), Iwate (13.9%), Tochigi (7.2%), Ibaraki (6.9%), Fukushima (5.7%) 
and Saitama (4.4%) prefectures, while on livestock facilities, etc. in Miyagi 
(71.2%), Ibaraki (8.8%), Tochigi (7.1%), and Iwate (5.8%) prefectures. 
The greatest amount of damage has incurred in Miyagi prefecture 
representing 56.5% of the total worth (Figure 25). The second most affected 
prefecture was Fukushima with 26.4% of the total damage. Iwate and Chiba 
prefectures have also incurred considerable damages - 7.8% and 4.8% of the 
total.  
 
Figure 25. Damages to agriculture in different prefectures from 2011 
earthquake as of July 5, 2012 (100 million yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries            
 
In Miyagi, Fukushima, Nagano and Iwate prefectures the damages on 
agricultural land take the greatest segment in the registered prefectural 
amounts. In Kanagawa, Shizuoka, Gunma, Chiba, Yamagata, Ibaraki, 
Tochigi, Nagano, and Nigata prefectures the damages on agricultural facilities 
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etc. dominate. In Iwate prefecture most of the damages are on coastal 
farmland protection facilities. In Akita prefectures damages on rural 
community facilities are the largest. In Saitama and Yamagata prefectures the 
crops and livestock losses are the biggest, while in Saitama and Aomori the 
damage on livestock facilities etc. are the most important.  
Early studies estimated the tsunami disaster losses in rice field in 
Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures to 1932.52 ha and 718.43 ha respectively, 
which are expected to cause a decrease in annual rice yield by 9,472.60 tons 
in Miyagi prefecture and by 2,939.10 tons in Fukushima prefecture, 
equivalent to a total annual loss of $US 1,411 millions [Liou et al., 2012]. It 
was also estimated that such loss would be undoubtfully enlarged by several 
orders of magnitude when the contamination of nuclear radiation is 
considered. 
A survey on the economic situation of agricultural management entities 
in the tsunami damaged areas have found out that in 2011 the sales 
revenues from agricultural products dropped by 68% comparing to 2010 and 
the agricultural income by 77% [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, 2013]. Farmers in Miyagi prefecture experienced the biggest 
decrease in sales and income, followed by the producers in Iwate and 
Fukushima prefectures (Figure 26). 
Severe blows on sales and income were registered by producers in the 
three dominant type of farming in affected region as those specialized mainly 
in facilities vegetables saw the highest decrease in sales and income (86% 
and 76% accordingly), followed by the rice and open field vegetable 
producers (Figure 27).  
There have been some improvements in sales and incomes in all areas 
but in 2013 they were still far bellow the 2010 level – 24% and 36% 
accordingly [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. The fastest 
recovery has been registered in Miyagi farms’ sales and income (49% and 
48% increase), followed by the Iwate (23% and 32% increase) and 
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Fukushima (21% and 13% increase) producers’ results. The slower growth of 
income compared to sales (in Iwate and Fukushima prefecture) was due to 
the higher costs associated with the post-disaster cleaning and rebuilding.   
 
Figure 26. Evolution of agricultural sale and income of agricultural 
management entities in tsunami-damaged areas (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
  
Figure 27. Evolution of agricultural sale and income of agricultural 
management entities with different specialization in tsunami-damaged 
areas (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries         
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There has been a good progress in recovery of sales and income of rice 
and vegetable farms but in 2013 their levels was still considerable lower than 
in 2010. The fastest income growth was registered by the rice producers 
(54%) due to restoration of farmland and augmentation of sales (62%). The 
slower pace of post-disaster recovery in the facility grown vegetables was 
caused by the prolonged farmland restoration and the high (facility) rebuilding 
costs after the land restoration is complete and operation resumed [Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014].  
In the first year after the disaster there was augmentation of the 
agricultural output value in 69.8% out of the 43 tsunami-damaged 
municipalities (Figure 28). In the rest of the affected municipalities there was 
no progress (11.6%) or even a reduction (18.6%) in the agricultural output, 
including in 58.3% of the damaged municipalities in Iwate prefecture, a half in 
Aomori prefecture, 26.7% in Miyagi prefecture, 16.7% in Ibaraki prefectures, 
and zero in Fukushima and Chiba prefectures [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2013].  
In 2013 there was a further augmentation of the agricultural output 
value in 67.4% of the tsunami-damaged municipalities, a reduction in 25.6% 
of them, and no change in the rest 7% (Figure 56). There was a regression or 
no progress in agricultural output of 46.7% of the affected Miyagi 
municipalities,  third of damaged Fukushima and Ibaraki municipalities, a 
quarter of hit Iwate municipalities, and a fifth of destroyed Chiba 
municipalities [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. 
Individual municipalities differed substantially in terms of amount of 
damages, the 2011 production level, and the 2011-2013 sell-price levels. 
Therefore, the evolution of agricultural output value gives only a partial insight 
on the state of farming recovery in different municipalities225.  
                                                          
225
 E.g. in 2012 there was no or very low output in Onagawa, Shiogama, and 
Shichigahama Town, Miyagi prefecture due to enormous tsunami destruction and farming 
suspension (no annual progression in the first two cases, and 80% reduction in the last 
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Figure 28. Evolution of agricultural output value in tsunami-damaged 
municipalities (10 million yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries         
                                                                                                                                                                                                
one). On the other hand, a small output progression (0.8%) in Kamisu, Ibaraki prefecture 
expresses maintaining of a relatively high 2011 level. 
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There are official estimates on some of the damages from the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster as well. For instance, the total product damages 
from the accident accounts for 2,568 billion yen in Fukushima prefecture, out 
of which 41.9% are in the evacuated and restricted areas (Table 17). These 
figures cover damage of products that cannot be sold, because of the 
restrictions on planning and distribution, and loss of the value caused by 
rumors.  
 
Table 17. Agricultural product damages in areas affected by nuclear 
disaster in 2012 
 Vege-
tables 
Live-
stock 
Fruit Rice Evacuated/
restricted 
area total 
Fukushima 
prefecture 
Evacuated/restricted area 
share (%) 
42.4 68.0 48.9 35.9 - 100 
Evacuated/restricted area 
(100 million yen) 
225 346 135 371 1,077 2,568 
Evacuated/restricted area 
ratio (%) 
8.8 13.5 5.2 14.4 41.9 100 
Source: Tohoku Department of Agricultural Administration, MAFF Statistics 
 
Above assessment does not include important “stock damage” (material 
funds, damage to production infrastructure, contamination of agricultural land, 
facilities for evacuation, and usage restrictions on machinery) as well as the 
loss of “society-related capital” (diverse tangible and intangible investments 
for creating production areas, brands, human resources, network structure, 
community, and cultural capital, ability to utilize resources and funds for many 
years). The later losses are quite difficult to measure and “compensate” 
[Koyama, 2013].  
Much of the overall damages from the 2011 disasters on farmers 
livelihood and possessions, physical and mental health, environment, lost 
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community relations etc. can hardly be expressed in quantitative (e.g. 
monetary) terms [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. Many farms livelihood and 
businesses have been severely destructed as a result of loss of lives, injuries 
and displacement, and considerable damages on property (farmland, crops, 
livestock, homes, material assets, intangibles such as brands, good 
reputation, etc.), related infrastructure, and community and business 
relations.  
What is more, thousands of farmers in Fukushima prefecture and 
neighboring regions have been continuing to suffer enormously from the 
radioactive contamination of farmlands and agricultural products, the official 
and/or voluntary restrictions on production and shipments, and the declined 
markets and prices for products [JA ZENCHU, 2012; Koyama 2013a, 2013b; 
Ujiie 2011 and 2012; Watanabe, 2011; Wataname 2013]. 
There has been a significant short and longer-term negative impact of 
the triple disaster on farm management entities in the most affected 
prefectures and beyond. According to a 2012 survey the disaster affected 
negatively almost 55% of the Japanese farms (Figure 29). Most severely 
affected have been farmers in Tohoku and Kanto regions, and the least 
affected in Hokuriko and Kinki regions. In the worst hit Iwate, Miyagi, 
Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Chiba prefectures more than 88 
89% of all farms “are still affected” or “were affected in the past” from the 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident. 
One year of the disaster 31.4% of the surveyed farms in the country 
reported adverse effect on their management by the disasters. More than 
71% of farmers in Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima prefectures, and more than 
56% of those in Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Chiba prefectures continued to 
feel the adverse effects of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident. 
Among different sectors of agriculture the most farms have been 
affected by the disasters in beef and facility flowers productions (Figure 30). 
Furthermore, one year after the disasters almost 78% of surveyed beef 
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farmers, around a half of mushroom and dairy producers, more than 42% of 
tea and almost 37% of facility flower producers reported they are still feeling 
the adverse effects of the disasters. 
 
Figure 29. Adverse effect of Great East Japan Earthquake on farm 
management in different regions of Japan (March 2012) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
There are also huge differences in the most affected sectors in each 
region of the country (Table 18). One year after disasters in Iwate, Miyagi, 
and Fukushima prefectures a great majority of farms in beef, dairy, 
mushroom, facility vegetables, fruit trees and rice cultivation are still 
adversely affected by the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident. On the 
other hand, in Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Chiba prefectures the negative 
impact lasted longer for the significant number of beef, mushroom, dairy, and 
open field vegetables producers. 
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Figure 30. Adverse effect of Great East Japan Earthquake on farm 
management in different subsectors of Japanese agriculture (March 
2012) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
The major reasons for the negative impacts of the triple disasters have 
been the “decline in sell prices” and “harmful rumors”, while the damaged 
inputs supply and production affected less farms (Table 19). What is more, for 
farmers still affected by the disasters the importance of the first two factors 
increased considerably in 2012 comparing to the disaster year.  
There has been a great variation in the importance of different factors 
affecting producers in individual sectors of agriculture (Table 20). For 
instance, “damaged production” has been a major factor for the most broilers 
producers, “damaged input supply” for the majority of pigs, upland crops, and 
open field vegetables producers, while “declined sell prices” and “harmful 
rumors” impacted farmers in all sectors.  Furthermore, in 2012 the impact of 
“reduced sell prices” further increased for most subsectors, while of the 
“harmful rumors” for all producers.  
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Table 18. Adverse effect of Great East Japan Earthquake on different 
subsectors in most affected regions (March 2012) 
 Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Chiba 
Currently 
still 
affected 
It was 
affected but 
not now 
Not 
affected 
until now 
Currently 
still 
affected 
It was but 
not now 
Not 
affected 
until now 
Rice 64.2 18.9 16.9 44 24.5 31.4 
Upland 
crops    46.2 23.1 30.8 
Open field 
vegetables 38.5 23.1 38.5 64.3 26.8 8.9 
Facilities 
vegetables 70.3 21.6 8.1 35.3 59.8 4.9 
Fruit trees 69.6 8.7 21.7 48 36 16 
Facilities 
flowers 64.3 17.9 17.9 54.1 45.9  
Mushrooms 87.5 12.5  92.9 7.1  
Dairy 95.2 4.8  79.8 19.3 0.9 
Beef 98.6 1.4  92.6 7.4  
Pigs 54.1 45.9  41.8 41.8 16.4 
Hens    38.1 33.3 28.6 
Broilers 42.1 52.6 5.3    
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
Another nationwide survey on farms performance reviled that there is 
significant differences in the dynamics of sales volume and income in of 
individual and corporate farms [Japan Financial Corporation, 2013]. For 
instance, there was a considerable decline in the income of vegetable 
producing Corporate Farms in 2012 comparing to 2011 (11.2% for open field 
and 34.1% for facility vegetables) with simultaneously improved performance 
in the Individual Management Entities. At the same time, declined in the 
income in Individual Farms was much higher than in the Corporate Farms 
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hen produces (69.8% and 30% accordingly) and the opposite for the broilers 
producers (2.6% and 20.3% accordingly). 
 
Table 19. Reasons for those who are currently adversely affected in 
different regions (August, 2011; January 2012)* 
 
Damage to 
production 
Damage input 
supply 
Damage to 
distribution 
Decline in sell 
prices 
Harmful 
rumors 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Japan 24.5 23.2 41 27.1 44.4 33 65.8 74.4 52.8 60.5 
Hokkaido 12.6 14.1 55.9 39.7 34.4 31.3 63.5 79.8 44.1 46.4 
Tohoku 46.3 38.2 51.5 25.2 60.8 41 55.2 65.8 58.3 72 
Kanto 34.1 26.1 28.8 17.6 45.2 27.8 69.6 72.8 72.9 76.1 
Hokuriko 12.4 14.8 47.6 29.6 40 24.1 44.8 63 45.7 55.6 
Tokai 7.6 7.3 30.5 18.2 41.9 34.5 86.7 87.3 35.2 43.6 
Kinki 5.4 11.4 25 28.6 29.3 25.7 73.9 77.1 44.6 28.6 
Chugoku-
Shikoku 6.3 9.7 31.7 23.9 33.7 29.2 72.6 80.5 38 50.4 
Kyushu 8.6 9.1 27.9 29.9 40.5 32.5 77.5 86.8 37.5 36 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation                     *multiple answers 
 
Having in mind multiplicities, complexity, spin-offs, and loner time spans 
of the agricultural impact of the 2011 disasters, its full evaluation is far from 
been complete. 
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Table 20. Reasons for those who are currently adversely affected in 
different subsectors (August 2011; January 2012) 
 
Damage to 
production 
Damage input 
supply 
Damage to 
distribution 
Decline in 
sell prices 
Harmful 
rumors 
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 
Rice 26.3 27.4 48.8 32.3 36.7 33.5 41.2 55.9 53.7 67.9 
Upland 
crops 10.4 16.3 63.6 55.6 32.9 34.1 50.3 73.3 41 49.6 
Open field 
vegetables 9.2 19.9 41.4 43.8 38.5 42.5 81 70.5 51.7 54.8 
Facilities 
vegetables 28.3 32.7 24 35.6 41.9 36.5 78.7 65.4 48.4 54.8 
Tea 13.5 13.4 8.7 15.9 40.4 34.1 69.2 67.1 80.8 87.8 
Fruit trees 14.7 21.3 35.3 20 42.2 41.3 56.9 65.3 49.1 61.3 
Facilities 
flowers 15.5 19.8 26.8 25.2 52.1 27 88.7 88.3 14.6 19.8 
Mushrooms 23 38.3 27 36.2 48.6 31.9 77 76.6 44.6 57.4 
Dairy 32.3 26.3 50 21.2 42.9 29.8 71.8 84 57.1 58.2 
Beef 22.4 18.4 29.5 10.5 55.9 35.6 96.7 94.8 87.4 80.8 
Pigs 49 22.8 66.9 16.5 56.6 15.2 35.2 75.9 34.5 53.2 
Hens 37 18.2 47.8 12.1 45.7 24.2 28.3 78.8 41.3 27.3 
Broilers 67.7 72.7 90.3 45.5 51.6 18.2 6.5 36.4 6.5 63.6 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation                         *multiple answers 
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Chapter 7. State of restoration of agricultural organizations, 
lands, and infrastructure 
 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries worked out a 
“Strategy for the Revitalization of the Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries” 
(2011) aiming to rapid restoration and resuming of farming in disaster 
affected regions. What is more, in line with the Government priority the 
strategy and accompanied measures have intended to rebuild economy, 
industry, and local communities with resilient structures through a “qualitative 
shift” towards a new socio-economic growth. The Basic Guidelines for 
Reconstruction called for reconstruction to make agriculture in Tohoku “serve 
as a model for the nation” [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
2011]. 
The Government reconstruction strategy incorporated seven basic 
principles:  
- country’s revitalization will underpin the reconstruction of East Japan, 
and the reconstruction of East Japan will serve as a trailblazing example for 
Japan's revitalization; 
- establish economic and social structures that are fortified against 
enormous risks; 
 - maintain confidence in public finances and social security, Japan 
brand; 
- concentrated allotment and concentrated investment in new growth 
under resource restrictions, such as those on financial resources and electric 
power; 
- realize local empowerment and private sector vitality; 
- revitalize economy in an open manner by strengthening "kizuna" (the 
bonds of friendship);  
- promote understanding in Japan and overseas regarding Japan's 
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revitalization. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries strategy has been 
supported by a series of supplementary budgets including: subsidizing part of 
the cost necessary to recover farm land, granting aid to resumption of 
farming, and providing interest-free loans for the afflicted farmers and 
businesses. It also considers projects for integrated development of 
residential zones, agricultural zones and other zones, including conversion 
from residential to agricultural zones.  
In addition, there has been easing in approval standards under the 
Agricultural Land Act and other laws, and one-stop procedure for zoning, 
approval and project planning in affected areas. Further enlargement of the 
loans with a credit line of 100 billion yen and interest-free loan under the “Act 
on Temporary Measures on Financial Support of Farmers has been 
introduced. Subsequently, farms having 30% and more harvest reduction and 
over 10% of property damages can apply up to 2 million yen for persons and 
20 million yen for companies with 3-6 years redemption period. For special 
cases the individual loans have 2.5 million yen ceiling and extending period of 
redemption of 4-7 years under the “Special Financial Aid Act for Heavy 
Disaster” [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries]. 
The government measures aimed at both recovering and increasing 
farm efficiency. Particularly, they have been contributing to accelerating 
farmland transactions and expanding farm operations. The “new” policy 
encourages communities in the afflicted area to discuss and submit “master 
plans” for farmland use. Citizens have been faced with a task of discussing 
land use for public, commercial, residential, farming and other purposes in 
order to rebuild communities. That made it possible for agricultural 
commissions with participation of stakeholders and citizens to discuss 
farmland use marking land zones clearly and effectively. The later gave 
opportunity to adjust land uses and aggregate farmland while concentrating 
residence and commercial/communal facilities into uplands, which allow 
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improving farmland efficiency and building a disaster-resistant community. 
The government pays 30 thousand yen for every 0.1 hectares of 
farmland to retiring farmers, non-farmer inheritors, etc. if they lease out land 
under certain conditions (period more than 6 years, land to be blindly 
entrusted to government-approved agencies taking part in farmland 
aggregation projects, etc.). The later created incentives to increase farmland 
transactions within the afflicted area as well as opportunities for farm 
managers to expand production by borrowing consolidated land plots from 
farmland aggregation agencies.  
There has been also a huge public support for decontamination efforts 
– e.g. national budget for decontamination for the period of 2012-2013 
comprises 1.1482 trillion yen [Koyama, 2013]. There has been increased 
public (national, prefectural, local) support to farms and agri-business in the 
affected regions. The Government established the Nuclear Damage Liability 
Facilitation Fund to support nuclear damages payments. By March 2012 
agricultural damages payments associated with the nuclear disaster totaled 
about 106.2 billion yen [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries]. 
The Government support to prefectures and farmers to recover from the 
disaster has been substantial. For instance, farmers that have conducted 
complete inspection of all cattle and feed lots are paid 50,000 yen per head of 
cattle. In places where shipping restrictions are imposed funds have been 
provided for the purchase and disposal of the beef in distribution chains or 
facing delayed shipment. Similar measures have been applied to other farm 
products as well. 
Last but not least important, there has been a significant support from 
diverse agricultural (such as agricultural cooperatives), business, academic, 
non-governmental and international organizations. All they intensified their 
activities in the affected regions and multiplied relations with individual 
farmers and agri-business companies. That has been associated with an 
increased “outside” service supply and likely positive effects on activity, 
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innovations, incomes, etc. 
A good progress in removal of debris, restoration of damaged 
agricultural lands, and resumption of farming has been achieved with 
concerted efforts of government agencies, prefectural and local authorities, 
agricultural cooperatives, farmers, private companies, volunteers, etc.  
In order to remove the salt from soils following procedures have been 
applied – construction of temporary diversion canals or creasing cannels, 
pouring lime soil conditioner, mole draining, reverse plowing/soil crushing and 
flooding for removing salt [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
2011]. 
One year after the disasters around a third of the damaged agricultural 
land was completely restored, including 27% of the tsunami damaged 
farmlands. During the same period about 90% of the tsunami-afflicted 
farmland was cleaned of rubble, a large part of the agricultural infrastructure 
reconstructed (including 100% of the major draining pumping stations and 7.3 
km priority restoration zones of coastal farmlands, and 92% of the rural 
community sewages) [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012].  
Consequently, 70% of all damaged farms in 9 prefectures and 40.2% of 
the tsunami damaged farms in 6 prefectures resumed farming (Figure 31). 
Until March 2013 the restoration and salt removal on 38% of the 
tsunami-damaged farmland was completed and it was available for farming 
(with restoration on another 63% ongoing) [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries, 2013]. That was close to the target in the 3 years plan226 for 
complete restoration of tsunami-damaged farming set by the Basic Guidelines 
for Reconstruction of Agriculture and Rural Communities after the Great East 
Japan Earthquake (Table 21). Consequently, a half of the affected by the 
tsunami farms resumed agricultural production or preparations for it [Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. 
                                                          
226 published on August 26, 2011 (concequently revised several times) specifying farmland restoration 
measurs and schedule. 
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Figure 31. Share of Agricultural Management Entities, which resumed 
farming (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries            
 
Table 21. Master plan for restoration of tsunami-damaged farmland, 
June 2014 (ha) 
Prefectures FY 
2011 
FY 
2012 
FY 
2013 
FY 
2014 
FY 
2015* 
FY 
2016 
or 
later* 
Evacu-
ation 
order 
area 
Diver
sion 
Total 
Iwate 10 100 150 190 40 190 - 50 730 
Miyagi 1,220 5,450 4,240 1,120 540 1,140 - 630 14,340 
Fukushima 60 400 890 280 240 890 2,120 580 5,460 
Aomori, 
Ibaraki, 
Chiba 
810 140 - - - - - - 950 
Total 8,100 5,280 1,590 820 2,220 2,120 1,260 21,480 
Share (%) 38 25 7 4 10 10 6 100 
*including scheduled enlargement of farmlands (710 ha in 2014, 1,570 ha in 2015) 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries      
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The latest figures indicate that 63% of the tsunami damaged agricultural 
land has been made available for farming [Reconstruction Agency, 2014] and 
more than 55% of the affected farms resumed operation. 
In the three most affected by the disasters prefectures approximately 
72% of the damaged farms and 52% of the tsunami-damaged farms resumed 
operations. The biggest progress in restoration of the damaged farms has 
been achieved in Iwate prefecture, and for the tsunami damaged farms in 
Miyagi prefecture. Despite that agricultural land in Miyagi prefecture was 
planed to be fully recovered by 2015, the officials announced that in might be 
delayed by a few more years [Fuyuki, 2013]. 
In Fukushima prefectures the restoration of operations in damaged 
farms has been progressing slowly. Until June 2014 merely 29.9% of the 
tsunami-damaged farmland has been restored and become resumeable for 
farming, 82.3% of damaged agricultural facilities have been restored, and 
60.9% of the Agricultural Management Entities resume operations [Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. Similarly, merely 69.3% of the 
planed agricultural lands (paddy, upland, orchards and pastures) from the 
Municipality decontamination area have been actually decontaminated 
[Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. Moreover, some parts of heavily 
contaminated areas remain almost untouched and probably require a long 
time before farming resumes.  
The major reasons for “not resuming farming” in the three most affected 
prefectures have been: the impact of nuclear accident, unavailable arable 
land, facilities and equipment, undecided place of settlement, and funding 
problems (Figure 32). The importance of most factors has been decreasing 
due to progression in reconstruction, returning of evacuees, restoration of 
farmlands, and public support measures. On the other hand, the significance 
of the nuclear crisis as a reason deterring an effective resumption of 
operations by the majority of farms has been increasing.  
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Figure 32. Reasons for not resuming farming in Iwate, Miyagi and 
Fukushima prefectures, multiple answers (% of farms) 
        
            Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries      
 
The post disaster lack of family labor and other factors such as sickness 
and injuries prevented resumption of activity in a few farms, and their number 
further decreased in the last 3 years. 
The most critical factors for “not resuming farming” for the majority of 
farms in Iwate and Miyagi prefectures have been unavailable arable land and 
facilities (Figure 33). Other important factors for a significant number of farms 
in these prefectures are that farmers have still not decided on the place of 
settlement (affecting 60% of the damaged farms in Iwate prefecture), funding 
of farming activities is an issue, and equipment can not be secured. On the 
other hand, the most important obstacle to restart operations for the most 
Fukushima farmers has been the “impact of nuclear accident”. 
The aging of farmers and the lack of successors in business has been a 
serious problem in the disaster areas and nationwide. For instance, presently 
a significant portion of the regular farm male workers in the tsunami-damaged 
areas of Miyagi prefectures are part-time farmers and older than 65 (Figure 
34). Therefore, any further delay in the reconstruction would be a great 
challenge for farming resumption by the previous farm managers (older in 
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age, lack of investment capability, short time span, lack of ability to put 
rebuilding efforts, lack of skills other than for rice paddy cultivation, 
unavailable successor, etc.). 
 
Figure 33. Share of farms with diverse reasons for not resuming 
farming, multiple answers (%) 
 
          Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries      
 
Figure 34. Age of regular male farm workers in different parts of Miyagi 
prefecture 
 
Source: Fuyuki, 2013 
 
 The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries launched the 
National Specific Disaster Restoration Programs for Farmlands and Farming 
facilities in FY2011 (Map 11). In efforts to secure reconstruction after land 
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restoration, it is implemented to enlarge partitions of farmlands to achieve 
economies of scale and farming efficiency (Figure 35). In March 2013 the 
later include 9,400 ha in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, funded by 
the Great East Japan Earthquake Reconstruction Grants and the like 
[Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. The national specific 
restoration program of farming facilities in Minamisoma city, Fukushima 
Prefecture started in FY2012. 
 
Map 11. Districts for implementing national    Figure 35. Overview of farmland  
specific disaster restoration programs            enlargement in Sendai Higashi District 
 
Source: MAFF           Source: MAFF 
 
The process of reconstruction of devastated by the earthquake and 
tsunami East Sendai agriculture is a good example for the efficiency of 
implementing strategy227 and programs.  
The strategy and the Plan for reconstruction of agriculture is an 
essential part of the ten year “Sendai City Disaster Reconstruction Plan” for 
                                                          
227
 Goals and progress presented in “Fresh Breeze of Change in Agriculture Starts Here” 
(http://en.re-tohoku.jp/movie/15294).  
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restoration, recovery and revitalizing of all aspects of social life and 
economies, and enhancing safety of residents and communities. The later 
include as major components the reconstruction projects such as: ”Tsunami 
reduction and housing reconstruction project”, “Residential area rebuilding 
project”, “Life recovery project”, “Agricultural and food frontier project”, 
“Seaside exchange and revitalization project”, “Model development project for 
a disaster-proof Sendai”, “Energy-saving and new energy projects”, “Sendai 
economy development project”, “Exchange promotion project”, and 
“Earthquake disaster memorial project” [City of Sendai, 2011]. 
The Eastern Sendai agricultural zone includes four districts - Takasago, 
Miyaguno-ku, Shishigo, Wakayabashi-ku, Rokugo, Wakayabashi-ku, and 
Shiromaru, Taihaku (Map 12). The total area is 4,633 ha, population of 
21,966 in 8,086 households, and number of buildings 12,277.  
 
Map 12. Tsunami damaged East-Sendai       Map 13. Plan for land use in Eastern  
agricultural zone                                  Sendai  
 
Source: City of Sendai                       Source: City of Sendai 
 
The total cultivated land in East Sendai is 2,300 ha, 78% of which was 
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damaged by the tsunami, including 1600 ha rice paddies and 200 ha 
vegetable fields [City of Sendai, 2014]. Furthermore, 2,400 tractors, rice 
planting machines and other equipment were lost, 10 ha greenhouses 
destroyed, 4 draining pumping stations completely collapsed, many buildings 
and houses heavily damaged or demolished, Sendai Agricultural and 
Horticulture Center flooded, and many water canals and farm roads were 
submerged. 
The economic damage to agriculture was enormous – it is estimated at 
72,1 billion yen, including 39,6 billion yen for damaged farmland, 10.6 billion 
yen for damaged machines and facilities used in agriculture, and 21.9 billion 
yen for damaged land improvement facilities [City of Sendai, 2014]. 
Few days after the disaster (on April 5, 2011) the Liaison Meetings 
between the city authority and diverse actors (representatives of farmers, 
agricultural cooperatives, Land districts, etc.) was established, and 
discussions on agriculture restoration and development started. 
Developed Reconstruction Plan includes as an essential part a new 
land use in East Sendai envisaging: Agricultural and food frontier zone, 
Seaside exchange and revitalization zone, Port area special reconstruction 
zone, and Sites left after collective relocation for urban infrastructure 
redevelopment (Map 13). 
The Agricultural and Food Frontier Project has been undertaken to 
support recovery from the disaster and development of agriculture in East-
Sendai agricultural zone. It is centered on four targets: farmland consolidation 
and improvement; supporting farmers in enhancement of management base; 
promoting “cross-industry diversification” (integrating farming with related 
industries such as food processing and sales), and improving support center 
facilities (Figure 36). 
The cleaning up, restoration and recovery of farmlands have been an 
enormous task mobilizing efforts of the local and central authorities. The work 
included removal of large amount of debris and desalination of huge areas of 
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farmlands.  
 
Figure 36. City of Sendai “Agricultural and Food Frontier Project” 
components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: 
City of Sendai 
 
The Debris Removal Project was carried out between July 1 and 
December 28, 2011 on 1,800 ha flooded farmland [City of Sendai, 2014]. It 
included clean up of damaged buildings, woody debris and cars swept into 
farmland, farm roads and irrigational channels. The project employed 1,202 
farmers who were victims of the disaster (with additional 64 registered for 
employment). 
The Soil Desalination Project was conducted from March 25, 2011 until 
April 30, 2014 on 1,860 ha. It was proceeded by detailed surveys on extent of 
soils salinations and designing of feasible countermeasures for land 
improvement. By the end FY 2012 around 30% (560 ha) of damaged 
farmland were restored and made available for resuming farming, while 
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farming restarted on 60 ha (10.71%). Until March 2013 around 80% of the 
damaged farmlands was restored and the majority of farms resumed 
operations (Photo 2). According to the officials the quality of harvested rice 
was at level equal to that before the disaster and the former rural landscape 
is steadily returning.  
 
Photo 2. Successfully reconstructed         Figure 37. Conceptual plan for farmland                 
East-Sendai agriculture                 development in Eastern Sendai                                
 
Source: City of Sendai, 2014                           Source: City of Sendai, 2014 
 
Simultaneously, restoration of irrigation and drainage channels has 
been conducted. The Temporary Restoration Drainage Pumping Stations 
Project was carried out from May 2011 until June 2012 and all 11 stations 
timely restored as the pre-disaster capacity (19 m3/s) reached. The full-scale 
restoration continues taking into account the degree of ground subsistence 
(approximately 50 sm). 
The Farmland Consolidation Project has been currently promoted and 
involves readjusting small traditional plots to form new larger ones (Figure 
37). The process is guided by a Council including representatives of different 
stakeholders – authority, farmers, agricultural cooperatives, Land districts, 
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etc. Before the aggregation farms plots were small and farm roads narrow 
which was obstacle for the efficient agricultural practices. Poor draining made 
it difficult to plant wheat, soybeans and other crops. Consolidation raises the 
farm efficiency, expends crop possibility, and allows farmland borrowing and 
lending to progress smoothly. 
The East Sendai District Farmland Consolidation Project covers 1,979 
ha out of the 2,244 ha District area including farmlands, roads and 
irrigation/drained channels [City of Sendai, 2014]. The operational expenses 
are 19.7 billion yen and planed project period from FY2012 to FY 2016. The 
ratio of the landlords consent for farmland consolidation is 94.6%. 
The Natori District (Shiromaru area) Farmland Consolidation Projects 
covers 708 ha (91 ha of the Shiromaru area) out of the 809 ha District area 
(including 100 ha Shiromaru area). The project period is from FY2013 to 
FY2015, the operational expenses 10.6 billion yen, and there is 98.8% of by 
landlords consent for farmland consolidation (including 100% in Shiromari 
area). 
New approaches for accumulating farmlands have been also reviewed. 
The goal is to promote land accumulation by leasing farmlands to current or 
future farm operators. The traditional approaches for farmland consolidation 
include: transfer of ownership (buying and selling farmlands), reploting by 
exchanging farmlands (constructing the farmland use rights through 
implementing land consolidation), lease contract (establishing farmland use 
rights though a contract to commissioning farming), and commissioning farm 
work (borrower farmer is commissioned to cultivate rice in paddy fields from 
plowing dry soils, tilling irrigated soils and transplanting rice seedlings to 
harvesting rice). 
Since April 2013 Sendai city in collaboration with the JA Sendai 
introduced a new approach to “bulk management of farmland” (Figure 38). 
Sendai city and JA Sendai act as intermediary by implementing bulk lease 
management practices of farmlands in the relevant areas so that borrower 
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farmer are able to cultivate consolidated land according to the scale and 
status of operations. 
 
Figure 38. Bulk management approach for farmland consolidation in 
East-Sendai 
        
Source: City of Sendai                                              
 
The city authority has also created “Sendai Agriculture Enhancement 
Plan” (Master plan for resuming Agricultural Management) based on the 
discussions held in communities and areas in the 14 districts of the city, 
including East-Sendai District. Among other things the Future Vision of the 
Regional Agriculture incorporates: 
- recognizing regional agriculture so that farmers who operate large 
farmland plots play a central role;  
- encouraging associations for rice-crop diversion practice to form 
group-farming organizations based on integrated cultivation of 
rice and other crops; 
- fostering community-based incorporated farming bodies as a model 
by establishing the right to bulk use and re-allotting farmlands to 
farm operators. 
The Ido and Arahama Districts have been selected as model districts, 
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and measures to establish the rights of bulk use and re-allotment of farmland 
to farm operators started in 2013. According to the progress and experiences 
obtained, the farmland accumulation will be promoted in all relevant areas. 
A variety of support measures have been also provided to lender and 
borrower farmers in order to put the plan into action. Support funding for 2013 
include Farm Accumulation Support Fund (Central Government) and Project 
to Promote Accumulation of Farmlands for Use (Sendai city government). 
The former provides support funds to farmland owners who are listed in the 
“Sendai City Agricultural Infrastructure Enhancement Plan” when they newly 
commission JA Sendai to lease-out land “giving full authority” (a contract 
without designating a borrower). 
Concerning the tsunami-affected farmlands recovered for farming after 
April 1, 2012, subsidies are offered to both “farm lender disaster-victims” and 
“borrowing farmers” when they made a new contract for leasing farmland or 
commissioning farming that extend over a period of three years. 
The Comprehensive Support Project for Agricultural Restoration in 
Disaster-stricken Areas (Leasing) give opportunities through the 
Reconstruction Grant Project for community farming organizations to lease 
free-of charge large machines (tractors, rice planters, combines, etc.) and 
facilities (plastic greenhouses for raising seedlings, machinery store houses, 
etc.) in the disaster-stricken farmlands assisting farming resumption. In FY 
2012 the target area covered Okada (Shinhama, Minami-gamo), Yotsuya, 
Sasayasaki, Kamiyashiki, Fujita, Arahama, Sambontsuka, Futaki, Ido, Nambu 
(Tanetsugi, Fujitsuka), and included 43 tractors, 24 rice planting machines, 32 
combines, rotaries, harrows for soil paddling, seeders, plastic greenhouses 
for razing seedlings, wells, storehouse for agricultural machines, and various 
other machines. In FY2013 similar items are included as well. 
The Great East Japan Subsidy for Agricultural Production Measures 
include financial support by the national, prefectural and municipal 
governments to groups which are organized by farmers, agricultural 
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producers cooperative corporations etc., so that they can install common 
facilities, do repair and renovations, and lease agricultural machines and 
materials.  
In 2011, 2012 and 2013 the amounts of such subsidies have been 
accordingly 603 million yen, 1,528 million yen and 1,386 million yen. The 
subsidy ration has been less than 82.5%. In 2011 and 2012 the number of 
projects were accordingly 51 and 28 with total project costs of 787 million yen 
and 603 million yen. 
The Measures for Project Subsidy/aid includes: (1) Emerging 
Installation of Plastic Greenhouses for Vegetables and Flowers, and (2) 
Project to Support Disaster-stricken Farmers to Resume Farming. 
The first one comprises (city government) subsidies of the part of 
expenses of the disaster-stricken farmers (farming groups, certifies farmers, 
eco-farmers, etc.) for installing plastic greenhouses to resume farming. The 
subsidy ration is less than 50% of the project costs with a limit of 2,650 yen 
per 1 m2. In 2011 and 2012 the number of projects was accordingly 15 and 
11 for areas of 11,769 m2 (78 buildings) and 24,172 m2 (135 buildings). The 
total amounts of projects and subsidies in 2011 were 55.5 million yen and 
26.5 million yen, while in 2012 it was 139.9 million yen and 62.5 million yen. 
The budget for FY2013 is 66.3 million yen. 
The second project provides subsidies to farmers who jointly establish a 
recovery association to remove fine debris, weeding or clearing so that 
farming can be resumed. It covers tsunami inundation areas and provides 
unit grant aid per 0.1 ha for rice paddy of 35,000 yen and vegetable fields of 
40,000 yen. In 2011 target areas, where associations were established, were 
four (Takasago, Shichiro, Rokugo, Nakada), and in 2012 three (Takasago, 
Shichiro, Rokugo). In 2011 and 2012 the number of farmers involved was 
accordingly 1,573 and 1.085, while the total amount of grant was 641 million 
yen and 401.6 million yen. In FY2013 the budget for this measure is 141.3 
million yen. 
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Another major aspect of the Agricultural and Food Frontier Project is the 
Promoting Diversification of Agriculture by integrating it with Related 
Industries such as Food Processing, Distribution and Sales. It includes three 
measures: 
a/ Promoting Collaboration between Agriculture, Commerce and 
Industry - it aims to encourage regional industries based on agriculture by 
arranging business “matching” opportunities and supporting activities to 
develop high value-added products and services. The idea is that the later 
can be done with the collaboration of agriculture, commerce and industry, and 
mutual utilization of resources, technologies and networks. Support measures 
include: seminars for promoting collaboration between agriculture, commerce 
and industry; support for development of new products (4 in 2012 and 4 in 
2013); and project for supporting the model to employ farmers based on 
collaboration between agriculture, commerce and industry (3 in 2011, 3 in 
2013, and 1 in 2013). 
b/ Diversification of Agriculture through Integration with Related 
Industries such as Food Processing, Distribution and Sales. Measures are 
carried out to promote “cross-industry diversification of agriculture” – e.g. 
farmers independently enter the businesses of food processing, distribution 
and sales, and collaborate with the secondary and tertiary industries to 
produce and develop new competitive products and services228. It also fosters 
young farmers who play a major role in management of cross-industry 
diversification. Support measures include: fostering human resources capable 
of developing the cross-industry diversification of agriculture; and support for 
promoting the cross-industry diversification of agriculture (3 in 2012, and 4 in 
2013).  
c/ Special Zone for Promoting Agriculture and Food Frontier Project – 
                                                          
228
 Example for so called “six industry” is the Cotton Project where some farmers grow 
cotton on salted fields cooperating with a textile company [Fuyuki, 2013]. 
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set up in East Sendai as a part of the central government special 
reconstruction zone program. It allows farm operators in the area to receive 
special tax provisions so that they can acquire machinery and facilities, start 
new incorporated businesses and other projects without difficulties.  
The target area covers approximately 3,000 ha in the tsunami-affected 
Miyagino-ku, Wakayabashi-ku and Taihaki-ku. Target businesses includes 
incorporated entities or small independent companies that contribute to 
creating employment opportunities and promote agriculture or operate 
businesses that correspond to cluster industries in approved area. Twenty 
different businesses are designated including: agriculture, food processing, 
distributing and sales-related industries, renewable energy-related industry, 
research and testing-related industry. The preferential measures include: 
special tax provisions, tax credit or special depreciation against taxes (income 
tax and corporate tax), exemption from prefectural tax (corporate tax and real 
property acquisition tax), exemption from municipal tax (fixed assets tax). 
Presently, 18 operators are developing businesses, which have been 
designated for the special zone project.  
Finally, the Renovation and Remodeling of the Support Center Facility 
has been under way. The goal is to rebuild and modernize the Sendai 
Agriculture and Horticulture Center as a support center to promote Agriculture 
and Food Frontier Project. The Center facilities include vegetables 
greenhouses, food-processing facilities, an allotment garden for “amateur 
farmer” city residents, direct sales shop, multipurpose open areas, and 
restaurant. 
The center supports development of lucrative agricultural business by 
providing training sessions to expend agricultural diversification, integration, 
and multiple management. It exhibits operations of its horticulture and food 
processing facilities, foster human resources and conveys information on the 
progress of recovery of Eastern Sendai agriculture. It organizes a variety of 
events where visitors have hands-on experience with agriculture and 
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opportunities to meet farmers. 
According to a December 2011 survey the majority of East Sendai 
farmers wanted the new paddy field to be plotted by blocks of 0.3 (33%) or 
0.5 ha (24%) while merely 22% preferred 1.0 ha [Tohoku Regional 
Agricultural Administration, 2012]. Furthermore, a quarter of farmers wanted 
to retire or cut back on farming (most likely because they do not have a 
business successor) while 11% wanted to expand or start out from the 
scratch. Therefore, the authority has to persuade farmers into large-scale 
operation by explaining the merits, efficient means to aggregate retiring 
farmers’ land, and supporting farmers’ moves toward corporate or community 
farming [Hori, 2012].   
Preventing farmland from being left uncultivated is a task common for 
all tsunami-afflicted areas and country as a whole [Hori, 2012]. While the 
government has already come up with incentives for retiring farmers, it should 
also consider providing incentives to farmers who would expand operations in 
the afflicted areas - ones who are expected to play a major role in agricultural 
recovery. 
Experts suggest that government should learn from the experience in 
farming modernization in the afflicted areas and apply the suggested 
measures nationwide to prevent further decline of Japanese agriculture [Hori, 
2012]. That would require a fundamental modernization of agricultural policies 
allowing consolidation of farm management in bigger more competitive 
structures, removal of restrictions on farmland transactions, new entrants and 
corporative management, easing approval of farmland diversion to other 
uses, reforming agricultural cooperatives, further liberalization of internal and 
international trade, changing costly for tax-payers subsidy system for 
producers, and introduction of new forms of public support to agriculture, etc.  
Namely, the agricultural reform incorporating some of the above 
measures have been an essential part of the growth strategy of new Abe 
administration [The Japan News, June 14, June 18, June 25, October 20, 
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2014]. More and more people support that new agricultural policy of the 
Government. Recent nationwide survey has found out that the policy of large-
scale farming is supported by 73% of respondents, 79% backed the abolition 
of rice paddy reduction program, 64% support easing of regulations on buying 
and selling farmland to make it easier for corporations to own farmland, 76% 
agree on abolishing the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives (JA-
Zenchu) control on regional agricultural cooperatives, 78% are for 
encouraging farmers to change from mainly cultivating rice to producing other 
products (such as vegetables and fruits), and 43% support participation in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership multilateral free trade agreement with nations in the 
Asia-Pacific region [The Japan News, July 15, 2014]. 
There is no official data on whether farmers have been able or not to 
harvest any produce on officially restored land in affected prefectures. 
However, there are reports that some of already desalinated and restored 
tsunami-damaged farmland is still unproductive.  
For instance, farmers have been unable to harvest any soybeans in a 
30-hectare area out of planted nearly 45-hectare field in Rokugo, Eastern 
Sendai [Ishikawa and Ishikawa, 2014]. According to farmers remained high 
salt concentration in the farmland soils might have been reason for that.  
Similar complaints have also been heard from farmers in Iwate 
Prefecture who have seen seawater flowing back to 5 km in the upper stream 
of some rivers due to land subsidence [Ishikawa and Ishikawa, 2014]. Even 
after restoration work is done, people in Ofunato have been unable to harvest 
crops on some farmland because of the lack of freshwater.  
Not all farmers are able to joint the government projects (including 
many medium and small-scale operators) and recover in lines with the 
government priorities229. For instance, in tsunami-damaged areas of Miyagi 
prefecture most farmers are elderly (over 65), small-scale (under 1 ha), part-
time and single crop (paddy only) farmers [Fuyuli, 2013].  
                                                          
229
 e.g. to integrate with downstream industries. 
  
170 
Nevertheless, some severely damaged farming communities recovered 
earlier than in others – e.g. Fujitsuka Hamlet of the Wakabayashi Word has 
been supported by a non-for-profit organization Re-Roots, which members230 
work on farmlands and sell output in temporary shop in Sendai [Fuyuli, 2013]. 
The process of reconstruction and rebuilding communities progress 
differently in individual places. Iwanuma was among the first municipality that 
initiated a collective relocation project231 [Pushpalal, 2013]. The plan is to 
relocate 348 coastal homes and build 156 public housing unit in 20 ha 
Tamaura Nishi District by April 2014232. Agriculture was the largest industry in 
Tamaura but most workers were aging part-time farmers in predominately 
rice production. Enormous losses of houses, workshops, machineries etc. 
have made it difficult to restart farming, 90% of farmers left the industry233, 
and citizen group decided to focus on large-scale agriculture revitalization. On 
the other hand, in Natori relocation plans have been delayed due to the 
conflicts of residents who want to return to previous neighborhood and who 
are against it234.  
One of the important issue affecting new land development is the 
disaster areas is that more than 40% of residents in the three most affected 
prefectures hope to sell their land or move away from areas subject to land 
use reallocation projects [The Japan News, March 9, 2014)]. Residents are 
concerned that widespread reluctance to return could turn redeveloped areas 
into vacant towns. Many municipalities are also worried over revisions to the 
                                                          
230
 Primarily students from Tohoku University. 
231
 cost of purchasing land is born by the government while most residents bear 
construction costs and partial subsidies are also available. Those who cannot buy are 
offered to rent public housing. 
232
 Plan was approved in March 2012 with estimated project costs of about 10.8 billion 
yen. Out of 400 households 300 are planning to move to new relocation cite, while 
remaining chosen to live elsewhere [Pushpalal, 2013]. A major downsize of group 
relocation was “all-or-nothing decision” since people who do not follow the plan might not 
receive financial support from autority [Koch, 2013]. 
233
 Damaged agricultural land (1,200 ha) accounted for 65% of the total farmland. Merely 
one eight of the later was cultivated in 2012 and one fifth in 2013. 
234
 In spring 2013 as much as 25.2% of all residents still intended to “return to their native 
home” down from 34.1% in the summer of 2012 [Pushpalal, 2013].  
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project plans, and say that more residents will leave if town rebuilding 
continues to be delayed. 
Land development in residential areas is planned on 1,315 hectares in 
40 areas across 16 municipalities in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures 
[The Japan News, March 9, 2014]. In surveyed 15 of the designated 
municipalities (covering 998 ha in 38 areas subject to land rezoning) 43% of 
the respondents235 indicated they want to sell the land or move away from the 
areas. Meanwhile, a half of respondents answered they “want to continue 
living there,” or “want to keep the land”, 9% are still “undecided” and the 
number of leaving could rise. 
In Sendai there are two projects – group resettlement in the “High 
Hazard Risk Zone” (funded by the central government) and City support Zone 
as a complementary program (financed by the city government). The plan236 
covers 3,860 households (1,560 under the relocation project and 2,300 under 
city support program) from 7 places in the east coastal zone to be resettled in 
14 residential estates in the inner part [Yonekura, 2013]. 
Major problems associated with the planning and implementation of 
relocation has been: opposition of part of affected population, financial burden 
to individuals237, different treatment and splitting of communities due to 
demarcation rule, unequal capability of local government for additional 
assistance for covering replacement costs, delays in land procurement, 
deficiency of traditional land registration and related disputes, inadequate 
manpower in authority238, mortgage status of some lands239, different 
                                                          
235
 around 90% (12,223) of residents and landowners in the areas responded, with multiple 
answers permitted in certain municipalities. 
236
 Approved in December 2011, total project costs of 57.7 billion yen, be committed in 
fiscal 2015.  
237
 e.g. huge (6 times) differences in the land price in disaster (10,500-17,800 yen per m2) 
and new settlement (60,000-81,500 yen per m2) areas . 
238
 to complete land ownership investigation, land surveys and registration. 
239
 E.g. in Sendai a quarter of land was under mortgage and cannot be sold to government 
as of group relocation arrangement. By end 2012 most banking institutions accepted 
request by the Financial Service Agency to release mortgages on land [Yonekura, 2013]. 
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regulations for alternative resettlements, complicated procedures and higher 
costs for individuals, etc. [Yonekura, 2013].  
For instance, costs differences for individuals in the alternative 
resettlement schemes (Group Relocation Project, Land Consolidation Project, 
and Non-project Zone) in Natori are presented in Table 22. Sendai city 
implemented 7.1 billion yen support program for reducing the burden of 
individuals including: costs of purchasing new houses in area outside of the 
Group Relocation Project, rebuilding houses in disaster area and moving to 
resettlement estate240; inclusion of displaced persons moving outside Sendai; 
and establish community support institutions (NGOs) [Yonekura, 2013]. 
Another major problem has been that a significant portion of land plots 
is the “property of unknown persons” since information in the real estate 
registrations is out of date due to inheritors not properly changing 
registration241, known owners are dead or moved to urban areas abandoning 
land, population decline, etc. [The Japan News, August 5, 2014]. 
Consequently, authorities have been hindered in conducting reconstruction 
works since they cannot obtain approval from landowners242. 
For instance, in Tokura district of Minami-Sanriku, Miyagi prefecture, 
the prefectural government plans to buy land around disaster-damaged dikes 
to repair and improve them. It has found a 300-square-meter plot for which 53 
people are registered as common owners (in 1924) and about 300 people 
having inheritance rights. Some of the right holders are great-grandchildren of 
original owners with unknown whereabouts while approval has to be obtained 
                                                          
240
 Government covers interest on loans up to a maximum of 7.08 million yen for rebuilding 
a new housing as well as costs for moving, which amounted 780,000 yen in Sendai.  
241
 due to hight costs or other reasons (multiple owners, disputes) – e.g. relatives have to 
pay ¥500,000 (commission fees for judicial scrivener and transport expenses) to change 
land ownership [The Japan News, August 5, 2014]. There are 1.7 million ha land that 
worth less than cost of changing ownership and titles would not be changed. Ownership of 
400,000 ha of abandoned arable land and 1 million ha forests owned in common would not 
be changed since inheritance procedures with multiple owners tend to be complicated. 
242
 property rights are guaranteed by Constitution and Civil Code. Real estate registrations 
protect personal property and changing ownership registration is left to each owner. 
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by the end of next fiscal year given the construction period. 
 
Table 22. Household cost estimation of alternative resettlement 
schemes in Natori (thousand yen) 
Alterna-
tives 
Type of 
resettle-
ment 
Buy  
land 
price 
Rebuil
ding 
cost  
Sell 
land 
price  
Subsidy 
housing 
loan 
Support 
moving 
costs 
Total 
costs  
 
Group 
Reloca-
tion 
Project 
Buying 
project land 
9,700 20,000 3,420 4,300 200 21,700 
Rental of city 
land 
0 20,000 3,420 2,630 200 13,750 
Buying land 
by individuals 
11,200 20,000 3,420 4,380 200 23,200 
Land 
Consol-
idation 
Project 
Rebuilding on 
owned land 
0 20,000 0 0 0 20,000 
Land selling 
and 
resettlement 
11,200 20,000 6,280 0 0 24,920 
Non-
project 
Zone 
 0 20,000 0 0 0 20,000 
Source: Yonekura, 2013 
 
Furthermore, decontamination of lands, houses, roads etc. in the 
affected areas has been a complex and slow process. Inevitably, priority has 
been given to decontamination of residences, public facilities and their 
surroundings, rather than farmlands [Watanabe, 2013].  
Appropriate radioactive decontamination technologies have been 
applied according to the radioactive cesium density levels in farmland soil: up 
to 5,000 Bq/kg - inventing plowing, radiation transfer reduction cultivation, 
topsoil removal (unplowed land); 5,000-10,000 Bq/kg - top soil removal, 
inverting plowing, padding with water; 10,000-25,000 Bq/kg - topsoil removal; 
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more than 25,000 Bq/kg - using soil hardener for topsoil removal [Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012].  
Results of farmland decontamination demonstration projects show that 
the topsoil removal reduced the radioactive cesium levels in plow layers by 
about 80-90% and air dose rates at a height of 1 meter above surface about 
60-80% [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. Similarly, 
inverting plowing reduced the radioactive cesium in plow layers by about 60% 
and air dose rates at 1 meter above surface about 30%. All results of test 
cropping on farmlands decontaminated under these projects243 have been 
below the minimum detection limit. 
Various trials have been made at grass-root level244 and some new 
plant introduced such as rape blossom seeds, sunflower etc. which reduce 
contamination of soils and air [JFS, 2011; NHK World, December 9, 2013, 
March 10, 2014]. 
Likewise, a number of measures were used to reduce radioactive 
materials in farm trees and crops such as: removal of rough bark in apple, 
pear and other fruit trees with rough bark; high-pressure washing for peach 
and other fruit trees having no rough bark; and for tea - pruning (deep skiffing 
and medium level cutting) covering leave layers, and at non-pruned tea fields 
puning branches to increase leaves for cutting [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2011]. 
Diverse measures to reduce the transfer of radionuclides from soil to 
crops have been also recommended such as: changing crop structure; 
application of potassium-based fertilizers (such as potassium silicate) and 
zeolite (natural mineral effective in improving soil quality); using combines for 
harvesting in order to reduce adhesion of soil; abating the impact of ambient 
radiation by avoiding the practice of drying harvested rice plants naturally in 
                                                          
243
 5.7 ha of rice and 1 ha of vegetables in Iitate, and 6.4 ha of rice in Kawamata. 
244
 E.g. recovery group “Resurrection of Fukushima” established 3 months after accident. 
There are 250 members, including researchers in the fields of physics, IT, and agriculture, 
as well as volunteers from all over the country [NHK World, December 9, 2013]. 
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the sun; transition to organic farming; bioremediation of farmlands, etc. [NHK 
World, March 10, 2014; Moqsud and Omine, 2013; Watanabe, 2013]. 
In relation to livestock and livestock products, different measures have 
been promoted for preventing grass from absorbing radioactive cesium. Until 
the end of FY2012 such measures were completed for 17,000 ha (44.73%) 
out of the 38,000 ha in grassland subjected to the measures [Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. Consequently, the frequency of 
exceeding the maximum limit of radionuclides in farm and livestock products 
has declined substantially. 
Similarly, new crops, products and technologies have been introduced 
such as plant factory, IT and smart innovations, biodiesel fuel made from 
sunflower and camellia seeds, land-sharing for crop and solar energy 
productions, etc. [Fukushima Minpo News, April 24, 2014; Cyberpunk World, 
January 8, 2014; The Mainichi Shimbun, April 4, 2012; NHK World, June 12, 
2012, July 15, 2013]. 
Decontamination of farmlands outside the evacuation zone has been 
completed and farming resumed in most places. According to the officials the 
appropriate reduction of radiation has been achieved to allow the safe 
production. The later has been confirmed by the multiple safety checks up 
and removal of restrictions on production and shipments of major farm 
produce. For instance, a farmer (Mr. H. Kikuchi) in Shinchi town resumed 
shipping “shiitake” mushrooms cultivated on logs for the first time in three 
years245 following the lifting of shipment restrictions246 [Fukushima Minpo 
News, July 26, 2014]. 
According to experts still there are many hot spot with excessive 
contamination. Since October 2012 a soil screening project247 has been going 
on in Fukushima-shi on 28,382 ha with 24,721 agricultural cooperative 
                                                          
245
 Shipments had been restricted since July 2011. 
246
 Levels of radioactive Cs detected in mushrooms stood at a maximum of 5 Bq/kg.  
247
 expected to complete in April 2014 and continue afterwards if funding is available. 
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members. Seven full time stuff and many volunteers do mapping with modern 
instruments (equipped with GPS) measuring contamination of soil and air. 
Samples are taken in 3 points of each of the 28,392 paddy fields and 10,058 
orchards. Current results show a great variation of radioactivity - between 
1,000-3,000 Bq/kg in paddies and up to 10,000 Bq/kg for orchards (Interview 
with the project leader Mr.Park, June 17, 2013). 
Experimental rice production on some farmlands in the evacuation zone 
started in 2012248 and it has been gradually expending [Fukushima Minpo 
News, December 14, 2013; Ishii, 2013; Kageyama, 2012]. After restrictions 
were lifted in the spring 2014249 farmers in 6 municipalities have resumed rice 
planting in about 2% of available rice fields [NHK World, June 11, 2014]. Most 
of the rice planting has resumed in Minamisoma City (111 hectares or 3.4% 
of the total available area), followed by Tomioka Town (0.2%), Namie and 
Okuma towns (0.1%), and Katsurao Village (0.06%)250. Officials in 5 of the 6 
municipalities say that full-scale rice farming will be resumed after planting 
rice on experimental basis and confirming the impact of radioactivity on crop. 
The first public cow pasture (Shibayama pasture) has reopened in Iwaki 
city, Fukushima prefecture after a closure of 2 years and 4 farmers brought 
10 cows that had to raise in a shed [NHK World, July 14, 2014]. Radiation 
level fell below the limit in 7 ha of the 50-ha land after workers cut down some 
grass, sowed seeds, and removed surface soil.  
Insufficient decontamination of farmland and irrigation canals, 
decreased motivation among farmers, and local anxiety over rumors about 
contaminated harvests are major reasons for the low resumption rate of 
farming in the former evacuation zone [NHK World, June 11, 2014]. It has 
                                                          
248
 in 2012 in Minami Soma next to no-go zone 135 farms were granted special permission 
to plant rice on condition that it will be destroyed [Kageyama, 2012]. In 2013 in 
Miyakojimachi district, Tamura within 20 km evacuation zone (decontamination completed) 
3 farms planed 6 ha rice intended for sale [The Japan Daily Press, May 20, 2013]. 
249
 Restrictions and self-imposed suspensions on rice planting were lifted on about 5,200 
hectares of land since radiation levels declined and the ban on entering the areas lifted. 
250
 Rice planting has not resumed yet in Futaba Town. 
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been also difficult to farm efficiently (e.g. water control in paddy fields) since 
farmers were not allowed to stay permanently, there has been uncertainty 
associated with marketing of output (high contamination, unwillingness of buy 
the region), and radioactive water runoff from mountains to reservoirs for 
irrigation and/or paddy fields251.  
A survey in Fukushima prefecture found 8,000 Becquerels or more per 
kilogram of radioactive substances in the soil at the bottom of agricultural 
dams and reservoirs in 568 out of the 1,940 dams and reservoirs inspected 
between June and December 2013 [NHK World, March 22, 2014]. Only 108 
of them were in the evacuation zones around the Fukushima nuclear plant, 
and 460 were further away. Officials detected 370,000 Bq/kg in the soil of a 
reservoir 58 km away from the plant, which is the highest reading recorded 
outside the evacuation zones252.  
Rain may have carried radioactive substances into the waters from 
surrounding forests. Water from the reservoir with the highest reading outside 
the evacuation zones is being used for rice paddies nearby. However, 
radiation levels exceeding food safety limits in locally produced rice has not 
been found, probably because radioactive substances in the soil barely 
dissolve in water. Residents were told they will not be exposed to radiation as 
long as there is water in the reservoir but they fear radioactive levels may 
surge if it dries up.  
The central and prefectural governments are set to resume the supply 
of dam water for agricultural use to the Odaka district of Minamisoma city 
(designated as evacuation area) in fiscal 2017 [Fukushima Minpo News, July 
12, 2014]. The supply of water from the Ogaki dam in the town of Namie has 
been suspended after the nuclear power accident. The city office is aiming to 
have residents return to the district in April 2016 and dam restoration and 
                                                          
251
 Later has been issue beyond evacuation areas as well [HNK World, March 10, 2014]. 
252
 more than 46 times the government limit of 8,000 Bq for radioactive waste. 
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resumption of agricultural water supply253 are expected to go a long way 
toward helping local people resume farming. Around 1,613 farming families 
used to receive dam water to irrigate 1,531 ha of farmland before disaster.  
Nevertheless, many farmers have been refusing to return back to 
homeland even after decontamination is completed because of the high 
radiation (residential areas, forests around houses and farms, hot spots) and 
unrestored infrastructure (shops, hospitals, schools etc.). Also once farms are 
abandoned “it is really tough, mentally and physically, to start all over again, 
especially when many farmers are aging” [The Japan Times, March 7, 2012]. 
According to the official it is not clear when thousands of evacuated 
farmers will return back to their land (interview with Ma. Satou, June 17, 
2013). A survey of the Fukushima prefectural government found out that as 
much as 50% of farms do not return back to their land. In JA Futaba, where 
all farmers were evacuated, merely 25% of the farmers “want to farm their 
own land again” [Nagashima, 2013]. Even combining with farmers who 
“continue farming in other lands” those who want to continue farming is just 
38% and who do not is a third.  
Many farmers still fear that “disaster is not over” and they do not want to 
return to their land. For instance, one of the interviewed by us farmer 
Mr.Tanaka said: “I think no matter how we decontaminate and make ND 
products, it means nothing if we cannot make the consumers trust us and 
consume our products. Also the nuclear power plant disaster is still 
continuing. I think people are afraid that something could happen again and 
refrain from investing or restarting the farm” (June 14, 2013).  
The Plan for Revitalization in Fukushima Prefecture [Fukushima 
Prefectural Government, 2012] envisages “building a safe, secure and 
                                                          
253
 That will be first case among 10 dams for agricultural water in no-go zone. Radioactive 
levels in surface water are below lower detectable limit, and authority intends to use only 
surface water and take no water when level declines or water becomes turbid (heavy rain). 
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sustainable society free from nuclear power”254. It includes a number of 
priority projects for revitalization in three major areas (Figure 39) with specific 
measures for each region (Map 14).  The First Version of the Plan (Second 
Version released in December 2012) focused on 38 specific measures and 
729 major projects, out of which 235 priority projects. The Plan also contains 
communication, cooperation, legislating, adjustment and monitoring 
measures to secure efficiency.  
 
Figure 39. Priority Projects in Plan for Revitalization in Fukushima 
Prefecture (Second Version) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fukushima Prefectural Government, December 
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 The prefecture is calling on decommission all nuclear reactors in Fukushima. 
Plan for Revitalization in Fukushima 
Prefecture 
Living with peace of 
mind 
Work in your 
hometown 
Rebuild towns, connect 
people 
Environmental restoration  
Assistance for rebuilding 
livelihoods 
Protecting the physical and 
mental health of citizens 
Raising and supporting our 
children and young people, 
who are our future 
Revival of primary industries 
Revitalization of SMEs  
Promotion of renewable 
energy  
Medical industry cluster 
Building Fukushima connections 
Fukushima tourism exchange 
Town development for the 
revitalization of tsunami-hit 
areas 
Strengthening the cooperation 
and communication 
infrastructure that links 
Fukushima 
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Different projects have “agricultural and food dimension” as well. For 
instance, the Environmental Restoration Project encompasses: 
Decontamination, Ensuring food safety, Waste disposal, and Establishment of 
environmental creative strategy hubs. The Primary Industry Revival Project 
include measures for farming revitalization; the Renewable Energy Promoting 
Project comprise expansion of agricultural related solar, wind, and biomass 
energy; etc. 
 
Map 14. Specific measures areas in Plan for Revitalization in Fukushima 
Prefecture 
 
                                   Source: Fukushima Prefectural Government, 2012 
 
Furthermore, the Industrial Reconstruction and Revitalization Plan 
(2013) underlines specific initiatives for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
aiming at “Create affluent and attractive rural districts and supply safe and 
trusted agricultural, forestry and fisheries products” through decontamination, 
improvement of production bases, efforts to help those engaged in 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries resume business, development of next 
generation of farmers and fishermen, stable supply of agricultural, forestry 
and fisheries products, branding and added value creation including the 
development of ‘sixth-order’ local industry, and development of the 
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Fukushima Prefecture Coastal Agriculture Revitalization Research Center. 
Among specific Industrial reconstruction and revitalization projects are: 
- Opening up Demand for Products and Services using the Regionally 
Based Collective Trademark System to establish Fukushima brands renewed 
(Nango tomatoes; Tsuchiyu Hot Spring; Aizu miso; and Soma ware) and new 
(Aizu Tajima asparagus), as charges, etc. are halved; 
- Developing original new species and building new brands such as 
Paddy rice (four types); strawberries; asparagus; peaches; nashi pears; 
apples; gentians; and calla lilies as application fees, etc., reduced by 75%. 
In the proposed fiscal 2013 budget of the central government a special 
attention has been given to Fukushima [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. The 
government plans to set aside JPY50.3 billion to create temporary 
communities for the Fukushima evacuees, using funds to build public 
infrastructure including housing, schools and improved roads. A further 
JPY10 billion is to be budgets to improve the living environment for families 
with children. As part of efforts to revitalize the local economy, JPY14.8 billion 
has been allocated for renewable energy related initiatives as well as 
promoting tourism and agriculture. Particular focus is to be placed on 
maximizing the benefits of renewable energy initiatives, as well as research 
and development in the area of pharmaceuticals and medical devices, with 
the aim of nurturing new globally competitive industries.  
There have been positive effects on product, technological and 
organizational development and innovation in agriculture and related 
industries. The enormous public funding as well as the novel business 
possibilities (and restrictions) have created new opportunities for revitalization 
and expansion of farming and agri-business in the most affected regions and 
beyond trough technological and organizational modernization.  
There have been huge incentives for investment in soil 
decontamination, emergency aid, agri-food safety, production recovery and 
modernization, product and technologies innovations and diversification, agri-
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food marketing, reconstructing of business and infrastructure, other public 
and private research and development projects. All they have been opening 
up more entrepreneurial, employment and income opportunities for 
agricultural and general population, and diverse form of business and non-for 
profit ventures.  
According to experts there are many companies (especially from 
outside of affected areas) wanting to lease in abandoned farmland and start 
large-scale corporate farming. That will let consolidate and enlarge farm size, 
introduces large-scale machineries and innovations, explore economies of 
scale and scope, increase investment and efficiency, diversify and improve 
competitiveness of farming enterprises. 
For instance, rice paddies and farming equipment in the Nobiru district, 
Miyagi prefecture was ravaged by the tsunami and a large number of rice 
growers given up farming leasing out paddies to a local farming corporation 
[NHK World, June 12, 2012]. Before disaster, the corporation managed 55 ha 
of 49 farmers but area increased to 81 ha of 46 more farmers after disaster.  
In addition, to a great variety of brand name rice with the name of the 
district where it was grown, there have appeared new brand name rice 
associated with the environmental conservation and social contribution. The 
later include Fukko-mai255, which is Sasanishiki rice grown in disaster area of 
the Great East Japan Earthquake [The Japan News, October 16, 2014]. 
In Iwate prefecture farmers had to gave up tea production in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster since long-term contracts were 
canceled. Innovator from Kunohe village managed to overcome challenges 
introducing a new special organically grown sweet tea (“ama-cha”) caffeine, 
tannin and calories free [NHK World, August 20, 2014]. The new developed 
product, with enhanced quality and packaging (tea bags), won a gold medal 
among 8000 products in UK and it is planed to appear on markets in 2015. 
 Plant “no-soil” factories have been developing in Japan for many years 
                                                          
255
 “Fukko” means happiness, but also has implication of reconstruction from the disaster. 
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and now about 130 on them grow lettuce, herbs, tomatoes, strawberries, etc. 
[Japan Finance Corporation, 2012]. Expansion of this new technology has 
been perceived as an efficient way to overcome some of major challenges 
associated with the post-disaster recovery in the affected regions with 
degradated (salinized or radioactive) soils, destructed farms and equipment, 
lack of employment and income opportunities, aging farm population, 
insufficient integration in supply chain, etc.  
A large futuristic vegetable plant has been opened led by Fujitsu Ltd. 
(Aizuwakamatsu Akisai Vegetable Factory) and uses renovated 2,000 m2 idle 
semiconductor-manufacturing clean (free of environmental contaminants and 
pests) room facility of the company in Aizuwakamatsu, Fukushima Prefecture 
[Fukushima Minpo News, 26 January 2014]. Production technology is 
chemical-free and completely controlled to maintain optimal growing and 
atmospheric conditions.  
The factory produces low-potassium leaf lettuce on a demonstration 
basis handling the whole process of production ranging from seed sowing to 
shipment. Initial daily output of 1,800 heads of leaf lettuce is to be boosted to 
a maximum 3,500. Production space will be also expanded (by 1,000 m2). 
About 30 people are employed and staff is expected to increase. The product, 
containing 86% less potassium on average, is intended for people suffering 
from chronic kidney disease requiring dialysis. It is also kid-friendly since a 
low nitrate level makes it less bitter and more appealing to children. 
Produced in a clean-room environment, output features few bacteria 
and a longer shelf life. Main customers include hospitals and department 
stores in and outside Fukushima. Annual sales are targeted at about 150 
million yen in the initial fiscal 2014 year and 400 million yen in the third year 
(fiscal 2016). The plant’s production is more expensive than the common 
varieties, but they have medical value, grow year around, they are organic 
and most importantly radiation-free [Lisa, 2014]. 
Similar factory has been built in Natori, Miyagi prefecture where the 
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tsunami inundated more than half of the farmland. A 5,900 m2 plant factory 
producing 1.4 million bulbs of lettuce in a year and costing 4.3-million dollar 
was built on tsunami-hit area by 3 farmers after their farms were devastated 
[NHK World, June 12, 2012]. Soil salt contamination has not been not a 
problem because the crops are grown in water while water temperature is 
controlled to enable year round production. Output is sold to a nationwide 
restaurant chain operator. The biggest challenge was the high construction 
cost since the Government subsidies covered 80% and farm group had to 
borrow one million dollars. Farmers expect to pay back the borrowed money 
in 7 years. 
A newly formed agricultural corporation Michisaki built indoor 
hydroponic “plant factories” on a just under seven acres rented land where 
tomatoes, spinach, and other vegetables grow under precisely regulated 
conditions since April 2013. It hires 10 full-time and 50 part-time workers, and 
market the produce to convenience stores and chain supermarkets. Using 
recycled heat from a nearby sewage treatment plant and fish byproducts from 
the port as fertilizer is also planed [Bird, 2013]. 
Another example is the state-of-the-art “Domed” Indoor Farms in 
Rikuzentakata, Iwate prefecture that harnesses solar energy and water to 
grow lettuce [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. The facility was built on 1.8 ha of 
land that was devastated by tsunami and transformed into a sustainable 
agriculture project with eight 5-by-30-meter domed indoor farms that utilize a 
number of innovative energy efficient features to reduce costs and improve 
production. This public-private partnership project was developed through a 
joint venture between Granpa Co. and Tobishima Corporation with support of 
a JPY300 million subsidy from Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. 
The facility was established in July 2012 and immediately began 
shipping produce. Each dome produces about 450 heads of lettuce per day, 
which is supplied to supermarkets, major sales retailers and fast-food chains. 
In addition to the solar power capabilities, the facility's innovative features 
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include air conditioning system that uses an exhaust opening in the ceiling to 
improve energy efficiency during the summer and winter months.   
The facility also incorporates a unique layered seedling planting design, 
which maximizes efficiency of space, increase production capacity and 
reduce labor and energy costs. Since lettuce produced at the facility is natural 
and guaranteed to be free from any forms of pollution, it is regarded as a 
promising new agricultural model that can appeal to customers while 
contributing to local revitalization. The project contributes to local economy by 
creating 20 new jobs and establishing sustainable business model of 
partnership with major food-chain actors.  
Due to the project's success the same model has already been adopted 
in Minamisoma in Fukushima Prefecture where municipality plans to build 7 
plant factories over the 3 years in the hope that local farmers can make a 
fresh start [NHK World, June 12, 2012].  
For instance, a Kawauchi farmer and a local government official (Takeo 
Endo) leads a group that farm in a sealed-off hydroponics factory with a 
technique where plants are grown using minerals and nutrients dissolved in 
water without using soil [The Japan Daily Press, May 12, 2013]. Aluminum-
clad, soccer field-sized building was completed in April 2013 and produce 
8,000 heads of lettuce for every farming cycle. The lettuce factory use filtered 
ground water, which is proven to be free of contaminants. Operations started 
with 25 employees providing jobs to unemployed idle farmers while produce 
sold in Fukushima's supermarkets “Kawauchi”.  
Some young entrepreneurs have seen new business opportunities in 
the most devastated areas. For example, Kei Watanabe was living in Tokyo 
but nuclear disaster instilled in him a determination to return to Kawauchi 
village and help set up a state-of-the-art hydroponic vegetable factory 
[Landline, 2013]. The sealed-off factory costs $6 million, has a size of a 
soccer field, uses LED lights and a water solution infused with fertilizer, and is 
able to produce 8,000 heads of lettuce a day which are sold in supermarkets 
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across Fukushima.  
Another example is the innovative Luxury Strawberry Farms in 
Yamamoto, Miyagi prefecture where March 2011 disaster wiped out nearly all 
strawberry farm greenhouses [Reconstruction Agency, 2014]. An IT specialist 
Hikoki Iwasa, who combined a technology expertise with a passion for 
reviving hometown agriculture, has realized the project. He established the 
General Reconstruction Association (July 2011) and rebuilt the strawberry 
industry using advanced IT systems creating something new. The business 
uses technology to optimize the climate for growing strawberries by 
automating windows and sprinkler systems.  
Local strawberry farmers, who lost their jobs have been hired and their 
expertise used to enhance product quality and secure knowledge digitally for 
future generations. The business led to the stabilization of the strawberry 
industry in Yamamoto and helped building a high-quality luxury brand image. 
The unit price has more than tripled from about ¥980 per kg before the 
tsunami to ¥3,000 per kg with the luxury "migaki-ichigo" strawberries selling 
for ¥1,000 per piece.  
The plant factory technology has a number of advantages: capacity for 
stable year-round production; possibility to be installed on non-farmland areas 
(industrial parks, vacant stores etc.) in shopping districts; safe and high-
quality agricultural produce with no or minimal pesticide use; employ novice 
farmers due to the light workload and the ease of standardizing procedures; 
comfortable work environment in which the elderly and people with disabilities 
can work with ease. 
Comparative survey shows that the consumers’ awareness of plant 
factory has increased in recent years (from 69% in 2009 to 76% in 2012) 
while the purchase experience also raised (from 9% to 17% accordingly) 
[Japan Finance Corporation, 2012]. Furthermore, consumers find superiority 
in the plant factory vegetables over the conventional farming in terms of 
safety, looks, ecology, etc.  
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Financial institutions (such as Japan Finance Corporation) provide long-
term financing with fixed, low-interest rates, taking into account unique 
business characteristics such as long investment recovery periods and 
unstable incomes influenced by the weather risk. Besides, the Japan Finance 
Corporation serves as a safety net for agriculture, providing quick and flexible 
finance for disasters, etc.  
In response to March 11 disaster the Japan Finance Corporation 
established an interest-free Special Earthquake Loan for those who suffer 
from direct or indirect damages by the earthquake or tsunami. The 
Agricultural Improvement Loan is an interest-free financing program that 
supports farmers’ challenges such as when they adopt a new crop or 
technology. For eco-farmers the maximum repayment periods can be 
extended from 10 years to 12 years and the maximum loan amount from 80% 
to 100% of total project costs. 
In order to support further challenging projects the institution also 
provides Capital Subordinated Loan. The later is not recognized as debt but 
as capital in borrowers’ financial statement because there is no need to repay 
principal for the first 8 years and interest rates are reviewed regularly 
according to the financial performances. 
There a number of challenges associated with that new technology 
such as: high building and running costs, difficulties in establishment of 
cultivation technique, and securing of human resource development, 
difficulties to use existing food certification system (because fertilizers for 
nutriculture are used to the water prepared for breeding and cultivation)256, 
etc. Under the new technology plant factory produce is a little more expensive 
(less competitive) than products grown outdoors or in greenhouses. Key to 
success is to secure stable outlets for marketing the output through close 
vertical integration. 
                                                          
256
 Since March 2012, a new third-party certification system evaluating the safety of 
vegetables produced in plant factories has been introduced. 
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Another prospective technology applied in the disaster-hit area is “solar 
sharing” - a process in which farmers generate solar power on the same land 
where they grow crops.  
Farmers in Fukushima prefecture have been testing that new 
technology and hope to sell power to help improve farmland or cover losses 
in income [Asiaone News, June 26, 2013]. In Minami-Soma, the prefectural 
government has begun a model project - 2,000 square meter piece of 
farmland in the city’s Odaka district is an example of solar sharing. On the 
farmland, 500 solar panels, each 70 centimeters by 1.6 meters, are installed 
atop 1.9-metre poles. Below the rows of panels, eggplants, chili peppers and 
produce are grown on an experimental basis.  
The prefectural government set up the project to determine how the use 
of the panels affects plants. An increasing number of farmers affected by the 
nuclear plant crisis want to convert land into mega solar power plants while 
continuing to grow crops on the same land. Farmers can sell the electric 
power to the utilities because (since July 2012) there is a system that obliges 
electric power companies to buy power generated by renewable energy 
sources at fixed prices. However, government sets some conditions for 
farmers wanting to use land for solar sharing –they must continue to cultivate 
land, and annual crop volume cannot fall 20% or more compared with the 
regional averages after introducing solar sharing. 
Eco Ene Minami-Soma Kenkyu Kiko, an incorporated foundation, plans 
a solar sharing project on about 600 m2 of farmland. According to the 
foundation about 1 million yen of annual revenue is expected from selling the 
electric power generated in the project [Asiaone News, June 26, 2013]. 
Rapeseed has been already planted because its oil is free of contaminants 
even though the plants themselves take in some radioisotopes such as those 
of cesium.  
In the end of 2013 the community run project Renewable Energy Village 
boasted 120 photovoltaic panels generating 30 kilowatts of power [Gilhooly, 
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2013]. Plans are afoot to put wind turbines on some of the land. Recreational 
and educational facilities as well as an astronomical observatory will also be 
built if further funding can be secured.  
Generous feed-in tariffs (renewable energy payments) set by the 
government support the project. While the proceeds from the crops and 
energy will be ploughed back into the project, the Renewable Energy Village's 
creators hope local farmers will mimic the model.  
Other large-scale solar projects257 treat farming traditions since if 
farmers sell up land entire communities will be wiped off. The Renewable 
Energy Village model offers a way around – it protects farmland and 
communities and creates increased prosperity (two parallel revenues). 
Minamisoma's Solar Agripark opened in spring 2013 and combines a 
500KW solar power facility with indoor plant farms [Reconstruction Agency, 
2014]. A new children's park is being created, where youth affected by the 
disaster can receive hands-on learning experience featuring renewable 
energy and advanced agriculture, helping to educate the future leaders on the 
importance of sustainability. This project is supported by a JPY115 million 
investment from Toshiba and subsidies from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (totaling JPY90 million). Energy generated from the 
solar facility is used to power the indoor farms, while surplus energy sold 
back to the grid. 
Other innovations have been also experimented. Dutch bio-farming 
company Waterland International and a Japanese federation of farmers made 
an agreement in March 2012 to plant and grow camellia on 2000 to 3000 ha 
[The Mainichi Shimbun, Aril 4, 2012]. The seeds will be used to produce bio-
diesel, which could be used to produce electricity. The affected region has a 
big potential for production of clean energy since some 800,000 ha could not 
                                                          
257
 Since feed-in tariff was introduced, several large-scale solar parks in Japan are 
announced or already in operation, but none uses solar sharing. Most have solar panels 
resting on ground (including largest in Minamisoma) making growing crops impossible.  
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be used to produce food anymore. Experiments have been carried out to find 
out whether camellia was capable of extracting cesium from the soil since 
experiment with sunflowers had no success. 
Various areas in Tohoku have been also considering rapeseed as a 
source of bioenergy for the future [NHK World, July 29, 2013]. The recovery 
project called Nanohana or Rapeseed Project is run by a company. The oil 
extracted from the rapeseed is processed into motor fuel and for one liter 
about 30 kilograms is needed. Concerned about environmental problems, this 
company started manufacturing biodiesel several years ago from used 
cooking oil that was collected through cleaning services. Now they apply the 
same technology, for processing rapeseed oil into biodiesel fuel. Since the 
rapeseed is being grown on a very small scale the process is far from turning 
a profit.  
Test runs on diesel vehicles have been completed and hope is to 
produce and sell the biodiesel for use in ordinary vehicles. The main problem 
is the lack of farmland to grow rape and members of the Project are focusing 
on farmland contaminated by saltwater. It is believed that if salt-resistant 
rapeseed could be grown there, the businesses could take off, which would 
also bring considerable relief to the farmers.  
Meanwhile Tohoku University scientists have been conducting research 
on rapeseeds, their resistance to salt, application and improvement. The leafy 
part of the rape plant called nabana, is edible so it can be sold as food. 
Farmers can earn income from this plant by extracting the oil or selling it as 
food. The oil can be used to make soap, candles or biodiesel fuel so the plant 
can be used according to the needs of each farm. The project is expected to 
take a minimum 10 years before achieving practical results.  
Furthermore, Nonprofit body Koriyama Area Technopolis Promotion 
Organization (KATPO) has been set to begin a demonstration test of a hybrid 
renewable energy system combining geothermal and solar power generation 
for the heating of agricultural greenhouse at the Iwase Ranch in Kagamiishi, 
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Fukushima prefecture [Fukushima Minpo News, January 21, 2014]. Two 
greenhouses are built for flower and vegetable plantation starting March 
2014, with one of the facilities set aside for the hybrid energy system.  
The experiment is implemented under the Fukushima prefectural 
government's project for the development of next generation technology for 
renewable energy. KATPO is the coordinator and study is done by Nihon 
University, Naito-Kogyosho Co. of Koriyama, Suzuki Seisakusyo Co. of 
Tanagura, Rhizome of Koriyama, and SK Electronics Industry Co. of 
Sukagawa. A budget of 50 million yen has been allocated to the experiment. 
The period of demonstration is expected to be around three years. Expertise 
and comparative data (on energy efficiency and cost of heating) will be made 
available to farmers after cost effectiveness has been confirmed. 
In the years after Fukushima nuclear accident an increase interests in 
renewable energy introduction has been reported, including in the sector 
“Agriculture”. In most affected regions and nationwide the later has been 
motivated by the new opportunities of development (including Government 
support measures) as well as souring costs of energy supply.  
A 2014 survey has found that 11.6% of the Agricultural Management 
Entities already use renewable energy, 10.2% of them are planning to do so, 
while 57.3% of all report interests in introduction of renewable energy [Japan 
Finance Corporation, 2014]. The highest rate of application or plans for 
introduction of renewable energy are among agricultural producers of Kyushu 
and Kanto regions (Figure 40). In Tohoku farms the transition to renewables 
is among the lowest in the country but there is a high interest in introduction 
of this type of energy in future. On the other hand, the greatest are shares of 
farms with “No interest to renewables” from Hokuriko and Chugoku-Shikoku 
regions. 
The highest rate of usage or planning of introduction of renewable 
energy is in Broilers, Dairy and Tea productions, while the lowest is in Rice 
cultivation (Figure 41). At the same time the largest shares of farms with 
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“Interests” in renewable energy is among Rice, Vegetables in facilities and 
Mushrooms producers. On the other hand, the greatest portion of producers 
with no interest in that issue is among the Hence farms. 
 
Figure 40. Interests for renewable energy introduction in agriculture in 
Japan (January, 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
Figure 41. Interests for renewable energy introduction in different 
subsectors of Japanese agriculture (January, 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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There is a great variation in the interests in the type of renewables by 
producers in general and in different regions on the country (Figure 42). The 
“Solar” energy is reported by the greatest number of agricultural producers 
who use, plan to or are interested in introduction of renewable energy in all 
regions of the country. The Tea and Upland crop producers are particularly 
strongly using or interested in that energy source (97% and 95% of them 
accordingly) while the Broilers producers relatively less (82.1%).  
 
Figure 42. Interests in different renewable energy among farms* using, 
planning or interested in introduction of renewables in Japan (January, 
2014) 
     
          Source: Japan Finance Corporation                        * up to 3 selections 
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The third most important source of energy in agriculture is Biomass and 
the biggest interest to that energy source which is shown by the farms in 
Tokai, Chugoku-Shikoku and Tohoku regions. Usage and interest to biomass 
is the highest among Pig, Broilers, and Dairy farms (58.7%, 57.1%, and 55% 
of them accordingly) and lowest in Tea producers (6.1%).  
Relatively good portions of producers in Hokuriki and Tohoku regions 
are also interested in Water as a renewable energy source. The application of 
or interests of hydro energy is the highest among rice producers (23.8%) and 
weakest in Hence farms (1.7%).  
Increasing applications of ICT in agriculture have been also reported 
leading to precision technologies, higher farming productivity, efficient use of 
resources, enhanced food safety, and improved relations with counterparts 
and consumers [NHK World, July 15, 2013]. 
The demand for proper measurements have induced numerous smart 
innovations for agriculture and related industries. For instance, a team of 
researchers from Fukushima University, PerkinElmer Japan Co. (a Japanese 
subsidiary of U.S. technology firm PerkinElmer Inc.), Japan Atomic Energy 
Agency, and Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology has 
developed a new system that can quickly analyze the density of strontium 90 
in soil [Fukushima Minpo News, September 19, 2013]. The new system cuts 
the time of analysis to only 20 minutes (from the existing one of two weeks to 
one month) and the smallest amount of strontium detectable in soil is about 5 
Bq/kg (a figure that is sufficient to be deemed a risk to humans). 
Similarly, a team of scientists developed a car borne radiation 
measurement method for the farmland and roads in the Minamisoma Ota 
area of Fukushima, and a community led radiation measurement framework 
was established and implemented [Furutani et al. 2012]. As a result, radiation 
measurements and visualization for farmlands, paddies, and forests, which 
had been conventionally unachievable, has been made possible. Verification 
of the effect of decontamination also became possible by feeding back 
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radiation measurement results before and after decontamination to residents. 
Another example for rapid cooperation for disaster recovery has been 
initiated by a nonprofit organization promoting intelligent transportation 
systems. The day after the massive quake and tsunami, ITS Japan, 
requested related companies such as Toyota Motor Corp., Honda Motor Co., 
Nissan Motor Co. and car navigation system maker Pioneer Corp. to provide 
it with probe data including information such as the roads driven by the 
vehicles. On the same day, Honda and Pioneer began providing probe data 
to users of their products while Toyota began providing probe data on March 
16. On March 19 ITS Japan began providing consolidated probe data 
compiled from Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Pioneer. Drivers get the data from 
either the car navigation systems in their cars or ITS Japan's website via 
smartphones or personal computers.  
New use of probe data helps speed up Japan's recovery258. Truck 
drivers could not have delivered the necessities of life to evacuees who lost 
homes after the quake and tsunami without knowing which roads were clear 
of debris. Road information from cars that had already driven in the coastal 
area was helpful for those who were to come later to continue delivering food, 
blankets and other goods for months. According to users the system was 
really helpful and it would have been even better if the data showed the 
breakdown of the size of trucks that had driven each road. 
Individual carmakers had already developed a system in which drivers 
share probe data. Consolidating the system from multiple companies was 
essential because more probe data give more precise information to drivers. 
The probe cars have data-sending functions installed in navigation systems. 
Drivers who volunteer to offer the data obtain the function when they 
                                                          
258
 On April 28, 2011, ITS Japan stopped providing probe data to public in Tohoku region 
due to declining demand as drivers became aware of which roads were clear of debris. 
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purchase sophisticated types of navigation systems259. Currently, 
approximately one in every several hundred cars is a probe car in the Tohoku 
area, while the rate is higher in urban areas. 
Optimism of business prospects in the post-disaster years could be 
demonstrated with the statement of one of the interviewed by us experts - 
Mr.Kishi, running a processing company: “Currently there are many subsidies 
supplied in Fukushima. We think that we could change this to a chance by 
producing new product from Fukushima. Our company is now on work for 
next year’s new product and planning for capital investment (June 5, 2013). 
 
  
                                                          
259
 ITS Japan originally anticipated probe data to be used to mitigate traffic jams and notify 
drivers of spots with frequent accidents as it show places probe cars put brakes/stopped. 
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Chapter 8. Impact on food industries 
 
After March 2011 the food industry in the disaster regions and 
throughout the country was also seriously affected by the production drops, 
business suspensions, distribution ruptures, etc. due to damaged plants, 
rolling blackouts, packaging material production shortages, gasoline 
shortfalls, etc. [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2011]. 
Regular surveys on food industries dynamics reviled that 71% of the 
country’s food companies were “affected” by the disasters, including more 
than 35% “still affected” at the beginning of 2014 (Figure 43). 
The strongest hit were food-industry companies in Tohoku’s most 
affected regions (Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures) (92.5%) and in 
Northern (84.6%) and Southern (82.3%) Kanto region. What is more, a 
significant share of the food industry was not still recovered from the disaster 
by the end of 2013 in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures and Northern 
Kanto region. Relatively less affected by the disasters were food industry in 
Chugoku (57.9%), Kyushu (59%), and Shikoku (62%). Despite the fast 
recovery a significant amount of food companies in these regions reported 
they were still affected in the end of 2011. 
Similarly, 57.9% of country’s food companies have been negatively 
affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster as about 35% still affected in the 
beginning of 2014 (Figure 44). The most severely affected have been the 
companies in the Northern Kanto (83.4%) and in Tohoku’s Iwate, Miyagi and 
Fukushima prefectures (81.9%).  
In the most impacted Fukushima prefecture 93.8% of all food 
companies have been adversely affected by the nuclear accident, including 
92.6% of them “still affected” in the beginning of 2014 [Japan Financial 
Corporation, 2014]. On the other hand, food industries in Kyushu have been 
relatively less affected by the nuclear disaster as only 38.8% of the 
companies report negative impact on activity (including 20.5% still impacted). 
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Figure 43. Earthquake-tsunami disaster effects on food industry in 
Japan (January, 2012, 2013, 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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Figure 44. Impact of Fukushima nuclear power plant accident on food 
industry in Japan (January, 2012, 2013, 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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individual factors for the adverse impact of the nuclear accident in different 
regions of the country. 
 
Figure 45. Share of food industry companies in Japan affected by Great 
East Japan Earthquake (September, 2011)* 
 
*“increase” Price of ingredients and raw materials, Production costs, “decrease” all others 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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number of food industry companies (Figure 46). The disasters affected 
uniformly strong the Procurement of ingredients and raw materials of the 
majority of companies in all subsectors. In addition, disasters affected the 
Demand from trade partners of many companies in Wholesale trade, and the 
Sales volume, the Number of consumers, and the Price of ingredients and 
raw materials in Restaurants business. 
 
Figure 46. Impact of earthquake and tsunami on overall management of 
food industry in Japan (January, 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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Figure 47. Impact of Fukushima nuclear plant accident on overall 
management of food industry in Japan (January, 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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Ibaraki, Gunma and Tochigi prefectures, while the slowest one in Aomori, 
Akita and Yamagata prefectures. 
 
Table 22. Impact of 2011 nuclear disaster on food industry companies in 
Fukushima prefecture (February 2013) 
Companies with changes in sales Companies with changes in 
income 
No Decrease Incr-
ease 
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ase 
Decrease No 
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Figure 48. Extent of food industry recovery from Great East Japan 
Earthquake effects (January, 2013) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
 
  
0 20 40 60 80
Less than 50%
60-70%
More than 80%
Less than 50%
60-70%
More than 80%
E
a
rt
h
q
u
a
ke
 a
n
d
ts
u
n
a
m
i
F
u
k
u
sh
im
a
 n
u
cl
e
a
r
a
cc
id
e
n
t Saitama, Tokyo, Chiba,
Kanagawa
Ibaraki, Gunma, Tochigi
Aomori, Akita, Yamagata
Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima
Japan
  
205 
Chapter 9. Radioactive contamination of agri-food products 
 
A large scale contamination of crops, livestock and agri-food products 
by radionuclides has happened as a result of the direct radiation exposure, 
the fallouts and distributed by wind and rains radioactive elements, the crop 
and livestock uptakes from leaves, soils, waters and feeds, the diffusion from 
affected inputs, buildings and equipment, the dissemination through 
transportation and wildlife, etc. 
On March 18, 2011 the radioactive iodine exceeding the provisional 
regulation limit260 was detected in raw milk produced in Fukushima prefecture 
[Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2011]. On the next day 54,100 
Bq/kg of iodine-131 was found in a sample of spinach, taken in Hitashi, 
Ibaraki prefecture (approximately 120 km south of the nuclear plant) [Institute 
for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, 2012]. In a kukitachina 
sample (local leafy vegetable) taken on March 21 in Mitomiya, Fukushima 
prefecture (70 km west of the plant) was detected 41,000 Bq/kg of Caesium-
134 and 41,000 Bq/kg of Caesium-137 [Institute for Radiological Protection 
and Nuclear Safety, 2012].  
On March 21, 2011 restrictions on food distribution were launched by 
the Director General the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters261. 
Distribution restriction was put on milk from Fukushima prefecture and 
spinach and kakina in Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Fukushima prefectures. 
On March 23, similar restrictions were placed on more leafy vegetables 
(komatsuna, cabbages) and all flowerheads brassicas (like cauliflower) in 
Fukushima prefecture, while parsley and milk distribution was restricted in 
Ibaraki prefecture.  
                                                          
260
 Provisional regulation values for radioactive substances under the Food Sanitation Act 
were set up for drinking water and agri-food products on March 17, 2011 and for fish and 
shellfish on April 5, 2011 [Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2011]. 
261
 Shipment restrictions are lifted if radioactive substances fall bellow the regulation 
valued in three consecutive weekly inspections (implemented from April 8, 2011). 
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According to reports virtually all milk and vegetable samples taken in 
Fukushima (March 18–21) and Ibaraki (March 16–22) prefectures were above 
the safe limit [International Atomic Energy Agency, March 24, 2011). Samples 
from Chiba, Ibaraki and Tochigi prefectures also had excessive radiation 
levels in celery, parsley, spinach and other leafy vegetables. In addition, 
certain samples of beef mainly taken on March 27–29 showed concentrations 
of iodine-131 and/or caesium-134 and caesium-137 above regulatory levels. 
On April 8, 2011 the “Policy on rice planting” was announced and 
restrictions on rice planting on 11,200 ha imposed (April 22, 2011)262 in 
restricted areas, planned-evacuation areas, and areas prepared for 
evacuation in case of emergency in 12 municipalities [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2011]. Voluntary moratorium of additional 2,000 ha of 
rice paddies was also introduced263. 
Other agricultural products from Tochigi and Ibaraki prefectures were 
also found to exceed the government limits such as pasture grass collected 
on May 5, approximately 11 times the state limit of radioactive cesium [NHK, 
May 13, 2011]. Hay and straw were found contaminated with Cesium264 80 
kilometers from the nuclear reactors.  
Contaminated beef was traced on farms as far as 100 km away from 
the Fukushima nuclear plant. The cesium was found in meat from animals fed 
by contaminated rice straw265. By July 26, 2011 it was known that more than 
2,800 cows fed with cesium-contaminated food were shipped to markets in 46 
of the prefectures (exception Okinawa)266. Measurements of some animals 
shipped form Miyagi prefecture were 1,150 Bq/kg.  
All shipment of beef raised in Fukushima prefecture was prohibited after 
July 19, 2011, from Miyagi prefecture on July 28, and Iwate prefecture on 
                                                          
262
 on farmland that contained more than 5,000 Bq/kg per of radioactive cesium. 
263
 with areas under mandotoy ban it makes 8.9% of all paddies in Fukushima prefecture. 
264
 No Iodine-131 was detected after mid-May [IRPNS, 2012]. 
265
 Such contamination did not affects pigs and chickens - they are not fed with rice straw. 
266
 Even in July radioactive beef was found on sale in 11 prefectures (until then testing was 
performed on skin and exterior of livestock while animal feed and meat cuts not checked).
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August 1. Later on the shipment of cattle and meat was only allowed after 
examination, and when the level of cesium is below the regulatory 
standard267. On August 3, 2011 the local government in Shimane prefecture 
decided to conduct radiation checks on all beef cattle to ease consumer 
concerns about food safety268. Authority introduced testing on all beef heads 
for radionuclides in 4 prefectures (Fukushima, Iwate, Miyagi and Tochigi) and 
testing on all farms in 3 other prefectures (Ibaraki, Gunma, and Chiba)269. 
The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries urged farmers and 
merchants to renounce the use and sale of compost made of manure from 
cows that may have been fed the contaminated straw. The measure also 
applied to humus from leaves fallen from trees. That “voluntary ban” could be 
lifted after developing guidelines for safety levels of radioactive cesium in 
compost and humus [JAIF, July 26, 2011]. 
On August 19, 2011 radioactive cesium (at one-tenth of the government 
limit) was found in a sample of rice from Hokota, Ibaraki prefecture about 160 
km south of the nuclear plant. On September 16, 2011 measurements of 
radioactive cesium in rice conducted in 17 prefectures found radioactive 
materials in 94 locations (4.3% of the total). The highest level detected in 
Fukushima prefecture was 136 Bq/kg.  
On September 23, 2011 radioactive cesium in concentrations above the 
government safety limit was found in rice samples collected in the 
northeastern part of Fukushima prefecture. Rice-samples taken before the 
harvest showed 500 Bq/kg in Nihonmatsu. The government ordered a two-
way testing procedure of samples taken before and after the harvest. Pre-
harvest tests were carried out in nine prefectures of Tohoku and Kanto 
regions. Farmers who already started harvesting were ordered to store crop 
                                                          
267
 All cattle have to be checked for radiation before shipment, and government asked 
prefecture to temporarily reduce number of shipments to match its inspection capability. 
268
 Late July at one farm rice-straw was discovered with radioactive Cs levels exceeding 
safety limit. Traders started to avoid all cattle from Shimane and beef prices plummeted. 
269
 In practice, all heads of cattle are tested in meat processing plants throughout Japan. 
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until the post-harvest tests is available [JAIF, September 25, 2011]. 
On November 16, 2011 radioactive cesium of 630 Bq/kg was detected 
in rice harvested in the Oonami district of Fukushima city [NHK World, 
November 17, 2011]. All rice of the fields nearby was stored and none sold to 
the market. All 154 farmers in that district were asked to suspend shipments 
of rice and tests were ordered on rice samples from all farms. Five more 
farms were found with cesium-contaminated rice at a distance of 56 km from 
the disaster reactors with the highest level of cesium detected of 1,270 Bq/kg. 
On November 28 cesium-contaminated rice up to 1050 Bq/kg was 
reported in samples of 3 farms in Date, 50 km from the Fukushima nuclear 
reactors. Consequently prefectural government decided to control more than 
2,300 farms in the whole district. On 29 November orders were given to 2,381 
farms in Nihonmatsu and Motomiya to suspend part of rice shipments in 
addition to already halted shipments at 1,941 farms in 4 other districts 
(including Date), totaling 4,322 farms [The Mainichi Daily News, November 
29, 2011]. 
On May 11, 2011 cesium levels in tea leaves from Kanagawa 
prefecture were reported to exceed government limits [Osawa, 2011]. On 
September 3 radioactive cesium exceeding the government's safety limit was 
also detected in tea leaves in Chiba and Saitama prefectures. One type tea 
leaves from Chiba prefecture contained 2,720 Bq/kg of radioactive cesium. A 
maximum of 1,530 Bq/kg was detected in 3 kinds of tea leaves from Saitama 
prefecture. Tea producers were asked to recall their products when that is 
necessary [JAIF, September 4, 2011]. 
In the end of spring, summer and autumn high levels of Cesium 134 
and 137 were fund in Fukushima bamboo shoots (several hundreds of Bq/kg) 
and fruits like Japanese apricots (up to hundreds of Bq/kg), yusu (up to 2,400 
Bq/kg), kiwi (up to 1,100 Bq/kg), pomegranates, chestnuts etc. [Institute for 
Radiological Protection and Nuclear, 2012]. 
On October 13, 2011 Yokohama city terminated the use of dried 
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shiitake mushrooms in school lunches after tests had found radioactive 
cesium up to 350 Bq/kg. In shiitake mushrooms grown outdoors on wood in 
Ibaraki prefecture, 170 km from the nuclear plant, samples contained 830 
Bq/kg of radioactive cesium. Radioactive contaminated shiitake mushrooms 
above safety limit were also found in two cities of Chiba prefecture. 
Consequently, restrictions were imposed on shipments from these regions. 
On October 29, 2011 it was announced that shiitake mushrooms grown 
indoors at a farm in Soma (north from nuclear plant) contained 850 Bq/kg of 
radioactive cesium: Mushrooms were grown on beds made of contaminated 
woodchips mixed and 1,070 (100-gram) packages of them had been shipped 
to supermarkets [The Mainichi Daily News, September 25, 2011]. 
In March and October food was served in Yokohama city with highly 
contaminated dried shiitake-mushrooms270 that came from a farm near this 
town (250 km away from Fukushima). On November 10, 2011, in Tochigi 
prefecture, 120 km away southwest from the Fukushima reactors, 649 Bq/kg 
of radioactive cesium was measured in kuritake mushrooms. Four other cities 
in that region already stopped sales and call back their mushrooms [NHK 
World, November 11, 2011]. 
On February 7, 2012 noodles contaminated with radioactive cesium 
(258 Bq/kg) were found in Okinawa [The Mainichi Daily News, February 13, 
2012]. “Okinawa soba” was apparently produced with water filtered through 
contaminated ashes271 from wood originating from Fukushima prefecture. On 
February 10, 2012 the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries set out a 
warning not to use ashes from wood or charcoal, even when the wood 
contained less than the governmental set maximum of 40 Bq/kg for wood or 
280 becquerels for charcoal.  
In mid November 2011 radioactive cesium up to 30.8 Bq/kg was found 
                                                          
270
 Test-results of mushrooms showed 2,770 Bq/kg in March, 2011 and 955 Bq/kg in 
October, 2011 [JAIF, November 5, 2011].  
271
 It is a custom to use ashes when kneading noodles or to take away a bitter taste, or 
"aku" from "devil's tongue" and wild vegetables. 
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in milk-powder for baby-food produced by Meiji Co. While this level was under 
the governmental safety-limit it could be harmful for young children. Previous 
tests in July-August on 25 baby products did not reveal any contamination 
[The Mainichi Daily News, December 10, 2011]. 
On March 20, 2011 radioactive substances were detected in tap water 
in Tokyo, and Tochigi, Gunma, Chiba and Saitama prefectures [The Japan 
Times, March 20, 2011]. Permissible levels of iodine-131 were exceeded in 
drinking water samples taken in Fukushima and Ibaraki Prefectures and in 
Tokyo from 17 to 23 March [IAEA, March 24, 2011].  
On March 24, iodine-131 was detected in 12 of 47 prefectures, of which 
the level in Tochigi prefecture was the highest (110 Bq/kg). Caesium-137 was 
detected in 6 prefectures but always below 10 Bq/kg. On March 25, 2011, tap 
water was reported to have reduced to 79 Bq/kg and to be safe for infants in 
Tokyo and Chiba prefecture but still exceeded limits in Hitachi and 
Tokaimura. On April 27, 2011 the radiation in Tokyo's water supply fell to 
undetectable levels for the first time since 18 March [Inajima and Nakayama, 
2011]. On July 2, 2011 in samples of tap water taken in Tokyo Shinjuku ward 
radioactive caesium-137 with concentration 0.14 Bq/kg was detected for the 
first time since April.  
Voluntary restrain on planting tobacco were also imposed in Fukushima 
prefecture in 2011 [Watanabe, 2013]. Furthermore, some tests found a high 
radiation level in wild mushrooms (28,000 Bq/kg of cesium) and a wild boar (6 
times above the safety limit) [JAIF, September 12, 2011].  
Many farm related services such as eco-tourism, eco-farm, etc. were 
suspended in the most affected areas. For instance, Mr. K. Yamauchi farm in 
Kitakata, Fukushima prefecture were popular with green tourism before the 
nuclear disaster, and accepted students from 10 schools from and outside 
prefecture to experience agriculture. However, no students visited the farm in 
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2011 and 2012 due to public concern over radiation272 [Fukushima Minpo 
News, May 16, 2013]. 
In March 2012 radioactive cesium was detected in yamame (landlocked 
masu salmon) caught in Niida river near Iitate town, which was over 37 times 
the legal limit [The Mainichi Shimbun, March 30, 2012]. Fishing cooperatives 
were asked to refrain from catching yamame fish from this river and all 
streams adjacent to it, and no fish was sold on market. Moreover, no fishing 
was allowed in the river Nojiri in the region Okuaizu in Fukushima after-mid 
March 2012. Although this river is located 130 km from the damaged reactors 
the caught fish contained 119-139 Bq/kg of cesium. In 2011 the fish 
measured only 50 Bq/kg but fishing was not popular.  
On March 28, 2012 smelt caught in the Akagi Onuma lake near 
Maebashi city in Gunma prefecture was found to be contaminated with 426 
Bq/kg of cesium [The Mainichi Shimbun, April 4, 2012]. In April 2012 
radioactive cesium concentrations of 110 Bq/kg were found in silver crucian 
carp fish caught in Tone river, north of Tokyo, 180 km away from the nuclear 
plant. Six fishery cooperatives and 10 towns along the river were asked to 
stop all shipments of caught fish. In March 2012 fish and shellfish caught in a 
pond near the same river were found to contain levels above the new legal 
safety limits [JAIF, April 26, 2012]. 
High levels of radioactive cesium were found in 23 varieties of 
freshwater fish sampled at five rivers and lakes in Fukushima prefecture 
between December 2011 and February 2012 and in 8 locations on the open 
sea. On July 2, 2012 the authority announced finding radioactive cesium 
between 61 to 2,600 Bq/kg in a kind of goby caught in Mano river flowing 
from Iitate village to Minamisoma city (north of the nuclear plant). Water bugs, 
common food for freshwater fish, also showed high levels of 330 to 670 
Bq/kg.  
All coastal fishery and trawl fishing offshore Fukushima, except trial 
                                                          
272
 on May 15, 2013 when students visits started again. 
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fishing273, have been voluntarily suspended since the accident at the nuclear 
plant. After detection of radioactive cesium above legal limits in Sand lances 
caught off the coast of Ibaraki, prefectural government banned fishing [NHK, 
May 13, 2011]. Marine fish was found less contaminated and showed levels 
between 2.15-260 Bq/kg since it might be more capable of excreting cesium 
from bodies (saltwater fish have the ability to excrete salt).  
Radioactive cesium was also found in high concentration in plankton in 
samples taken up to 60 km from the coast of Iwaki city in July 2011 as up to 
669 Bq/kg was measured in animal plankton 3 km offshore [JAIF, October 15, 
2011]. Occasional incidents of caught fish with enormous amount of cesium 
have been reported since the nuclear accident – e.g. radiation 2,540 times 
the legal limit for seafood was measured in a 'murasoi'-fish caught in January 
2013 at the coast of Fukushima prefecture [Bullones, 2013]. 
Forestry industry has been also severely affected by the nuclear 
accident. For instance, Fukushima's broad-leaf forest area is one of country’s 
leading producers of mushroom growing logs [Fukushima Minpo News, 
September 26, 2014]. After the nuclear accident, radioactive cesium levels 
exceeding the maximum standard (50 Bq/kg) were detected in many log 
producing areas and in 2012 only 300,000 logs were produced or 6% of the 
pre-disaster level274.  
During the year after the nuclear accident officials tested 137,037 agri-
food samples across the country and detected 1,204 cases (0.88%) 
exceeding the provisional safety limit in 14 prefectures  (Figure 49). 
Most of the contaminated food samples were in Fukushima prefecture 
(59.63%), followed by Saitama (10.55%), Ibaraki (7.14%), Tochigi (6.23%) 
and Miyagi prefectures (5.32%). The share of contaminated items in all 
                                                          
273
 Test-fishing began in 2012 for limited species of marine products. It targets 27 species 
of which redioactive cesium concentration has been remarcably decreased and they are 
cought on a trial basis at the limited offshore area (20 km away from the nuclear station) 
and sold after inspection of each landing for each species [Fishery Agency, 2014]. 
274
 In 2010 Fukushima prefecture produced about 5 million such logs (nearly 3 million sold 
outside prefecture) earning forestry industry about 1 billion yen in annual sales. 
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inspected samples was highest in Saitama (3.64%), Fukushima (3.33%) and 
Kanagawa (1.98%) prefectures, and in Tokyo (1.42%). 
 
Figure 49. Number of agri-food samples above radiation safety limit 
detected until March 31, 2012 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
The majority of highly contaminated items in Fukushima prefecture 
were vegetables, fishery products and meats, in Ibaraki and Chiba 
prefectures vegetables, in Miyagi prefecture beef, in Tochigi prefecture 
vegetables and meats, in Saitama prefecture and Tokyo tea leafs.  
More than 3,600 fishery products were tested in Fukushima prefecture 
during the first year after the accident, and 34.7% of them found above 100 
Bq/kg [Fishery Agency, 2014]. In the rest of the country from almost 5,000 
inspected fish samples 4.5% were above safety norm. 
The mandatory and voluntary restrictions on shipment covered a 
number of products from designated areas of affected regions. In addition, 
there was a ban on rice planting on 8,000 ha of paddies in evacuation (95%) 
and other contaminated areas [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
2012]. Several municipalities (Minami-shi, Hirono-machi, Kawauchi-mura and 
Tamura-shi) also called for voluntary restraints on planting of paddy rice on 
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total area of 5,600 ha.  
In order to meet growing public safety concerns since April 1, 2012 new 
more stringent official limits on radioactive elements in food items have been 
enforced in the country as longer transitional periods were set for some 
commodities like rice and beef (until September 30, 2012), and soybean 
(December 31, 2012). 
In August 2012 officials reported that cesium levels had dropped to 
undetectable levels in most cultivated vegetables from the affected areas, 
while food sourced from forests, rivers or lakes in the Tohoku and northern 
Kanto regions were showing excessive contamination [Aoki, 2012]. Reported 
contamination mostly involved fish (landlocked salmon and flounder) and 
seafood, Shiitake-mushrooms, and meat of wild animals. Radiation levels 
remained especially high in species like cod, sole, halibut, landlocked 
kokanee, carp, trout, and eel.  
In the last two years the number of (official, collective, private) food 
inspections has multiplied in the 17 most vulnerable prefectures275 and 
around the country.  
Officially tested food items doubled in 2012, 0.85% of all samples were 
found exceeding safety limit for radionuclides, and a few highly contaminated 
items were detected in 4 more prefectures (Aomori, Nigata, Yamanashi and 
Hiroshima)  (Figure 50). The biggest number of unsafe food items was 
detected in Fukushima (58.05%), Iwate (10.96%), Tochigi (10.79%), and 
Miyagi (6.91%) prefectures. The portion of highly contaminated food items 
was biggest in samples from Fukushima (3.95%) and Iwate (1.03%) 
prefectures. 
Most of the detected items were fishery products, wild animal meats, 
vegetables and mushrooms. In Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Iwate 
                                                          
275
 Regular tests on 98 items have been carried out in Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Akita, 
Yamagata, Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, Kanagawa, 
Niigata, Yamanashi, Nagano, and Shizuoka prefectures. 
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prefectures there were also detected samples of drinking water exceeding 
safety standard. 
 
Figure 50. Number of radionuclide food tests and items above safety 
standard in Japan 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
In FY 2013 the number of inspections increased further but only 0.30% 
of samples were found with level higher than the safety standard276. The bulk 
of highly contaminated items were in Fukushima prefecture (62.42%) followed 
by Gunma (10.99%), Tochigi (8.42%) and Miyagi (8.32%) prefectures. The 
greatest segment with highly-contaminated items was detected in samples 
from Fukushima (1.5%) and Yamanashi (1.18%) prefectures.  
Most of the detected items in Fukushima prefectures were fishery 
products, agricultural products (vegetables, soybean, rice, etc.) and wild 
animals meat; in Miyagi prefecture agricultural products (bamboo shoot, 
vegetables, etc.), wild animal meat and fishery products; in Gunma and 
Tochigi prefectures wild animal meats; and in Yamanashi prefecture 
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 No drinking water sample above safety limit was detected. 
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mushrooms.  
Up to December 7, 2014 of the FY 2014 positively tested items were 
fond inly in 14 prefectures and their number of was further diminished – just 
0.16% of the total. Above a half of the contaminated items were in Fukushima 
prefecture (50.26%), followed by Miyagi (14.09%), and Gunma (10.63%) 
prefectures. The greatest proportion with highly contaminated items was 
detected in samples from Yamanashi (2.14%), Fukushima (0.63%), and 
Shizuoka (0.34%) prefectures. 
Most of the detected items in Fukushima prefectures were wild animals 
meat, fishery products, and agricultural products (mostly wild ones, and 
soybean); in Miyagi prefecture wild animal meat, agricultural products (mostly 
wild, and log-grown Late fall oyster mushrooms), and fishery products; in 
Gunma prefectures wild animal meats, fishery products, and agricultural 
products (wild ones, and log-grown Shitake powdered. 
Official inspections results in the last years indicate that for all 
agricultural food products, but mushrooms and wild edible plants, the number 
of samples with radioactive cesium above safety limits is none or insignificant 
(Table 23).  
What is more, the share of samples with detected radioactivity higher 
than the half of the new safety norm (>50 Bq/kg) has been minor, declining or 
zero. For instance, during April 1, 2013 - March 31, 2014 this portion was 
merely 0.002% in beef meat, 0.008% in rice, 0.01% in vegetables, 0.45% in 
tea infusion (>5 Bq/kg), 0.66% in fruits, 1.19% in other cultivated plants, 
3.03% in honey, 4.58% in pulse, and 6.76% in mushrooms and wild edible 
plants [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. Similarly, for the 
period April 1, December 31, 2014 the proportion of such items in all samples 
was merely 0.0001% for rice, 0.068% for fruits, 0.27% for pulses, and 3.03% 
for in mushrooms and wild edible plants. 
The test data for marine fishery products radioactive contamination also 
indicate that the number of cases above safety limit has dropped 
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considerably (Figure 51).  
 
Table 23. Results of inspections on radioactivity levels in agricultural 
products in Japan* 
 
Products 
March, 2011 - March 31, 
2012 
April 1, 2012 - 
March 31, 2013 
April 1, 2013 - 
March 31, 
2014** 
April 1, 2014 – 
November 27, 
2014*** 
Num-
ber of 
sam-
ples  
Above 
provi-
sional  
limit 
Above  
new 
limit 
Number 
of sam-
ples 
Above 
max-
imum  
limit 
Num-
ber of 
sam-
ples 
Above 
max-
imum  
limit 
Num-
ber of 
sam-
ples 
Above 
max-
imum  
limit 
Rice 26,464 39 592 10.4 
million 
84 11 
million 
28 10 
million 
0 
Wheat and 
burley 
557 1 27 1,818 0 592 0 366 0 
Vegetables 12,671 139 385 18,570 5 19,657 0 12,719 0 
Fruits 2,732 28 210 4,478 13 4,243 0 2,955 0 
Pulse 698 0 16 4,398 25 6,727 59 1,485 2 
Other plants 498 1 16 3,094 14 1,613 0 751 0 
Mushrooms 
and wild 
edible 
plants 
3,856 228 779 6,588 605 7,583 194 6,801 102 
Tea/Tea 
infusion* 
2,233 192 1,562 867(*) 13(*) 446(*) 0(*) 183(*) 0 
Raw milk 1,937 1 7 2,453 0 2,052 0 1,393 0 
Beef 91,973 157 1096 187,176 6 208,477 0 na  
Pork 538 0 6 984 1 693 0 na  
Chicken 240 0 0 472 0 385 0 na  
Egg 443 0 0 565 0 418 0 na  
Honey 11 0 1 124 0 66 0 na  
Other 
livestock 
23 0 0 99 1 118 0 na  
* for crops in 17 northeastern and eastern prefectures, for livestock products all 
prefectures; ** for meat and eggs, January 31, 2014; *** for raw milk, December 31, 2014 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries          
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Figure 51. Monitoring results for marine fishery products radioactive 
levels in Japan 
 
Source: Fishery Agency 
 
In Fukushima prefecture, in the months after the accident, the share of 
highly-contaminated fish was 57.7% but it reduced by half after one year. The 
portion of samples above safety limit decreased considerably to around 1.5-
1.7% in the last 3 quarters.277 In other prefectures the share of contaminated 
fish decreased from 4.7% to less than 1% in 3nd quarter of 2012. 
Most recent data show that from January 1 until October 5, 2014 the 
total number of tested agri-food items was 168,667, out of which 272 (0.16%) 
were with levels exceeding the official safety standards in 13 prefectures 
[Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2014]. The greatest part of the above 
safety limits items (260) was not under cultivation and feeding management. 
The biggest proportion of detected items was in Fukushima (146), Miyagi (39) 
and Gunma (32) prefectures, followed by Tochigi (19) and Nagano (11) 
prefectures. In other regions the amount of detected foodstuff above safety 
standards was minor – 5 in Chiba and Shizuoka prefectures, 3 in Iwate, 
Ibaraki and Nigata prefectures, 2 in Akita and Yamanashi prefectures, and 1 
in Yamagata prefecture. 
The Fukushima Agricultural Technology Center performs regular tests 
on 461 agricultural and food items from Fukushima prefecture with the state 
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 After 2nd quarter of 2012, monitoring is focused on species with more than 50 Bq/kg. 
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of the art equipment. For the period March 19, 2011-March 31, 2014 as many 
as 109,853 agricultural and food items were tested at the Center’s 
laboratories [Fukushima Agricultural Technology Center, 2014]. Until the first 
anniversary from the nuclear accident (end of FY2011) contamination above 
provisional safety limit was found in 3.58% of checked samples (Table 24). 
One third of all highly contaminated items were fish, 23.8% livestock forage, 
18.6% mushrooms and wild plants, 21.3% vegetables and fruits, a small 
portion other products, and no detection for meat, eggs and brown rice. 
During the second years after the accident (FY 2012) the share of 
detected items above safety limit dropped to 1.83% almost three quarter of 
them being fish. The portion of highly-contaminated fish, and mushrooms and 
wild edible plants was considerable (14.6% and 8.3% accordingly), no 
detection was reported for meat, milk and eggs, and insignificant portion of 
contaminated items for others.  
During the last year (FY2013) only 1.48% of tested samples exceeded 
the safety limit. The majority of highly contaminated items were fish (56.6%), 
mushrooms and wild plants (19.1%) and cereals (19.8%). The radiation 
detection in mushrooms and wild plants, fish and cereals has been relatively 
high (5.8%, 2.9% and 1.6% respectively), merely 0.8% for forage for 
livestock, and none for all other products.  
The latest data show that a high contamination still remains in certain 
Fukushima products like edible wild plants attributed to radioactive 
substances on mountains surfaces [NHK World, May 14, 2014]. Out of 383 
samples tested during the last season 4.2% exceeded the safety limit278. 
Furthermore, a survey has found that the levels of radioactive cesium in 
home-cooked meals in Fukushima prefecture are mostly below the maximum 
allowable limit [Fukushima Minpo News, March 7, 2014]. Out of 100 
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 On May 13, 2014 Fukushima prefecture restricted shipment of 7 varieties of edible wild 
plants after detecting high levels of radioactive contamination – 700 Bq in fiddleheads, 430 
Bq in varieties of bracken, and 460 Bq in Japanese spikenard [NHK World, May 14, 2014]. 
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households surveyed during period November 2013 - February 2014 using 
meals prepared over two days, only 4 showed measurements slightly above 
the limit for radioactive cesium (the one with the highest level of 2.6 Bq/kg for 
Cesium 137 and 1.1 Bq/kg for Cesium 134). Household members were also 
tested for internal exposure to radioactive materials by a whole-body counter, 
and all screened persons (82) had counts below the 300 Becquerel threshold 
for human radiation exposure.  
 
Table 24. Results of inspections on radioactivity levels in agri-food 
products in Fukushima prefecture 
 
  Products 
Items June 1, 2011 - March 
31, 2012 
April 1, 2012 - 
March 31, 2013 
April 1, 2013 - 
March 31, 2014 
Number 
of 
samples 
Above 
provisio-
nal  limit 
Number 
of 
samples 
Above the 
maximum  
limit 
Number 
of 
samples 
Above 
the 
maximum  
limit 
Brown rice 1 1,724 0 35,238 71 601 28 
Cereals 
without rice 
8 607 3 2,169 10 4,428 55 
Vegetables 
and fruits 
232 6,010 145 7,264 7 5,806 0 
Milk 1 651 15 441 0 405 0 
Meat 5 5,001 0 6,310 0 4,888 0 
Eggs 1 221 0 144 0 133 0 
Forage for 
livestock 
- 773 162 1,664 48 2,368 19 
Fish 146 3,330 227 6,037 879 8,282 237 
Mushrooms 
and wild 
plants 
64 922 127 1,090 90 1,377 80 
Others 3 51 2 68 1 63 0 
Total 461 19,290 681 60,425 1,106 28,351 419 
Source: Fukushima Agricultural Technology Center 
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Currently there are still a number of products from certain areas of 17 
prefectures, which are subject to mandatory or voluntary shipment restrains 
(Table 25).  
 
Table 25. Agricultural and fish products subject to shipment restraints in 
designated areas of Japanese prefectures (as of December 18, 2014)279 
Prefec-
tures 
Mandatory Voluntary 
Aomori  Wild mushrooms 
Iwate  Shiitake, Nameko and Kuritake mushrooms 
grown on Raw Log (open fields); Koshiabura; 
Fiddlehead fern; Wild Bracken; Wild Japanese 
parsley; Bamboo shoots; Wild mushrooms;  
Cattle*;  
Japanese seaperch; Japanese black porgy; 
Iwana mountain trout; Japanese dace 
 
Dried shiitake mushrooms grown 
on Raw Log in 2011 and spring 
2012; Shiitake mushrooms grown 
on Raw Log; Wild Kusasotetsu; 
Wild Taranome; Wild Uwabamisou; 
Wild butterbur; Wild Sanshou; 
Hiratake, Bunaharitake and 
Mukitake mushrooms grown on 
Raw Log (open field); Kuwai (open 
field); Natural Yamame 
Akita   Wild Nemagaridake 
Miyagi  Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw Log (open 
fields); Kusasotetsu; Bamboo shoots; 
Koshiabura; Fiddlehead fern; Wild mushrooms;  
Cattle*; 
Takifugu pardalis; Japanese seaperch; 
Japanese black porgy; Yamame (except 
cultured); Sweetfish (except cultured); Iwana 
mountain trout (except cultured); Japanese 
dace  
Mukitake mushrooms grown on 
Raw Log; Nameko mushrooms 
grown on Raw Log (open field); 
Wild Taranome; Wild Bracken; 
Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw 
Log (mushroom facilities); Natural 
Eel; Iwana mountain trout (except 
cultured) 
Yamagata  Koshiabura 
Fukushi-
ma 
 
Non-heading leafy vegetables; Heading leafy 
vegetables; Bud vegetables belonging to 
brassicaceae; Kabu; Japanese plum; Yuzu; 
Loquat; Walnuts; Japanese 
persimmon; Dried shiitake 
mushrooms; Wild Udo; Wild 
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 updates on requests for shipment restrains and other measures are available on: 
http://www.maff.go.jp/e/quake/press_since_130327.html 
  
222 
Japanese chestnut; Kiwi; Shiitake and Nameko 
mushrooms grown on Raw Log (open field); 
Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw Log 
(mushroom facilities); Wild mushrooms; 
Bamboo shoots; Kusasotetsu (open field); Wild 
Taranome; Wild butterbur sprout; Wasabi 
(grown in fields); Koshiabura; Fiddlehead fern; 
Bracken; Wild Bracken; Wild butterbur; Wild 
Uwabamisou; Cattle*; Raw milk; Yamame 
(except cultured); Sweetfish (except cultured); 
Iwana mountain trout (except cultured); Carp 
(except cultured); Japanese dace; Fat 
greenling, Red tongue sole, Ikanago (except 
for fry), Stone flounder, Sebastes thompsoni, 
Surfperch, Brown hakeling, Fox jacopever, 
Black cow-tongue, Jacopever, Japanese black 
porgy, Sea raven, Okamejei kenojei, Masu 
salmon, Poacher, Sebastes cheni, Japanese 
seaperch, Nibe, Starry flounder, Slime 
flounder, Takifugu pardalis, Bastard halibut, 
Red gurnard, Spotted halibut, Common 
Japanese conger, Yellow striped flounder, 
Marbled sole, Flathead, Pacific cod, 
Roundnose flounder, Spotbelly rockfish, Frog 
flounder, Stimpson’s hard clam, Northern sea 
urchin, Long shanny, Barfin flounder, 
Starspotted smooth-hound, Shosai-fugu; 
Japanese halfbeak, False kelpfish; Crucian 
(except cultured); Eel  
Sanshou; Koshiabura; Bamboo 
shoots; Wild Taranome; Chocolate 
vine; Mokuzugani; Honmokoro 
(cultured); Himemasu; Weather 
loach 
Ibaraki  Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw Log (open 
fields); Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw Log 
(mushroom facilities); Bamboo shoots; Wild 
koshiabura; Sebastes cheni, Japanese 
seaperch, Nibe, Okamejei kenojei, Pacific cod; 
Bastard halibut; Stone flounder; Channel 
catfish (except cultured), Carassius auratus 
langsdorfii (except cultured); Eel 
Wild mushrooms; Bamboo shoots; 
Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw 
Log; Dried shiitake mushrooms; 
Wild Taranome; Ikanago; Takifugu 
poecilonotus; Natural iwana 
mountain trout; Natural Carassius 
cuvieri 
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Tochigi  Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw Log; 
Nameko and Kuritake mushrooms grown on 
Raw Log (open field); Wild Taranome; Bamboo 
shoots; Wild Kusasotetsu; Wild Koshiabura; 
Wild Sanshou; Wild fiddlehead fern; Wild 
bracken; Wild mushrooms; Japanese chestnut; 
Cattle*  
Dried shiitake mushrooms grown 
on Raw Log); Shiitake mushrooms 
grown on Raw Log; Uwabamisou; 
Wild Myoga; Wild Momijigasa; 
Yamaguri; Natural fishes in 
mountain streams  
Chiba  Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw Log; 
Bamboo shoots; Silver crucian carp; Natural 
carp 
Bamboo shoots; Dried shiitake 
mushrooms; Shiitake mushrooms 
grown on Raw Log (open fields); 
Japanese seaperch; Stone 
moroko; Crucian carp; all kinds of 
fish and shellfish; Silver crucian 
carp; all species of fish and 
shellfish except for Freshwater 
prawn; Eel 
Tokyo  Eel 
Gunma  Wild mushrooms; Yamame (except cultured); 
Iwana mountain trout (except cultured); Eel 
Dried shiitake mushrooms grown 
on Raw Log; Bamboo shoots; 
Nameko mushrooms grown on 
Raw Log (open field); Wild 
Taranome; Natural Japanese 
smelt; Natural Japanese dace; 
Natural carp; Natural iwana 
mountain trout; Natural yamame 
Saitama  Wild mushrooms Natural catfish; Eel 
Nagano  Wild mushrooms Koshiabura; Taranome 
Kanaga-
wa 
 Shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw 
Log (open fields) 
Nigata  Wild mushrooms 
Yamana-
shi  
Wild mushrooms  
Shizuoka  Wild mushrooms Dried shiitake mushrooms (picked 
and processed after March 11) 
* whole area, from other prefecture (except less than 12 months), shipping to slaughter 
houses, exclude cattle controlled by shipment inspection policy of Prefectural Government 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries               
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In Fukushima prefecture the mandatory and voluntary restrictions cover 
a wide range of vegetables, fruits, livestock and fish products grown in heavily 
contaminated areas. There is also a ban on rice planting on 2,100 ha (almost 
3 times lass than in 2013) and overall production management restrictions on 
4,200 ha paddies in the evacuation area (Table 26, Map 14).  
 
Table 26. Target areas of rice planting restrictions (ha) 
Type 2013 2014 
Planting restrictions 6,000 2,100 
Farmland preservation and cultivation test* - 700 
Planting resume preparation 6,200 5,100 
Total volume production delivery management 5,200 4,200 
* set in the new “Policy on the planting of the 2014 annual rice” 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries               
 
Map 14. Target areas* for planting restrictions of 2013 and 2014 annual 
rice 
 
* orange - areas with a ban on rice planting; green - farmland preservation and 
cultivation test; blue - areas planting to restart; yellow - rice planted allowed  
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries               
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In other prefectures the mandatory and voluntary shipment restrictions 
mostly concern mushrooms, wild plants, and fish.  
For most contaminated areas of Fukushima prefecture there are still 
requests for intake restraints for a wide range of non-heading leafy 
vegetables (such as Spinach, Komatsuna, Kakina etc.), heading leafy 
vegetables (Cabbage, Hakusai, Heading lettuce, Brussels sprout etc.), bud 
vegetables belonging to brassicaceae (Broccoli, Cauliflower, Stick Broccoli 
etc.), shiitake mushrooms grown on Raw Log (open field), wild mushrooms, 
and non cultured Yamame [MAFF, 2014].  
The challenges associated with the agri-food contamination continue all 
the time. For instance, in 2014 Date farmers renewed shipments of popular 
dried permission but not all produce have been cleared [NHK World, 
November 12, 2014]. Despite decontaminations the radiation level of some 
lands’ output is still above the legal limit since drying increases the 
concentration of radiation 4-5 times.  
It has been also found out that the rice paddies located about 20 km 
from the Fukushima nuclear plant were with radioactive cesium blown by the 
wind [NHK World, July 14, 2014].  The prefectural government revealed that 
2013 year's harvested rice from 14 locations in the city of Minami Soma 
contained more than 100 Bq/kg of cesium. Initially there was a speculation 
that debris removal work at the nuclear station (conducted in August 2013) 
may be one of the reasons for the contamination280. Recently the officials 
announced that it is highly unlikely that radioactive particles from the nuclear 
plant contaminated rice fields and it may have come from river and ground 
water [NHK World, October 31, 2014]. 
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 Neither the government nor TEPCO informed Minami Soma City officials the work at 
the plant may have contaminated the crop. 
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Chapter 10. Effects on markets, consumers and international 
trade 
 
In the days after the 2011 disasters there was destruction of supply of 
potable water, foods and other necessities in most affected regions [Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2011; Watts, 2011]. What is more, food 
shortages spread beyond the worst affected areas as many people were 
panic buying after the nuclear crisis (Figure 52). Unprecedented for the post 
war period situation of food rationing and empty stores shelves was prevailing 
in the days after the crisis across the disaster areas and big cities like Tokyo. 
 
Figure 52. Stores with over-the-counter rice inventories in Tokyo and its 
vicinity (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries    
                     
The Government implemented swift measures to procure and provide 
emergency food, beverages, fuel etc., and rapidly restored damaged agri-
food production and distribution facilities. During the period March 11 - April 
20, 2011 the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries procured and 
delivered 25.84 million packs of meals, 7.62 million bottles of drink (3.81 
million liters) and 53 thousand cans formula milk for infants [Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012].  
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“Normal” food supply to all affected by the disasters people was quickly 
restored and important infrastructure (production and storage facilities, 
wholesale markets, transportation network, etc.) rebuilt. Nevertheless, there 
have been numerous restrictions on production, sells, shipments and 
consumption of basic agricultural and food products in the affected by the 
nuclear accident regions. All they stopped, delayed or significantly reduced 
the effective supply of a great range of local agri-food products. 
Furthermore, due to genuine or perceived health risk many Japanese 
consumers stop buying agricultural, fishery and food products originated from 
the affected by the nuclear accident regions (“Northern Honshu”). Even in 
cases when it was proven that food is safe some wholesale traders, 
processors and consumers restrain buying products from the contaminated 
areas [Futahira, 2013; Koyama, 2013; MAFF, 2012; Watanabe 2011, 2013].  
That dynamics of the demand has been a result of lack of sufficient 
capabilities in the inspection system, inappropriate restrictions (initially 
covering all shipments in a prefecture rather than from contaminated 
localities), revealed rare incidences of contamination in commonly safe 
origins, low confidence in the official “safety” limits and inspections, lack of 
good communication, harmful rumors (“Fu-hyo”), and in certain cases not 
authentic character of traded products [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. The 
“reputation damage” has been particularly important factor for the big agri-
food producing regions like Fukushima, Ibaraki, etc. which products have 
been widely rejected by consumers [Futahira, 2013; Fukushima Minpo News, 
May 11, 2014; Koyama, 2013; Watanabe, 2013; NHK World, July 14, 2014]. 
Consequently, the demand for many traditional farm produces from the 
affected by the nuclear disaster regions (such as rice, fruits, vegetables, 
mushrooms, milk, butter, beef, etc.) significantly declined while prices 
considerably decreased. For instance, regardless of the good result from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries emergency inspection for 
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radioactive contamination of rice281 the circulation of all rice produced in 
Fukushima prefecture stopped in 2011-2012 [Koyama, 2013].  
The marketing problems of farms in the most affected areas has been 
further enhanced due to the fact that a large number of them (used to) 
practice direct trade at wholesale markets and direct sells to consumers, 
retailers, and processors (Figure 53). 
 
Figure 53. Share of Agricultural Management Entities by shipping 
destination of agricultural products in 2010 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                    
 
Since autumns of 2011 and 2012 radiation measurement tests in all 
beef and package of rice have been carried out in Fukushima prefecture. 
Until April 30, 2013 more than 10.3 million bags of rice were checked by JA 
Fukushima, and detected radiation in 99.78% of them were less than 25 
Bq/kg while in only 71 bags (0.0007% of the total) it was above 100 Bq/kg [JA 
Fukushima Prefecture, 2013]. Despite that the prefectural authority 
introduced a higher then the national radiation level safety standard for rice 
(60 Bq/kg) the recovery of sale has been slow. Intensive safety checks have 
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been also carried out on a great range of agri-food products by the authority, 
farmers, agricultural organizations, processors, retailers etc. 
Despite all safety checks many consumers in the big consumer centers 
(Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, etc.) and in the region alike continue to avoid 
Fukushima products [Takeuchi and Fujioka, 2013; Koyama 2013]. In the end 
of March 2013 the rice sales from Fukushima was almost half of what it had 
been before the disaster while rice prices considerably lower. Nowadays 
many consumers continue to avoid buying products from Fukushima 
prefecture despite the vigorous safety checks – e.g. merely 20% of the rice 
put on the market in 2013 was bought by consumers [NHK World, July 14, 
2014]. A very popular across Japan organic rice of a agricultural corporation 
from Nihonmatsu (customer base of 4,000 people) has got no orders from 60 
% of customers [NHK World, March 10, 2014]. 
Similarly, sales of vegetables as ingredients for school lunch in 
Fukushima prefecture have decreased; only 3 out of 16 farmers market 
recovered the sales (positive trends are mostly for markets in the South part 
of the prefecture), most of the sales decreased by 30%, some (like in Date) 
still struggle at 40% of the pre-disaster level, and one was closed; sales of 
meat started to recover but it is still bellow the pre-disaster level, etc. 
[Nagashima, 2013].  
Fukushima labels and brands for agri-food produce which once 
representing top quality and safety after the accident brought rejections and 
significantly less than usual market value282.  
The same has been experienced by many food processors in the 
affected regions. For instance, manufacturers of natto283 from Mito were 
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 Fukushima products continue to top different competition - 2 farmers from prefecture 
won gold awards while others other awards in annual international rice tasting competition 
in Shichikashuku, Miyagi [Fukushima Minpo News November 25, 2013]. Three brands of 
rice (Koshihikari and Hitomebore from Aizu region, and Hitomebore from Nakadori area) 
were among 38 top level "Special Grade A" brands in Japan Grain Inspection [Fukushima 
Minpo News, February 14, 2014]. For the second straight year Fukushima-brewed sake 
brands got top award at Annual Japan Sake Awards as 17 out of submitted 39 brands 
were awarded Gold Prize [Fukushima Minpo News, May 21, 2014].  
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seeking compensation from TEPCO because their sales in April–August 2011 
fall by 50% and losses risen up to 1.3 million dollars [JAIF, August 13, 2011]. 
According to one of the interviewed by us experts - Mr.Kishi, running a small 
company for frozen desserts (ice creams, puddings, and jellies) in Fukushima 
city “for school lunch there are still harmful rumors and factories in Fukushima 
are unable to join the tender in some areas. His company is doing well since 
it supplies all ingredients outside prefecture and has a proper safety control 
system put in place (June 5, 2013).  
Some popular food chains such as Sukiya have introduced “no 
Fukushima beef” policy in their restaurants around the country, including in 
Fukushima prefecture. 
Before the nuclear accident Fukushima prefecture had been a favorite 
tourist destination both for local and outside visitors. After the accident the 
number tourists sharply declined - visits by local tourists dropped more than a 
half and all visits more than 40% comparing to the same periods in 2010 
[Fukushima prefectural government, 2012]. That has been a severe blow for 
the related farming and food products supplying tourists with numerous local 
specialties. The (agri and rural) tourism started to recover in 2012 but it is still 
struggling to reach pre-the disaster levels. 
Some research has also proved that consumers’ attitude toward the 
agricultural products from the affected regions has changed dramatically 
[Burch, 2012; Ujiie, 2011, 2012, 2013]. Almost 38% of the surveyed in 2012 
consumers indicated that they do not purchase fresh foods produced in the 
affected by the nuclear accident areas, and only 8.4% said they buy [Japan 
Finance Corporation, 2012]. A different survey has found out that a half of 
consumers in Tokyo and Osaka would not buy Fukushima and Ibaraki 
products with “contamination less than the official criteria” and another 30% 
said they would not buy if products were “not contaminated at all” [Ujiie, 
2012]. A follow up 2013 survey reviles that while consumers still maintain the 
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 fermented soybeans normally packed in rice-straw. 
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high risk conscious, the “origin of product” factor is playing less important role 
is the choice.  
Even residents and producers of Fukushima prefecture tend to avoid 
buying local products, and local produce has not been used in school 
lunches284. A 2013 consumer survey shows that this is particularly true for 
some segment of population (e.g. family with children) as well as for certain 
products (such as mushrooms and seafood) (Interview with Prof.Komatsu, 
June 17, 2013).  
One of the interviewed by us farmer Mr.Takahashi said: “As a producer 
in Fukushima, I am suffering to find the way to promote consumption of 
Fukushima products to local citizen. While the consumption in Fukushima do 
not return, there is no meaning to promote safeness and trustworthy of 
Fukushima products to other prefectures” (June 14, 2013). 
A countrywide survey found out that more than a third of surveyed 
Japanese farmers (Figure 54) and almost of 38% of food industry personnel 
(Figure 55) indicate that “Sales slackened because consumers tended to 
refrain from buying food products”. The later figures are much higher for the 
most affected by the disaster regions. A substantial number of food industry 
companies point out that they “switched from agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries products in areas with radioactive contamination fears to areas in 
Japan for their purchasing” and that amounts for more than 57% in 
Fukushima prefecture. 
There has been significant change in the purchase behavior of a great 
number of consumers after disasters. A July 2011 survey found out that a 
good share of consumers decreased the purchased amount of fresh (10.6%) 
and processed (9.8%) food, ornamental flowers (21.6%), confectionary 
(15.2%), etc. (Figure 56). On the other hand, there is an increase in purchase 
                                                          
284
 Insofar the “grow local, eat local” movement not taken off in Fukushima prefecture, and 
it is difficult to sell agricultural produce outside the prefecture [Koyama, 2013].  
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mineral water (17.6%). All these changes were more dynamic in the worst 
affected East Japan than in the other parts of the country. 
 
Figure 54. Effects of nuclear accident on farmers in 2012 (percent)* 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                *multiple answers 
                 
Figure 55. Effects of nuclear accident on food industry, 2012 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries              *multiple answers 
 
In the months after the earthquake, the item most emphasized by the 
consumers at the time of purchase of fresh food was “production location” 
and for processed food the “origin of raw materials” (Figure 57). However, for 
the majority of consumers there was not change of the place to buy fresh 
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(88.5%) and processed (89.1%) food comparing to the pre-duster period 
[Japan Finance Corporation, 2011]. 
 
Figure 56. Change in purchase amount of different category of food 
after Great East Japan Earthquake (July 2011) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
Figure 57. After earthquake, items to be emphasized at the time of 
purchase of fresh and processed food in Japan (July 2011) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
The consumer attitude to purchase food products from the affected by 
the nuclear disaster regions has evolved in post disaster years (Figure 58). 
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Currently, relatively more and more consumers do not mind the impact of the 
nuclear disaster when purchase agri-food produce. Nevertheless, still 
significant share of consumers do not buy fresh (31.8%) and processed 
(28.3%) products from that regions because of the nuclear disaster impact. 
 
Figure 58. Awareness when purchase fresh and processed food from 
region after nuclear accident (July 2011, January 2012, January 2013) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
Latest data indicate that a good portion of Japanese consumers 
(36.5%) “often” or “sometimes” purchase foodstuffs from affected by the 2011 
disasters areas (Figure 59). The figure is much higher in Tohoku region then 
in the other parts of the country.  
There are also gender and age differences in willingness to buy from 
the affected regions. For instance, older generation and women tend to buy 
more from the affected regions than the younger generation and men [Japan 
Finance Corporation, 2014]. 
Nevertheless, for a great proportion of the consumers it is important to 
select the region of agro-food products and they purchase “rarely” or “not at 
all” from the affected regions. 
Diverse promotions about produce safety etc. increase consumer 
willingness to purchase products from the affected regions [Japan Finance 
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Corporation, 2014]. For most Japanese consumers who do not want to 
purchase food stuff from the effected regions even the promotion the main 
reasons is “worry about safety”  (Figure 60). 
 
Figure 59. Purchase of foodstuffs produced* in areas affected by Great 
East Japan Earthquake (including eating out) (January 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation      *processed goods and agricultural products 
 
Figure 60. Reason do not want to purchase even there is a promotion 
(January 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
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from contaminated regions. Fukushima prefecture has lost its comparative 
advantage to other farming regions. In 2011 the price of peaches from 
Fukushima dropped 100 to 200 Yen, and asparagus around 300 Yen 
compared to the same products from other regions [Murayama, 2012]. 
Wholesale market shipment prices of vegetables in summer-fall 2012 were 
20-30% lower in absolute terms than for 2011 [Watanabe, 2013]. At the same 
time, new rice in 2011 was 10-20% more expensive than 2010 crop due to 
the efforts of wholesalers to purchase rice with no radioactivity [MAFF, 2012].  
There was sharp decline in the demand and prices for the agricultural 
products mostly affected by the accidents such as vegetables, fruits, beef, 
etc. (Figure 61). In Fukushima prefecture the extent of price reductions and 
the pace of price recoveries have been much slower than the nation ones.  
 
Figure 61. Dynamics of prices of major agricultural products affected by 
nuclear disaster 
 
Source: Fukushima prefectural government 
 
The farm products prices have not recovered yet in the most affected 
regions. For instance, in September 2014 farmers in Soma “were shocked by 
the price” that a local agricultural cooperative offered to pay saying they 
would not be able to make a living” [The Japan News, October 28, 2014]. The 
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cooperative offered ¥6,900 per 60 kg for Koshihikari brand rice harvest 
ranked as the highest grade which was about 40% lower than last year285.  
The effect of the nuclear disaster on prices can be demonstrated by 
comparing the dynamics of wholesale prices of major farm products from 
Fukushima prefecture and other regions.  
There was a considerable decline in the wholesale prices of beef cattle 
in Fukushima prefecture and in Japan after the accident (Figure 62). The 
prices in the country have been recovered and there has been gradual 
recovery of beef prices in Fukushima prefecture. Nevertheless, beef prices for 
different categories are still 12-13% lower in Fukushima prefecture comparing 
to the national prices.  
 
Figure 62. Evolution of wholesale prices for beef cattle in Fukushima 
prefecture and other parts of Japan (yen per kg) 
 
Source: Central JA Union for Fukushima Prefecture 
 
Similarly, on Tokyo Metropolitan Central Wholesale for the period July-
December 2011 the average prices for wagyu (Japanese beef cattle) bullock 
carcasses for all producing regions were 19% lower than for the same period 
the year before (with a dramatic year-on-year drop of 25% in October) 
[Watanabe, 2013]. The price of wagyu bullock carcasses from Fukushima 
prefecture declined by 50% in October 2011 compared to the same month of 
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 Prices are generally low nationwide due to abundant harvests and falling consumption 
in 2014. In Ibaraki prefecture ¥9,000 was offered for 60 kg - about 20% lower than in 2013. 
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the previous year, and stayed more than 30% lower than the average price 
for all producing regions. Since the beginning of 2012 prices for all producing 
regions gradually recovered and by the end of the year returned to the level 
of three years ago (although under 2,000 yen/kg). The price of Fukushima 
bullock carcasses has been recovering but it remained more than 10% lower 
than the average for all producing regions. 
At the first 2014 auction in Fukushima prefecture 873 calves put up for 
sale fetched an average of Y551,893 per head, 23% up from a year earlier, 
higher than the prefecture’s average price (Y446,914) before the disaster, 
and close to the to nationwide levels [Kachi, 2014]. Likely wise, the price for a 
Japanese Black Cattle calf stood at Y548,776 per head on average in the 
nation’s cattle market (113 locations) in December 2013286 - 24% up 
compared with December a year earlier, and the highest since 1994 when the 
Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation organization started keeping 
records [Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation, 2014].  
According to the experts falling supply rather than growing demand 
drives beef cattle prices up nationwide and Fukushima prefecture alike 
[Kachi, 2014]. Aging population and a lack of successors has cut the number 
of domestic cattle growers while high prices for cattle feed have pushed 
others out of the market. Fukushima farmers were strongly hurt by the March 
2011 disaster (calf prices falling to Y308,628 per head in August 2011), which 
derived out cattle breeders and lead to the closure of two out of the three 
prefectural cattle markets.   
There has been the same tendency at the Sendai central wholesale 
meat market in Miyagi prefecture. There has been significant decline in the 
number of transacted pigs and Japanese beef cattle in 2011 (Figure 63). Pig 
wholesale prices were increasing with the same nationwide tendency, but 
beef cattle prices decrease considerably more than the overall price reduction 
across the country.  
                                                          
286
 December is typically when the prices are the highest. 
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Figure 63. Dynamics of number of transacted animals and wholesale 
prices at the central meat wholesale markets (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                
 
In 2012 there was a nationwide recovery above 2010 numbers for 
Japanese beef cattle transactions but wholesale prices were still bellow the 
pre-disaster level. In Sendai, recovery in the numbers and prices of traded 
animals was slower than in the rest of the country. 
Fukushima prefecture is the forth-biggest rice-growing prefectures of 
Japan and rice accounts for about 40% of the prefecture’s agricultural 
output287. After the nuclear accident the price of Fukushima rice fell in both 
absolute and relative terms [Watanabe, 2013]. In 2012 rice prices in 
Fukushima prefecture bounced back in absolute terms, with a pace of 
recovery varying between 3 major regions. However, prices of the Fukushima 
rice continues to stay relatively lower comparing to the rice grown elsewhere. 
Before the nuclear accident (2005 - February 2011) Koshihikari brand grown 
in Nakadori region was traded between Tokyo dealers for more (on average 
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 Fukushima is divided into three regions (Hamadori, Nakadori, and Aizu) with extensive 
rice farming and local rice brands. 
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
100.00
110.00
120.00
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Japan- total Sendai Tokyo
Number of pigs
transact
Price per 1 kg
(average)
Price per 1 kg (first
grade)
Japanese beef cattle-
cows transact
Price per 1 kg
(average)
Price per 1 kg  (A-5)
 Japanese cattle-steer
transact
Price per 1 kg
(average)
Price per 1 kg (A-5)
  
240 
3.3% higher) than that in Kanto region. For the 2011 crop it was priced on 
average over 5% lower (falling down over 8% in February 2012) while for the 
2012 crop remaining almost 3% inferior. 
Fukushima prefecture was also a leading producer of summer-fall 
cucumbers and tomatoes. Before the nuclear accident, the Fukushima variety 
sold for about 10% more than the average for all producing regions at the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Central Wholesale Market (Figure 64). Price of 
Fukushima cucumbers fell more than 2% below the average in 2011 and 
almost 10% in 2012. Likewise, tomatoes priced were less than 8% below the 
average prices in 2011 and over 11% below in 2012. 
 
Figure 64. Relative prices of Fukushima vegetables (average wholesale 
price = 100) 
 Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, TMCWM 
 
According to experts the prices of fruits in Fukushima prefecture (mostly 
bought for gifts) largely recovered since the consumers choice is not 
determined by the price but the “origin of product” (2013 interview with 
Prof.Komatsu). 
In 2011 there was registered a decrease in the overall prices of 
agricultural commodities in the country (Figure 65). Prices of rice and 
vegetables declined more than the overall reduction (with 2.4% and 4.7% 
accordingly) while prices of fruits and pulses prices diminished a little (only 
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0.1% and 0.2% accordingly). On the other hand, potatoes and livestock 
prices slightly increased (2.5% and 1.2% accordingly) while that of industrial 
crop grown significantly (11.7%). 
 
Figure 65. Price index of agricultural commodities in Japan (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                 
 
Diminution of the prices of Wheat and burley, Miscellaneous cereals 
and Leaf and stem vegetables was the highest, while that of Leguminous 
vegetables, and Hen eggs, and Young livestock increased the most.  
There was a significant dynamics in traded quantities and wholesale 
prices of individual agricultural products. For instance, in 2011 there was a 
slight increase (0.36%) of wholesale traded domestically produces vegetables 
[MAFF, 2012]. At the same time there was a considerable decline in the 
traded value (7.52%) and wholesale prices (7.93%).  
Figure 66 shows the individual vegetables with the highest change 
(decrease or increase) in the wholesale quantities or prices. The most 
adversely affected in terms of traded quantities were Bamboo choots and in 
terms of price Parsley while the highest augmentation of amount was 
achieved by Yams and prices by Edible burdocks. 
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
2010 2011 2012
Agricultural products
Rice
Wheat and barley
Pulses
Potatoes
Fruit vegetables
Leaf and stem vegetables
Root vegetables
Leguminous vegetables
Fruits
Industrial crops
Flowers
Hen eggs
Raw milk
Livestock for meat
Young livestock
Adult livestock
Rice straw
  
242 
Figure 66. Dynamics of wholesale quantities and prices of domestic 
vegetables with more than 5% change in traded volumes or prices in 
major cities in 2011 (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries               
 
In 2012 there was a rebound of the agricultural products prices above 
the pre-disaster levels. The rice price demonstrated the highest growth, 
followed by the Young livestock and Fruit vegetables.  
A significant dynamics in the wholesale quantities and prices of 
individual agricultural products persisted. For example, there was a small 
decrease (0.85%) in the wholesale traded domestically produces vegetables 
[MAFF, 2013]. Simultaneously, significantly lower that the pre-disaster year 
levels of traded values (7.37%) and wholesale prices (7.84%) sustained. The 
greatest reduction in traded volume continued for Bamboo choots (20.68%) 
while potatoes showed the biggest decline in 2010 prices (43.67%). Cherry 
tomatoes registered the greatest augmentation in traded quantities (11.54%) 
and “Shungiku” in traded prices (21.69%). 
Since March 2011 many consumers in the affected regions and 
throughout Japan have seen their direct procurement (e.g. prices) and 
transaction (information, search, assurance etc.) costs for supply of needed 
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safe agri-food relatively from alternative regions, countries or guaranteed 
sources increased [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. However, there are no detailed 
studies on these effects of the nuclear disaster yet.  
Some research proves that a major way to minimize the transaction 
costs for supply of radiation safe product from a big number of costumers is 
to use “origin of product” selective governance [Uijie, 2012]. A segment of 
consumers went even further to purchase only from the “guaranteed sources” 
like some Tokyo residents using direct sales contract to buy rice from Kyushu 
farms [Kakuchi, 2013]. Some Fukushima farmers see growing new crops (like 
cucumbers) and direct sales to customers (rather than supermarkets) as a 
way to recover operations.  
Experts argue that both producers and consumers are victims of the 
“reputation damage” [Koyama 2013]. According to 2013 survey 26.1% of the 
consumers do not even know that inspections of radioactive contamination 
are being conducted [Consumer Affair Agency, 2013].  
In order to facilitate communication with consumers, promote and 
recover Fukushima agricultural products numerous initiatives have been 
undertaken by farmers, agricultural organizations, NGOs, authorities, 
businesses, retailers, etc. such as: direct sells by farmers, on spot radiation 
tests, recovery markets, Farmers Café events, government “Eating for 
support” initiative, joint ventures with shops, promotion complains with 
participation of top officials, celebrities, journalists, and farmers in big cities, 
international fairs, etc. [Fukushima Minpo News, January 27, 2014; Inoue, 
2014; The Japan News, March 8, 2014; Koyama, 2013; NHK World, May 17, 
September 21, 2014; MAFF, 2014].  
For instance, the fast-food chain Yoshinoya has set up a joint venture to 
produce and market food from the Fukushima prefecture to help recovery 
[Thompson and Matsutani, 2013]. The company provides funds (investment 
of Y10m or $102,000) through a joint venture (Yoshinoya Farm Fukushima 
Co) held with local farmers who will grow rice, onions and cabbages (35 
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tones), which then will go to the 1,175 restaurants the chain operates. 
Farmers in Fukushima had already been exploring the possibility of a similar 
link-up, but that project was put off following the nuclear accident.  
The fight against “harmful rumors” has been also a high priority for local 
and national authorities. For instance, Fukushima prefecture is spending 
about 1.7 billion yen ($16.6 million) this fiscal year to fight rumors about 
radiation - fourfold budget increase over the previous year [Inoue, 2014)]. In 
2012 it hired popular the idol group Tokyo for commercials to appeal 
Fukushima agricultural produce in Tokyo area. In this year’s survey of before-
and-after results from the commercials the ratio of respondents who said they 
“do not want to buy” Fukushima produce dropped by about 10 points from 
27% after viewing.  
The central government plans to do more to help revive industries 
suffering from groundless rumors. The Reconstruction Agency compiled new 
guidelines for helping local businesses which say that: the government will 
continue releasing the results of radioactivity tests on agricultural products 
from Fukushima prefecture; continue to urge foreign countries to ease or 
abolish import restrictions; work to attract tourists, including students on 
school trips, from inside and outside Japan; urges related agencies to lead 
the way to help give the industries a boost; ask member companies of the 
Japan Business Federation to use Fukushima farm products as gifts and offer 
at in-house sales events;  [NHK, June 23, 2014]. 
Latest data suggest that demands for Fukushima (Ibaraki and Northern 
Honshu) agricultural products (e.g. rice, beef, vegetables) have been 
recovering fast while the farm-gate and wholesale prices in the most affected 
regions (Fukushima, Ibaraki) are still lower than in the other part of the 
country. That is consequences of a number of factors: reduction of 
radioactive contaminations, improving consumer confidence on inspection 
and safety, “forgetting” the contamination issue by some part of population, 
preferences to lower prices regardless the quality by some segment of 
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consumers, changing marketing strategies of processors and smaller shops 
(not promoting/labeling anymore some farming and processed products as 
“Fukushima origin”), increasing procurement by restaurants and processors 
of safe and cheap produces from the region, etc. Consequently, despite 
negative impact on local producers in affected region some actors in the food 
chain (restaurants, food stores, middleman, etc.) have been profiting 
enormously from a higher margin. 
Consumer food prices declined slightly in the post disaster years 
following the trend from the past (Figure 67). The biggest retail price 
diminution was marked for Vegetables and Seaweeds, while for Fruits, Fish 
and Shellfish the prices were increasing. 
 
Figure 67. Consumer food price index in Japan (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries               
 
Consequently, the annual household member food expenditures in the 
most of the biggest cities around the affected regions and nationwide 
declined in 2011 (Figure 68) following the downsizing trend in the past 
several years [MAFF, 2013]. In 2011 it was registered a food costs rise in 
Aomori and Morioka as well as a higher than the national enlargement food 
costs in the most affected prefectures (Aomori, Morioka, Sendai, Akita, Mito) 
in the following year.  
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Figure 68. Dynamic of Annual Food Expenditures per Household 
Member* in prefectural capitals of affected regions (2010=100) 
 
Source:  MAFF     * in households of 2 or more persons 
 
All surveys show that there is increased awareness of the needs to 
keep foodstuff at home after the 2011 disasters [Japan Finance Corporation, 
2014]. Furthermore, around 29.5% of consumers report they kept food 
stockpiles at home event before the disaster, 21.5% are keeping such piles 
after the disaster (much higher percentage in worst affected Tohoku and 
Kanto regions), while 7.9% kept after the disaster but currently not (much 
higher in Tohoku region) (Figure 69). 
Data show that in 2011 the daily intake per person for some of the most 
likely affected by the nuclear disaster food groups decreased comparing to 
the period before the accident (Figure 70). For instance, consumption of 
mushrooms dropped by 12.5%, seaweeds by 5.4%, pulses by 6.5%, etc. The 
later change in the national consumption pattern is probably a consequence 
of the newly emerged consumers risk concern, higher procurement costs or 
other (unspecified) reasons. 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Ja
p
a
n
A
o
m
o
ri
M
o
ri
o
k
a
S
e
n
d
a
i
A
k
it
a
Y
a
m
a
g
a
ta
F
u
k
u
sh
im
a
M
it
o
U
ts
u
n
o
m
iy
a
M
a
e
b
a
sh
i
S
a
it
a
m
a
C
h
ib
a
Tok
yo-
Ku
…
Y
o
ko
h
a
m
a
N
ii
g
a
ta
T
o
ya
m
a
K
a
n
a
za
w
a
F
u
k
u
i
K
o
fu
N
a
g
a
n
o
G
if
u
S
h
iz
u
o
k
a
N
a
g
o
y
a
2010/2011
2012/2010
  
247 
Figure 69. Stockpiling of food (incl. drinking water) at home after Great 
East Japan Earthquake (January 2014) 
 
Source: Japan Finance Corporation 
 
Figure 70. Daily intake per person by food groups in Japan (grams) 
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare   
 
The 2011 disasters affected considerably the international trade with 
agricultural products. Around 40 countries imposed restrictions on agri-food 
import from Japan after the nuclear accident, including major importer such 
China, United States, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. The European 
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Union required food and animal feed from 12 prefectures to be checked prior 
the export to prove that radioactive levels do not exceed EU standards. In 
addition, agri-food items from 35 other prefectures had to be shipped along 
with a certificate of origin to verify where the products were produced.  
Few months after the nuclear crisis some countries (like Canada, 
Thailand, etc.) lifted or eased restrictions on Japanese food imports. Rice 
exports to China with government-issued certificates of origin and produced 
outside the prefectures Chiba, Fukushima, Gunma, Ibaraki, Niigata, Nagano, 
Miyagi, Saitama, Tokyo, Tochigi and Saitama became possible in April 2012. 
In October 2012 the EU also substantially eased import restrictions from 11 
prefectures but kept restrictions for products from Fukushima prefecture as 
radioactive test certificates are usually required [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. 
By March 1, 2013 as many as of 10 countries completely lifted 
radionuclide related restrictions on food products from Japan including 
Canada, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Columbia, Guinea, 
Myanmar, Malaysia and Serbia [Reconstruction Agency, 2014].  
Various initiatives have been undertaken to promote food-safety among 
major importers of Japanese agri-food products (Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan, etc.) like fairs, information etc. Recently Chiba288 governor has called 
on Taiwan to lift the ban on imports of food and agricultural products 
requesting Taiwanese inspectors be dispatched to Chiba to see the 
inspection process [NHK World, October 27, 2014]. 
On August 18, 2014 for the first time Fukushima rice was exported (60 
bags of 5kg of  “Koshihikari” variety harvested in Sukagawa) for high-end 
supermarket in Singapore [Fukushima Minpo News, August 19, 2014].  
Due to the foreign countries’ import restrictions and experienced 
damages, the value of Japan’s farm and livestock product exports declined 
                                                          
288
 among 5 prefectures with food and agricultural products blanket ban in Taiwan. 
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substantially - in April-December 2011 the export plunged by 40.9 billion yen 
(11%) from the year before [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
2012). In January-March, 2012 the value of country’s export of agricultural 
products was 89 million (12.77%) lower than for the same period before the 
disaster (Figure 71). 
 
Figure 71. Value of agricultural exports before and after March 2011 
disaster (hundred millions of yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Consequently, there was a considerable decease in the overall 
agricultural (including fields crops and livestock products) as well fishery 
products export in 2011 (Figure 72). At the same time, there was a significant 
increase in the import of agricultural, forestry and fishery products as imports 
of farm products jumped 16% to 5.58 trillion yen in 2011 (Figure 73). 
In April-December 2012 it was registered a 5.98% growth in the export 
of agricultural products of the country. A slight augmentation of the annual 
exports of agricultural and field crops products was reported but the export 
value was still bellow 2010 level. The overall import of agricultural and crop 
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products decreased but it was still above the pre-disaster levels. At the same 
time fish products exports continue to enlarge. 
 
Figure 72. Dynamics of agricultural, forestry and fishery export of Japan 
(million yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Figure 73. Dynamics of agricultural, forestry and fishery import of Japan 
(million yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Recent data indicate that Japan’s exports of agricultural, forestry and 
fishery products (like marine products, beef, processed foods and sake) are 
expected to hit a record in 2014 for the second consecutive year [The Japan 
News, December 27, 2014]. Exports of such products totaled ¥489.3 billion in 
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January-October 2014, up 10% from the same period of 2013. The later is 
due to demonstrated safety as well growing popularity of Japanese cuisine 
worldwide coupled with a weaker yen. For instance, beef exports jumped 
43% to ¥6.3 billion and demand for high-grade Japanese beef is expected to 
grow further as the European Union has lifted a ban on beef imports from 
Japan. Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry now hopes to achieve the 
government’s goal of ¥1 trillion exports of agricultural, forestry and fishery 
products ahead of the target year of 2020. 
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Chapter 11. Effects on food regulation and inspection system 
 
Up to the Fukushima nuclear plant accident there had been no 
adequate system for agri-food radiation regulation and inspection to deal with 
such a big disaster [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2011]. On 
the wake of the accident a number of measures were taken by the 
government to guarantee the food safety in the country.  
Widespread inspections on radiation contamination were introduced 
and numerous shipment and consumption restrictions on agri-food products 
imposed.  
 Within a week from the nuclear accident (March 17, 2011) Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare introduced Provisional regulatory limits for 
radionuclides in agri-food products289 (Table 27).  
 
Table 27. Provisional regulatory limits for radionuclides in agri-food 
products (Bq/kg) 
Products I-131 Cs-134 + Cs-137 
Drinking water 300 (100)* 200** 
Milk/Milk Products 300 (100)* 200** 
Vegetables/Fish 2000 500** 
Cereals/Meat/Eggs - 500** 
*for infants             ** values take into account the contribution of radioactive strontium 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
On 29 March 2011, the Food Safety Commission of Japan drew up a 
report guaranteeing that the ongoing measures based on provisional 
regulation values are effective enough to ensure food safety for consumption, 
domestic distribution and exportation. On 4 April 2011 the Ministry of Health, 
Labor and Welfare decided to use the ongoing provisional regulation values 
                                                          
289
 based on intervention exemption level of 5 mSv/y and 50% contamination rate [Ministry 
of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2011]. 
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for the time being and set up provisional regulation value for radioiodines in 
seafood (April 5). 
In order to meet growing public safety concerns since April 1, 2012 
new290 official limits on radioactive cesium291 in food items have been 
enforced in the country (Table 28). Four categories of Drinking water, Infant 
foods and Milk, and General foods are distinguished. New safety standards 
are more stringent than international ones – e.g. maximum allowed 
radioactive substances in the European Union and USA in grains are 
accordingly 1250 Bq/kg and 1200 Bq/kg, in vegetables 500 Bq/kg and 1200 
Bq/kg, in drinking water 100 Bq/l and 1200 Bq/kg, etc. 
 
Table 28. New standard limits for radionuclides in food in Japan (Bq/kg) 
Food item Cs-134 + Cs-137 
Drinking water 10* 
Milk 50* 
General Foods 100* 
Infant-food 50* 
* limit takes into account the contribution of radioactive strontium, plutonium etc. 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
For some raw materials and processed food (like rice, beef, soybean) 
there were transitional measures and longer periods (until December 31, 
2012 or “the best before date”) for complete enforcement of the novel safety 
standards. The reason is that producers of such commodities need more time 
for preparation to prevent any confusion in distribution at the time of shift to 
new limits for radionuclides in food (Figure 74). 
 
                                                          
290
 annual maximum permissible dose from radioactive cesium in foods reduced from 
5mSv to 1mSv - the same as Codex GLs [Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2012]. 
291
 Standard limits are not established for radioactive Iodine, which has been no longer 
detected (short half-life), and Uranium, which level is almost the same in the nuclear power 
plant site as in the nature environment [Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2012]. 
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Figure 74. Transitional measures for enforcement of new standards for 
radionuclides in food in Japan 
 
     Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
 
In addition, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries undertook 
a number of measures to improve food safety: provided advice on creation of 
food inspection plans and supporting inspection equipment installations in 
affected prefectures; commissioned laboratories to analyze agri-food 
contamination; implemented technical guidance regarding feeding and 
management of livestock (March 19, 2011); set up provisional tolerable levels 
for forage for producing milk and beef below the provisional regulation value 
for food (April 14, 2011); set up provisional tolerable levels for fertilizers and 
feed for preventing radioactive contamination of farmland soil from expanding 
and for producing agricultural and animal products below the provisional 
regulation value for food (August 1, 2011); released a farmland soil radiation 
level map (August 30, 2011) and updated it covering a wider scope and more 
details (March 23, 2012); supported emergency radiation inspections for rice 
in Fukushima prefecture and conducted analysis of factors for radioactive 
contamination over the regulation level (November 2011); implemented 
restrictions on rice planting (April 22, 2011; February 28, 2012; March 25, 
2013; March 7, 2014); revised provisional tolerable levels for producing 
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animal and fishery products below the standards limits for radionuclides in 
foods (February 3 and March 23, 2012); published farmland decontamination 
technical book (August 2012), publish list of registered administrative and 
private laboratories for radionuclide inspections (April 1, 2013), etc. 
At the Fukushima Agricultural Technology Center, in Koriyama city, 
advance laboratories for emergency radiation monitoring of agricultural 
produces are equipped with 10 germanium semiconductor detectors and 16 
of stuff trained to conduct precision analysis. They work 6 days a week from 8 
am to 21 pm analyzing 200 items per day. As many as 461 items have been 
regularly monitored in the prefecture. The results of analysis are released on 
the next day through website of the center, published in the regional 
newspapers and other media. For the period March 19, 2011-March 31, 2013 
as much as 81,502 items were analyzed. 
Since June 2011 regular radiation tests have been carried out on a 
great number of agri-food products292 in 17 prefectures in Northeastern and 
Eastern Japan. In addition, since 2012 all rice bags293 produced in Fukushima 
prefecture have been checked in the Agricultural Cooperative inspection 
cites. 
There have also emerged many private and collective inspections 
systems introduced by farmers and rural associations, food processors, 
retailers, local authorities, consumer organizations, independent agents etc.  
For instance, in Nihonmatsu-shi, Towa town, there was a sharp decline 
in well-developed before the nuclear accident tourism and agricultural sells. 
The local Rural Development Association introduced radiation measurement 
of farm products in June 2011. It is done in own laboratory (equipment 
supplied by a private company) and costs 500 yen per test for farmers. Due 
to the timely introduction of safety inspection and the proper product safety 
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 In late March 2014 the number of items was reduced from 98 to 65 because of low 
detection rate [Fukushima Minpo News, May 21, 2014]. 
293
 one baggage is 30 kg. 
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reporting (labeling) the number of costumers visiting that farmer market 
recovered almost fully as well as 80% of the sells on not restricted items 
(interview with the Chairman of the Association Mr.Muto, July 6, 2013). The 
municipality has also introduced 60 points for the inspection of food for self-
consumption (done free for producers).  
Similarly, a group Rebuilding Beautiful Country from Radiation launched 
an inspection service soon after the nuclear accident through a 
non-governmental fund [Kakuschi, 2013]. It supports more than 90,000 
farming households who pay a nominal fee to have produce inspected for 
contamination and declared safe for consumers. 
The Agricultural Cooperatives in Fukushima prefecture conduct own 
testing using analytical equipment (such as NaI scintillation spectrometer) 
either purchased or borrowed from a government agency [Watanabe 2013]. 
Member farmers bring crop samples to testing sites before shipping, where 
measurement is done (about 30 minutes) for free. Many agricultural 
cooperatives in the prefecture have in place systematic testing regimes 
covering every farm and item, and all members are required to have produce 
tested before shipping. 
The Fukushima Consumer Cooperatives Union has also 30 machines 
around prefecture for food inspection and training of members. In addition, it 
introduced 35 machines for radiation body check providing free mobile 
service including in neighboring prefectures.  
Many farmers groups and organizations from heavily contaminated 
areas have been organizing own tests on soils (detailed maps), inputs (water, 
livestock feeds) and output to secure safety. For instance, a large scale tests 
to collect data294 and find a solution on fighting rice contamination has been 
carried by a group in Nihonmatsu which is no comparable with other 
experiments done by national or local governments [NHK World, March 10, 
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 proved that organic crops are not contaminatrd - well-mainatined soil immobilizes Cs. 
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2014].  Another producer group from Nihonmatsu developed a way to put all 
information about products (contamination, beta-carotene and sugar content 
sugar) and grower details into a QR code - a kind of bar code that people can 
scan with cellphones [The Japan News, March 7, 2012]. 
According to the Fukushima Food Industry Organization many of the 
member companies bought own equipment for radiation checks of 
ingredients, water and final produces, or use outside safety checks to avoid 
risks, deal with harmful humors, and secure customers. Likely wise, 
practically all heads of cattle are tested at meat processing plants in Tohoku 
and Kanto regions, and throughout Japan [Wayanabe, 2013]. 
Big retailers (like Aeon) have also strengthened testing with a goal of 
selling cesium-free food only. A mail-order company based in Tokyo 
(Cataloghouse Ltd.) allocated space for fresh food from Fukushima (August 
2011) and sells only products cleared safety standards giving explanation on 
labels [Kakuchi, 2013]. The store bought a testing machine (for 3.5 million 
yen) and checks the cesium level in food in front of customers.  
Recovery, Sunday, evening, promotion etc. markets, Farmers' 
Document and Farmers' Café events etc. organized by farmers, authorities, 
NGOs, food chain partners etc. have been regularly held in Fukushima and 
around the country, where farmers sell directly products confirmed as safe 
through voluntary screening [Koyama, 2013]. A numerous big processors and 
retailers have been also promoting products from the affected regions 
nationwide [The Japan Times, March 10, 2014].  
Farmers, farmers’ organizations, food industry, and local communities 
have introduced various voluntary restrictions on sale.  
According to some farmers the biggest hurdle they face is the lack of a 
clear radiation risk standard that can be universally accepted [Kakuchi, 2013]. 
In order to address consumer concerns on food safety some producers, 
processors and retailers started to use lower than the official norms for 
radiation. According to one of the interviewed by us experts – Mr.Nagashima, 
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working at Agricultural Cooperative in Fukushima “Farmers in Fukushima are 
trying to satisfy the government’s strict standard for the radioactive 
contamination and even to have results below 25Bq/kg (“Not Detected”), 
which is the limit for inspection by screening method” (June 6, 2013).  
There has been a progress in efficiency of radiation testing devices for 
farm and food products. From April 2014 the Fukushima prefecture 
introduces easy to use and more accurate radiation detectors at community 
centers and other public facilities so that residents will no longer have to cut 
up items into small pieces and get result faster295 [Fukushima Minpo News, 
March 3, 2014].  
All theses measures and actions taken at production, distribution and 
consumption stages have let the Fukushima agri-food products to become 
one of “most secure in the world” [Fukushima Minpo News, January 27, 
2014]. Nevertheless, many concern consumers continue to disbelieve in the 
existing inspection system and employ other ways to procure safe food - 
direct sales contracts, origins, imports, etc. [Kakuchi, 2013; Ujiie, 2012]. 
There have been a number of challenges with the present system of 
safety inspection. Due to the lack of personnel, expertise, and high-precision 
equipment, the water, food and soil tests have not always been accurate, 
consistent and comprehensive. For instance, quite expensive high-precision 
instruments are not available everywhere to measure lower radiation levels 
set up by the new regulation (e.g. for drinking water capable of detecting a 
single-digit level of becquerels). 
Food safety inspections are basically carried out at distribution stage 
(output for shipment or export)296, and do not (completely) cover produces for 
farmers markets, direct sells, food exchanges and self-consumption. 
Nevertheless, the prefectural government and municipalities in Fukushima 
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 Now residents can test home-grown vegetables and wild plants at community centers 
but detectors require cutting 500 grams into small chunks, and 30 minutes to get results.  
296
 Cropping is not restricted and inspection carried at ex-post production - shipping stage. 
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have been strengthening inspections for self-consumed agricultural products 
since 2013. 
Capability for radiation safety control in Fukushima prefecture is 
significantly higher than in the other affected regions, while radiation 
contamination has “no administrative borders”. Most food is regularly 
inspected in Fukushima prefecture and is much safer than other prefectures 
where strict tests are not carried out at all. 
Many of privately and collective employed testing equipment are not 
with high precision, and/or samples are properly prepared for analysis (by 
inexperienced farmers). Consequently, some of the sold and consumed 
products are labeled as “Not detected” despite existing contamination. Some 
tested agricultural products are further cooked or dried reaching higher levels 
of radiation at consumption stage. Uptake of radioactive materials with food 
by local residents increases especially during summer season when mostly 
fresh vegetables and fruits are consumed.  
There are also untested wild plants or produced food, which are widely 
consumed by local populations – e.g. radioactive contamination in forestry 
trees leaves is found far away in Nagano prefecture297.  
There are considerable discrepancies in measurements of radiation 
levels in air and food done in a specific location – e.g. in Nihontatsu-shi the 
NGO and Government laboratories are located across the street (50 m of 
each other) but often register different radiation in environment and food.  
Agri-food inspections, regulations and countermeasures are conducted 
in vertically segmented administrations with “own” policies and not 
(well)coordinated procedures. For instance, soil contamination surveys and 
inspection of agricultural produce is conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, monitoring of air radiation levels by the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, regulations on food 
safety standards and value determination by the Ministry of Health, Labor and 
                                                          
297Some say it was there before due to natural or manmade (nuclear tests) radiation. 
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Welfare, decontamination and waste disposal by the Ministry of the 
Environment, training associated with food safety by the Consumer Affairs 
Agency, and restoration and decontamination programs by the 
Reconstruction Agency. 
There are no common procedures and standards, nor effective 
coordination between monitoring carried out at different levels and by 
different organizations (national, prefectural, municipal, farmers, business, 
research, etc.). Neither there is a common framework for centralizing and 
sharing all related information and database, and making it immediately 
available to interested parties and public at large.  
Officially applied “area based” system for shipment restrictions have 
been harming many farmers producing safe commodities. For instance, 2014 
screenings of shiitake mushrooms grown on logs in two municipal areas of 
Fukushima prefecture have found that samples of four farmers do not contain 
radioactive substances above the upper limit298 [Fukushima Minpo News, 
June 11, 2014]. Therefore, instead of a municipal area wide blanket lifting and 
a permit mushroom shipment by selected farmers would be more appropriate.  
Last but not least important, there have been on-going discussions 
among experts about the “safety limits” and that lack of agreement 
additionally confuses producers and consumers alike. 
One of the interviewed by us experts – Mr.Satou, working at prefectural 
government agricultural department said “I regret to have easily believed the 
“myth of safeness of nuclear power plant” and not having prepared enough 
for the disaster - not having made safety standards of restriction for 
radioactive contamination, enough machines to inspect radiation in 
agricultural organization, and research about technologies for preventing 
radioactive contamination. Floods of information confused both producers 
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 Out of 65 shiitake samples from greenhouses, 52.3% were measured below lowest 
detectable limit and the rest far below the upper limit, with a maximum of 6.6 Bq/kg 
[Fukushima Minpo News, June 11, 2014]. 
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and consumers after the accident. People did not trust government’s 
information which was caused from the government’s attitude after the 
accident, such as not announcing the data SPEEDILY” (June 6, 2013). 
There have been attempts to improve coordination and cooperation 
between different agencies and organizations. For instance, analysis on 
contamination of agri-food products is one of the major working areas of the 
Fukushima Future Center for Regional Revitalization. When unsafe food item 
is found, the Fukushima Agricultural Technology Center is informed, and the 
later take decision for ceasing shipments. Similarly, the Soil Screening 
Project in Fukushima is coordinated by the Fukushima Consumer 
Cooperatives Union with participation of a number of regional agencies and 
volunteers from the country.  
Experts suggest existing system to be further improved by creating 
uniform inspection manuals and standards, enhancing coordination and 
avoiding duplication between different organizations, establishing inspection 
framework that cross prefectural borders, and a new management system 
that extend random sampling tests of circulating produce (shipment level) 
with management/control at production “planning” stage [Science Council of 
Japan, 2011; Koyama, 2013].  
The later is to be based on detailed contamination maps of each 
agricultural field based on soil analysis and a farmland certification system299 
targeting to establish production practices (crop selection, land 
decontamination, inputs control) preventing agri-food products contamination. 
Depending on the degree of radiation dose, an effective decision could be 
made whether to restrict cropping (high level), decontaminate (medium level), 
or encourage certain type of crops combined with further reduction measures 
(low level). 
Another challenge associated with the current inspection system is the 
costs. The Fukushima prefecture costs for food testing, including sample 
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 like certification system “Guideline to indicate specially cultivated agricultural products”. 
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purchases, amount to about 150 million yen each year300 [Fukushima Minpo 
News, May 11, 2014]. When tests conducting began (June 2011) available 
funding for food screening was about 2 billion yen while in May 2014 only 
about 600 million yen. The Fund is also used for projects and is expected to 
deplete in several years unless central government extends support. The 
prefectural government plans to maintain the number of tested items but it is 
unclear how much support the government will give (it decreased the number 
of items subject to screening). 
The Fukushima prefectural government will continue to check all packs 
of rice harvested in the prefecture for radioactive contamination after the end 
of fiscal 2014 [Fukushima Minpo News, July 5, 2014]. The program costs 
about 700 million yen a year and there is central government's approval to 
continue it until fiscal 2017. The prefecture also announced that it will screen 
for radioactive contamination all logs used for “shiitake” mushroom 
cultivation301 blanket log test starting with the Aizu region302 [Fukushima 
Minpo News, September 26, 2014]. However, the Fund for radioactivity-
checking program is running short and there is no idea how long to continue 
the program in its present form.  
Producers have also expressed dissatisfaction over the Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare’s new guidelines to reduce testing underlying that 
the government perception is very different from the field [Fukushima Minpo 
News, May 11, 2014]. According to official from the Fukushima Japan 
Agricultural Cooperatives crisis management center the “Effects of unfounded 
rumors are still strongly rooted. It is inconceivable to say we have a choice of 
not conducting the testing just because radioactive substances have not been 
detected. We need to carry out the testing at least until the stage in which 
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 from the Fund for Residents' Health Management. 
301
 It will be the third time for the local government to check all products and materials prior 
to shipment (following rice and persimmons). 
302
 equipment will be put for 2015 year's harvesting season in fall. New testing will expand 
in rest of prefecture to restore it as largest producer of mushroom growing logs. 
  
263 
trouble at the nuclear plant, including the contaminated water issue, does not 
occur at all”. 
Some farmers started to be nervous about the efficiency of the applied 
methods. In some places they discuss to cease inspections, which are 
associated with significant costs (time for preparation of samples, shipment, 
payments for tests) with no adequate compensation received or a farming 
recovery progressing.  
An interviewed by us expert – Mr.Sunaga, retired officer from the 
prefectural government put it that way: “Cultivation management and 
inspections to secure safety is needed despite they are imposing heavy 
burden in short terms. However, there are worries how long we should 
continue these works. Farmer’s willingness to continue is also declining 
because it is unclear when they can recover consumers’ trust (June 4, 2013). 
Public food safety policies have been also positively affected. March 
2011 earthquake and the following nuclear disaster considerably impacted 
citizens’ consciousness on food security in Japan. This disaster has prompted 
more 34.3% of the consumers to “become conscious of need of food storage” 
on the top of another 34.5% who “remained conscious with that need” [MAFF, 
2012]. A great part of the surveyed consumers have also strongly recognized 
the importance of different food supply arrangements (Figure 75). 
There have been a number of challenges in the public support 
responses as well. Most important among them are: a delay in establishing 
the Reconstruction Agency (February 2012) for coordinating multiple recovery 
efforts in affected areas; a lack of clear government guidelines for the nuclear 
disaster recovery, a lack of detailed contamination map for all affected 
agricultural lands, using extension officers in affected areas for obtaining 
samples for monitoring tests while suppressing their ability of consulting, 
introducing technology, and educating in areas of production badly needed, 
etc. [Koyama, 2013].  
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Figure 75. Measures considered to be required for stable food supply in 
Japan, 2012 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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Chapter 12. Farms and agri-businesses damages from nuclear 
accident 
 
It is quite difficult to access the enormous economic damages from the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster on the Japanese farms and agri-businesses. The 
scale and directions of the negative effects have been huge. Some of the 
economic impacts could hardly be measured in quantitative (e.g. monetary) 
terms such as: lost livelihood and accumulated with many generations capital 
(community relations, permanent crops, livestock herds, established brands, 
networks, etc.), degradated natural resources (farmlands, waters, crop and 
livestock varieties, biodiversity, landscape), labor health implications (reduced 
productivity, increased healthcare costs) etc. [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. 
Principally the immediate and shorter-term negative effects on farms 
and agri-business have been in a number of directions (Figure 76): 
1. Direct production damages on crops and livestock products due to 
the radiation contamination. A large amount of yields of crops (mostly 
vegetables) was lost since it was not safe to consume or process. As a result 
of the government sale bans farmers from a large territory had to dump 
millions of liters of milk, and tons of ripe vegetables and fruits. For instance, 
Kenzo Sasaki milking 18 cows on a farm outside Fukushima city was 
reported losing nearly $31,000 every month from the sales ban not including 
the cost of feeding the herd [Wines, 2011]. Similarly Shoichi Abe, grazing 30 
cows was unable to sell his 1,100 pounds of daily production (costing 70,000 
yen a day or about $860) because the earthquake damaged the local co-op 
milk-processing plant and the government prohibition. 
2. Decreased production and income due to production and/or 
shipment restrictions, and low market demands for products and services. In 
early April 2011, government restricted planting of rice and other crops in soil 
with more than 5,000 Bq/kg of cesium. There was also a ban or delays of 
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shipment of beef and other major agri-food produces. As a result of voluntary 
restrictions, declined consumer demands, reduction in the number of local 
population (evacuation and/or outmigration) and tourists, and “harmful 
rumors” many farmers and businesses lost significant markets and income.  
 
Figure 76. Economic effects from Fukushima nuclear disaster on farms 
and agri-business 
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500 Bq/kg were detected in the 2011 rice crop [Watanabe, 2013]. In addition, 
several municipalities independently decided to call for voluntary restraints on 
planting of paddy rice over a total area of 5,600 ha. The combined total area 
of rice paddies subject to restrictions was almost 13% of the 2010 area of 
paddy fields303 in the prefecture. 
Numerous shipping restrictions have been imposed on agricultural 
products in the prefecture. Despite the area subject to restrictions has 
gradually diminished most of the affected products are local specialties and 
important cash source. The negative impact on farm households’ income has 
not been negligible [Wanatabe, 2013].  
There has been important items subject of voluntary restraints on 
processing such as ampo-gaki and dried persimmons. Unusual technique for 
producing ampo-gaki originated in the northern part of the prefecture, and 
before the accident this popular local brand generated impressive revenues 
[Wanatabe, 2013]. Since 2011 voluntary restraints on processing have been 
imposed in seven municipalities in the north part of prefecture. 
Similarly, roughage such as grass and rice straw cannot be produced, 
used (fed to livestock), or distributed by livestock farms, unless they are 
proven to be within safety standard by monitoring inspections304. The use and 
distribution of compost are also prohibited unless monitoring inspections on 
each farm find radioactivity to be under the standard limit305. Collaborative 
efforts between crop and livestock farmers to recycle resources locally (e.g. 
livestock farmer using compost on own land or supplying it to crop farmers, or 
growing feed as alternative crop and sell out fodder) have lost momentum 
even when radioactivity has been within safety norms [Watanabe, 2013]. 
Consequently, livestock farmers’ ability to supply own roughage or source it 
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 production targets equivalent to around 45,500 tons or 8,300 ha (547 kg, average yield 
per 10a in 2012) were reassigned elsewhere in prefecture [Watanabe, 2013]. 
304
 provisional maximum level for fodder fed to cattle and horses is 100 Bq/kg. 
305
 provisional maximum level for radioactive cesium is 400Bq/kg. 
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locally has been reduced, and serious difficulties with disposing livestock 
manure and compost application and circulation created. 
Likely wise, leaf tobacco is grown throughout the prefecture (especially 
the Nakadori area) but voluntary restraints were imposed on tobacco planting 
in 2011. Farmlands under contract to sell leaf tobacco plummeted from two 
thirds (from 992 ha in 2010 to 320 ha in 2012) partly because of the 
imposition of more stringent safety standards by Japan Tobacco Inc. 
[Watanabe, 2013]. 
Before the disaster Fukushima prefecture was known as “Tokyo's 
vegetable basket” and the Japan’s second largest producer of peaches, the 
third largest producer of Japanese pears, the fourth largest producers of rice, 
the fifth largest producer of apples, the twelfth largest producer of grapes, etc. 
Orders of all these major produces plunged after the nuclear plant crisis due 
to fears about radiation even though radiation levels have been well below 
the safety limits.  
According to a survey 88.5% of the farmers in Iwate, Miyagi and 
Fukushima prefectures suffered from the consequences of the 2011 
disasters, and most of them (71.4%)306 were still suffering in 2012 [Japan 
Finance Corporation, 2012]. The downslide of selling price and the harmful 
humor were the main cause of the negative impact on farms in these regions. 
After the nuclear accident, the Gross Agricultural Product in Fukushima 
prefecture shrunk by 47.9 billion JPY [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries]. There has been also agriculture-related damages amounted to 
62.5 billion JPY (by May 2012). The annual loss from the nuclear accident in 
the prefecture is estimated to be around 100 billion JPY [Koyama, 2013]. 
Latest data indicate that rice output in the prefecture is USD 300 million short 
comparing to before disaster [NHK World, November 12, 2014]. And all these 
figures are only a calculation of damages based on flow of agricultural output 
(production and sells) while there has been significant unaccounted damage 
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 17.1% “had suffer but no anymore”, while 11.6% “not suffer”. 
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to farmland, rural organizations and personal relationships (“social capital”) 
important for the Japanese agriculture. 
A great majority of the surveyed food companies in Fukushima 
prefecture report lower income due to the decline in sales after the accident 
[Fukushima Food Industry Organization, February, 2013]. Popular agri and 
rural tourism and other related businesses and services in affected areas 
have been also badly damaged after the disaster.  
The same has been true for Ibaraki prefecture, famous with the highest 
production of melon, lotus roots, and blades like potherb mustard, chingen-sai 
(pakchoi) and mitsuba (honewort), the second highest production of rice in 
the country, and well developed agri-processing, etc.  
On August 5, 2011, the government released interim guidelines for 
determining nuclear losses [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
2011]. On September 12, it established the Nuclear Damage Liability 
Facilitation Fund to support nuclear damages payments. In addition, Dispute 
Reconciliation Center for Nuclear Damage was established in order to 
encourage conflicts resolution. By March 2012, the agricultural damages 
payments associated with the nuclear disaster totaled about 106.2 billion yen 
[Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2012]. 
Councils were set up around the JA Group in 18 prefectures in eastern 
Japan to assist producers through the procedures for damage claiming. 
Some of the direct damages to farms’ production and marketing have been 
specified with the compensation claims of farmers to TEPCO. 
Until the end of September 2011 the compensation for damage to crop 
and livestock produce from the nuclear disaster demanded by 14 prefectures 
reached 70.9 billion USD (Table 29). The biggest claims for damage were for 
months after June, as Fukushima and Ibaraki prefectures accounted for the 
three quarters of all group agricultural claims to TEPCO. During the same 
period the provisional payments actually dispersed by TEPCO were 20.2 
billion yen or less than 30% of the total claims [JA-ZENCHU, 2011]. 
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Table 29. Claims for damage to crop and livestock produce from nuclear 
accident as of end of September 2011 (million yen) 
Prefectures April May June July August September Total 
Iwate      29 29 
Miyagi     222 367 590 
Akita      102 102 
Yamagata     63 202 265 
Fukushima  478 2559 6527 8070 9905 27539 
Ibaraki 1846 6619 7609 5702 2870 1633 26279 
Tochigi 1108 1344 1298 1239 313 295 5595 
Gunma  1607 2301 383 74 185 4550 
Saitama     857 2 859 
Chiba  298 1554 1495 704 204 4254 
Kanagawa   142 176 53  371 
Nigata     16 48 64 
Shizuoka     94 11 105 
Shimane      36 36 
Total 2952 10346 15464 15522 13338 13018 70640 
Source: JA-ZENCHU 
  
Almost 100,000 farmers lost about 58 billion yen ($694 million) by 
March 1, 2012 or 25% of the production [Takada and Song, 2012]. 
Available information for the 2011-2012 TEPCO payments to the 
Groups Representing Victims indicates that the Agricultural Cooperatives 
received 280,400 million yen [Nomura and Hokugo, 2013]. The greatest 
share of the groups’ agricultural payments went to Fukushima (29.8%), 
Ibaraki (13.8%) and Shizuoka (10.4%) prefectures (Figure 77). 
Food industries companies have also lost hundreds of millions from 
canceled orders, reduced demands and prices, and increased costs. Some of 
their losses have been recovered by TEPCO. 
Agriculture and agri-business have been a major employer for family 
and non-family labor in the affected regions. After the accident a great 
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number of workers lost temporary or permanently employment (and income) 
opportunities in these important sectors. The later effect of the nuclear 
disaster on the local agri-food economy is very difficult to quantify.  
 
Figure 77. TEPCO compensation payments to Agricultural Cooperatives 
(billion yen) 
 
Source: Nomura and Hokugo, 2013 
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agri-food chain. Many farmers and business have seen increased the costs 
associated with the post-disaster recovery, destructed and safe inputs supply, 
marketing (delayed, restricted and cancel shipments, safety control, 
certificates, and guarantees), shifting to new suppliers from other regions or 
countries, decontamination of crops, farmlands, material, biological assets.  
A number of appropriate technologies have been tested and 
recommended for farmers to decontaminate the farmland and crops [Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. Farmers and agricultural 
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Some experts307 argue that organic farming is the way to revitalize Fukushima 
agriculture, but it is similarly associated with increased costs308. 
All such measures and methods have been accompanied with 
additional production and learning costs to farmers and their organizations.  
There have been additional costs to protect labor and clean equipment 
used in contaminated environment, adapt new structure of products and 
technologies with reduced radiation absorption, partial and complete dislocate 
business, etc. Likely wise, there has been costs to destroy contaminated (by 
radiation), or unsold (due to the shipmen restrictions or lost markets) 
agricultural output. 
Many livestock farmers had to buy forage from other locations to feed 
animals because own grass was contaminated occurring significant extra 
costs. In May 2011 about 20,000 livestock farmers in 7 prefectures were 
asked to refrain from grazing cattle because excessing radioactive 
substances found in pastures. That affected 700,000 head of cattle while 
forage cost additional 50 billion yen a year [Yomiuri Shimbun, May 2011].  
Disrupted supply for agricultural and food produce within and from the 
affected regions had to be met with additional costs for food-chain 
businesses, public authorities, and consumers. For instance, most surveyed 
food companies in Fukushima prefecture report a lower income due to higher 
costs of alternative supply of ingredients from other prefectures309 
[Fukushima Food Industry Organization, February, 2013]. The overall amount 
of costs for the initial emergency supply and continuing alternative food 
supply is hardly to be estimated. 
In addition, there have been considerable transaction costs for 
adaptation to the new more strict official safety standards, and the voluntary 
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 On June 6, 2013 we attended a lecture at Fukushima University of Prof.Hasagawa who 
set up organic farm and advocating it as a way for reconstruction of Fukushima agriculture. 
Film on organic farmers facing nuclear crisis available on http://uncannyterrain.com/blog/ 
308
 Most organic products have been (self)certified by the farmers organization while 
independent organic certification is still insignificant part (0.02%) of the overall production.  
309
 At east one company moved its factory to another prefecture. 
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restrictions imposed by the professional organizations and authorities, for 
multiple safety tests and certifications of inputs and output, for “additional” 
relations with public authorities, TEPCO, farmers organizations and other 
(e.g. research, international, etc.) institutions, for inputs supply, product 
promotion and marketing, for providing guarantees, for communications with 
counterparts and consumers, for alternative supply trough import from other 
regions and/or countries, etc.  
For instance, radiation levels in all baggage of rice and beef have been 
checked by the JA Fukushima since autumn 2012 and September 2011 
accordingly, and huge testing programs have been going on farmlands, 
numerous agri-food products, etc. Some of the related costs have been 
covered by public authorities, others have been claimed by TEPCO, some 
have been invested by agricultural organizations, processing and retailing 
businesses, and the rest have been carried by farmers or consumers.   
Similarly, there have been significant individual and collective costs 
associated with negotiation, application, disputing, etc. of damage claims 
from TEPCO. Most of the surveyed food companies in Fukushima prefecture 
report “additional costs and efforts” to deal with food safety risks and harmful 
humors such as: performing radiation checks on new acquired equipment, 
outside tests by other organizations, consumers and clients information, “hard 
working”, products safety promotions through meetings, website, labeling, 
etc. [Fukushima Food Industry Organization, February, 2013]. Some of the 
surveyed companies indicate they stopped using “Fukushima made” label in 
order to facilitate transactions. 
Last but not least important, there has been a huge increase in “public 
relation” costs of prefectural and local governments aimed at improving the 
damaged image of Fukushima products.310  The precise scale and impact of 
                                                          
310
 E.g. the “public relation” item accounts a sizable portion of the overall budget of 
Fukushima prefectural government and it has been increasing.   
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all such private, collective and social transaction difficulties and costs are 
impossible to quantify. 
5. As a result of the contamination, dislocation, institutional 
restrictions, and/or reduced markets for regional products, many farmers and 
agri-businesses have lost a significant portion of the value of their farmlands, 
livestock, orchards, material assets, and intangibles (such as established 
relations, reputation, brands, labels, product origins, etc.). For instance, highly 
popular Fukushima brand products such as Iidate beef and Anpo gaki 
(persimmon) has been immensely destructed. However, the total amount of 
such long-term damages is quite hardly to clarify. 
6. There has been unspecified effect on the reduction of labor 
productivity, increased healthcare and recreation costs, etc. due to the 
nuclear accident. The extent of such kind of economic damages has not been 
fully studied yet. 
Diverse negative economic implications have been quite unlike for the 
different agents and various regions. Farms and businesses in Fukushima 
and neighboring regions have experienced the greatest negative impacts on 
costs and sales. More than 41% of farmers and 52% of food industries in 
Fukushima prefecture report “extra costs emerged for radiation tests and 
various certificates as requested by trading partners” while these figures are 
much higher than in other regions of the country  (Figure 100 and Figure 
101).  
Similarly, 3% of Japanese farmers indicate that “Income declined due to 
the abandonment of farm products and the relinquishment of manufacturing 
and production due to foreign countries' import controls and trading partners' 
refusal to import Japanese products” as a result of TEPCO accident (Figure 
100). The later share for farmers in Fukushima prefecture is almost three 
times higher.  
On the other hand, some farmers and agri-businesses from non-
contaminated regions have got positive effects on businesses due to the 
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increased prices, redirected demands, and better production and sales 
opportunities on the wake of Fukushima disaster. 
 “JA Group Tokyo Electric Co., Ltd. Nuclear Accident Agriculture and 
Livestock Damage Compensation Countermeasures Convention of 
Fukushima Prefecture” was established in May 2012 to deal with the 
compensation problems. It comprises all agricultural cooperatives in 
Fukushima prefecture and 35 other organizations including All-island 
Prefectural Headquarters, Prefectural Dairy Association, Livestock Recovery 
Association, Prefectural farm managers organization Liaison Assembly, and 
Prefectural Mushroom Promotion Assembly. General meetings have been 
held monthly to decide on the amount of demands for compensation and 
submitting it to TEPCO.  
Until the mid April 2013 demanded compensation though the 
Fukushima Taskforce was 109,3 billion yen, while the received compensation 
were 97,2 billion yen or 89% of the demand (Figure 78). Most of the claims 
have been for lost work due to evacuation orders and for crops damages. 
Until May 2012 the amount of compensation demands reached 62.5 billion 
yen with a greatest portion of claims being for the untilled land (compensation 
for suspension of work) horticulture and livestock damages (Table 30). For 
the same period the amount of money received as compensation accounted 
for 73% of the claimed damages.  
The progress in compensation payments has been slow and uneven 
due to the delays in TEPCO’s review process and demands for further 
documentation, lack of sufficient funds for satisfying all claims, multiple 
disputes, etc. 
According to experts compensation payments to farmers in neighboring 
prefectures has been at lower rate - e.g. 50% in Miyagi prefecture. 
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Figure 78. Claims for damages to TEPCO by the Fukushima Prefecture 
JA Group 
 
Source: Fukushima Prefectural Union of Agricultural Cooperatives 
 
Table 30. Breakdown of Fukushima Prefecture Union Compensation 
Claims (100 million yen） 
 
Claims 
On May 1, 2012 On May 1, 2013 
Value Share (%) Value Share (%） 
Rice 11 1.8 32 2.9 
Horticulture 130 20.8 264 24.2 
Fruit 62 9.9 75 6.8 
Milk 18 2.9 20 1.8 
Livestock disposal 99 15.8 100 9.2 
Other livestock damages 85 13.6 162 14.8 
Pasture 27 4.3 50 4.6 
Untitled land (for work suspension) 163 26.1 325 29.8 
Business damages 30 4.8 64 5.8 
Total 625 100 1,092 100 
Source: Central JA Union for Fukushima Prefecture 
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TEPCO is supposed to advance a half the amount of each claim the 
next month after it was filed, but it takes considerable time (almost a year) to 
pay the full amount [Watanabe, 2013]. Meanwhile, farmers have been facing 
cash-flow difficulties struggling to pay production and household expenses. In 
January 2013 TEPCO established a new organization within the company 
(Fukushima Revitalization Headquarters, headed by a vice president) in order 
to improve compensation procedures and payments. Nevertheless, there has 
been no amelioration in the payments of compensation due to the lack of 
funding and multiple disputes. 
In order to alleviate cash-flow difficulties certain agricultural 
cooperatives in Fukushima Prefecture started offering interest-free loans by 
subsidizing the interest while others established own substitute payment 
programs [Watanabe, 2013]. 
TEPCO continues to receive claims for damages of farmers and agri-
food business from around the country. The total amount of claims received 
by and paid to different affected agents is not easy to find. 
There have been many problems related to the compensation of 
damages from TEPCO. For farmers and agriculture cooperatives in 
Fukushima prefecture the major issues are: three month to almost a year 
delays in payments; not paying the full amount claimed; disputing nuclear 
accident origin of damages; denying claims when people restrain production 
and distribution voluntarily; claims related to farmland and farming property 
damage; compensation for discontinuation of business; “the closing date 
issue” (how long compensation will last) not decided yet; insufficient amount 
of compensation to restart farming; additional (inspection, administrative, 
radiation map preparation, etc.) costs and damages of organizations such as 
agricultural cooperatives not compensated yet; support for damages not 
clearly specified in the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage 
Compensation guidelines [Koyama, 2013; Nagashima, 2013].  
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Difficulties experienced by older age farmers associated with paper 
works in compensation procedures are also pointed out as a problem [Ishii, 
2013]. According to experts the efforts of farmers who did not market 
products through cooperatives are particularly big (interview with 
Prof.Komatsu, June 17, 2013). We have found that some of “safety tests” 
costs incurring by farmers (for voluntary and self inspections) and consumer 
associations (e.g. Consumer cooperatives) and due to be compensated in 
unclear future, are also a problem.  
An important issue how certain claims will be compensated is still 
disputed by parties and unspecified. For instance, the JA Union, Fukushima 
prefecture, and the Central Federation of Societies of Commerce and 
Industry have established a zero interest fund (Farmers Management Stability 
Funds) to support farmers with immediate needs. There are also funds for 
compensating beef distribution restrictions to help emergency management of 
companies raising cattle for consumption; supporting measures for 
emergency rice straw provisions, measures to allow undisturbed marketing of 
cattle, and programs sponsoring free rice straw in Fukushima prefecture. 
In areas where restrictions are placed on planting, a standard 
compensation “per 10 are” is guaranteed. There are issues with uniform 
compensation, including differences in the amount of products per 10 are, 
discrepancies in farming method (e.g. organic, conventional), unlike value 
added of produce, etc.  
Compensation claims negotiations are conducted individually and it is 
quite difficult for an individual farmer to negotiate and dispute effectively with 
TEPCO. For example, the compensation for areas with new planting 
restrictions in 2012 was 59,000 yen per 10 are while many people were 
purchasing rice for consumption and falling into a deficit [Koyama, 2013]. The 
later amount is not recognized for compensation as well as the value of left 
property in evacuation areas.  
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Food processing companies also receive compensation on lost income 
according to the Government guidance. According to expert the procedures 
are quite costly and associated with great paper works, hiring layers, lengthily 
negotiation, etc. 
The negative consequences of the nuclear accident on agriculture could 
be summarized by the statement of one of the interviewed by us experts – 
Mr.Nagashima, Agricultural Cooperative in Fukushima: “There are still 
harmful rumors for Fukushima products, the decontamination of farmlands is 
slow, and insufficient compensation is paid by TEPCO. People are starting to 
forget the disaster. Under these conditions, farmer’s willingness to work is 
decreasing, decline in new farmers is accelerating and abandoned farmlands 
increasing. De-industrialization of agriculture in Fukushima is a major 
concern” (June 6, 2013). 
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Part 3. Overall impact on agri-food 
production, distribution and 
consumption  
 
Chapter 13. Impact on farms number, farmland use, and 
agricultural employment 
 
The triple 2011 disaster affected significantly the Japanese agri-food 
sector. The most adversely impacted by the earthquake and tsunami has 
been farmers from the six coastal prefectures of Tohoku and Kanto regions - 
Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki and Chiba. The negative effect of 
subsequent nuclear accident mostly damaged Fukushima farmers but also 
has spread to other producers in Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu regions. This part 
of the book analyzes the aggregate impact of the 2011 disasters on farming 
sector in the three most affected regions and the country as a whole. 
In 2010 Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu regions accounted for 55.18% of the 
Agricultural Management Entities in the country, including 46.83% of the 
Juridical Entities and 55.29% of the Non-juridical Persons in agriculture 
(Table 31). What is more, 55.32% of the Management entities with sales of 
the country were located in these three regions, including 18.88% in Tohoku, 
16.22% in Kanto, and 20.21% in Chubu region [MAFF, 2011]. 
In the three regions 55.3% of the county’s commercial farm 
households were operating, including 44.7% of the full-time and 59.4% of the 
part-time commercial farm households [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, 2011]. Thus, the 2011 disasters affected directly or indirectly a 
significant number of agricultural farms and organizations in Japan. 
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Table 31. Number of Agricultural Management Entities in Tohoku, Kanto 
and Chūbu regions in 2010 
Prefectures Juridical 
persons 
Non-juridical 
persons 
Local 
authorities 
Total 
number 
% in 
Japan 
Tohoku region 2,731 310,587 97 313,415 18.67 
 Aomori  422 44,219 26 44,667 2.66 
 Iwate  620 56,356 25 57,001 3.39 
 Miyagi  347 50,390 4 50,741 3.02 
 Akita  394 48,106 21 48,521 2.89 
 Yamagata  363 40,459 9 40,831 2.43 
 Fukushima  585 71,057 12 71,654 4.27 
Kanto region 2,761 273,393 39 276,193 16.45 
 Ibaraki  542 70,994 6 71,542 4.26 
 Tochigi  359 48,101 3 48,463 2.89 
 Gunma  518 32,043 6 32,567 1.94 
 Saitama  387 44,772 8 45,167 2.69 
 Chiba  672 54,710 5 55,387 3.30 
 Tokyo  50 7,396 9 7,455 0.44 
 Kanagawa  233 15,377 2 15,612 0.93 
Chūbu region 4,636 332,208 54 336,898 20.06 
 Niigata  1,003 67,228 14 68,245 4.06 
 Toyama  433 22,471 2 22,906 1.36 
 Ishikawa  328 17,341 - 17,669 1.05 
 Fukui  277 19,805 4 20,086 1.20 
 Yamanashi  232 21,075 2 21,309 1.27 
 Nagano  845 63,429 15 64,289 3.83 
 Gifu  473 36,803 11 37,287 2.22 
 Shizuoka  443 39,658 1 40,102 2.39 
 Aichi  602 44,398 5 45,005 2.68 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
After the 2011 disasters the number of commercial farm households in 
the most damaged prefectures declined substantially (Figure 79). For 
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instance, by 2012 the total number of Tohoku farmers decreased by 11.8% 
and the full time farmers by 15.93%, which was much bigger then the national 
average reduction of 7.8% and 6.4%. The strongest post disaster decline of 
commercial farms in Japan was registered in Fukushima prefecture (almost 
15%) and of the full-time farmers in Miyagi prefecture (more than 30%). 
Consequently, Tohoku share’s in the total market farmers in Japan dropped 
from 18.7% to 17.9%. 
 
Figure 79. Dynamics of commercial farm households in 2012 comparing 
to 2010 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In other two regions there was above (but close to) the national average 
reduction of the commercial farm households. In some prefectures 
(Yamagata, Ibaraki, Fukui, Gifu and Aichi) there was even increase in the 
number of full time farmers during that period. The later probably was 
because of the (absolutely or relatively) increased business opportunities 
(higher demand for agricultural products to compensate reduction in most 
damaged areas; lack of alternative income sources) and/or increased number 
of new comers (young farmers, start ups by evacuees from disaster areas). 
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In 2013 the decrease in the amount of commercial farm household 
continued with a slower than national annual rate in Tohoku region (97.4%), 
higher in Kanto region (95.3%), and the same in Chubu regions (96.7%). 
Before the 2011 disasters Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu regions cultivated 
46.75% of the agricultural lands in Japan, including 57.46% of the paddy 
fields, 41.57% of the uplands, 48% of the permanent crops, and 12.62% of 
the short time meadows [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
2011]. Tohoku region was with the largest cultivated lands comprising 
18.96% of the national, including 24.94% of all paddies311, 16.11% of all 
permanent crops, 11.55% of uplands, and 10.25% of meadows (Figure 80). 
 
Figure 80. Cultivated agricultural lands in affected regions in 2010 (ha) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In 2011 Tohoku region saw the higher that the national reduction in 
cultivated farmlands (including paddy and upland fields) due to the impacts of 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster (Figure 81). Subsequently, its 
share in the national cultivated land slightly contracted (from 18.96% to 
18.70%). The greatest decrease in the cultivated farmland was registered in 
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the paddies and uplands in Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, the 
permanent crops in Iwate prefecture, and the short-term meadows in Ibaraki 
and Chiba prefectures. 
 
Figure 81. Dynamics of cultivated agricultural lands in affected regions 
in 2011 comparing to 2010 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In 2012 the Tohoku region slightly increased its paddy (0.28%) and 
uplands (0.15%) fields on the background of an overall trend for agricultural 
lands reduction in the country. That was a result of resuming farming in 
restored previously damaged paddies in Miyagi (1.77% increase) and 
Fukushima (0.2%) prefectures. Consequently, the region recovered a part of 
the lost portion in the national cultivate land reaching 18.79% of the total. 
At the same time, the total cultivated farmlands in other two regions 
contracted slower than the national average of 0.26%. Nevertheless, there 
was a higher annual rate of reduction in the short-term meadows in Kanto 
region due to the decreasing size in Saitama (12.66%), Chiba (3.42%) and 
Ibaraki (2.18%) prefectures.  
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Farming has been an important employment, income and food source 
for a great number of household members in the most affected regions. Just 
before the 2011 disasters Kanto-Tosan (including Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, 
Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa, Yamanashi, and Nagano prefectures and Tokyo 
Metropolis) had a bigger share of family members engaged in farming than 
the national average (Table 32). What is more, Kanto-Tosan and Tohoku 
regions had bigger absolute numbers of family members engaged in farming 
than the country’s average. 
 
Table 32. Working members and working hours in farms of households 
in affected regions, beginning of 2011 
Regions Total 
fam-
ily 
mem
bers 
Mon-
ths 
mem
ber 
enga
ged 
in 
farm  
Members 
engaged 
Types of employment of 
members* 
Work-
ing 
hours 
in own 
far-
ming 
in 
own 
far-
ming 
regular 
farm 
workers 
own 
far-
ming 
own 
farm-
ing & 
side 
busi-
ness 
regular 
office 
or 
physic-
cal 
work 
tem-
pora-
ry 
hired 
Tohoku 3.71 2.12 1.08 0.42 1.51 0.05 0.73 0.18 1,693 
Kanto-
Tosan 
3.47 2.04 1.11 0.6 1.31 0.12 0.7 0.08 1,949 
Hokuriku 4.18 2.02 0.51 0.13 0.51 0.03 1.14 0.35 955 
Tokai 3.83 2.1 0.96 0.49 1.22 0.14 0.99 0.13 1,819 
Japan 3.54 2.08 1.05 0.52 1.34 0.06 0.72 0.17 1,834 
* who always lived in the house and engaged in agriculture more than 60 days in a year 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Furthermore, in Tohoku and Tokai (including Gifu, Shizuoka, Aichi, and 
Mie prefectures) regions the average family member worked more months in 
farming than the national average. In Tohoku region the number of family 
members working in own farm was much higher then the national level. On 
  
286 
the other hand, in Hokuriku region (including Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, and 
Fukui prefectures) much smaller number of family members works in own 
farming and spend less time in farm operations. 
There is no statistical data on how the farm households members 
working status and loads have changed in the post disaster years. 
Nevertheless, we can suppose that the 2011 disasters have impacted directly 
the livelihood of a great number of farm households and their members in the 
affected regions. 
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Chapter 14. Impact on agricultural productions 
 
All affected by the 2011 disasters regions have been large producers of 
major farm produces such as rice, fruits, vegetables, sweet potatoes, 
soybean, buckwheat, tobacco leafs, tea leafs, meats, milk, eggs etc. (Table 
33 and Table 34).  
Most strongly hit by the earthquake and tsunami Tohoku and Kanto 
regions have been large producers of vegetables, fruits, nuts and flowers in 
glass houses, vinyl houses, and tunnels (Figure 82). Before the disasters 
both regions were responsible for 47.68% of the planted vegetables in 
tunnels, 41.08% in the vinyl houses, and 28.2% in the glass houses; 37.42% 
of the planted flowers in tunnels, 25.5% in the vinyl houses, and 21.03% in 
glass houses; and for 20.07% of fruits and nuts in vinyl houses [MAFF, 2014]. 
 
Figure 82. Tohoku and Kanto prefectures share of planted area of crops 
in glass houses, vinyl houses, and tunnels in 2009 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                       
 
The 2011 disasters have been severe blow for the Tohoku rice sector. 
Subsequent of the tsunami destructions and the production restrictions the 
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rice planted areas declined by 7.25% and the production by 5.96% comparing 
to 2010 (Figure 83).  
 
Table 33. Share of Tohoku, Kanto and Chūbu regions in major crop 
products of Japan in 2010 (percent) 
Prefectures Rice Apples Jap. 
pears 
Soy-
bean 
Buck-
wheat 
Jap. 
radish 
Car-
rots 
Tob- 
acco 
Tohoku region 27.57 93.08 12.00 21.63 19.53 15.64 6.87 30.27 
 Aomori  3.37 69.05 0.00 2.76 1.83 8.42 5.62 9.82 
 Iwate  3.68 7.46 0.00 2.04 2.43 1.89 0.36 9.65 
 Miyagi  4.72 0.58 1.31 8.04 0.75 1.10 0.27 0.54 
 Akita  5.76 4.50 1.12 3.86 1.76 0.97 0.16 3.24 
 Yamagata  4.79 6.67 0.61 3.55 6.50 1.19 0.13 0.99 
 Fukushima  5.25 4.82 8.97 1.37 6.26 2.07 0.34 6.03 
Kanto region 15.42 1.37 38.63 5.69 12.75 27.62 29.91 6.91 
 Ibaraki  4.79 0 9.70 2.09 5.52 4.34 4.70 4.04 
 Tochigi  4.05 0 8.50 2.71 4.71 1.25 0.67 0.71 
 Gunma  0.86 1.37 1.76 0.21 1.27 2.37 0.23 0.08 
 Saitama  1.79 0 3.65 0.23 1.12 1.68 4.13 0 
 Chiba  3.92 0 12.21 0.42 0.08 10.93 19.00 2.08 
 Tokyo  0.01 0 0.70 0.00 0.01 0.68 0.63 0 
 Kanagawa  0.18 0 2.10 0.02 0.03 6.38 0.54 0 
Chūbu region 18.35 22.91 18.29 16.10 17.32 12.23 6.95 6.50 
 Niigata  7.28 0 5.14 4.38 2.56 3.34 0.97 4.22 
 Toyama  2.52 0.26 1.49 3.08 0.33 0.24 0.04 0 
 Ishikawa  1.63 0.10 1.25 0.86 0.27 0.94 0.08 0.75 
 Fukui  1.64 0 0.45 0.68 5.82 0.45 0.11 0 
 Yamanashi  0.33 0 0 0.13 0.42 0.41 0.04 0 
 Nagano  2.50 22.11 6.53 1.55 7.47 1.50 0.26 0.44 
 Gifu  1.39 0.26 0.72 2.21 0.26 1.64 0.99 0.02 
 Shizuoka  1.06 0 0 0.15 0.15 1.86 0.43 0.19 
 Aichi  1.82 0 2.70 3.05 0.03 1.84 4.03 0.88 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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Table 34. Share of Tohoku, Kanto and Chūbu regions in major livestock 
and livestock products of Japan in 2010 and 2009* (percent) 
Prefectures Cows Row milk Beef cattle Pigs* Poultry** Eggs 
Tohoku region 8.32 8.36 14.27 17.29 25.21 14.42 
 Aomori  0.94 0.93 2.16 3.91 6.11 3.51 
 Iwate  3.21 2.92 3.90 4.42 16.12 2.94 
 Miyagi  1.64 1.74 3.32 2.43 1.71 3.19 
 Akita  0.41 0.41 0.73 2.80 0 1.47 
 Yamagata  0.94 1.04 1.45 1.70 0.42 0.47 
 Fukushima  1.19 1.31 2.70 2.02 0.85 2.85 
Kanto region 12.75 14.71 10.06 25.48 3.57 23.61 
 Ibaraki  2.08 2.18 1.96 6.66 0.99 7.52 
 Tochigi  3.63 4.06 3.43 3.80 0.22 2.21 
 Gunma  2.68 3.35 2.35 6.26 1.08 3.28 
 Saitama  0.90 0.97 0.72 1.40 0 2.17 
 Chiba  2.67 3.30 1.39 6.52 1.28 7.51 
 Tokyo  0.14 0.15 0.04 0.04 0 0.06 
 Kanagawa  0.65 0.70 0.17 0.81 0 0.86 
Chūbu region 6.62 7.83 6.21 10.10 3.93 15.61 
 Niigata  0.65 0.81 0.47 2.09 0.61 3.89 
 Toyama  0.18 0.21 0.16 0.41 0 0.82 
 Ishikawa  0.28 0.30 0.11 0.35 0 0.81 
 Fukui  0.10 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.35 
 Yamanashi  0.29 0.26 0.26 0.19 0.35 0.31 
 Nagano  1.33 1.51 1.02 0.88 0.53 0.41 
 Gifu  0.55 0.66 1.24 1.06 0.61 2.97 
 Shizuoka  1.07 1.29 0.89 1.30 0.86 1.82 
 Aichi  2.16 2.68 1.94 3.76 0.90 4.25 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                        ** shipments 
 
The planted areas and the production plummeted in Fukushima (more 
than 20%) and Miyagi (more than 9%) prefectures. In Aomori prefecture 
planted area declined more than 5% while production reduction was smaller. 
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Consequently the region’s share in the national rice areas and production 
dropped to 24.68% and 26.17% accordingly [MAFF, 2012]. The later 
contributed to a higher than the usual decrease in the country’s rice acreages 
by 3,2%. However, due to the higher output in other prefectures the national 
reduction of rice production was only 0.6%. 
 
Figure 83. Dynamics of rice planted areas and rice production in Japan 
(percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In 2012 there was some recovery in the planted areas in all affected 
prefectures of Tohoku region and even a higher growth in the rice production. 
Nevertheless, rice planted areas and production in the most impacted Iwate, 
Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures are still bellow the pre-disaster levels. 
Consequently, region’s importance in the national rice areas and rice 
production increased (to 25.09% and 26.84% accordingly) but it is bellow the 
2010 figure. 
The combined impact of the 2011 disasters on some other major 
productions has been also considerable. For instance, in 2011 there was a 
big decline in the production of important vegetables like Japanese radish 
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and carrots in Fukushima (18.39% and 14%) and Miyagi (14.55% and 8.86%) 
prefectures due to decreased areas (Figure 84). In some other prefectures 
the production of Japanese radish (Aomori, Tochigi, Chubu region) and 
carrots (Aomori, Iwate, Nigata, Kanto region) increased.  
 
Figure 84. Dynamics of major vegetables and grass productions in 
Tohoku, Kanto and Chūbu regions during 2010-2012 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
All that evolution was during a simultaneous small decrease in the 
national Japanese radish production and an augmentation in the carrot 
production. Consequently, Tohoku and Kanto region’s shares in the national 
Japanese radish production little decreased (to 15.48% and 27.56% 
accordingly) while of the Chubu region increased (up to 12.69%). Contrary 
happened in the carrot production - Tohoku and Kanto region’s importance in 
the national output improved (up to 7.93% and 30.82% accordingly) while that 
of Chubu region deteriorated (down to 6.05%). 
In 2012 there was a slight rebound of the Japanese radish in Miyagi 
prefecture and further reduction of carrots production. In Fukushima 
prefecture the vegetable productions continued diminishing in 2012 due to the 
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negative impact of the nuclear accident. Contrary, there was a good increase 
of the Japanese radish production in Iwate and Yamagata prefectures and 
Chubu region, and of the carrot production in Iwate prefecture and Chubu 
region. All that evolution was associated with insignificant reductions in both 
productions in the country as a whole. Consequently, the affected regions 
have lost previous positions in the national output for major vegetables with 
exception of Chubu region for carrots. 
There has been also parallel impact of the 2011 disasters on the 
shipments of vegetables from different prefectures (Figure 85). For instance, 
in 2011 there was a huge decline in the shipments of Japanese radishes from 
Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures. The later was counterbalanced by the 
increased shipments from other prefectures (like the biggest producer 
Aomori), and Tohoku region even slightly increased the overall amount and 
its national share (13.89%). There was some decline in the shipment from a 
major producer Kanto region but the national lever was unaffected due to the 
increased shipments from other regions.  
In 2012 the shipment from Aomori prefecture decreased over the 
national average reduction (5.15%) as well as the overall region’s importance 
(13.31%). 
The evolution of structure and level of the vegetable productions and 
shipments in the three regions and nationwide strongly depended on the 
available farmlands (extent of damaged land and pace of restoration), the 
level of contamination of products, the changing market demands due to 
harmful rumors and consumption preferences as well as the new 
opportunities to increase production of more profitable crops and/or 
compensate reduced output and shipments from other (adversely affected by 
the disasters) areas. 
The same has been true for other important crops for the regions as 
well like soybean, buckwheat, sweet potatoes, tobacco, and tea leaves. For 
instance, Tohoku region accounted for 27.39% of the national soybean areas 
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in 2010 [MAFF, 2012]. In 2011 the areas devoted for soybean declined in all 
but Aomori prefectures - with 6.65% for the region, including by 27.08% in 
Fukushima prefecture and 12.43% in Miyagi prefecture. The soybean output 
decreased in the major producer Miyagi prefecture by 10.16% as well 
Yamagata (13.54%) and Fukushima (3.61%) prefectures (Figure 86). 
Nevertheless, due to the increased yields in all but Aomori and Yamagata 
prefectures, and the additional areas in Aomori prefecture, the annual 
reduction of region’s soybean production was just 0.94% and lower than the 
national (1.76%). Subsequently the region even slightly improved its share 
(up to 21.79%) in the country’s soybean production. 
 
Figure 85. Dynamics of shipments of Japanese radishes, apples and 
Japanese pears in Tohoku, Kanto and Chūbu regions 2009-2012 (%) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Similarly, in 2011 there was a decrease in the profitable buckwheat 
production in the tsunami-hit Aomori, Iwate and Miyagi prefectures. However, 
there was a general (and a higher then the national) expansion of buckwheat 
planted areas and production in Tohoku and Kanto regions which improved 
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their importance (up to 23.45% and 15.16%) in the country’s overall 
production [MAFF, 2013].  
 
Figure 86. Dynamics of soybean, buckwheat and sweet potato 
productions in Tohoku, Kanto and Chūbu regions 2010-2012 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Likewise, in 2011 and 2012 the two major producers of sweet potatoes 
in Kanto region (Ibaraki and Chiba prefectures) enlarged production leading 
to an increased region’s share in the national output to 34.19% [Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. Meanwhile, the country’s output of 
sweet potatoes increased in 2011 and slightly contracted in 2012 staying 
above the pre-disaster level. 
The most affected by the tsunami and the nuclear accident (Aomori, 
Iwate, Fukushima and Ibaraki) prefectures have been major producers of 
tobacco leafs as well. The 2011 disasters led to 29.51% reduction in the 
areas and 20.79% decrease in the production of this important for the Tohoku 
farmers commodity. In 2011 tobacco production was entirely suspended in 
Fukushima prefecture and plummeted (by 12.15%) in Ibaraki prefecture 
(Figure 87).  
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Figure 87. Dynamics of major industrial crop and soiling maize 
productions in Tohoku, Kanto and Chūbu regions 2010-2012 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In 2012 a part of the production resumed in Fukushima prefecture and 
increased almost 5.5 folds in Miyagi prefecture. Contrary, both tobacco areas 
and production continued to decline in other prefectures. Nevertheless, due to 
a faster reduction in the country as a whole Tohoku prefecture enhanced its 
key position with 36% of the national production [MAFF, 2013]. 
Similarly, due to the radiation there was a huge decline in the tea leafs 
production in Ibaraki (89,13%) and Saitama (11.21%) prefectures in 2011. 
The later has been largely compensated by an increased production in the 
main producer Shizuoka prefecture, and the country’s production dropped by 
merely 0.65% [MAFF, 2013]. The prefecture’s share in the national output 
increased from 38.7% to 39.59%. In 2012 tea leaf production further declined 
in Saitama prefecture and partly recovered in Ibaraki prefecture on the 
background of 5% increase in country’s tea output. 
Chiba and Ibaraki prefectures comprised 75.92% and 14.13% of the 
Japanese peanut production in 2010 [MAFF, 2011]. In order to compensate 
fall downs in other productions due to the tsunami, radiation and rumor 
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damages, Ibaraki and Chiba farmers enlarged profitable peanut production by 
63.42% and 27.64% in 2011 [MAFF, 2012]. In 2012 due to the further 
reduction in planted areas the peanut production dropped by 19.77% in 
Ibaraki and 13.38% in Chiba prefecture [MAFF, 2013]. Subsequently, the 
national production augmented by 25.31% in 2011 and then contacted by 
14.78% in 2012 maintaining above pre-disaster level. 
Feed and fodder crops productions have been also badly affected by 
the radiation contamination, tsunami damages, and decreased livestock 
numbers in the region. Before the 2011 disasters the Tohoku region 
accounted for 12.57% country’s grass areas and 11.36% of the national grass 
production. In 2011 there was a small decrease in the grass areas in Tohoku 
and Kanto regions (1.99% and 1.42% accordingly) mostly due to a bigger 
reductions in Fukushima (10.2%) and Ibaraki (3.33%) prefectures [MAFF, 
2012]. Nevertheless, the grass production in the two regions declined 
substantially (17.51% and 24.78% accordingly) with the plummeted by 
88.73% output in Fukushima prefecture. Consequently, Tohoku share in the 
national grass production declined to 9.65%. 
In 2012 the reduction of grass areas in almost all prefectures of the 
affected three regions continued with a registered further production drop in 
most of them and no output in Miyagi, Fukushima, Saitama, Tokyo, 
Kanagawa, Nigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi and Shizuoka 
prefectures [MAFF, 2013]. Consequently, the Tohoku share in the national 
grass production contracted to 6.91%. 
Nationwide, there was a slight decrease in grass areas in 2011 (0.53%) 
and 2012 (0.57%) but a considerable reduction in grass production during the 
period (2.89% in 2011 and 9.48% in 2012). 
Similarly, in 2011 the soiling maize planted areas decreased by 3.68% 
in Tohoku region and soiling maize production contracted by 6.58% due to 
reduction in the regional second and forth biggest producers - Fukushima 
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(8.7%) and Miyagi (3.53%) prefectures. Consequently the region diminished 
its share in the national production from 11.52% in 2010 to 10.6% in 2011. 
In 2012 there was a further slight reduction in the soiling maize areas in 
the region (1.58%) and a huge contraction in the output (24.98%). There was 
reported increased production in Iwate, Aomori and Yamagata prefectures 
but no output for Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures [MAFF, 2013]. 
Consequently, the region’s importance in the national soiling maize 
production dropped to 7.77%. 
In 2012 no soiling maize output was registered in Saitama, Tokyo, 
Kanagawa, Nigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Yamanashi and Shizuoka 
prefectures [MAFF, 2013]. Despite the (partial or full) recovery (Tochigi, 
Gunma, etc.) and increase (Ibaraki and Nagano) in production in other major 
producers, Kanto and Chubu soiling maize output is still bellow the pre-
disaster level while their shares in the national diminished (correspondingly 
from 13.69% and 4.04% in 2011 to 12.8% and 3.1% in 2012). At nationwide 
scale there is an increasing production of soiling maize throughout the period. 
Fruits production in Tohoku region has particularly suffered by the 2011 
disasters. For instance, in 2011 there was a little reduction of apple areas in 
the region (0.87%) due to the decline in orchards areas in all but Aomori 
prefectures [MAFF, 2012]. Nevertheless, there was a sizable decline in the 
apple production in all prefectures (Figure 88), and an overall downfall by 
20.20% in the region as a whole.  
Chubu (a major producer) and Kanto regions also experienced some 
decrease in the apple production but due to the higher output in the rest of 
the country the national apple production sustain at previous level [MAFF, 
2012]. Consequently, Tohoku’s bulk in the national apple output shrinked to 
74.28% while Chubu’s one only deteriorated slightly (22.09%). 
Furthermore, major apple shipments from Tohoku region plummeted by 
25.42% and together with a reduced shipment from Chubu region led to 
significant diminution of the national amount. 
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Figure 88. Dynamics of major fruits productions in Tohoku, Kanto and 
Chūbu regions during 2010-2012 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In 2012 there was a partial recovery of the apple production in Tohoku 
region and a great progression in Chubu region (18.06%) and country as a 
whole. Tohoku region improved modestly its position in the national output 
(up to 75.01%) while relative share of Chubu region fell to 21.53%.  
The apple shipments from Tohoku region rebounded considerably but 
bellow the pre-disaster level. However, an enormous progression of the 
shipment from Chubu and other regions let to effective augmentation of 
shipments over the pre-disaster level. 
The Japanese pears production experienced another development. In 
2011 there was some downsizing in the areas and a bigger one in production 
in the main Tohoku producer Fukushima prefecture, which led to a fall in the 
region’s portion in the national output to 10.46%. Nevertheless, there was an 
expansion in the Japanese pears production in major producers from Kanto, 
Chubu and other regions, and the overall augmentation of the national output.  
Japanese pear shipment from Tohoku and Kanto region plummeted by 
17.44 % and 7.33%, and regions share in the national diminished from 
13.78% to 10.29% and 48.22% to 40.42% accordingly. However, increased 
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shipments from Kanto and another regions led to a good overall increase in 
the nationwide amount. 
In 2012 Fukushima prefecture and Tohoku experienced a further 
sizable reduction in the areas and the production of Japanese pears (by 
19.4% and 15.57% accordingly) downsizing the region’s share in the national 
output to 9.18% [MAFF, 2013]. That was accompanied by a lesser decrease 
in the areas and productions in other regions, and the in country’s level. 
Tohoku and Kanto Japanese pears shipments continued plummeting 
(15.95% and 7.35% accordingly) and the regions shares in the national 
further decreased (to 9.03% and 39.11% accordingly). There was some 
increase in the shipments from Chubu region augmenting its share in the 
national to 17.88%. Nevertheless, the overall amount of the national 
shipments further declined. 
Japanese parsimon has been important for the farmers in Fukushima 
and Yamagata prefectures, and Chubu region. The 2011 disasters and 
consequent production restrictions have led to a huge reduction of Japanese 
parsimon production in Fukushima prefecture. Subsequently, prefecture’s 
share in the national output dropped from 7.39% to 2.19%. At the same time, 
there was some increase in the Japanese parsimon production in Yamagata 
prefecture, a higher in Chubu region, and even more elevated nationwide. 
In 2012 there was registered diminished areas and production 
Japanese parsimon in Tohoku region but a considerable growth in Chubu 
region and the country as a whole. Chubu producers enhanced their portion 
in the national output from 24.59% (20country 26.66% while Tohoku farmers 
segment plummeted down from 12.27% to 5.31% [MAFF, 2013]. 
Flower productions and shipments have been important for many 
farmers in the affected by the 2011 disasters regions. In 2010 the analyzed 
regions were responsible for the shipments of 58.87% of the country’s roses 
(including 31.36% Chubu and 18.57% Kanto region), 47.04％ of the 
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chrysanthemums (including Chubu 34.45% and Kanto 6.48%), and 21.07% of 
the gypsophilas (including Chubu 9.39% and Tohoku 9.63%) [MAFF, 2011]. 
In 2011 there was a significant (much higher than the national) 
reduction in flower shipments from the three regions (Figure 89), as a result 
of which their segments in the national productions diminished. The biggest 
declined was registered in Tohoku region – 28.15% for chrysanthemums, 
24.93% for roses, and 12.92% for gypsophilas. What is more, the sizable 
chrysanthemums shipments from Aomori, Miyagi, Yamagata, Chiba, Saitama 
and Kanagawa prefectures completely stopped. At the same time, Fukushima 
prefecture decreased only slightly chrysanthemums and gypsophilas 
shipments and ceased that for roses. Besides, Ibaraki prefecture expended 
its chrysanthemums shipment. 
 
Figure 89. Dynamics of shipments of flowers in Tohoku, Kanto and 
Chūbu regions during 2010-2012 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In 2012 Tohoku region rebounded partially its flower shipments due to 
an above the pre-disaster level recovery in Fukushima, Akita and Yamagata 
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prefectures, and ceased chrysanthemums shipments from Miyagi and Aomori 
prefectures. Kanto regions flower shipments continue to decline faster than 
the national average [MAFF, 2013]. All three regions have lost their portions 
in the national shipments of flowers. 
The 2011 disasters have been a severe blow for the beef industry in the 
most affected regions and beyond. The number of Tohoku beef cattle 
declined by 9.48% during 2011-2012 with a rate of livestock reduction in all 
but Yamagata prefectures much higher than the national average (Figure 90). 
In 2011 the contraction was highest in the tsunami and nuclear accident 
affected Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures. Unlike other 
prefectures, were 2012 decline was lower than the national, the Fukushima 
beef cattle continued to contract sharply by 25.60% during 2-year period. 
Consequently, the region’s share in the beef cattle of the country fell to 
13.72% [MAFF, 2013]. 
 
Figure 90. Dynamics of number of beef cattle, slathered animals, and 
beef meat production in Tohoku, Kanto, Chūbu regions 2010-2012 (%) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
The cutback of beef cattle and the adverse impact of nuclear accident 
led to a decline in the number of slathered beef animals and the produced 
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beef meat in Tohoku region by 11.89% and 10.60% in 2011. Miyagi and Iwate 
prefectures experienced the biggest contraction in the slathered animals and 
meat production.  
Kanto and Chubu regions’ beef cattle have also declined but at a slower 
rate than the national shrinkage. On the other hand, the fall in the numbers of 
slathered beef cattle and the produced beef meat were higher than the 
national diminution.  
Likely wise, in 2011 there was a greater than the national reduction in 
the number of cows in the three affected regions and a significant downsizing 
of the row milk production (in 2011, 2012). Tohoku milk production declined 
by 11.09% and the region’s share in the national milk output dropped to 
7.68%. Due to the reduced number of cows and shipment restrictions many 
prefectures experienced reduction of milk production. Fukushima prefecture 
registered the greatest contraction in milk production (more than a quarter) 
followed by Miyagi, Ibaraki, Nigata, and Iwate prefectures (Figure 91).  
In 2012 there was a further reduction in the cows in Tohoku region 
mostly due to the considerable downsizing in Fukushima prefecture. The later 
saw 15.91% of its dairy livestock reduced in two years. Milk production 
rebounded in all Tohoku prefectures (which partially regain its share in the 
national output) and in the country as a whole but far bellow the pre-disaster 
level [MAFF, 2013]. The three affected regions have seen their portions in the 
country’s cows and milk production wakened after the disaster. 
There was a significant reduction in number of pigs in Miyagi prefecture 
in 2011 comparing to 2009 (Figure 92). That was compensated by aincreased 
number of animals in other prefectures, which resulted in a rise of overall 
number of pigs in Tohoku region [MAFF, 2012]. At the same time, there was 
a decrease of pigs in other two regions and in the country. Consequently, the 
Tohoku share in the overall pig number of the country augmented to 17.81%. 
In 2011 the number of slathered animals and the produced pork meat in 
Tohoku region declined a good deal compering to the previous year with a 
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faster rate than the national one. The later was due to the considerable 
reduction in meat production in Miyagi and Fukushima. The reduction in meat 
production in other two regions was slower than the national [MAFF, 2012]. 
 
Figure 91. Dynamics of number of cows, milk production, and eggs 
shipments in Tohoku, Kanto and Chūbu regions 2010-2012 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Figure 92. Dynamics of number of pigs, pork meat production, and 
broilers shipments in Tohoku, Kanto, Chūbu regions 2009-2012 (%) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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In 2012 the number of pigs in Tohoku regions decreased due to the 
further reductions in Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures, and some regression 
in all but Aomori prefectures. Comparing to 2009 the Fukushima pig farms 
diminished animals by 44.78%. There was a further reduction in other two 
regions with a slower rate in Kanto region than national one [MAFF, 2013].  
What is more, in 2012 there was a significant recovery in Tohoku pork 
production and sustainable levels in other regions and in the country [MAFF, 
2013]. Consequently, the three regions reduced a little bit the pre-disaster 
shares in the slathered animals and the produced pork meat in the 
diminishing national amounts [MAFF, 2013]. 
Tohoku broilers and hen eggs productions have been also considerably 
affected by the 2011 disasters. Comparing to 2009 there was a 7.73% 
reduction in shipped broilers due to the contraction in all affected by the 
tsunami prefectures. Similarly, there was a 5.46% decrease in the hen eggs 
production due to the considerable contraction in Fukushima and Miyagi 
prefectures. Consequently, the region’s portion in the national broilers 
shipment and eggs production declined to 23.89% and 13.83% accordingly 
[MAFF, 2012]. In Kanto region there was lesser then the national reduction in 
broilers shipment and bigger for the egg production while the vise verse is 
true for Chubo region.  
In 2012 the broiler shipment recovered rapidly in all but Fukushima 
prefectures of Tohoku region razing above the pre-disaster level. The eggs 
production also rebounded in Miyagi and continued growing in Aomori and 
Iwate prefectures. 
The shipment of broilers was not significant in Kanto and Chubu regions 
and further declined in 2012 on the background on increasing shipment 
nationwide [MAFF, 2013]. At the same time, the major eggs production 
slightly grew around the national average level. 
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Chapter 15. Impact on agricultural output and income 
 
Before the 2011 disasters Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu regions produced 
above the half of the agricultural output and agricultural income in the country 
(Table 35). The three regions were responsible for the sizable share of the 
Japanese rice (63.30%), vegetables (56.06%), flowers (58%), fruits and nuts 
(54.13%), pigs (54.53%), and hen eggs (54.77%) outputs. The biggest 
contributor to the national agricultural output and income was Kanto region, 
followed by Chubu region for the agricultural output and Tohoku regions for 
the agricultural income. The most severely hit by the tsunami and nuclear 
accident prefectures (Ibaraki, Chiba, Fukushima, Aomori, Iwate and Miyagi) 
were among the greatest producers of agricultural output and income in that 
region.  
The crops value dominates in all but Iwate prefecture where livestock 
(chicken and pigs) production is the most important Table 36). Rice is the 
major segment in the most Tohoku and a good part of the Chubu prefectures 
while vegetables are the key sector in Kanto region and a good portion of 
Chubu prefectures. 
The 2011 disasters have influenced considerably the farm economy in 
the most affected regions. In times of the overall growth of the national 
agricultural output, that value declined significantly in the most severely hit 
prefectures as biggest annual decrease was registered in Fukushima, Ibaraki 
and Miyagi prefectures (Figure 93).  
Generated value of all agricultural products in Fukushima prefecture 
contracted enormously comparing to the pre-disaster period ranging from 
over 5% in rice up to more than 96% for the industrial crops (Figure 94, 
Figure 95).  
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Table 35. Share of Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu regions in national 
agricultural output and agricultural income in 2010 (percent) 
Prefectures Agricultural 
output 
Crops 
 
Livestock Processed 
agricultural 
products 
Agricultural 
income 
Tohoku  15.17 15.39 14.97 3.02 16.56 
 Aomori  3.33 3.48 3.09 0.18 3.41 
 Iwate  2.77 1.73 5.00 0.00 2.81 
 Miyagi  2.03 1.87 2.42 0.53 2.36 
Akita  1.81 2.14 1.15 0.18 1.80 
Yamagata  2.41 2.97 1.27 0.89 2.58 
Fukushima  2.82 3.21 2.04 1.25 3.61 
Kanto 19.61 21.06 16.68 14.06 19.69 
Ibaraki  5.22 5.63 4.25 10.32 5.91 
Tochigi  3.09 3.04 3.22 1.78 3.46 
Gunma  2.70 2.34 3.49 0.36 2.23 
Saitama  2.43 3.07 1.12 0.36 2.64 
Chiba  4.90 5.42 3.91 0.89 4.33 
Tokyo  0.33 0.46 0.08 0.00 0.26 
Kanagawa  0.94 1.11 0.60 0.36 0.85 
Chubu  16.15 18.95 9.92 33.81 16.25 
Niigata  3.10 3.76 1.79 0.18 3.78 
Toyama  0.74 0.93 0.34 1.42 0.90 
Ishikawa  0.62 0.74 0.36 0.36 0.75 
Fukui 0.50 0.67 0.16 0.18 0.64 
Yamanashi  0.96 1.28 0.27 1.25 1.06 
Nagano  2.72 3.47 1.09 5.34 2.27 
Gifu  1.35 1.27 1.54 0.36 1.24 
Shizuoka  2.57 2.91 1.42 24.02 2.49 
Aichi  3.59 3.92 2.95 0.71 3.13 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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Table 36. Share of different productions in agricultural output value in 
2010 (percent) 
Prefec-
tures 
Crops Livestock 
Total 
Rice Vege-
tables 
Fruits 
& nuts Total 
Beef 
cattle 
Dairy 
cattle 
Pigs Chick-
en, egg 
Tohoku  68.22 30.38 18.61 13.85 31.64 6.49 5.34 7.80 11.77 
Aomori  70.23 14.90 23.37 27.12 29.73 4.36 2.62 9.38 12.98 
Iwate  42.06 19.94 11.37 4.55 57.94 9.09 9.97 10.41 28.03 
Miyagi  61.70 39.73 15.96 1.31 38.12 11.49 8.16 6.37 11.97 
Akita  79.52 52.54 16.67 5.42 20.41 2.81 2.21 10.44 4.82 
Yamagata  82.88 35.10 18.13 24.67 16.87 4.78 4.48 5.89 1.61 
Fukushima  76.48 33.95 23.65 12.53 23.22 6.65 4.72 4.33 7.38 
Kanto 72.24 16.44 41.64 4.12 27.27 3.24 7.53 8.46 7.78 
Ibaraki  72.53 19.62 40.48 3.23 26.13 3.23 4.16 9.20 9.48 
Tochigi  66.18 25.20 30.92 3.84 33.42 6.66 12.93 8.82 4.94 
Gunma  58.45 5.71 40.61 4.04 41.46 5.66 12.35 13.70 8.98 
Saitama  85.08 16.62 52.74 3.59 14.82 1.80 3.99 3.34 5.44 
Chiba  74.28 16.65 41.40 3.58 25.59 1.09 6.77 8.18 9.24 
Tokyo  92.36 0.36 56.36 10.18 7.64 0.36 4.73 0.73 1.09 
Kanagawa  79.15 5.02 53.67 12.23 20.59 1.16 8.75 5.53 5.15 
Chubu  78.91 26.13 26.55 12.43 19.69 3.03 4.83 4.30 7.02 
Niigata  81.47 55.48 16.00 3.86 18.49 1.05 2.85 4.68 9.91 
Toyama  83.90 66.99 7.97 3.90 14.80 2.44 2.76 3.58 6.18 
Ishikawa  80.91 51.57 17.91 4.53 18.70 1.38 5.51 3.74 8.07 
Fukui  89.83 63.20 16.22 2.18 10.17 1.69 2.42 0.73 5.33 
Yamanashi  90.13 7.85 12.28 63.16 9.11 1.14 2.91 1.39 3.42 
Nagano  85.82 19.08 35.00 21.62 12.84 3.21 5.22 2.14 1.96 
Gifu  63.29 19.03 30.52 4.13 36.62 8.98 5.12 6.19 15.98 
Shizuoka  75.98 8.24 27.60 13.85 17.66 3.58 4.90 2.83 5.28 
Aichi  73.53 8.44 37.61 6.01 26.33 3.07 7.26 7.46 7.43 
JAPAN 67.25 19.04 27.24 9.08 32.07 6.15 9.37 6.48 9.44 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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Figure 93. Dynamics of agricultural output and income during 2010-2012 
(percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Figure 94. Dynamics of value of agricultural products in most affected 
prefectures in 2011 comparing to 2010 (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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prefectures, vegetables in all but Iwate prefectures, potatoes of all but Miyagi 
prefectures, flowers of all but Ibaraki prefectures, industrial crops in all but 
Aomori and Miyagi prefectures, fruits and nuts in Ibaraki prefecture, etc. 
 
Figure 95. Dynamics of agricultural production value in Fukushima 
prefecture 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
At the same time, there was a good increase in the rice value in all but 
Fukushima prefectures, fruits and nuts in Chiba, Iwate and Miyagi 
prefectures, hen eggs in Iwate prefecture, other cereals and pulses in Chiba 
prefecture, industrial crops in Aomori prefecture, etc. Consequently, in some 
of the most affected prefectures like Aomori and Iwate, there was even an 
increase in the total value of agricultural output.  
Furthermore, a strong augmentation of produced farm output was 
achieved in neighboring Akita and Yamagata prefectures. Subsequently, 
there was a slight increase in the overall agricultural output of the Tohoku 
region as a whole (Figure 96). 
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drop in agricultural output. The most adversely affected were beef cattle in all 
948
791 750 867
546
551
389
436
272
292
197
212
65
61
51
63
513
541
417
388
106
94
47
57
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2009 2010 2011 2012
Others
Livestock
Flowers
Fruits
Vegetables
Rice
  
310 
but Chiba and Tokyo prefectures, fruits and nuts in Tochigi, Gunma and 
Saitama prefectures, etc. The sustainable levels or the insignificant 
augmentation in other productions did not compensate the later, and the 
overall agricultural output of the region slightly declined by 0.74%. 
 
Figure 96. Dynamics of agricultural output in Tohoku, Kanto and Chubu 
regions (100 million yens) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
On the other hand, in Chubu region only Shizuoka and Aichi prefectures 
registered a little reduction in agricultural output. The later was compensated 
by an increased output from other prefectures, and the region demonstrated a 
higher than the national progression in the overall agricultural output (2.78%). 
The strongest augmentation of the produced farm output was achieved in 
Toyama, Ishikawa and Nigata prefectures.  
There was a decline in the outputs from potatoes, wheat and burley 
productions, miscellaneous cereals and pulses in all but Shizuoka and 
Ishikawa prefectures, fruits and nuts in all but Fukui, Gifu and Shizuoka 
prefectures, vegetables in all but Nigata, Toyama, Ishikawa and Yamanashi 
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prefectures, beef cattle in all but Ishikawa, Fukui and Yamanashi prefectures, 
dairy section in all but Fukui, Yamanashi and Aichi prefectures, industrial 
crops in all but Nigata, Ishikawa, Nagano and Gifu prefectures, pigs in 
Yamashi prefectures, etc.  
At nationwide scale, there was an annual reduction of the value of 
wheat and burley production (21.03%), miscellaneous cereals and pulses 
(8.77%), industrial crops (7.42%), vegetables (5.08%), flowers (4.03%), dairy 
cattle (2.46%), potatoes (1.76%), beef cattle (0.91%), and processed 
agricultural products (0.18%) [MAFF, 2012]. Simultaneously, there was a 
slight progression in the outputs of pigs and chickens, and a good increase in 
the rice output (17.91%) leading to an overall growth in the country’s 
agricultural output.  
All that development has been associated with a changing structure of 
the agricultural output in the most affected regions and nationwide. There was 
a considerable enlargement of rice share in the overall value of agricultural 
output in the three regions and nationwide (to 22.21%). At the same time, 
there was a reduction in the importance of all other productions but fruits and 
nuts, pigs and chickens in Kanto region, and pigs in Chubu region. 
In 2012 there was a good progression in the agricultural output value in 
all affected prefectures but Aomori, Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Shizuoka. The 
augmentation in most impacted prefectures and Tohoku region was higher 
than the national average, while in Kanto region the same as national, and in 
Chubu region bellow the national. 
Nevertheless, there was a further deterioration of the output of beef 
cattle (24.55%), other cereals and pulses (20%), and chickens and eggs 
(8.03%) in Fukushima prefecture [MAFF, 2013]. 
Consequently, there was a recovery of the pre-disaster levels and the 
effective growth during the period in all but Fukushima, Ibaraki, Gunma, 
Tokyo, and Shizuoka prefectures [MAFF, 2013].  
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Ibaraki prefecture almost achieved the agricultural output level from the 
pre-disaster period (99.42%), producing more (0.86%) crops value and 
lagging behind (4.44%) for livestock. 
The situation was still quite bad in Fukushima prefecture producing 
15.26% less, including 8.42% in crops and 28.28% in livestock value. The 
recovery was particularly slower for the important beef cattle farming 
producing 46.45% of the pre-disaster level as well as other cereals and 
pulses (28.46%), potatoes (7.39%), vegetables 20,87%), industrial crops 
(55,66%), row milk (17.35%), pigs (8.81%), chickens and eggs (26.73%), and 
processed agricultural products (85.61%). During that period there was only 
effective progression in rice (9.61%) and flowers (3.28%) output value. 
In a national scale there was three times higher than the overall 
expansion of the rice output and much higher growth for other cereals and 
pulses [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2014]. On the other 
hand, there was a modest increase in the value of milk, processed 
agricultural products, beef cattle, vegetables, fruits and nuts, flowers, and 
pigs, and contractions for all others. Subsequently, besides for rice output 
(where there was 29.45% enlargement during post-disaster period) and 
miscelenouse cereals and pulses, beef and dairy cattle, pigs and processed 
agricultural products, for all other production there was an effecting reduction 
in the agricultural output value. 
All that evolution was associated with a further modification of the 
agricultural output structure in the three regions and nationwide. Rice share 
continued to enlarge reaching 39.1% in Tohoku, 30.86% in Chubu, 20.24% in 
Kanto, and 23.64% countrywide. There was a small (but bellow the 2010 
levels) expansion of fractions of “other cereals and pulses” (along with the 
same nationwide trend), fruits and nuts, flowers and beef cattle in Chubu 
region, and diminished importance of all other groups. 
The 2011 disasters have affected considerably the farm income as well. 
In 2011 there was 10.52% decline in the produced agricultural income in 
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Tohoku region due to a significant drop in all but Aomori and Akita 
prefectures (Figure 97). What is more, the decrease in income in Fukushima 
and Miyagi prefectures was superior then the reduction of agricultural output. 
Furthermore, a good agricultural output enlargement in Yamagata and Iwate 
prefectures was associated with a negative development in produced income. 
 
Figure 97.  Share of agricultural income in agricultural output (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
On the other hand, Akita and Aomori prefecture registered a good 
growth in generated income, which in the later case was higher than the 
output augmentation. 
Consequently, the share of agricultural income in agricultural output 
deteriorated in all but Aomori prefectures, as particularly strongly were 
affected Iwate and Yamagata prefectures. That led to a decrease in the 
region’s ration from 38.4% to 34.23% in line with deterioration of the national 
figure. During the pre-disaster period farming profitability in Tohoku region 
and in all but Akita prefectures was higher than the national level. In the 
disaster year, all prefectures but Iwate and Yamagata maintained or improved 
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(like Aomori) superiority over the country’s performance in terms of income 
share.  
As a result of all that development most prefectures, with exception of 
Aomori and Akita, decreased their shares in the national agricultural income 
as the portion of Tohoku region diminished to 15.59% [MAFF, 2012]. 
The agricultural income of Kanto region plummeted by 7.71% in 2011. 
Ibaraki prefecture was the worst hit while most prefectures had higher than 
the national decline in produced income with exception of Tochigi, Gunma 
and Chiba prefectures with a lesser reduction. Tochigi and Kanagawa 
prefectures, having outputs grown, saw their income contracted while other 
prefectures registered a higher income reduction that in the output. Only 
Chiba prefecture had a lesser annual reduction in the income than the output. 
All but Chiba prefectures saw the ration of generated income in the 
output diminished in 2011 leading to a decline of the region’s from 35.32% 
(higher than the national average) to 32.92% (bellow the national). 
Nevertheless, Ibaraki, Tochigi and Saitama prefectures continued to maintain 
a higher income generating efficiency than the national one. 
Tochigi, Gunma and Chiba prefectures decreased their portions in the 
national agricultural income, as regional share slightly declined from 19.69% 
to 19.12% [MAFF, 2012].  
All prefectures in Chubu region but Aichi had a better performance in 
terms of income than the national one. There was an augmentation of 
produced agricultural income in Toyama, Gifu, Ishikawa, Nagano and 
Shizuoka prefectures while in the rest the decline was less that the national 
average leading to a small annual drop (0.7%).  
During 2011 all prefectures but Nagano and Gifu saw their income 
segment in the agricultural output diminished, which led to a decrease of the 
regional from 35.39% to 34.19%. Nevertheless, the number of prefectures 
with efficiency rations lower than the national decreased by 1 and only 
Nagano, Gifu and Shizuoka were performing worst than country’s average. 
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Aichi prefecture maintained and all others improved their share in the 
generated national income, increasing the regional portion to 16.98%. 
In 2012 there was registered a considerable increase in the produced 
agricultural income in all prefectures of Tohoku region leading to an annual 
growth of 20.22% in the region as a whole. Moreover, in all but Aomori 
prefectures the annual rate of income augmentation was higher than the 
national increase. 
Generated income in Fukushima and Iwate prefectures was still far 
bellow the pre-disaster level – 17.39% and 9.69% accordingly. 
Simultaneously, other prefectures achieved much higher income growth than 
the national one being superior in Akita prefecture (41.19%), followed by 
Yamagata (26.67%), Miyagi (13.85%) and Aomori (11.53%) prefectures 
[MAFF, 2013]. During the post disaster period the Tohoku efficiency in terms 
of progression in agricultural income (7.57%) was much higher than in the 
other regions and the country’s levels. 
All prefectures in the region improved the income-output rations. 
However, in Iwate prefecture it was much lower than the national level and 
the pre-disaster level. Furthermore, Fukushima prefecture achieved lower 
than 2010 but much higher that the national efficiency ratio. Consequently, 
the region’s profitability in terms of income generation recovered slightly 
above the pre-disaster level (38.91%). 
Contribution of all prefectures to the national agricultural income 
increased during 2012 (being still bellow the pre-disaster level in Fukushima 
and Iwate prefectures) leading to an enlarged regional share of 17.38%. 
All Kanto prefectures generated a growth in agricultural income being 
higher than the national in Chiba and Kanagawa prefecture. Nevertheless, 
the later was not enough to compensate the post-disaster decline and the 
produced agricultural income in Gunma, Saitama, and Tokyo prefectures was 
bellow 2010 levels while in Ibaraki prefecture far bellow under it (16.14%). On 
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the other hand, Kanagawa and Tochigi prefecture achieved a superior that 
the national income augmentation. 
All prefecture but Ibaraki improved their income-output ration leading to 
an average regional of 34.21%. Furthermore, Ibaraki, Gunma and Saitama 
prefectures diminished further their share in the national agricultural income, 
and the region’s overall contribution dropped to 19%. 
Generated agricultural income in Chubu region increased slower 
(3.74%) than in the rest of the country. Only Yamagata and Nagano 
prefectures had a higher than the national income growth while in Shizuoka, 
Nigata and Ishokawa prefectures there was a contraction. Comparing to the 
post-disaster period most prefectures and the region as a whole achieved a 
higher income growth rate than the national one. In Aichi prefecture the 
expansion of the income was slightly bellow the national while in Nigata and 
Shizuoka prefectures still bellow 2010 level. 
During 2012 there was a progression of the income-output ratio for all 
but Nigata, Toyama and Shizuoka prefectures, and the regions figure rose to 
34.9%. Nevertheless, performance for all but Nagano, Shizuoka and Aichi 
prefectures, and region as a whole was still bellow the pre-disaster level.  
As a result of that development the contribution to the national 
agricultural income of most prefectures and the entire region diminished 
(16.33%) but it was higher than in the pre-disaster period. 
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Chapter 16. Impact on farm economy 
 
The integral impact of the 2011 disasters on farm households’ 
agricultural and overall incomes and expenditures has been quite divers in 
different parts of the affected regions and the country. 
In 2011 there was an increase in the total Agricultural Expenditures of 
farming households in all affected regions and nationwide (Figure 98). In 
Kanto-Tosan region the rate of augmentation of the Agricultural Expenditures 
was much higher than country’s average, while in other affected regions 
lower that the national one. 
 
Figure 98. Dynamics of farm households Agricultural Gross Income, 
Agricultural Expenditures, and Agricultural Income in Japan (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
National average Agricultural Cash Expenditures of farm households 
rose a little bit more (4.5%) than the Total Agricultural Expenditures while that 
of the Depreciation costs slower (4.12%). Similarly, in Tokai region the 
Agricultural Cash Expenditures expended faster (3.74%) that the overall 
agricultural costs, while the Depreciation rise was much lower (1.26%). 
On the other hand, in Tohoku and Hokuriko regions the annual rise of 
the Agricultural Cash Expenditures of farm households was lower (1.78% and 
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1.5% accordingly) then the growth of the total amount while that of the 
Depreciation higher (4.27% and 2.42%). In Kanto-Tosan region the 
Agricultural Cash Expenditures increased (7.31%) almost as much as the 
Total Agricultural Expenditures, while Depreciation hike was slower (6.55%). 
The highest augmentation was registered in the costs “Paid for 
agricultural employees” in all regions but Tohoku (Figure 99). Similar to the 
national trend, in all affected regions there was a higher than the overall 
augmentation of the expenditures for “Fuel, light, heat and power”, 
“Agricultural implements”, and “Rental change” (except of Tokai).  
 
Figure 99. Dynamics of farm households Agricultural Expenditures in 
affected regions (Thousands yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Like country’s average, there was a considerable rise in “Feed” costs in 
Tohoku and Kanto-Tosan regions and “Animal and insemination charges” in 
Kanto-Tosan region. There was also registered a significant growth in the 
costs for “Maintenance and repair of farm building” in Tohoku and Kanto-
Tosan regions, “Agricultural motor vehicles” expenditures in Tohoku and 
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Hokuriko regions, “Seed and seeding” costs in Tohoku region, and “Fertilizer” 
costs in Hokuriko region.  
In addition, the “Mutual relief premiums and other contributions” portion 
in the “Other” expenditures increased a lot in Kanto-Tusan (17.24%) and 
Tokai (6.9%) regions on the background of a declined figure in other two 
regions and unchanged national average [MAFF, 2013]. The later does not 
comprise a big share in the overall expenditures of farms households and its 
dynamic affected little the variations in total amount. 
The Agricultural implements, Others, and Feed costs retained their 
dominant shares in the overall agricultural costs of farm households in the 
affected regions (with exception for Feed costs in Hokuriko region) and 
nationwide. What is more, in 2011 the relative fractions of “Agricultural 
implements” slightly enlarged while that of “Others” tiny dropped. Similarly, 
there was a further expansion of the portion of “Feed costs” in Tohoku and 
Kanto-Tosan regions, and “Rental charges” in Tohoku, Hokuriko and Kanto-
Tosan regions, along with the same trends nationwide.  
Unlike countrywide development, in most affected (but Tokai) regions 
there was an increased share of the costs for “Maintenance and repair of 
farm building”, “Agricultural motor vehicles costs” in Tohoku and Hokuriko 
regions, and “Seed and seeding costs” in Tohoku region. At the same time, 
the relative importance of all other items of Agricultural Expenditures 
declined. 
Rice production costs data indicate a downsizing trend in the pre-
disaster period [MAFF, 2013]. In 2011 production year there was a further 
decrease in the production costs in the most affected regions along with the 
same nationwide evolution (Figure 100). Nevertheless, some of the most 
affected by the disasters prefectures (like Iwate) registered a considerable 
annual growth in the production costs. 
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Figure 100. Dynamics of production cost for 10 are* paddy field rice in 
most affected prefectures 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries                       *1 a = 100 m2 
 
There was also a significant augmentation of certain costs items in the 
most affected prefectures. For instance, there was a much higher than the 
national rise in “Building repairing costs” in Aomori (31.46%) and Miyagi 
(65.84%) prefectures; a substantial increase in “Machinery repairing costs” in 
Iwate (30.03%) and Yamagata (16.37%) prefectures unlike the diminution 
trend nationwide, etc. The later is likely a consequence of the higher costs 
associated with post disaster recovery and reconstruction in respected 
regions. 
In 2012 production year there was a reverse dynamics in the production 
costs level in the majority of prefectures and countrywide. The production 
costs expansion in some of the most affected prefectures (like Aomori, 
Fukushima, Yamagata, Chiba etc.) was higher that the national average. 
In most affected by the disasters prefectures there was a significantly 
faster that the national augmentation of costs for “Building repairing” 
(Fukushima – 143.27%, Chiba 111.85%, Yamagata 107.32%, Aomori - 
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40.12%, etc.) and “Machinery repairing” (Iwate 39.72%, Miyagi, 23.15%, etc.) 
[MAFF, 2013]. 
Summarized nationwide production costs data312 for major annual 
upland crops demonstrate continuing downsizing trends for wheat, barley, 
rape seeds, and buckwheat, a 2011 increase and followed reduction for 
soybean and sugar cane, and a 2012 augmentation for potatoes and sweet 
potato use [MAFF, 2013]. All that means that the 2011 disasters had no 
significant impact on the production costs dynamics for most upland crops in 
Japan. However, there are no indications that the same trends have been 
applicable in the most affected regions as well. 
Likewise, the national production costs data for livestock for the last 
several years suggest continuing upwards trends for Japanese veal calf, 
Raising dairy male and hybridize type cattle, and row milk, and a 2011 
augmentation (from the lowest for the period 2010 level) for Fattening 
castrated young, dairy male and hybridize type cattle [MAFF, 2013]. The 
increasing “Feeds costs” has been mostly responsible for that tendency. We 
can only guess on what extend the later development has been affected by 
the 2011 disasters, and what the regional specificities are. 
A survey on effects of the nuclear plant accident found out that more 
than 41% of the farmers and 52% of the food industries in Fukushima 
prefecture report “extra costs emerged for radiation tests and various 
certificates as requested by trading partners” while the figures are much 
higher than in other regions of the country  [MAFF, 2012].  
The 2011 disasters have had a considerable effect on the farm 
households’ finance in most affected regions. For instance, there was a 
bigger than the national (2.33%) rise in the Deposits and Accounts 
Receivable of the farm households in Tohoku (2.57%) and Tokai (17.14%) 
regions [Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. On the other 
                                                          
312
 no data available for evolution of production costs in individual prefectures and regions.  
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hand, there was a considerable reduction of that amount in Kanto-Tosan 
(5.84%) and Hokuriko (3.96%) regions.  
In the pre-disaster year the Deposits and Accounts Receivable of the 
farm households in Tohoku and Hokuriko regions were much smaller than the 
national average (with 45.14% and 8.92% accordingly) while in Kanto-Tosan 
and Tokai regions much above that level (28.45% and 21.37%). Therefore, 
2011 events positively affected that part of farmers finance in Tokai and 
Tohoku regions, and relatively deteriorated it in the other two regions. 
In the pre-disaster period there was a tendency for decreasing of the 
overall amount of borrowed and owned money by farm households in Japan 
[MAFF, 2013]. In 2011 there was a further reduction in the average volume of 
debt of farm households nationwide (Figure 101).  
 
Figure 101. Dynamics of farm households Debts in affected regions, end 
of the year (Thousands yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In the most disaster affected Tohoku region there was a considerable 
(5.56%) increase in Borrowed Money by farming households. Simultaneously, 
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is a small portion of the overall debt of Japanese farmers, declined by a half. 
Consequently, there was a good progression in the total debt of farm 
households. The later dynamic of borrowed and owned money was a likely 
consequence of the adverse impact of disasters on farm households’ finance. 
Similarly, in Tokai region there was some augmentation of Borrowed 
Money and a sizable increase in Accounts Payable of farm households, while 
in other affected regions a higher than the national diminution of farms’ debt 
was registered. 
In the pre-disaster year the amounts of farm households’ debt in 
Tohoku and Hokuriko regions were only a fraction of the national average 
(smaller with 44.22% and 49.97% accordingly) while in Tokai region it was 
among the country’s highest [MAFF, 2011].  
Interest rates have been traditional low in Japan but an increasing 
amount of borrowed and owned money in 2011 put an additional burden for 
many farm households in times of hardship. 
Japanese farmers finance their activities and investment through a 
variety of public, cooperative and private sources. The Japan Finance 
Corporation is a major policy-based financing institution313, which supports 
the reconstruction after the Earthquake. In 2011 it approved 11,076 cases of 
agricultural loans worth of 214,533 million yen [MAFF, 2013]. There are no 
data for the relative importance to farmers of this funding and public support 
source. Nevertheless, data gives some idea about the significance of different 
type of loans through that specific financing institution. 
In the pre-disaster period there was a trend for decreasing the overall 
cases of agricultural loans provided by the Japan Finance Corporation while 
approved 2010 value was the lowest for the past several years [MAFF, 2012].    
                                                          
313
 utilizing a variety of financing programs and schemes to meet social needs while 
complementing the activities of private financial organizations. 
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In 2011 there was a big increase in the approved cases and the values 
of agricultural loans nationwide (Figure 102). In Tohoku region there was 
much higher than the national rate of multiplication of loan cases and 
approved loans (78.1% and 97.3% accordingly). In badly hit Miyagi 
prefectures the loans’ cases and volumes tripled comparing to the previous 
year. Similarly there was a significant growth in loan cases and volume in 
Fukushima and Yamagata prefectures, and loans value in Aomori prefecture. 
 
Figure 102. Dynamics of cases and values of loans to agriculture 
business units approved by Japan Finance Corporation (percent) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Consequently, the Tohoku prefecture expended significantly its share in 
the country’s loan cases (from 14.30% in 2010 to 20.12% in 2011) and values 
(from 10.48% to 16.94%) [MAFF, 2012]. 
Likewise, there was a great augmentation of loan cases and values in 
Kanto region (69.41% and 95.19% accordingly) and its most badly affected 
prefectures (Ibaraki, Tochigi, etc.). Subsequently, region’s portion in the 
national loan cases and values considerably augmented - from 11.55% to 
15.45%, and from 14.77% to 23.62% accordingly [MAFF, 2012]. 
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In less affected by the earthquake Chubu region a lower than the 
national dynamics of loan cases and value was registered - 7.01% increase 
and 7.44% reduction accordingly. As a result, the region’s fraction in the 
overall loan cases dropped from 16.46% to 13.91% and in the loan values 
from 17.64% to 13.38% [MAFF, 2012]. 
There was also a substantial change in the structure of approved 
agricultural loans comparing to the pre-disaster year. In 2011 the “Agricultural 
management reinforcement” loans retained, but diminished considerably, 
their major share in the overall amount nationwide – the portion of loans 
numbers declined from 54.94 % to 42.26 %, and that of loans value from 
61.70 % to 45.85% [MAFF, 2012]. At the same time, the “Agriculture safety 
nets” stake expended enormously – from 9.51% to 19.28% in terms of loan 
cases, and from 5.3% to 18.02% in terms of loans value. All other type of 
agricultural loans diminished their importance in terms of cases and values. 
In Tohoku and Kanto regions, and in the most affected by the disasters 
prefectures (but Aomori) the “Agriculture safety nets” loans become dominant 
in terms of cases and value (Figure 103). Simultaneously, in Aomori 
prefecture a tiny share of the loan cases for Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries Equipment (0.83%) become the major loans value users (45.18%). 
In Chubu region the later type of relatively small number of loans retained its 
bulk share in terms of value. 
In 2012 there was a slight reduction in cases and a small augmentation 
of the values of agricultural loans nationwide. Nevertheless, the numbers and 
amounts of loans in Tohoku and Kanto regions considerably declined – 
accordingly by 24.66% and 18.45% in terms of cases, and by 21.54% and 
23.76% in terms of value [MAFF, 2013]. Consequently, the relative share of 
two regions in the national loan numbers diminished to 15.74% and 12.91% 
accordingly, and in loans values to 13.12% and 17.8%. 
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Figure 103. Values of loans to agriculture business units approved by 
Japan Finance Corporation, 2010-2012 in affected regions (million yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
At the same time, the loans cases and amounts increased a lot in 
Chubu region (by 7.2% and 44.76%) as the region enlarged its portion in the 
national one to 15.27% and 19.12% accordingly [MAFF, 2013]. 
In 2011 there was some annual growth in the Gross Agricultural Income 
of farm households in all affected regions but Hokuriku (Figure 96). In Tohoku 
and Tokai regions the expansion was slower than the country’s average, and 
much higher in Kanto-Tosan region. 
The Gross Agricultural Income of farm households from “Crops” 
augmented more than the overall in Tohoku and Tokai regions, and 
nationwide, while in Kanto-Tusan region the growth of “Livestock” contribution 
was higher that the composite one (Figure 104). Consequently, the crop 
shares in the Gross Agricultural Income increased further everywhere. At the 
same time, there was a slight rise in the fraction of  “Livestock and livestock 
products” in Kanto-Tosan region and countrywide at the expense of “Others”. 
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Figure 104. Dynamics of farm households Agricultural Gross Income in 
affected regions (Thousands yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
In all regions there was a huge increase in the “Rice” Gross Agricultural 
Income of farm households (20.87% in Tohoku, 22.68% in Kanto-Tosan, 
23.9% in Hokuriko, and 30.22 in Tokai) being a lower than the national one 
(22.52%) in Tohoku region. 
Simultaneously, there was a considerable (and a higher than the 
national 3.33%) decline in the “Vegetables” Gross Agricultural Income of farm 
households in Tohoku (8.52%) and Kanto-Tusan (4.39%) regions with a good 
growth registered in Hokuriko (3.23%) region. Similarly, there was a great 
reduction in the “Fruits and nuts” Gross Agricultural Income of farm 
households in Tohoku (8.03%) and Tokai (6.09%) regions with a positive 
growth nationwide (1.14%) and lesser one in other regions.  
Furthermore, there was a huge fall in the contribution of “Livestock and 
its products” to the Gross Agricultural Income of farm households in Hokuriko 
(14.83%), Tohoku (6.12%) and lesser one in Tokai (1.15%) regions, on the 
background of a good growth in Kanto-Tosan region (5.55%) and country’s 
average (2.87%).  
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Tohoku region also registered a high growth in the “Flowers” Gross 
Agricultural Income of farm households (10.17%) at the time of the overall 
decline in that contribution in other regions and country as a whole. 
Farm households in all regions but Kanto-Tosan reported downsizing of 
“Others” Gross Agricultural Income of farm households, including the “Mutual 
relief indemnity”. Nevertheless, in 2011 the later still composed a good 
segment in the Gross Agricultural Income of all regions being higher than the 
(10.65%) national in Tohoku (12.69%) and Hokuiko (11.41%) regions, and 
lower in Kanto-Tosan (7.69%) and Tokai (6.01%) regions. 
In the pre-disaster period there was a decrease in national figures for 
the farm households indemnified for paddy field rice, damaged acreages and 
yields, and the mutual relief, insurance and reinsurance indemnities paid 
[MAFF, 2012]. The later followed the tendencies for reduction of insured farm 
households314 and the mutual relief, insurance and reinsurance premiums, 
and a “stable” amount of covered acreages and yields. 
In 2011 it was registered a good progression of the number of farm 
households indemnified in the country as they reached 63,750 or 3.86% of all 
insured farm households (Figure 105). At the same time, further reductions in 
damaged acreages and yields, and mutual relief, insurance and reinsurance 
indemnities were reported as they dropped to 25,637ha (or 1.74% of the 
insured paddy fields), 21,745t (0.4% of the insured crops), 4,045.85 million 
yen (16.72% of the mutual relief premiums), and 1,285.129 million yen 
(7.21% of the insurance premiums), and 93.112 million yen (0.62% of the 
reinsurance premiums) [MAFF, 2013]. 
In Tohoku region there was a huge increase as the number of 
indemnified for rice farm households increase by 74.33%, the amount of 
damaged areas and yields by 58.41% and 93.86%, and the mutual relief and 
insurance indemnity by 99.28% and 154.29% [Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. The biggest rise in all these figures was 
                                                          
314
 In Japan practically all market-oriented farms are insured for paddy filed rice. 
  
329 
reported in the most affected Fukushima, Yamagata, Iwate and Miyagi 
prefectures. 
 
Figure 105. Dynamics of mutual relief and insurance of farm households 
for paddy field rice in affected regions in 2011 (2010=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Consequently, Tohoku’s share in the country’s indemnified farms 
augmented from 6.02% to 8.94%, in damaged acreages from 11.3% to 
24.38%, in damaged yields from 6.07% to 12.19%, in mutual relief indemnity 
from 6.85% to 15.39%, insurance indemnity from 4.91% to 14.01%, and 
reinsurance indemnity315 from 0.24% to 40.79% [MAFF, 2013]. 
In Kanto region there was an overall reduction of farms households 
indemnified (by 36.87%), damaged areas (by 67.42%) and yields (by 
60.36%), and mutual relief indemnity (by 59.03%), and a small increase in the 
insurance indemnity (1.02%). However, in most severely hit by the disasters 
Ibaraki, Tochigi and Chiba prefectures a considerable rise in all these figures 
was registered. 
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 Reinsurance indemnities applied only in Akita (2010) & Yamagata (2011) prefectures. 
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Consequently, region’s portion in the country’s overall number shrinked 
enormously – from 15.81% to 8.63% for indemnified farms, from 18.17% to 
8.06% for damaged rice paddies, from 16.94% to 6.95% for damaged rice 
yields, from 14.14% to 6.53% for mutual relief indemnity, from 3.99% to 
4.53% for insurance indemnity, and 53.27% to 0.37% for reinsurance 
indemnity [MAFF, 2013]. 
In Chubu region there was a good increase in the number of 
indemnified farms (38.24%), damaged yields (179.76%), and paid mutual 
relief (44.05%) and insurance (14.25%) indemnities. The biggest rise was 
registered in Nigata, Toyama, Yamashi, and Shizuoka prefectures. 
Subsequently, region’s share in the country’s indemnified farms further 
increased from 12.97% to 15.25%, in damaged yields from 10.62% to 
30.76%, in mutual relief indemnity from 15.53% to 25.21%, and in insurance 
indemnity from 23.09% to 29.62%, while slightly decreased for damaged 
acreages (from 20% to 18.81%) and plummeted for reinsurance indemnity 
(from 43.54% to 0.01%) [MAFF, 2013]. 
The Japanese farms have been well supported by the government 
through various subsidy schemes. In FY 2011 there were 1,150,159 
payments to Agricultural Management Units under the “Individual Income 
Support Allowance System for Farmers” amounting to 5,366 million yen 
[MAFF, 2013].  
The average amount of support per payment was 466,544 yen [Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013]. The highest amount per 
payment was for “Income support allowance subsidy for upland field crops” 
averaging 2,114,998 yen, followed by the “Additional subsidy” (428,878 yen), 
the “Income support allowance subsidy for utilizing paddy fields” (410,938 
yen), and the “Income support allowance subsidy for rice (fixed amount)” 
(152,081 yen). 
The greatest majority of recipients of public subsidies were Individuals 
(Table 37), and the rest Juridical Persons (0.66%) and Rural Communities 
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(0.66%). A great portion of the commercial farms households was covered by 
that support system as the number of payments to Individuals accounts for 
75.47% of the number of Farm households. 
 
Table 37. Share in total numbers and amounts of payments under 
Individual Income Support Allowance System for Farmers, April 30, 
2012 (percent) 
 
Regions 
In total number of payments In total amount of subsidies 
Indivi-
duals 
Subsi-
dy for 
rice 
fixed 
amount 
Subsi-
dy 
utilizing 
paddy 
fields 
Sub-
sidy 
uplan
d field 
crops 
Addi-
tional 
subsi
dy 
Rice 
fixed 
amount 
Utili-
zing 
paddy 
fields 
Upland 
field 
crops 
Addi-
tional 
Tohoku 98.57 89.29 50.86 8.15 0.79 41.77 47.04 10.44 0.65 
Aomori 99.07 84.29 52.61 6.78 0.52 32.50 56.88 10.00 0.63 
Iwate 98.60 85.51 55.17 3.21 0.59 36.67 52.22 10.00 1.11 
Miyagi 97.90 94.06 27.52 2.73 0.72 38.16 46.05 14.91 0.44 
Akita 98.27 92.41 63.36 9.95 1.02 46.02 45.13 8.41 0.44 
Yamagata 98.44 87.03 65.01 17.32 1.26 46.11 43.33 10.00 0.56 
Fukushima 99.40 91.15 43.03 11.41 0.63 55.56 36.11 7.41 0.93 
Kanto 99.15 90.28 46.74 6.49 0.74 30.41 48.16 20.82 0.20 
Ibaraki 99.27 88.71 45.28 5.70 0.34 31.39 43.80 24.82 0.00 
Tochigi 99.24 92.59 52.13 9.00 1.18 32.50 53.00 14.00 0.50 
Gunma 98.63 85.65 44.95 6.06 0.98 17.74 45.16 35.48 0.00 
Saitama 98.95 91.25 42.57 6.52 0.49 25.00 46.15 28.85 0.00 
Chiba 99.08 90.81 45.49 1.27 0.67 43.24 48.65 8.11 0.00 
Tokyo 100 98.84 1.16 2.31 0.00 0 0 0 0 
Kanagawa 99.48 96.77 17.87 3.14 0.05 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chubu 98.50 92.67 38.84 5.79 0.84 43.57 40.08 15.55 1.07 
Niigata 98.49 97.99 45.16 5.35 1.03 55.27 36.71 7.17 0.84 
Toyama 96.87 97.17 45.93 5.07 0.69 42.74 41.03 15.38 0.85 
Ishikawa 98.25 98.32 19.58 3.61 0.84 57.63 30.51 11.86 1.69 
Fukui 97.50 97.78 29.54 7.94 0.71 41.98 37.04 19.75 1.23 
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Yamanashi 99.47 88.83 24.55 6.95 0.10 50.00 50.00 25.00 0.00 
Nagano 99.04 84.46 41.36 11.00 0.66 35.53 36.84 26.32 1.32 
Gifu 99.05 86.70 41.70 1.08 0.50 31.43 50.00 17.14 1.43 
Shizuoka 98.84 86.19 34.82 3.78 1.64 42.11 52.63 10.53 0.00 
Aichi 99.38 90.49 33.67 6.13 1.69 20.48 49.40 27.71 1.20 
Japan 98.68 87.64 46.93 6.49 0.73 28.57 41.33 29.41 0.67 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
Tohoku, Kanto, and Chubu farms got accordingly 19.82%. 9.65% and 
20.34% of the overall national payments under that particular scheme [MAFF, 
2013]. In 2011-2012 as many as 227,920 Tohoku farms, 110,951 Kanto 
farms, and 233,941 Chubu farms were supported by the scheme. 
The majority of supported farms in the affected regions received 
“Subsidy for rice (fixed amount)” and a considerable portion of them “Subsidy 
for utilizing paddy fields”. A small part of the farms also got “Subsidy for 
upland field crops” and “Additional subsidy”.  
The biggest part of the public payments in Tohoku and Kanto regions 
was for “Utilizing paddy fields” followed by the “Subsidy for rice” and “Upland 
field crops”. The later took relatively a higher share in Ibaraki region at the 
expense of a lower portion of the rice subsidy.  
On the other hand, in Chubu region the support for rice dominated 
followed by the subsidies for utilizing paddy fields and for upland field crops. 
In all affected regions the “Additional subsidies” were a tiny fractions of the 
overall amount similar to the countrywide trend. 
The shares of subsidies for utilizing paddy fields and for rice in the total 
were higher than the national for all affected regions, while for upland field 
crops lower than the country’s average.  
For Tohoku farms the level of overall public support under that scheme 
was a little big higher (1.75%) than the national, being a considerably above 
the country average for all but Iwate and Fukushima farms (Figure 106). All 
farms in the region received significantly more Income support allowance 
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subsidy for rice; and Miyagi farms more Income support allowance subsidy 
for utilizing paddy fields and for upland field crops; and Aomori farms more 
Income support allowance subsidy for utilizing paddy fields; and Aomori, 
Iwate and Fukushima farms more additional subsidies, than in the other parts 
of the country. 
 
Figure 106. Amount of support per farm of different type of payments in 
FY2011 (Japan=100) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
On the other hand the overall support to Kanto and Chubu farms was 
much lower than the country’s average. Nevertheless, the level of certain 
support measures in some prefectures were much higher that the national. 
In FY 2012 there was a decrease in the number of payments under the 
Individual Income Support Allowance System for Farmers in the country 
(2.76%), and increase in the amount of support (4.42%) [MAFF, 2013].  
In Tohoku region there was less than the national reduction in number 
of payments (1.22%) and a slight augmentation in the badly affected 
Fukushima (3.58%) and Miyagi (1.09%) prefectures. At the same time, there 
was a less that the country’s average increase in total subsidies in the region 
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as a whole (0.83%) and in most prefectures (Iwate and Yamagata – 2.22%, 
Miyagi 2.63%, Fukushima – 2.78%), with a decline in Aomori (4.37%) and 
Akita (0.78%) prefectures. 
In Kanto and Chubu regions there was registered a reduction in the 
number of payments (2.5% and 4.34% accordingly) and increase in the total 
amount of support (3.88% and 5.76% accordingly). 
In 2012 the amount of subsidies per payments increased less that the 
country’s average of 7.38% in Tohoku and Kanto regions (1.97% and 6.54% 
accordingly) and faster in Chubu (10.56) region [MAFF, 2013]. Consequently, 
the amount per a payment in all affected regions was bellow the country’s 
average level – with 3.37% in Tohoku, 6.08% in Kanto, and 29.62% Chubu 
region [MAFF, 2013].  
While the overall subsidies per payment was still higher that the 
national in Aomori (10.15%), Miyagi (12.01%), Akita (10.05%), and Yamagata 
(16.23%) prefectures, it was significantly lower in the badly hit Iwate (20.56%) 
and Fukushima (39.59%) prefectures. Nevertheless, the specific payments 
for Income support allowance subsidy for rice was considerably higher that 
the national average in all prefectures (with 45.1% in Tohoku region as a 
whole) as well as for Income support allowance subsidy for utilizing paddy 
fields in Aomori and Miyagi, and for Income support allowance subsidy for 
upland field crops in Miyagi, and for Additional subsidy in Aomori, Iwate and 
Akita prefectures. 
There has been also a huge budget of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries for direct and indirect support of diverse aspects of 
agrarian and rural development (Table 38). Particularly, there has been an 
increasing amount of the public works expenditures for the “Improvement of 
agriculture and agricultural village”, constant spending on the “Disaster 
restoration”, and fluctuating “Subsidies for development of rural areas” 
(Figure 107). 
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Table 38. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries accounts for 
agrarian and rural development (million yen) 
Budget items 2011 2012 2013 
Securing food safety and consumer trust 12,272 10,882 9,961 
Strengthening cooperation between food and agriculture  134,510 82,880 61,645 
Strengthening cooperation food and agriculture for domestic 
agricultural and livestock products, by customs duty on beef 65,966 64,247 
 
60,035 
Strengthening agricultural and food industries 3,127 2,093 24,422 
Establishment of food security 8,349 12,922 11,922 
Farm management 670,617 705,896 670,175 
Securing and efficient use of superior farmland 17,863 22,377 20,326 
Promotion of agricultural production infrastructure 2,432 28,643 17,967 
Development of agricultural production infrastructure 62,479 63,754 60,710 
Support for environmentally-sound agricultural production  4,024 3,403 3,119 
Collaboration of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
industrialization of rural areas 13,236 10,962 10,193 
Securing against expansion of consumption for national 
agriculture, forestry, fisheries na na 3,984 
Exchange between cities and rural areas 1,749 1,449 2,546 
Conservation of rural area resources and others 49,296 50,763 56,857 
Countermeasure against tidal damage 2,936 2,866 2,917 
Preservation of farmland 14,465 15,072 36,670 
Infrastructure facilitating individual income support allowance 17,870 18,290 2,092 
Maintenance of strengthening agricultural conflict na na 36,507 
Revitalization of rural areas 29,640 13,575 15,733 
Development of rural areas 25,669 8,570 91,357 
Global environment  agriculture, forestry and fisheries industry 95 114 129 
For storm damages 90 63 57 
Contract construction costs such as implementation costs 1,553 1,197 3,564 
Coastal project surveys 4 4 4 
Surveys on maintenance and development of agricultural 
production infrastructure 
 
1,146 1,146 
 
1,145 
Damaged agricultural facilities restoration works 7,932 7,990 7,977 
Works associated with disaster against agricultural facilities 228 170 183 
Transfers to special accounts 253,051 219,928 210,051 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
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Figure 107. Evolution of public works expenditures related to 
agriculture (100 million yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
As a result of all these development, there was a higher than the 
national (2.15%) augmentation of the Cash Income from Agriculture per farms 
households in Kanto-Tosan region (3.3%), lesser rise in Tohoku (1.09%) and 
Tokai (0.63%) regions, and a (1.19%) reduction in Hokuriko region. 
Comparing to the pre-disaster period in 2011 there was a certain growth 
in the Gross Agricultural Income of farm households in the most affected 
regions. However, the later was accompanied by a higher rise in the farm 
households Agricultural Expenditures. Consequently, the Net Agricultural 
Income per farm households contracted in all affected regions and nationwide 
(Figure 96). 
In Tohoku region the Agricultural Income of farm households contracted 
less (0.91%) then the national one (2.21%) while in the other affected regions 
the reduction was much greater (Hokuriko – 6.17%, Tokai – 3.72%, and 
Kanto-Tosan 3.45%).  
Consequently, in 2011 the relative share of Agricultural Income in the 
Total Farm Households Income decreased in most regions (from 26.95% to 
25.81% in Tohoku region, from 21.12% to 19.51% in Hokuriko, and from 
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19.08% to 18.11% in Tokai) and nationwide (from 26.24% to 25.81%) (Figure 
108). On the other hand, in Kanto-Tosan region there was a slight 
augmentation in the relative importance of that income source - from 24.37% 
to 24.54%. 
 
Figure 108. Dynamics of farm households income in affected regions 
(Thousands yen) 
 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
The agricultural income has been the third biggest income source of the 
farm households in all affected regions and nationwide. In Tohoku and Kanto-
Toscan regions that source of income comprised a bigger part of the overall 
households’ income. Therefore, the variation of the former affected strongly 
the overall farm households’ income. 
The Income of Business on Agriculture Production was not affected in 
Tohoku and Hokuriko regions, and largely increased in the other parts of the 
country (55.56% in Kanto-Tosan, 25% in Tokai, and 14.29% nationwide). 
Subsequently, the relative portion of that income source increased slightly in 
all but Tohoku regions. Nevertheless, this income source has been an 
insignificant part of the overall income of farm households in the affected 
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regions (0.07% in Tokai, 0.1% in Tohoku, 0.15% in Hokuriko, and 0, 19% in 
Kanto-Tosan) and nationwide (0.15%). Therefore, the variation of the later 
had no essential effect on the overall households’ income. 
A survey on effects of the nuclear plant accident found out that 3% of 
the Japanese farmers indicate that “Income declined due to the abandonment 
of farm products and the relinquishment of manufacturing and production due 
to foreign countries' import controls and trading partners' refusal to import 
Japanese products” [MAFF, 2012]. The later share for the Fukushima 
prefecture farmers is almost three times higher.  
There was an increase in the Non-agricultural Income of farm 
households in all affected regions. That was a result in the increased Gross 
Non-agricultural Income in all regions but Tokai, and an effective diminution 
of the Non-agricultural Expenditures everywhere. 
The expansion of the Non-agricultural Income was particularly high in 
Tohoku region (10.06%) and good in other regions (4.94% in Hokuriko, 
2.48% in Tokai, and 2.4% in Kanto-Tosan) on the background of an overall 
reduction in that income source at nationwide scale (0.37%). Subsequently, 
the comparative importance of this income source increased across the 
country – from 42.24% to 42.67% in Tokai region, from 39.8% to 41.12% in 
Hokuriko, from 36.06% to 37.75% in Tohoku, and from 34.87% to 37.21% in 
Kanto-Tosan, and 34.55% to 34.62% in the country as a whole [MAFF, 2013]. 
In Tohoku, Hokuriko and Tokai regions the Non-agricultural Income 
represents the biggest segment of the overall income of farm households 
while in Kanto-Toscan region and nationwide it is the second most important 
one. Therefore, its variation affected quite significantly the overall income of 
farm households. 
Finally, there was much higher than the national (0.27%) augmentation 
of the Pension, Presents, Gifts etc. in all affected regions (Tohoku – 4.71%, 
Tokai – 2.81%, Hokuriko – 2.36%) with exception of Kanto-Toscan, where 
there was a sizable reduction (10.26%) in that income source. Consequently, 
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the relative segment of that income source slightly increased in Hokuriko 
(from 38.93% to 39.23%) and Tokai (from 38.61% to 39.13%) regions and 
nationwide (from 39.06% to 39.39%), and decreased in the other two regions 
(from 36.89% to 36.75% in Tohoku, and from 40.58% to 37.95% in Kanto-
Tosan).  
In Kanto-Toscan region that source accounts for the biggest income 
source for the farm households while in all other regions it is the second 
biggest one. 
As a result of all these developments, the Total Farm Household 
Income in Tohoku, Hokuriko and Tokai regions increased, which was a 
particularly high (5.12%) for the Tohoku farmers, and modest for producers in 
other two regions (1.58% in Hokuriko, and 1.44% in Tokai). At the same time, 
in Kanto-Tosan region there was a considerable (4.04%) and a higher than 
the national (0.58%) reduction of the farm households income. 
The Taxes, Imports and Other obligations (except agricultural 
management) effectively decreased in all affected regions, which was less 
than the national (3.98%) reduction in Tohoku region (3.27%) and higher in 
other regions (Tokai – 7.58%, Kanto-Tosan, 6.13%, and Hokuriko 5.96%). 
Subsequently, the relative importance of these payments diminished 
everywhere – from 12% to 11.05% in Tohoku region, from 12.17% to 11.27% 
in Hokuriko region, from 16.38% to 16.02%, from 18.73% to 17.06% in Tokai 
region, and from 14.55% to 14.05% nationwide [MAFF, 2013]. 
Ultimately, the Disponible Income of farm households in all but Kanto-
Toscan region augmented being especially high in Tohoku region (6.26%), 
and modest in Tokai (3.52%) and Hokuriko (2.63%) regions. On the other 
hand, in Kanto-Toscan region farmers saw their Disponible Income reduced 
(3.73%) while at a nationwide scale it was the same as in pre-disaster year. 
There was an augmentation of the share of the Disponible Income in 
the Total Income of Farm Households in all affected regions (from 88% to 
88.95% in Tohoku, from 87.83% to 88.73% in Hokuriko, from 83.62% to 
  
340 
83.98% in Kanto-Tosan, and from 81.27% to 82.94% in Tokai) and 
nationwide (from 85.45% to 85.95%). 
In the pre-disaster period the farm households in Tohoku region had 
lower than the national Agricultural, Total and Disposable Incomes (Table 
39). On the other hand, farmers in other affected regions had a lower than the 
national Agricultural Income but higher overall and disponible incomes. 
 
Table 39. Level and structure of farm households income in affected 
regions (Japan=100) 
Regions Agricul-
ltural 
income 
Income 
agricul. 
busi-
ness* 
Non 
agricul-
tural 
income 
Pension, 
prese-
nts, 
gifts, etc. 
Total farm 
house-
hold 
income 
Taxes, 
imports
obli-
gations 
Dispo-
sabe 
income 
2010        
Tohoku 89.94 57.14 88.94 82.75 87.60 72.27 90.21 
Hokuriku 80.87 100.00 104.35 100.16 100.49 84.07 103.29 
Kanto-
Tosan 
95.26 
128.57 111.01 
106.59 102.60 
115.49 100.40 
Tokai 83.48 57.14 153.11 113.52 114.83 147.79 109.22 
2011        
Tohoku 91.14 50.00 96.72 86.41 92.62 72.81 95.86 
Hokuriku 77.59 87.50 109.91 102.25 102.68 82.33 106.00 
Kanto-
Tosan 
94.15 
175.00 114.61 95.40 99.03 112.90 96.76 
Tokai 82.19 62.50 148.71 116.38 117.16 142.24 113.06 
* calculate labor cost and material cost 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
 
After the 2011 disasters, the farm households in Tohoku region 
diminished the differences with the average nationwide level slightly for the 
Agricultural, and more visibly for the Total and the Disposable Incomes. At 
the same time, the farm households in other two regions saw their agricultural 
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income decreased comparing to the average national level. However, while 
there was a further enlargement of the total households and disposable 
incomes in Hokuriko and Tokai regions, in Kanto region these levels 
deteriorated bellow the country’s average. 
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Chapter 17. Expert assessments on impacts and factors of 
March 2011 disasters 
 
Needs and importance of expertise 
 
Our analysis has demonstrated that some of the impacts and factors of 
the March 2011 disasters are difficult to identify and assess due to the 
insufficient information, controversial data, continuing challenges and 
uncertainties, etc.  
In order to expend the assessments we have carried out numerous in-
depth interviews with leading experts in the areas, and representatives of 
governments, farmers, food industry and non-governmental organizations, 
and affected farmers, business and consumers.   
In addition, we have organized two expert assessments in order to 
identify the 2011 disasters’ short and longer terms impacts on agriculture, 
food industries and consumers as well as factors for persistence of negative 
impacts, and longer-term impacts on major resources, productions, 
organizations, efficiency, etc. in the most affected regions and the rest of 
Japan. 
The experts’ identification was based on a careful study of their 
positions in the affected agri-food chains, decision-making, and post-disaster 
evaluation and governance as well as research, publications and 
presentations. In addition, multiple consultations with the leading analysts in 
the field were made before selecting the members of the expert panels. 
The experts were asked to specify the overall impacts on agriculture, 
food industry, and food consumption in different regions affected by the 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster. Since individual effects have quite 
different time span and the individual experts have quite different horizon we 
let the experts to decide on the duration of “short-term” and “longer term”.  
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We prepared a list of factors for persistence of the negative effects on 
the base of an extensive study of most commonly cited factors by officials, 
experts, stakeholders, analysts, media, etc. A similar approach was employed 
in working out the list of most likely affected in the long-term aspects of agri-
food sectors (resources, performances, behavior, markets, costs, 
governance, international trade, etc.). There was also an option left for 
experts to include other (new) factors and assess their importance as well as 
a space for free comments related to the 2011 disasters. A Japanese 
translation of the assessment form was provided to all experts who are not 
fluent in English, while a bilingual expert translated responses back into 
English.  
The first expertise was carried out in June-July 2013 and focused on 
the specific impacts and factors of the Fukushima nuclear accident. The 
number of experts was eleven, including four researchers (two from the 
Fukushima University, one from the Tohoku University, and one from the 
Tsukuba University), two representatives of the prefectural government in 
Fukushima, two farmers, two representative of farmers associations from 
Fukushima prefecture, and one representative of a Fukushima food industry 
organization. One out of the twelve initially selected expert panel members316 
did not fill in the assessment form but gave us an in-depth interview on major 
issues.  
The second expert assessment was carried out in October-November 
2014 and covered the specific and combined impacts of the March 2011 
earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster. The number of experts was 
thirteen – all leading researchers in the area317 (five from the Tohoku 
University, one from the Tsukuba University, and seven from the Policy 
                                                          
316
 the Managing Director of the Consumer Cooperatives Union, Fukushima. 
317
 All of them assessed the impacts on agriculture, eleven assessed the impact on food 
industry, and twelve assessed the impact on food consumption. 
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Research Institute, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). The same 
approach like in the first expertise was used throughout that assessment. 
More than three and a half years after the triple disaster, the expertise 
gives some tentative assessment on the diverse (specific, combined, short-
term, long-term, functional) impacts of the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and 
nuclear accident on agriculture, food industries, and food consumption in 
different regions of the country. 
 
Specific impacts of earthquake 
 
Short-term implications  
 
According to the experts, the short and long-term impacts of the Great 
East Japan earthquake on agriculture, food industries and food consumption 
in different regions of the country have been quite different.  
The specific short-term impact of the earthquake on agriculture in 
Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures is significant negative according to a 
greatest proportion of the experts (Figure 109). Furthermore, a good portion 
of them evaluates that impact as moderate negative. In Iwate prefecture the 
most of the experts believe that impact is moderate or insignificant negative, 
while in Aomori, Chiba and Ibaraki prefectures the effect is predominately 
assessed as insignificant negative. The specific short-term impact of the 
earthquake on agriculture in other parts of the country is generally evaluated 
either as insignificant or none.  
At the same time no expert believes there is a positive specific of 
combined short or long-term impact on the 2011 disasters on agriculture in 
Japan. 
The specific short-term impact of the earthquake on food industries in 
Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures is significant negative (Figure 110). 
Nevertheless, a good segment of the expert panel evaluates that impact as 
  
345 
insignificant negative. In Iwate and Chiba prefectures the greatest portion of 
the experts assess that effect as moderate negative or insignificant negative. 
The short-term impact of the earthquake on food industries in Aomori and 
Ibaraki prefectures, and the rest Japan is predominately evaluated as 
insignificant negative. However, many experts also believe the later impact is 
more severe (including up to a significant one in the two Tohoku prefectures).  
 
Figure 109. Short-term impacts of March 2011 disasters on agriculture 
in different prefectures of Japan 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
 
Simultaneously, no expert indicates that there is a positive specific short 
or long-term impact on the 2011 earthquake on food industries in Japan. 
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Figure 110. Short-term impacts of March 2011 disasters on food 
industries in different prefectures of Japan 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
 
The majority of experts think that the specific short-term impact of the 
earthquake on food consumption in Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures 
has been significant or moderate negative (Figure 111). Despite that, the 
number of those evaluating that impact as insignificant or none is also not 
small. For Aomori and Ibaraki prefectures, a half of the experts evaluate that 
impact as significant or moderate negative while another half as insignificant 
negative or none. The specific short-term impact of the earthquake on food 
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consumption in Chiba prefecture is mostly assessed as insignificant negative 
or none, but a good proportion also ranks it with a higher magnitude. In the 
rest of the country that impact is mostly estimated as insignificant, but every 
third expert still believes it is more severe (predominately significant).  
 
Figure 111. Short-term impacts of March 2011 disasters on food 
consumption in different prefectures of Japan 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
 
No expert believes there is a positive specific or combined short or 
long-term impact of the 2011 disasters on food consumption in Japan. 
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Long-term implications  
 
According to a great majority of the experts there will be no specific 
long-term impact of the 2011 earthquake on agriculture in Aomori, Ibaraki and 
Chiba prefectures, and other parts of Japan (Figure 112). Nevertheless, a 
good number of experts expect more severe consequences for the later three 
Tohoku prefectures (mostly evaluated as insignificant).  
 
Figure 112. Long-term impacts of March 2011 disasters on agriculture in 
different prefectures of Japan 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
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The experts are divided in their impact estimates for Miyagi and 
Fukushima prefectures as around a half foresees it as significant or moderate 
negative, while the rest as insignificant negative or none. Long-term 
consequences for Iwate agriculture are predominately seeing as negative 
(mostly insignificant) but a significant number of the experts also expect no 
impact at all.  
 
Figure 113. Long-term impacts of March 2011 disasters on food 
industries in different prefectures of Japan 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
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The bulk of experts estimate there will be no specific long-term impact 
of the earthquake on food industries in Aomori, Iwate, Ibaraki, and Chiba 
prefectures, and other parts of Japan (Figure 113).  
 
Figure 114. Long-term impacts of March 2011 disasters on food 
consumption in different prefectures of Japan 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
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Nevertheless, a good proportion of the panel foresee some insignificant 
to moderate adverse long-term consequences for Iwate and Ibaraki 
prefectures’ food industries. In Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures most 
experts expect some negative long-term impact predominately evaluated as 
moderate and insignificant in the former one and not consensually 
determined for the later. However, the number of experts anticipating no 
impact in the later two prefectures is also considerable.  
The greatest majority of the experts predict no specific long-term impact 
of the earthquake on food consumption in Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi, Ibaraki and 
Chiba prefectures, and other parts of Japan (Figure 114). Nevertheless, a 
good portion of the panel foresees some negative long-term consequences - 
insignificant to moderate in Tohoku prefectures (mostly moderate for Miyagi 
prefecture and insignificant for all others), insignificant or significant in the rest 
of the country. For Fukushima prefectures the greatest part of the experts 
expect some (insignificant or moderate) negative impact from the earthquake 
on food consumption. At the same time, the number of experts appreciating 
no long-term implications in that prefecture is also quite considerable. 
 
Specific impacts of tsunami 
 
Short-term implications  
 
According to the experts the short and long-term impacts of the 2011 
tsunami on agriculture, food industries and food consumption in different 
regions of the country have been also unlike.  
The greatest majority of the experts assess the short-term adverse 
impact of the tsunami on agriculture as significant in Miyagi and Fukushima 
prefectures, as moderate in Iwate prefecture, as insignificant in Aomori and 
Chiba prefectures, and moderate or insignificant in Ibaraki prefecture (Figure 
109). As far as the impact on agriculture in the rest of the country is 
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concerned, the experts are divided as half of them assess it as neutral while 
another half as negative (mostly insignificant). 
The specific negative short-term impact of the tsunami on food 
industries in Miyagi, Fukushima and Iwate prefectures is evaluated as 
significant by the greatest portion of the expert panel (Figure 110). In Aomori 
prefecture that effects is mostly ranged to be moderate while in Chiba 
prefecture insignificant. For Ibaraki prefecture opinions of the majority are 
split between significant negative and insignificant. Similarly, the greatest part 
of the experts evaluates as negative the impact of tsunami on food industry in 
the rest of the country but there is no agreement on the extent – one part 
evaluate it as insignificant while another part as moderate or significant. What 
is more, some experts evaluate the short-term implications for food industries 
in the rest of Japan as none or even positive.   
Most experts estimate there is a negative short-term impact of the 
tsunami on food consumption in all affected prefectures (Figure 111). The 
later is mostly described as significant in Miyagi prefecture, significant or 
moderate in Fukushima prefecture, insignificant in Ibaraki prefecture, 
insignificant or moderate in Aomori and Chiba prefectures, insignificant or 
significant in Iwate prefecture. The majority of experts indicate either there is 
not adverse impact on food consumption in the rest of Japan or it is 
principally insignificant. 
 
Long-term implications  
 
According to the biggest part of the experts there will be a significant 
long-term impact of the tsunami on agriculture in Miyagi and Fukushima 
prefectures (Figure 112). Most of them assess that effect to be insignificant 
for Iwate and Ibaraki agriculture. Nevertheless, a good portion of the panel 
evaluates much more severelly the adverse long-term implications of that 
disaster on agriculture of the later two prefectures - moderate in Ibaraki 
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prefecture and predominately moderate in Iwate prefecture. The majority of 
experts do not perceive any long-term impact for Aomori and Chiba 
prefectures, and the rest of the country. Nevertheless, a good segment of 
them still believe there will be some negative (mostly insignificant) long-term 
impact on Aomori and Chiba agriculture. 
The greatest proportion of the experts evaluates that there will be a 
significant negative long-term impact of the tsunami on food industries in 
Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures, significant or moderate in Iwate 
prefecture, and a moderate one in Ibaraki prefecture (Figure 113). Most 
experts expect the negative long-term effect to be insignificant in Aomori 
prefecture, and none in Chiba prefecture and the rest of the country. 
Nevertheless, a good part of them foresee some adverse impact (mostly 
insignificant) in Chiba prefecture and (insignificant) in the rest of Japan.  
The majority of the experts predict there will be no specific long-term 
impact of the tsunami on food consumption in Ibaraki and Chiba prefectures, 
and other parts of the country (Figure 114). For other four affected 
prefectures most experts expect some negative longer-term consequences 
for food consumption, which is mainly evaluated as moderate (for Miyagi and 
Iwate prefectures) or insignificant (for Aomori and Fukushima prefectures). 
 
Specific impacts of nuclear disaster 
 
Short-term implications  
 
According to the experts the Fukushima nuclear accident’s impacts on 
agriculture, food industries and food consumption in different regions of the 
country are quite dissimilar.  
The experts are unanimous that the specific short-term impact of the 
nuclear accident on Fukushima agriculture is significant negative (Figure 
109). Most of them also assess the short-term impacts of the disaster on 
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Aomori agriculture as insignificant negative. The adverse impact in other 
badly affected prefectures (Iwate, Miyagi, Ibaraki, and Chiba) and the rest of 
the country is evaluated chiefly as moderate. Moreover, a good portion of the 
panel ranks as significant the short-term impact of the accident on Miyagi and 
Ibaraki agriculture. Some experts also believe there are no negative 
implications for the agriculture of Aomori, and Chiba prefectures.  
The greatest number of experts estimates that the specific short-term 
impact of the nuclear accident on food industries in the most affected 
prefectures and the rest of Japan is negative (Figure 110). Most of them 
range it as significant for Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures, and 
moderate for Chiba and Aomori prefectures and other parts of Japan. The 
experts are divided for the scale of the negative effect on Ibaraki food 
industries between significant and moderate. Moreover, some experts believe 
there is a positive short-term impact from that accident on food industries in 
other parts of the country. 
Almost all experts estimate there is a significant negative short-term 
impact of the nuclear accident on food consumption in Fukushima prefecture 
(Figure 111). The majority of them also believe that short-term negative 
effects on food consumption in Miyagi, Ibaraki, Iwate and Chiba prefectures, 
and the rest of Japan are significant or moderate. A half of the panel 
evaluates as insignificant the negative impact on food consumption in Aomori 
prefecture but another half thinks it is much more adverse (moderate or 
significant). 
The 2014 expertise principally reconfirmed the 2013 expert 
assessments on impacts of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on agriculture, 
food industries and food consumption in Fukushima prefecture, neighboring 
prefectures, and other parts of Japan [Bachev and Ito, 2013].  
Most experts agree that the overall agricultural impact from the nuclear 
disaster in Fukushima prefecture varies considerably according to the specific 
location of farms since living and working environment, contamination of 
  
355 
farmlands and assets, restrictions on entry, production, shipping of produces, 
etc. have been quite different in the evacuation areas and rest of the 
prefecture. The common view is that “in the areas of restriction to entry, stay 
and residence, the recovery of agriculture remains difficult while the other 
areas are affected by bad reputation”.  
The major reason for the negative consequences of the nuclear 
accident on food industries in Fukushima region is specified as “decreasing 
sales caused by the contamination and harmful rumors”. The experts also 
believe that “in a longer term the recovery of regional food industries will be 
faster than in the sector agriculture”. 
The most badly affected by the nuclear disaster areas of agriculture in 
Fukushima region are described as: harmful rumors, shipping restriction, 
contaminated farmlands, decreased sales, unable and restricted farming, 
farming, lowered price of products, declined willingness to continue farming, 
works to prevent absorbance of radioactive matters, radiation inspections, 
polluted agricultural mountain products, compensation procedures, destroyed 
livestock in evacuation area, abolished products, destructed high brand local 
products, organic agriculture, agricultural management (decreased income), 
decreased values of farm assets, increased abandoned farmlands, moving 
farmers to other prefectures, declined consumption of local products by local 
population, secured market, external exposure to radiation, vegetables, rice, 
milk, beef, mushrooms, and fruits (Table 40).  
Some experts are particularly concerned with the “decreased current 
and future number of farmers” as a result of diminished willingness to farm 
and moving farmers to other prefectures as well as with the “decreased 
consumption of local products by local people”. 
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Table 40. Most badly affected areas from Fukushima nuclear disaster 
In Agriculture Food industries Food consumption 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fukushima 
region 
Harmful rumors (******) 
Restriction of shipping (*****) 
Contaminated farmlands (****) 
Decreased sales (*****) 
Unable farming due to 
evacuation (****) 
Restricted farming (***) 
Lowered price of products (***) 
Declined willingness to continue 
farming (**) 
Works to prevent absorbance of 
radioactive matters  (**) 
Radiation inspections (**) 
Polluted agricultural products 
(**) and mountain vegetables  
Procedures for compensation 
Destroyed livestock in 
evacuation area 
Abolished products  
Destructed high brand local 
products  
Organic agriculture 
Agricultural management 
(decreased income) 
Decreased economical values of 
farm assets  
Increased abandoned farmlands 
Some farmers moved to other 
prefectures 
Declined consumption of local 
products by local people 
Secured market 
External exposure to radiation  
Vegetables  
Rice  
Harmful rumors 
(******) 
Decreased use of 
local ingredients 
(****) 
Changed places for 
buying ingredients 
(***) 
Increased costs (***) 
Decreased sales (**) 
Closed factories 
because of 
evacuation (**) 
Unrecovered 
consumer trust 
Safety of local raw 
materials  
Excluded from 
tenders local 
factories 
Decreased naming 
“Made in 
Fukushima” 
Management 
Seafood produces 
 
 
Avoiding Fukushima 
products (******) 
Worries of radioactive 
contamination (*****) 
Stopped use of local 
products for school 
lunch 
Increased costs for 
nonlocal supply  
Increased costs for 
buying water, etc.  
Declined population 
Whole Fukushima area 
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Milk  
Beef  
Mushrooms   
Fruits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neighboring 
regions 
Harmful rumors (****) 
Restriction of shipping (***) 
Decreased sales (***) 
Needs of inspection 
Anxiety about polluted farmland 
Gradual radioactive pollution 
Procedure for compensation 
It depends on density of 
radioactive substance 
Vegetables 
Rice  
Milk  
Beef 
Harmful rumors (**) 
Decreased sales (**) 
Changes in buying 
ingredients (**) 
Needs of inspection 
Inspection fees 
Worries of 
consumers  
Decline in 
exportation  
More damages from 
earthquakes and 
tsunami 
It depends on 
density of 
radioactive 
substance.  
Seafood produce 
Anxiety due to 
radioactive 
contamination (***) 
Avoiding East Japan 
products (**) 
Decreased 
consumption of local 
products 
Avoiding Fukushima 
products 
Harmful rumors  
Increased costs for 
buying water, etc. 
 
 
 
 
Other parts 
of Japan 
Worries of radioactive 
contamination in East Japan 
Polluted agricultural products 
and mountain vegetables and 
little promotion made 
Declined exportation 
Restriction of shipping abroad 
Decreased sales 
Detected radioactivity in wild 
plants 
Beef 
Restriction of 
shipping abroad 
Changes in buying 
ingredients 
 
Avoiding East Japan 
products 
Avoiding Fukushima 
products 
Increased costs for 
buying water, etc. 
Increased anxiety 
  
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2013                         * frequency of listing 
 
The most badly affected by the nuclear disaster areas of agriculture in 
the neighboring regions are defined as: harmful rumors, restriction of 
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shipping, decreased sales, needs of inspection, anxiety about polluted 
farmland, gradual radioactive pollution, procedure for compensation, density 
of radioactive substance, vegetables, rice, milk, and beef. 
As far as agriculture in other parts of the country is concerned, the most 
badly affected areas from the nuclear disaster are specified as: worries of 
radioactive contamination in East Japan, polluted agricultural products and 
mountain vegetables, little promotion made, declined exportation, restriction 
of shipping abroad, decreased sales, detected radioactivity in wild plants, and 
beef. 
The most badly affected by the nuclear disaster areas of food industries 
in Fukushima region are identified as: harmful rumors, decreased use of local 
ingredients, changed places for buying ingredients, increased costs, 
decreased sales, closed factories because of evacuation, unrecovered 
consumer trust, safety of local raw materials, excluding from tenders of local 
factories, decreased naming “Made in Fukushima”, management, and 
seafood produce. 
The most badly affected areas of food industries in the neighboring 
regions are listed as: harmful rumors, decreased sales, changes in buying 
ingredients, needs of inspection, inspection fees, worries of consumers, 
decline in exportation, density of radioactive substance, seafood produces. It 
is also mentioned that the food industry in these regions has been “more 
damaged from the earthquakes and tsunami than from the nuclear accident”. 
As far as food industries in other parts of the country are concerned, the 
most badly affected areas from the nuclear disaster are specified as: 
restriction of shipping abroad, and changes in buying ingredients. 
The most badly affected areas of food consumption in Fukushima 
region are determined as: avoiding Fukushima products, worries of 
radioactive contamination, stopped usage of local products for school lunch, 
increased costs for nonlocal supply, increased costs for buying water etc., 
declined population, and the whole Fukushima area. 
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The most badly affected areas of food consumption in neighboring 
regions are identified as: anxiety due to radioactive contamination, avoiding 
East Japan products, decreased consumption of local products, avoiding 
Fukushima products, harmful rumors, and increased costs for buying water 
etc. 
The most affected areas of food consumption in other parts of Japan 
are listed as: avoiding East Japan products, avoiding Fukushima products, 
increased costs for buying water etc., and increased anxiety. 
 
Long-term implications  
 
According to all experts there will be a significant long-term negative 
impact of the nuclear accident on agriculture in Fukushima prefecture (Figure 
112). Most experts also predict that in a longer term the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster will cause a moderate negative impact on Iwate, Miyagi and Ibaraki 
agriculture, insignificant one on agriculture in Chiba prefecture and the rest of 
Japan. For long-term consequences on Aomori agriculture the majority of 
experts are divided between none and insignificant adverse effects. 
Nevertheless, a good portion of the experts foresees significant negative 
long-term implications on Miyagi agriculture, and more severe (moderate to 
significant) on Aomori and Chiba agriculture.  
The greatest segment of the experts evaluate that there will be a 
significant negative long-term impact of the nuclear accident on food 
industries in Fukushima prefecture (Figure 113). For other prefectures the 
largest part of the experts expects some negative consequences for food 
industries mostly assessed as significant for Miyagi prefecture, moderate for 
Ibaraki prefecture, and insignificant for Aomori, Iwate and Chiba prefectures 
and the rest of Japan. At the same time, a good proportion of the panel does 
not expect any negative impacts on Aomori, Chiba and the rest of Japan food 
industries in a longer term.  
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All experts expect there will be a negative long-term impact of the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster on food consumption in Fukushima prefecture, 
mostly ranged as significant (Figure 114). The majority of experts also 
suggest there will be some adverse long-term impactions from the nuclear 
disaster on food consumption in other badly affected prefectures as well as 
the rest of Japan. The later are mostly estimated to be moderate in Aomori, 
Iwate, Miyagi, Ibaraki, and Chiba prefectures, and insignificant for the rest of 
the country. Nevertheless, a third of the experts do not expect any long-term 
negative implications from that accident for food consumption in Chiba 
prefecture and the rest of the country. The same is true according to a fifth of 
the experts as far as the food consumption in Aomori, Iwate, Miyagi and 
Ibaraki prefectures is concerned. 
All these foresights have basically reconfirmed the 2013 experts 
assessments on long-term impacts of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on 
agriculture, food industries, and food consumption in Fukushima prefecture, 
neighboring prefectures and the rest of the country [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. 
 
Combined impacts of 2011 disasters 
 
Short-term implications  
 
Finally the experts have assessed the combined impacts of the triple 
2011 disaster on agriculture, food industries and food consumption in 
different parts of the country. 
The combined short-term impact of the 2011 disasters on agriculture in 
all regions is negative. According to all experts the disasters’ overall short-
term impact on Fukushima agriculture is significant negative (Figure 109). All 
experts also evaluate as significant or moderate the short-term impacts on 
Miyagi and Iwate agriculture (mostly scaled as significant). The adverse 
short-term implications on Ibaraki and Chiba agriculture are predominately 
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ranked as moderate. The negative short-term impact on agriculture of Aomori 
prefecture and other parts of Japan is commonly evaluated as insignificant. 
According to the great majority of all experts the combined short-term 
impact of the 2011 disasters on food industries in all regions is negative 
(Figure 110). There is a full consensus among experts on the severity of the 
adverse effect on Fukushima food industries, which is inclusively jugged as 
significant. Most experts also assess as significant the negative impact on 
food industries in Miyagi, Iwate and Ibaraki prefectures. The short-term 
impact on food industries in Chiba prefecture is predominately evaluated as 
moderate, and in Aomori prefecture and the rest of the country as 
insignificant. Nevertheless, a good number of the experts also believe in a 
stronger (moderate and significant) negative impact in Aomori prefecture and 
the rest of the country. Furthermore, some experts think the 2011 disasters 
had a combined positive short-term impact on food industries in other parts of 
the country. 
The experts also estimate that the combined short-term impact of the 
2011 disasters on food consumption in all regions of the country has been 
negative (Figure 111). The food consumption in Fukushima prefecture has 
been the most severely affected where the general assessment is significant 
negative. The biggest part of the experts estimates that the adverse short-
term impact has been considerable in all other badly affected prefectures as 
well as the rest of the country. The later is mostly ranked as significant 
throughout all regions with exception of Aomori prefecture where the common 
estimate is moderate. 
According to the experts the most badly affected by the 2011 disasters 
areas of agriculture in Aomori prefecture are: paddy fields, vegetable farming, 
livestock, and apple production (Table 41).  
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Table 41. Most badly affected areas from March 2011 disasters 
Regions Agriculture Food industries Food consumption 
Aomori prefecture Paddy fields (**) 
Vegetable farming 
Livestock 
Apple production 
Equipment 
Inputs supply 
Marine products 
Rice milling 
Milk processing 
Fish industry 
Vegetables 
Apple and other fruits 
Rice 
Milk 
Fish  
Iwate prefecture Paddy fields (***) 
Paddy fields near 
seashore 
Livestock (****) 
Buildings 
Mushrooms 
Vegetable farming 
Irrigation 
Fisheries 
Equipment 
Inputs supply 
Seafood processing 
Marine products 
Processing factories 
Rice milling 
Milk processing 
Dairy industry 
Eligible wild plants 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Rice 
Milk 
Dairy products  
Miyagi prefecture Paddy fields (*******) 
Buildings 
Hamlet infrastructure 
Mushrooms 
Community 
Agricultural 
machinery 
Livestock 
Vegetable farming 
Irrigation 
Labor availability 
Restoration of 
farmland in some 
areas 
Fisheries 
Equipment 
Inputs supply 
Seafood processing 
Marine products 
Processing factories 
Rice milling 
Milk processing 
Labor availability 
Fish industry 
Shellfish products 
Eligible wild plants 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Rice 
Milk 
Fish  
Fukushima 
prefecture 
Paddy fields (******) 
Fields 
Livestock (***) 
Irrigation (**) 
All agricultural 
Equipment 
Aizu brand reputation 
Inputs supply 
Brand reputation 
Reputation 
Eligible wild plants 
Food self-sufficiency 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Rice 
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products 
Hamlet infrastructure 
Brand reputation 
Labor 
Soil and water 
Community 
Vegetable farming 
Peach production 
Fisheries 
Reputation 
Many brands 
Price 
Rice milling 
Milk processing 
Fish industry 
Shellfish products 
Coastal fish products 
Milk 
Fish  
Reputation 
 
Ibaraki prefecture Paddy fields (**) 
Buildings 
Livestock 
Vegetable farming 
Irrigation 
Fisheries 
Rice milling 
Milk processing 
Fish industry 
Shellfish products 
Eligible wild plants 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Rice 
Milk 
Leaf vegetables  
Chiba prefecture Paddy fields (**) 
Buildings 
Vegetable farming 
Livestock 
Rice milling 
Milk processing 
Fish industry 
Shellfish products 
Vegetables 
Fruits 
Rice 
Milk 
Leaf vegetables  
Other parts of 
Japan 
Brand reputation 
Vegetable farming 
Paddy fields 
Fish industry Vegetables 
Apple and other fruits 
Rice 
Milk 
Fish 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014                   * frequency of listing 
 
The most severely impacted areas of food industries in the prefecture 
are: equipment, inputs supply, marine products, rice milling, milk processing, 
and fish industry. The most badly affected areas of food consumption in this 
prefecture are: vegetables, apple and other fruits, rice, milk, and fish. 
The worst affected by the 2011 disasters areas of agriculture in Iwate 
prefecture are identified as: paddy fields, paddy fields near seashore, 
livestock, buildings, mushrooms, vegetable farming, irrigation, and fisheries. 
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The most badly impacted areas of the prefectural food industries are: 
equipment, inputs supply, seafood processing, marine products, processing 
factories, rice milling, milk processing, and dairy industry. The most affected 
areas of food consumption in this prefecture are: eligible wild plants, 
vegetables, fruits, rice, milk, and dairy products. 
The worst affected by the 2011 disasters areas of agriculture in Miyagi 
prefecture are specified as: paddy fields, buildings, hamlet infrastructure, 
mushrooms, community, agricultural machinery livestock, vegetable farming, 
irrigation, labor availability, restoration of farmland in some areas, and 
fisheries. As the most badly impacted areas of food industries in the 
prefectures are listed: equipment, inputs supply, seafood processing, marine 
products, processing factories, rice milling, milk processing, labor availability, 
fish industry, and shellfish products. The most severely affected areas of food 
consumption in this prefecture are: eligible wild plants, vegetables, fruits, rice, 
milk, and fish. 
In Fukushima prefecture the most badly affected by the triple disaster 
areas of agriculture are identified as: paddy fields, fields, livestock, irrigation, 
hamlet infrastructure, brand reputation, labor, soil and water, community, 
vegetable farming, peach production, fisheries, and reputation. The worst 
affected areas of prefectural food industries are: equipment, Aizu and other 
brands reputation, inputs supply, brand reputation, reputation, price, rice 
milling, milk processing, fish industry, shellfish products, and coastal fish 
products. The most badly impacted areas of food consumption in this 
prefecture are: eligible wild plants, food self-sufficiency, vegetables, fruits, 
rice, milk, fish, and reputation. 
The most badly affected by the 2011 disasters areas of agriculture in 
Ibaraki prefecture are specified as: paddy fields, buildings, livestock, 
vegetable farming, irrigation, and fisheries. The worst impacted areas of food 
industries in the prefecture are: rice milling, milk processing, fish industry, and 
shellfish products. The most severely affected areas of food consumption in 
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this prefecture are: eligible wild plants, vegetables, fruits, rice, milk, and leaf 
vegetables. 
In Chiba prefecture the most badly affected by the triple disaster areas 
of agriculture are identified as: paddy fields, buildings, vegetable farming, and 
livestock. The worst impacted areas of food industries in the prefecture are: 
rice milling, milk processing, fish industry, and shellfish products. Adverse 
effect on food consumption in this prefecture is in the area of: vegetables, 
fruits, rice, milk, and leaf vegetables. 
In other parts of the country the most badly affected by the 2011 
disasters areas are brand reputation, vegetable farming, and paddy fields in 
agriculture; fish industry; and vegetables, apple and other fruits, rice, milk, 
and fish consumption. 
In addition, many experts have underlined that there are considerable 
differences in the impacts in major regions (like Tohoku, Kanto, rest of Japan) 
as well as among individual areas of each prefecture. Therefore, in depth 
studies for each area are necessary in order to better understand diverse 
impacts and factors of the disasters. 
Furthermore, some experts have pointed out that the 2011 disasters 
added some complication to already existing problems like aging 
communities in rural areas. The lost community identity by many people, 
avoidance of Tohoku products, and labor scarcity in certain industries (e.g. 
marine), all they have been also highlighted by some experts.  
One expert has commented that the March 2011 disasters hurt a lot the 
agri-food chain but some subsectors (like vegetable and fruit marketing) 
quickly restarted in Miyagi prefecture thanks to the small commercial shops 
(Yoyo). The later rapidly secured vegetables and fruits supply from local 
producers (on March 12, 2011) and proved that small size marketing 
business is much more resilient during a big disaster comparing to “highly 
efficient” large operators (supermarkets). 
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Long-term implications  
 
According to all experts there will be a significant negative long-term 
impact of the 2011 disasters on agriculture in Fukushima prefecture (Figure 
112). The majority of the experts also expect a significant impact on Miyagi 
agriculture and moderate one on Iwate agriculture. For Aomori, Ibaraki and 
Chiba agriculture the majority foresee insignificant long-term adverse 
implications. However, a good share among experts also believes there will 
be stronger long-term negative consequences for agriculture in these three 
prefectures (particularly Ibaraki and Chiba). At the same time, a good portion 
of the panel perceives no adverse implication in a longer term for Aomori and 
Chiba agriculture – almost a third and a quarter of experts accordingly. While 
the bulk of the experts do not project any long-term implication on agriculture 
in other parts of Japan, a good portion of them still believe there will be some 
(mostly insignificant or moderate) negative impacts. 
The greatest part of the experts estimate there will be a significant 
negative long-term impact of the 2011 disasters on food industries in 
Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures (Figure 113). Most of them also expect 
significant negative consequences on Iwate food industries, moderate one for 
Ibaraki prefecture, and insignificant ones in Aomori and Chiba prefectures. 
Nevertheless, a good portion of the panel believes there will be no long-term 
implications for Chiba, Ibaraki, and Iwate food industries. Most experts 
indicate they see no long-term consequences from the 2011 disasters for 
food industries in other parts of Japan as well. However, many among them 
believe there will be some type of negative impacts on a longer run. 
Two-third of the experts predict that the combined long-term impact of 
the 2011 disasters on food consumption in Fukushima prefecture will be 
significantly negative while a quarter among them project it is to be moderate 
negative (Figure 114). The greatest portion of the experts also believes there 
will be some negative consequences on food consumption in all other regions 
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of the country - mostly evaluate as moderate and insignificant. Nevertheless, 
many experts predict there will be no long-term effects from the disasters in 
relation to food consumption in all these regions. 
 
Long-term impacts on different aspects of agri-food sector 
development 
 
The expert panel has also assessed the long-term effects of the 2011 
disasters on different aspects of the agri-food development in most affected 
regions and the rest of Japan. 
According to the experts, in the longer term the mostly affected by the 
disasters areas of agri-food sector in Fukushima prefecture are likely to be: 
livestock, permanent crops, seasonal and annual crops, water and land 
resources, production structure, relations with buyers, disaster prevention 
measures, demand for region’s products, reputation of products and services, 
safety control, labor, sector’s export, viability of agricultural communities, rural 
infrastructure, relations with buyers, willingness to enter that business, 
product safety, farming and business infrastructure, public support to the 
region, sustainability of small enterprises, willingness to leave present 
business, income and profit, relations with community, and public support to 
the sector (Figure 115). The greatest majority of the experts evaluate the 
level of long-term effects in all these areas as high. 
In the long-term the most severely affected by the disasters area of 
agri-food sector of Miyagi prefecture is specified to be land resources (Figure 
116). The greatest majority of the experts also expect a considerable 
(moderate or high) long-term effect on disaster prevention measures, viability 
of agricultural communities, sustainability of small enterprises, relations with 
community, labor, and willingness to enter agri-food business in the 
prefecture. Besides, a good number of the experts project significant long-
term implications on willingness to leave present business, sustainability of 
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middles size enterprises, and production structure of Miyagi agri-food sector. 
The long-term impacts of the disasters on all other areas of the agri-food 
development are ranked as less important in this prefecture. 
 
Figure 115. Longer-term effects of March 2011 disasters on different 
aspects of agri-food sector in Fukushima prefecture 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
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Figure 116. Longer-term effects of March 2011 disasters on different 
aspects of agri-food sector in Miyagi prefecture 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
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sustainability of small enterprises, viability of agricultural communities, and 
land resources (Figure 117). A good number of them also project a significant 
impact on sustainability of middle size enterprises, farming and business 
infrastructure, and rural infrastructure in the prefecture. On the other hand, 
the majority of experts foresee no significant implications for all other areas of 
agri-food sector in this prefecture. 
 
Figure 117. Longer-term effects of March 2011 disasters on different 
aspects of agri-food sector in Iwate prefecture 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
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For other parts of the country, a bigger part of the experts (almost 39%) 
only envisage a high or moderate long-term effect of the 2011 disasters on 
disaster prevention measures. A good number of the panel (almost 31%) also 
anticipates more substantial (mainly moderate) impact on sector’s export and 
safety control. In all other areas of the agri-food sector development the 
greatest proportion of experts see no long-term implications for the rest of the 
country. 
The expert panel has also assessed the long-term effects of the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster on different aspects of agriculture and food 
industries development. 
The experts are unanimous that there will be a high long-term effect on 
food safety in agriculture (Figure 118). They also expect there will be a 
significant effect on relations with consumers, income and profit, and land 
resources in the sector. Furthermore, there will be high or moderate effects 
on sector’s export, sustainability of small and middle size enterprises, 
reputation of products and services, diversification of activity, permanent 
crops, investment capability, labor, water resources, livestock, relations with 
research and education institutions, demand of products, willingness to leave 
present business, product safety, costs of doing business, public support to 
sector, and relations with community.  
On the other hand, the long-term effects on rural infrastructure, relations 
with buyers, organizational structures, and management in that sector are 
mostly estimated as moderate. Finally, according to the experts the nuclear 
disaster will have only a low effect on productivity and willingness to enter 
that business. 
The strongest long-term effect of the nuclear disaster in food industries 
will be on safety control and sector’s export (Figure 119). There will be also 
high and moderate consequences on sustainability of middle size enterprises, 
and reputation of products and services in this sector. 
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Figure 118. Long-term effects of Fukushima nuclear disaster in 
agriculture 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2013 
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Figure 119. Long-term effects of Fukushima nuclear disaster in food 
industries 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2013 
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sustainability of big enterprises, willingness to enter that business, rural 
infrastructure, and organizational structures, are predominately evaluated as 
moderate by the experts. 
According to the most experts the long-term effects of the nuclear 
disaster on land and water resources, sector’s import, productivity, relations 
with public authorities, relations with suppliers, management, education and 
training in the food industries are expected to be rather low. 
 
Factors for persistence of negative impacts of 2011 disasters 
 
The expert panel has identified the major factors for the persistence of 
the negative impacts of the 2011 disasters on agri-food sector in the most 
affected regions and nationwide. 
According to the great majority of the experts the most important factors 
for the adverse effects’ continuation in the agri-food sector of Fukushima 
prefecture are: the destruction of traditional communities, consumers 
unwillingness to buy, bad reputation, long time required for cleaning and 
restoration of lands, slow restoration of infrastructure and services, and high 
radiation (Figure 120).  
More than a half of the experts also point out as critical factors for 
sustaining the negative impacts in the prefecture: the lack of consensus in 
local communities, lack of labor, insufficient support from the central 
government, bad communication, and health risk concerns. Furthermore, a 
good number of the experts also believe that crucial for maintaining the 
negative consequences in the prefecture has been: the slow process of 
returning evacuees back to home places, unresolved permanent radiation 
waste storage issue, low confidence in the official information, and the 
government’s bans on production and/or sells. 
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Figure 120. Factors318 for persistence of negative impacts of March 2011 
disasters on agri-food sector (percent) 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2014 
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 One expert added ”Recent agricultural policy reform” as important factor for all regions. 
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According to the majority of the experts the most important factors for 
the persistence of negative impacts in agri-food sector of Miyagi prefecture 
are: the destruction of traditional communities, lack of consensus in the local 
communities, slow restoration of infrastructure and services, and lack of 
labor. 
A good number of experts also underline as critical factors in this 
prefecture: the long time required for cleaning and restoration of lands, and 
insufficient support from the central government. 
The majority of the experts are convinced that the most important 
factors for the persistence of the negative consequences from the 2011 
disasters in Iwate agri-food sector are: the destruction of traditional 
communities, lack of labor, and lack of consensus in the local communities. In 
addition, numerous experts have pointed out the slow restoration of 
infrastructure and services as an important factor. 
For the other parts of the country the majority has identified no single 
factor for the persistence of the adverse consequences of the triple disaster. 
Nevertheless, almost 31% of the experts estimate that the consumers’ 
unwillingness to buy has been an important factor, while just above 15% 
specify as such: the bad reputation, low confidence in the official information, 
ineffective policies, lack of information, and overall state of the Japanese 
economy. 
The expert panel has also identified the major factors for the 
persistence of negative impacts of the Fukushima nuclear disaster on 
agriculture, food industries and food consumption.  
The most important factors for the persistence of the nuclear accident’s 
negative impacts on agriculture are: the consumers unwillingness to buy, long 
time required for deactivating radiation, insufficient support from the central 
government, and low prices of produce (Figure 121). The low confidence in 
official information, lack of information, bad reputation, and little preparedness 
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of public authorities are also identified as significant factors for sustaining 
disaster’s negative consequences in this sector.  
 
Figure 121. Factors for persistence of negative impacts of Fukushima 
nuclear disaster on agriculture (percent) 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2013 
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preparedness of public authorities (Figure 122). Besides, the bad reputation, 
insufficient support from the central government, and low confidence in official 
information are also ranked as key factors for the persistence of negative 
effects on food industries. 
 
Figure 122. Factors for persistence of negative impacts of Fukushima 
nuclear disaster on food industries (percent) 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2013 
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As far as the most important factors for the persistence of negative 
impacts of the nuclear disaster on food consumption is concerned, they are 
identified as: the lack of information, and low confidence in official information 
(Figure 123). In addition, a good portion of the experts believe that insufficient 
support from the central government and bad reputation are significant for 
sustaining negative impacts of that disaster on food consumption.  
 
Figure 123. Factors for persistence of negative impacts of Fukushima 
nuclear disaster on food consumption (percent) 
 
Source: assessment by panel of experts, 2013 
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Conclusion 
 
The unprecedented triple disaster in Northeast Japan in March 2011 
was among the worst in the Japanese and world history. The earthquake, 
tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident have had immense impacts on 
diverse aspects of people life in the most affected regions, the rest of the 
country, and beyond.  
The excellent individual and community disaster preparedness, and 
well-established national system of disaster management, have been a major 
reason for the adverse impacts to be much lower that it would have been 
elsewhere in a similar disaster. Furthermore, a superior disaster recovery 
experience, good organization, and enormous public support from 
government, other organizations, volunteers, etc. have allowed a rapid 
recovery and a successful reconstruction of a great part of devastated 
regions and sectors. For home country of one of the book coauthors 
(Bulgaria) a recovery from such a disaster certainly would have taken 
decades. 
Almost four years after the disaster there are still a number of 
challenges associated with the recovery and reconstruction in Tohoku region 
and elsewhere. They are mostly related with a big number of evacuees with 
destructed life and businesses (temporary accommodation, health problems, 
lost relations and employment, etc.), continuing outmigration from the badly 
affected areas, slow pace of rebuilding of devastated infrastructure, housings 
and businesses, prolong decontamination process in some places, on-going 
crises in Fukushima nuclear plant, consumer reluctance to visit and buy 
products of affected regions, etc.  
Subsequently, the speed and extent of disaster recovery and post-
disaster reconstruction differ quite substantially among individual agents, 
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(sub)sectors, and (sub)regions. Besides, there are great uncertainties 
associated with the long-term social, health, economic, environmental, policy 
etc. consequences of the 2011 disasters. 
Nevertheless, people in the disaster regions have proved their 
determination to overcome all challenges and rebuild their lives looking 
forward to future. The photo bellow captured one of the numerous 
celebrations that demonstrates the optimism and determination of people of 
all generations to overcome hardships and challenges. 
 
Street dance in downtown Sendai, December 6, 2014 
 
Photo: Hrabrin Bachev 
 
On the eve of the forth anniversary of the 2011 disaster a number of 
conclusions on the agricultural and food chain impacts could be made. 
Agriculture, food industry and food consumption have been among the 
worst hit by the disasters areas. Agri-food sectors of Fukushima, Miyagi and 
Iwate prefectures have been particularly severely affected in the short and 
longer term. There are also significant adverse consequences on other 
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(neighboring) regions and entire food chains at a larger (regional, national, 
international) scale.  
There is a great variation of the specific and combined impacts of the 
earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster on different type of farming and 
business enterprises (small-big scale, specialized, diversified, integrated), 
particular agents (producers, processors, distributors, consumers, community 
and public organizations), individual sub-sectors (rice, vegetables, beef), and 
specific locations (evacuation zone, seaside).  
Moreover, there have been enormous damages and long-term 
consequences on farming and rural households, important properties 
(farmland, livestock, orchards), personal ties, established brands, informal 
organizations and traditional communities. Many of all these negative effects 
can hardly be adequately expressed in quantitative (e.g. monetary) terms.  
In addition, the 2011 disasters have considerably aggravated some 
already existing problems of the agrarian and rural regions such as: aging 
and shrinking population, lack of labor and young entrepreneurs, low 
competitiveness and efficiency, income and services disparities, etc.  
The specific responses to the 2011 disasters have highlighted the 
comparative advantages of traditional communities and non-governmental 
organizations, and certain less “efficient” but more resilient structures (such 
as small operators, partnerships) and sectors (one season crops, poultry, pig, 
processing). What is more, the disasters have had positive impacts on the 
development of certain (more resilient, adaptive) sectors in the most affected 
regions and some (traditional, prospective) sectors in other parts of the 
country. 
The post disaster recovery and reconstruction have also given 
opportunities and induced considerable policies and institutional 
modernization in agrarian and other (e.g. energy, security) sectors, and 
improve disaster prevention and management, food safety information and 
inspection, technological and product innovation, jobs creation and 
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investment (including in “new” areas such as research and innovation, ICT, 
renewable energy, robotization), farmlands consolidation and enhancement, 
infrastructural amelioration, organizational restructuring, etc. 
Not least important, the failures of government bureaucrats to foresee, 
prevent, communicate, and deal with the March 2011 disaster and its 
consequences have thought individual agents to take decentralized actions – 
self-recovery and reconstruction, community and business initiatives, private 
and collective safety checks and decontamination measures, voluntary 
shipment restrictions, new production and marketing methods, movements for 
fundamental policies change, etc. 
This study was just a first attempt to specify and assess the overall 
impact of the March 2011 disasters on Japanese agriculture and food chains, 
and present it to a wider world audience. Understandably the research is 
incomplete due to the “short” period of time after the disasters, insufficient 
and controversial data, difficulties to adequately assess longer term 
implications, etc. Therefore, more future studies are necessary to evaluate 
and update the “known” agricultural and food impacts of the 2011 disasters. 
Besides, further in depth “micro” studies are needed to fully understand and 
estimate the impacts of the disasters in each location and community, type of 
farms and productions, and component of agri-food chain.  
There are a number of major lessons that can be learned from the study 
of the March 2011 disasters’ impact on and post disaster reconstruction of 
agri-food sector in Japan. 
First, the triple March 2011 disaster was a rare but a high impact event, 
which came as a “surprise” even for a country with frequent natural disasters 
and well-developed disaster risk management system like Japan. Therefore, 
it is necessary to “prepare for unexpected”, and design, build and test a multi-
hazard disaster risk management for the specific conditions of each country, 
region, sector, etc. Accordingly appropriate measures and sufficient 
resources (funding, personnel, stock piles, shelter cites, transportation 
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means) have to be planed for the effective prevention, early warning, 
mitigation, response, and post disaster relief and recovery from big disasters 
and accidents. Besides state resources it is important to mobilize huge 
private, community, NGOs, and international capabilities, expertise and 
means. For instance, a public-private partnership is necessary to properly 
identify and designate available public and private resources 
(accommodations for a longer stay, relief supply, etc.) in case a big disaster 
occurs and evacuation needs arise. 
Second, the risk assessment is to include diverse (health, dislocation, 
economic, behavioral, ecological, etc.) hazards and complementary, (food, 
supply, natural, biological) chain, spin offs, and multilateral effects of a likely 
(natural, man made, combined) disaster. Modern methods and technologies 
are to be widely employed (mass and social networks, computer simulation, 
satellite imaging, etc.) for effective communication, preparation of disaster 
maps, assessment of likely impacts, planning of evacuation routs, relief 
needs, and recovery measures, secure debris and waste management, etc. It 
is crucial to involve multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholders teams in all 
stages of risk management to guarantee a holistic approach, “full” information 
and transparency, adequate assessment of risks, preferences and 
capabilities, and maximum efficiency. 
Third, the risk management system is to be discussed with all 
stakeholders, and measures taken to educate and train individuals, 
organizations and communities for complex disasters and all contingencies. 
The individual responsibilities are to be well-specified and effective 
mechanisms for coordination of actions of authorities, organizations, and 
groups at different levels put in place and tested to ensure efficiency (speed, 
lack of duplication and gaps) during emergency. Individual and small-scale 
operators dominate in the agri-food sector of most countries around the 
world, and their proper information, training, and involvement is critical. The 
later is to embrace diverse agri-food and rural organizations, consumers, and 
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population of each age group, which all commonly have no disaster 
management “culture”, knowledge, training, and plans (particularly for large 
disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis, nuclear and industrial accidents). 
Forth, it is necessary to modernize the specific and overall formal 
institutional environment (property rights, regulations, safety standards, 
norms) according to the needs of contemporary disaster risk management. A 
particular attention is to be put on updating agri-food safety, labor, health, and 
animal welfare standards, and ensure adequate mechanisms, qualified 
agents, and technical instruments for effective implementation and 
enforcement. Establishment of an accessible cooperative, quasi public or 
public agricultural (crop, livestock, machineries, building, life and health) 
insurance system, including assurance against big natural, nuclear etc. 
disasters is very important for many countries for rapid recovery of affected 
agents and sectors. Modernization of the out of dated (often informal) lands, 
material, biological and intellectual property registration and valorization 
system is also important for effective post disaster compensation, recovery 
and reconstruction. That is particularly true for the great number of subsistent 
and “semi-market” holdings dominating the agro-food sector around the 
globe, which usually suffer significantly from disasters (often losing all 
possessions) but get no market valuation, insurance and/or public support.  
Sixth, it is important to set up mechanisms to improve efficiency of 
public resource allocation, avoid mismanagement and misuse of resources as 
well as reduce individual agents’ costs for complying with regulations and 
using public relief, support and dispute resolution (e.g. court) system. That 
would let efficient allocation of limited social resources according to agents 
needs and preferences, intensify and speed up transactions, improve 
enforcement (of rights, laws, standards) and conflict resolution, decrease 
corruption, and eventually accelerate recovery and reconstruction. In this 
respect it is obligatory to involve all stakeholders in decision-making and 
control, increase transparency etc. at all levels and stages of disaster 
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planning, management, and reconstruction. In the case of a post-disaster 
evacuation it is essential to secure proper (police, voluntary group) protection 
of private and public properties from thefts and wild animal invasion in 
disaster and evacuation zones.  
Seventh, different agents and elements of agri-food chain are affected 
unlikely from a disaster and have dissimilar capability to recover. Most 
farming assets (multiannual crops, irrigation facilities, building, brands, 
biodiversity, landscape) are interlinked with the land, and if the later is 
damaged a rapid recovery (rebuilding, relocation, alternative supply) is very 
costly or impossible. Similarly, smaller-scale and highly specialized 
enterprises, small-member communities and organizations, and visitors and 
tourists to the disaster regions, are all more vulnerable and have less ability 
to protect, bear consequences and recover. All that require differential public 
support (intervention, compensation, funding, assistance) to various types of 
agents it order to provide emergency relief, accelerate recovery and diminish 
negative long-term consequences.  
Eight, there is also a strong “regional” specificity (interdependency) of 
agrarian, food and other rural assets. Subsequently, if a part of these 
assets/products is damaged or affected (e.g. destruction of critical 
transportation, communication, distribution, electricity and water supply etc. 
infrastructure; a nuclear, chemical, pathogen etc. contamination) the negative 
externalities impact all agents in the respective region (including undamaged 
lands, livestock, produce and services). In order to minimize damages it is 
important to properly identify (locate) risk and take prevention measures, 
recover rapidly critical infrastructure, strictly enforce quality (safety, 
authenticity, origin) of products and adequately communicate them to all 
interested parties (producers, processors, distributors, consumers, 
international community). 
Ninth, good management of information and communication is 
extremely important in emergency, recovery, and post disaster reconstruction 
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operations. The March 2011 disasters have proven that any delay, a partial 
release or controversies of official information have hampered the effective 
(re)actions of agents, and adversely affected public trust and behavior (e.g. 
buying products from disaster regions). Before, during and after a disaster all 
available (risk, monitoring, measured, projected) information from all reliable 
sources is to be immediately publicized in an understandable by everyone 
form through all possible means (official and community channels, mobile 
phones, social media, etc.). It is essential always to publish alternative 
(independent, private, scientific, international) information as well, including in 
foreign languages, which would build public trust and increase confidence. In 
Japan it has not been easy to find all available information related to the 
Match 2011 disasters in a timely and systematized way (updates, diverse 
aspects, unified measurement, time series, alternative sources), which make 
many foreigners and local alike skeptical about accuracy. 
Tenth, a big disaster like the Match 2011 in Japan often provides an 
extraordinary opportunity to discuss, introduce and implement fundamental 
changes in (agricultural, economic, regional, energy, disaster management) 
policies, improve disaster management and food security, modernize 
regulation and standards, relocate farms and houses, consolidate lands and 
operations, upgrade infrastructure, restructure production and farming 
organizations, introduce technological and business innovation, improve 
natural environment, etc. All such opportunities are to be effectively used by 
central and local authorities through policies, programs, measures, and 
adequate public support given for all innovative private and collective 
initiatives in the area. 
Eleventh, it is important to learn from the past experiences and make 
sure that “lessons learned” are not forgotten. The impacts and factors of a 
disaster, disaster management, and post disaster reconstruction are to be 
continuously studied, knowledge communicated to public, and “transferred” to 
next generation.  It is critical to share “good” and “bad” experiences with 
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disaster prevention, management and recovery with other regions and 
countries, in order to prevent that happening again. It is particularly important 
to share the advance Japanese experience at international scale through 
media, visits, studies, conferences, etc. and turn Tohoku in a disaster risk 
management hub for other regions and countries. It is essential not to copy 
but adapt the positive Japanese experiences to the specific (institutional, 
cultural, natural) environment and risks structure of each community, 
subsector, region, and country. 
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